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A PAN-AMERICAN POLICY: THE MONROE DOCTRINE MODERNIZED[1]

By John Barrett,

Director General, Pan-American Union, Washington, D. C.; Formerly United States Minister to Argentina, Panama and Colombia.

I sometimes feel that all this discussion of the Monroe Doctrine is entirely in vain, that there is nobody who is an ultimate court upon the subject—nobody who can decide just what is its interpretation or its meaning or its significance. I know that I would not for a moment pretend that any views which I have upon the subject are final. I had at first decided I would not make any remarks, but I will briefly summarize some thoughts which I have been going over in my mind for many years in my association with Latin America. In my humble experience as minister in three American republics and during the seven years that I have had the honor of being the Director General of the Pan-American Union, I have striven earnestly to get what I call the Pan-American viewpoint of the Monroe Doctrine. Now I do not ask anyone to accept what I say as final, but perhaps I look at this subject from a viewpoint a little different from that of many persons, because I have the rather unique position and experience of being the only Pan-American officer in America—not only one who is an officer of the United States but who is in every respect equally an officer of the other Latin-American countries. Each day it is one of the duties of the members of my staff to lay before me the consensus of opinion of the newspapers of every important capital of the western hemisphere; and therefore while I am actually in this country, I am able to follow closely the views of the peoples of other lands upon this subject under discussion.

As one who has been intimately associated, officially and privately, for nearly fourteen years with Latin America and Latin Americans, I may be permitted to make a few humble suggestions, which, if followed, might affect the permanent status of the Monroe Doctrine among the American nations, and might not!

[1] Remarks as presiding officer of the session of the Academy, Friday morning, April 3, 1914.

I believe the time is coming when there may be evolved from the Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle and phrase, and thereupon substituted for the Monroe Doctrine as a principle and phrase, the principle and phrase of a "Pan-American policy." (These ideas, to some extent, I developed last fall at a meeting in Washington of the Society for Judicial Settlement of International Questions. What I am saying here is really a sublimated form of what I said at that time.) By that I mean a Pan-American policy acceptable to and approved by not only the United States, but all the American republics, a policy belonging to each and all on the same basis of attitude and action, protecting alike the sovereignty and governments of each—which is, after all, the delicate point—without the offensive suggestion of preponderance, dictation or domination of one nation like the United States. It is a common error among some of the statesmen and essayists of the United States, whenever they speak or write anything about the southern republics, to patronize them. This is a fatal error—always thus reminding them of the power and mightiness of the United States, as if the United States were both "papa" and "mamma," and they a group of little children playing in the back yard. Coupled with this are the equally common errors: First, that of not recognizing the extraordinary greatness and progress of some of the republics, even if others are not so progressive; and secondly, of classing them all as having revolutionary tendencies, in spite of the fact that two-thirds of Latin America, in area and population, has known no serious revolution whatever in the last twenty-five years.

This Pan-American policy would adopt, absorb and enlarge the Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States into a greater and all-American policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position and the same sense of independence as the United States now has. By eliminating the attitude of absolute dictation and centralized power, which the Monroe Doctrine has been interpreted in Latin America as applying to the relations of the nations of the western hemisphere, by the substitution of "Pan-American" for "Monroe"—thus including all the American nations as sponsors—and by the substitution of "policy" for "doctrine" and thus removing the hard, unyielding, dictatorial and didactic suggestion of the words "Monroe Doctrine," about which every Latin American is a little sensitive, a long step will be taken

towards a new era of Pan-American comity and Pan-American confidence.)

It is not the Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle, but the *interpretation*—and mark my word—*the interpretation thereof*, as indicated in the recently published opinions of many prominent Latin Americans on this subject, that is not acceptable to the majority of Latin-American countries and statesmen. This is a point that has been clearly overlooked by the critics of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States. If its haphazard interpretation can be supplanted with responsible and reasonable judgment, the majority of arguments against the doctrine in Latin America, and also in the United States, in describing it as obsolete will fail absolutely in their purpose and logic.

A distinguished Yale professor, for whom I have profound regard, leaving the safe fields of archaeological study, and venturing into the complex relations of international politics, calls the Monroe Doctrine an "obsolete shibboleth." How in the world any one man can assume to pass that judgment upon a great policy or doctrine, I cannot possibly understand. I fear that in his academic viewpoint he has exaggerated the importance which the Latin-American countries attach to the Monroe Doctrine, and he has attributed to that much assailed and suffering Doctrine all kinds of faults which are due to entirely other and different causes, such as North American ignorance and lack of appreciation of South America.

In conclusion, the Monroe Doctrine in its final analysis, in my opinion, and, as I say, I do not for a minute state these things in a didactic way and my judgment may be entirely wrong, will continue to be a great *international* principle only to the degree that it is evolved into this greater Pan-American policy; and from a Doctrine of the United States alone into a policy of all the American republics, and now, if you follow me, though it is a little complicated, to the degree that it is evolved from being *subjective* on the part of the United States alone towards all the other American republics as *objective*, to being *subjective* on the part of each towards each and all the others as *objective*. That is, making each and every American republic feel that it is part of its policy towards each and every other American republic, instead of being just the policy of the United States alone towards all these other countries. To be still clearer in my idea I would say that I mean to evolve the Monroe Doctrine

from being *subjective* on the part of the United States towards the other American republics in an *objective* position, to being *subjective* on the part of each and all towards in turn each and all as *objective*.

Then we will have achieved, in my opinion, that ideal, unselfish, fraternal relationship of the American governments and peoples which will give a new worth and a permanent, acceptable significance to Pan-American relationship, Pan-American accord, and the status of the Pan-American Union.

A STUDY OF IBERIC-AMERICA

By Rear-Admiral F. E. Chadwick, U.S.N.,
Newport, R. I.

South of us in this hemisphere are nearly 8,000,000 square miles of land three-quarters of which are within the tropics. This last is a great momentous and dominating fact. For this means that there are 6,000,000 square miles, an area about twice the size of the United States exclusive of Alaska, which will never in the main be peopled by the white man as we understand the phrase. For say what some may, the white does not thrive in regions characteristically tropical and most of these 6,000,000 square miles are so. There are exceptions, as considerable portions of Mexico and Central America, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia are so high that such parts have what may be called a white man's climate. But even so it is not likely that the future inhabitants of these higher regions will differ largely in race characteristics from those now there. This fact is at the bottom of the Iberic-American question. It is that the races to the south of us differ essentially from the Anglo-Saxon in psychic qualities.

I desire to say that what follows herein is not said in unkindly criticism or in unkindly spirit. I have an immense liking for the Spanish race wherever found; for its hospitable and generous character, for its beautiful family life, its dignity and courtesy. While there is something which they can learn from us, there is very much for us to learn from them and I wish that we might take this last fact very much to heart.

It is part of our northern make-up (call it stupidity if you will, and you will not be far astray), that we view the mental habit of all other races as being akin to our own; that the Mexican, Peruvian, Brazilian will understand things political in exactly the sense that we do. There never was such a thing, for example, as a constitutional election in Mexico nor do one-tenth of 1 per cent of the Mexican people know what it means. How can they when a vote in a presidential election rarely exceeds 18,000? And how can it be otherwise when the upper class, say but a fifteenth of the population, the only class with a semblance of education, is itself temperamentally unable

to understand a constitutional government? They belong to a class tribal by instinct in whose very blood is unrest and inability to coalesce into a single responsible government carried on on constitutional lines. The Spanish and Portuguese races to which the governing classes in all the republics to the south of us belong began as Berbers and remain essentially Berber-Moor today, scarcely changed at bottom from their relations across the straits in Morocco and the Atlas.

It is this lack of comprehension of what race character means that causes our trouble. We do not understand the other man, and until we recognize our ignorance in this regard, until we accept the great fundamental fact of all life,—that every race, every species has its special race or specific temperament and habit of thought and action,—we shall be unsuccessful in our relations with these our brother republics. It is a study of temperament, disposition, outlook on life, a study in a word of all that goes to make up character that we need for successful dealing with races so essentially different from our own. Until we shall see this, we are but groping darkly.

And a word as to the use of the word "Iberic." It has become the fashion to speak of Latin-America. This is a phrase almost wholly misplaced. There is no "Latin" America in any true sense. There is an Iberic-America, and this confusion of terms has caused or has helped largely to cause, our confusion of thoughts. The Spaniards and Portuguese who settled with whites all to the south of us are not of Latin stock, though with some Latin intermixture. I would say again to accentuate the fact, that the ancient people of the Iberic peninsula which includes Spain and Portugal were, with the exception of a remote Celtic strain, Iberians—Berbers—the same in race as the Berbers of today, of the African Atlas, akin to the Moor and in the distant ages to the Arab. Their occupancy of North Africa and of Spain is lost in the mists of history.

The Greeks established a colony on the east coast of Spain as they did in so many other parts of the Mediterranean. The Carthagenian, a Semite, came and took possession of the ports and exploited the mines of the region. The Romans expelled these in 206 B.C., and then took two hundred years in conquering the original inhabitants. They governed and administered Spain until Rome herself fell before the barbarians, but they never colonized in the true sense. Roman governors and Roman armies occupied the country and impressed upon the whole peninsula their power and language sufficiently

to develop the latinized languages of the Spain and Portugal of today. Undoubtedly, too, there was a large infusion of Roman blood, as was but natural. In the long occupation of three hundred years following the two hundred of conquest, Spain was indeed a Roman province in a larger sense than almost any other lying beyond the confines of Italy, but the Goths, Vandals and Visigoths, who came atop of the Romans were with the last all absorbed by the conquered Iberians as were the Norman invaders of England by the English. The people of the Peninsula remained Iberian at bottom despite their many conquerors. This is markedly so of the south, diminishing somewhat toward the north, but always true. In Portugal later on came a strong negro strain through slavery. The negroes thus brought have thoroughly coalesced with the native Portuguese who seem never to have shown a dislike to so mixing.

In 700, the Berbers from Africa crossed the straits and made an easy conquest, as it was but coalescing with people of their own blood. The kindred Moors lent a hand and the peninsula became Berber-Moor in dominion as in blood. The Africans swept over Spain with wonderful rapidity because of their kinship. For five hundred years they held all of Spain and for two hundred more its fairest portion, and when their downfall came it was mainly through difference of religion, Christianity having been brought by the invaders who followed the Romans; it did not come through essential difference of race.

The tribal tendencies of the race are shown in the long continuance of the many separate kingdoms, thirteen in number, which constitute the Spain of today. Until the time of Ferdinand and Isabella they were largely independent and the largest was still Moorish. After the fall of Granada all the petty kingdoms were, in a way, united into one, but it was as the kingdom of Las Españas, the Spains, and not a single unified Spain, and the country has always remained regional, as the Spanish expression goes.[1]

I have thought it well to give this little bit of history because in it lies the very root of our subject, the reason why the Spanish race wherever found is ready for revolution or insurrection. It is this Ber-

[1]For a more extended discussion of this subject see Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain*. (Diplomacy), Introduction. For the Inception and Development of the Monroe Doctrine, *Ibid.*, chapters ix and x.

ber-Moorish blood which has given it the tribal, separatist, regional instinct, or whatever one may call the tendency mentioned and which has made it impossible for the people of Spanish blood to understand a centralized constitutionalized government. That there is somewhat less of this revolutionary and separatist instinct in the Portuguese comes through the mixture in Portugal of negro blood just mentioned which has given it softer characteristics, and in this is to be found the reason for the less revolutionary character of the Brazilians though as we know even from the present unrest in Brazil it is far from absent.

Leaving Portuguese Brazil aside for the moment, the Spaniards through their superior qualities and education over those of the native and mixed races have naturally been the governing class of the Spanish-American provinces. They came among a mild, barbarous people whom they practically enslaved and who have remained till now almost without education or uplift in economic condition. They have remained as ignorant as the Spanish peasant himself remained for ages, the tool of warring factions in Spain as in Mexico, for be it remembered that Spain through a great part of the nineteenth century was torn by revolution and factional slaughter as Mexico is today. Our minister to Spain, Caleb Cushing, of distinguished ability, wide observation and intimate knowledge of the country could say of Spain in a dispatch dated July 11, 1876,

> . . . . my residence in Spain has enabled me to appreciate the true cause and character of administration in Cuba. It is that the governors are incapable of conducting and the governed equally incapable of receiving good government. They are all Spaniards alike, as General Prim has so often said, whether you call them Peninsulars or Cubans. . . . . Now has there been maladministration in Cuba? So there has been in Spain herself. Have there been rebellions in Cuba, guerrilla warfare, burnings, sacking of towns, military executions, deportations, embargo of private property, banishments, suspension of suffrage, arbitrary domination of captains-general? So all these things have been occurring in Spain. She has had naught else for more than sixty years but alternations between anarchy and despotism.

And so he goes on, saying near the end, "the misfortunes of Spain and of Cuba are conditions of the national character, as manifested alike in Spain and in all Spanish America."

There spoke in this dispatch the true and candid statesman, one who recognized that the first element in international questions is knowledge of the character of those with whom you are dealing. I

would, had I my way, have every newly appointed secretary of state read and ponder the inner meaning of this dispatch.

Now what is to be the outcome of the present and prospective conditions in Iberic-America? We see two of the republics in South America which have arrived at marked stability, Argentina and Chile; to a lesser degree, Brazil. There can be no question that these at least are on the road to greatness. Greatest in area, at least, is Brazil, a country a tenth larger than the United States, with a population claimed to be 24,000,000 (but largely guess-work) or about three times that of Argentina. But nine-tenths is within the tropics and with a climate but little modified in these nine-tenths by any marked elevation of land. Nearly a third of the whole population (7,280,000) is in the other tenth which extends from Rio de Janerio to Uruguay, and it is in this tenth that the whites largely predominate. It is here that are to be found some 400,000 of Germans the product of an immigration which has been continuous since 1820, and the greater number of Italians who outnumber the Germans three to one. The Italians however are somewhat migratory, many returning yearly to Italy, as they do to a large degree in the United States. This habit of migration is even more frequent in Argentina where many thousands of Spaniards and Italians travel yearly the 10,000 miles (to and fro) for the wheat harvest.

About 3,000,000 square miles (or nine-tenths) of Brazil lie to the north of Rio de Janeiro which is just within the tropics. In this vast region there are probably not over 14,000,000 people, or less than five to the square mile, made up, with a very moderate number of pure whites, of various mixtures of white, negro and Indian blood. The state of Pará with 443,903 square miles has but one inhabitant to the square mile. Amazonas with 732,439 square miles (approximating three times the size of Texas), has a population of but about 250,000, or but about one to every three square miles. Matto Grosso twice the size of Texas has but 118,000 population or about one to every five square miles. Brazil's best showing is San Paulo of 112,307 square miles, and with a population of 2,282,279, or 20.3 to the square mile. To show how sparse this population is: New England has 108 to the square mile; the Middle Atlantic division (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), 193; the South Atlantic (Delaware to Florida inclusive), 45 to the square mile. One has to go to the Saharan regions to find any likeness to the sparsity of population in vast stretches of Brazil.

That there can be any reasonable approach to a republican system of government is of course impossible in a population where 80 per cent can neither read nor write and where the effort to increase literacy is so slight that but only 634,000 children in a population claimed to be 24,000,000 are at school. Were there the same population at school as in the United States there would be about three and a half millions in actual school attendance instead of less than a fifth that number. Even the reported numbers are very doubtful.

Set between Brazil and Argentina is Uruguay a state a little larger than New England and with but a million and a half of population perhaps the most truly Spanish in character of any but Chile. As the actual number of immigrants coming to settle in the country is but about 6,000 a year and many of these are Spanish, it will long retain its Spanish character. So situated, between two much more powerful neighbors, there is much apprehension among Uruguayans as to the political future of their country. This is of course too delicate a subject to discuss here and need only be mentioned.

Argentina, as large nearly as the United States east of the Mississippi, with a splendid and magnificent capital of a million and a half of inhabitants, a population of 8,000,000, rapidly increasing and with great present and immense potential wealth, is bound to be one of the seats of empire. Nearly the whole is a vast plain bordered on the west by the Andes and their foothills and is akin in appearance though not in climate to the steppes of Russia. Its northern edge is just within the tropics; its capital is in the relative latitude of southern Tennessee, and its southern limit in relatively that of the south edge of Hudson's Bay. But as one goes south the continent narrows until it is a narrow wedge between the two great oceans, and the climate becomes that of Great Britain instead of that of Labrador. Into this vast region with but six inhabitants to the square mile have come to be added to the Spanish stock the blood of nearly 3,000,000 immigrants who came and stayed in the country from 1857 to 1911. In this last mentioned year came 117,723 Spaniards and 58,185 Italians, fully 60 per cent of whom however came only for the harvests and then returned. But there were others many of whom stayed; as 4,916 French, 1,730 English, 16,694 Swiss, 23,450 Germans and 24,785 Austrians, besides Syrians, Poles, Russians and many other nationalities in smaller numbers.

The immigration for 1910, 1911 and 1912 (the last returns avail-

able) was 500,319; the emigration was 338,496, or nearly 68 per cent of the entries. The net gain in immigrants in these three years was thus but 161,823.

The population of the country will necessarily be a mixture of many races. Fortunately it is free of the negro problem which is such a handicap to Brazil. But whatever the preponderant blood may be, Argentina by force of its economic advance and the establishment of vast commercial interests which have been controlled by the Germans and English, has long been out of the revolutionary pale, and is a surprisingly rich, stable and rapidly advancing commonwealth.

The same though on a smaller scale may be said of Chile, which with an area a fourth larger than France, is a long narrow strip 2,600 miles long and but a hundred broad, barred from any eastward extensions by the Andes. The northern third is a desert rich however in copper and nitrates; the central third remarkably like California in climate and general character; the south like Scotland. Again the English and Germans are to the fore commercially though sixty years ago the American Wheelwright was the great promoter of Chilian advance, a fact which Chile has recognized in erecting a statue to his memory. Ethnically Chile is mainly Spanish with a strong English and German strain. In the south are still a hundred thousand of Aruacanian Indians, who now peaceful were never conquered. The whole population is less than 4,000,000, and as the immigration is but about 2,000 a year, it will be long before there will be much racial change. Twenty-five years has passed since the revolution due to the liberalizing ideas of the Balmaceda government. The revolution was at bottom moved by much the same ideas as those which are causing Mexican unrest. Madero was a Mexican Balmaceda. Both were the victims of their liberal ideas which continue dimly today in Mexico where the vast ignorant mass follows leaders, some of whom are almost equally ignorant, in the dim hope of alleviation, in some way, of their unfortunate lot.

Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela are all in the category of states with a cultivated society of Spanish descent, moderate in number and who in general are responsible for the government and conditions of the country. But in the main the population of these is of an Indian and mixed race inert in character, densely ignorant and of extreme conservatism. Though we are dealing with great stretches it is with populations comparatively insignificant in numbers. Peru

is nearly three and a half times the size of the German Empire; Colombia twice the size of Germany and Venezuela nearly three times, Ecuador but a half. The populations are: in Peru less than three millions, in Ecuador one and a quarter, in Colombia about five and in Venezuela probably about a million and a half. That the Panama Canal will have a great effect upon the regions west of the Andes is undoubted, but it will be long before they are built into powerful states, with the exception perhaps of Chile.

Bolivia, but little less in area than three Germanys, with a mixed and Indian population of two and a quarter millions, and Paraguay the equal of three New Yorks, and with but 800,000, people, are practically Indian or semi-Indian states. The latter in its struggle against the combined forces of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina in 1865 and 1866 lost so heavily that it is estimated that there are in the country but about a fourth as many men as women. It is thought that about 30,000 European immigrants have settled in the country in the last 32 years or an average of 1,000 a year.

We may pass by Central America whose population is made up much as that of its neighbors, and come to Mexico. The *Almanach de Gotha*, as reliable an authority as any existing, gives for the population in 1912 as 15,445,787. It also gives the nationalities of foreigners within its borders in 1910 as follows: Americans 19,586, Spaniards 24,212, French 3,971, English 4,771, Italians 2,068, Germans 3,645, Turks 2,563, Chinese 12,769, Japanese 1,922, Arabs 1,338, Cubans 2,394, Guatemalans (who can scarcely be looked upon as foreigners), 21,302—a total of 105,544. In other words as these are the totals of those established in the country through many years, there is practically no emigration to Mexico.

But what concerns us more: how are the 15,400,000 Mexicans made up? In spite of larger claims, I doubt if more than 1,000,000 are of pure Spanish blood; the other 14,000,000 and more are Indians and cross-breeds in all degrees, who taken generally are perhaps more ignorant, immoral, lazy and intemperate than any other 14,000,000 in the world. As the appropriation for schools is but about three and a half millions in American money it is readily seen that the great mass go without any education whatever. And this mass is in a state of peonage scarcely removed from slavery. It is perhaps the greatest mission field in the world, and perhaps the most neglected. I use the word mission not in the sense of a religious propaganda, but in that

of educational, moral and hygienic uplift. The attempt to plant in Mexico at this period of its development, our Protestant ideas of Christianity, would I believe result in utter failure and would be a sad mis-spending of money which would be much better used in teaching the a b c's of civilization and leaving them to their present religion which, in its way, is ingrained in the people. Upon such uplift depends in large degree our own safety. The staggering question is how to bring this uplift about. The impulse must come from without, apparently it cannot come from within "this poor and intensely ignorant mass."

The stern facts seem to be as I have stated. I would refer to the *Immigration Problem* by Messrs. Jenks and Lauch who were members of the United States Immigration Commission and who have put forth a summary of the report of that commission, in which they take a very disheartening view of Mexican immigrants to this country. They state that they engage practically only in unskilled work; their wages in the railway work are the lowest paid; very few become foremen; they can care only for eight acres of beets as against eleven by the Japanese; their standard of living the lowest, their lack of thrift the greatest of any immigrants; they learn English slowly; the attendance at school and intelligence of the children are much less than the average; they are likely to become public charges; they are quarrelsome and inclined to crime; they are less desirable as citizens even than as laborers; their progress is much slower than that of Japanese or Chinese.

A competent observer, Mr. A. W. Warwick, in a very sober and thoughtful article on the Mexicans in the *Forum* for January says:

> The phenominal growth of Mexico from 1900 to 1910 was not in any sense due to the progress of the Mexicans. There was no improvement in agricultural methods and from the Rio Grande to Yucatan there was not, so far as I am aware, a single railroad, factory, or irrigation project fostered by purely Mexican capital and designed and executed by Mexican engineers. Further, in spite of the long period of instruction by foreigners it is safe to say that the Mexican engineers and workmen could not efficiently operate the railroads, electric light works, smelters or factories of the country if all the foreigners were withdrawn.[2]

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[2] A. W. Warwick, *Forum.*, January, 1914, p. 45.

The same writer states that:

> A high authority was very probably correct when he stated that between 50 and 55 per cent of all births in the republic were outside marriage relations. In some states the figures are much higher, in Hidalgo it was 80 per cent; in Michoacan it was 75 per cent, and in this same state the district of Zamora was credited with no less than 93.6 per cent of illegitimate births. Astonishing as these figures are they are entirely worthy of credence. Outside the larger towns probably 95 per cent of the people would be illiterate.[3]

This writer sums up the Mexican people as follows:

1. Mainly of Indian type.
2. Illiterate.
3. Mainly of illegitimate birth.
4. Inefficient as workers.
5. Intemperate.
6. Quarrelsome.

> As long as the people have their present characteristics civil war will be more normal than peace and good order . . . . although there may be peace enforced by an iron hand for a few years, the seething forces underneath the superficial crust of a commercial and land aristocracy will have their day, and it seems inevitable that the Mexican of this generation will live in short periods of peace frequently broken by more or less prolonged civil war.[4]

I think the situation is here exactly described. There is an aristocracy of a certain amount of culture, but itself of a blood which means unrest; and in the hands of this aristocracy is nearly all the land of the country, some of the estates running to thousands of square miles. Below this is a great seething mass largely of another blood and temperament, with nothing to aspire to because it does not know what aspiration means, but it knows in a dull way that it is treated badly and that it wants something better. The Mexican periodical unrests are in fact fundamentally agrarian with half-conscious efforts to become citizens instead of slaves. The great landed class has, as a class, never given a thought to the uplift of this mass of misery into citizenship, decency and well being. Certainly any true effort cannot, as just said, come from these poverty stricken ignorant millions. The situation, unless there should be developed a lofty patriotism and an almost impossible altruism

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[4] *Ibid.*

among the great landowners and the rich of Mexico (of which one scarcely sees a sign), appears almost hopeless. For such a condition one must hark back to the Dark Ages or to the Russia of generations since. And back of all this there still remains lowering gloomily the greater question as to the possibility of real development in the Aztec and other Indian races of Mexico. The Indian of Central and South America is even more stolid and unadaptable, so that we are in face of one of the great problems with no solution in sight. The only one that I can imagine is that he and his low mentality may disappear in the melting pot of a great immigration.

Brazil north of Rio de Janeiro (and I would recall that this means a region as large as the United States), is another and even more difficult problem. This vast region will finally and inevitably be peopled with a mixture in which the Indian and negro will predominate. From this there is no escape. The great basin of the Amazon with its many gigantic tributaries is a region in which the white man may live, but in which he can never thrive. This statement in my opinion is beyond question. The hope of Brazil lies in its great southern plateau, a region as large as the states of California, Oregon and Washington combined and in which the chief part of the population, rapidly increasing by immigration chiefly Italian, is white. Whether the colored race mixture of the north shall in the very distant future develop better qualities than those of the Mexican is extremely questionable. Neither the South American Indian nor the negro has in him constructive statesmanship. Hayti and Liberia are concrete examples of this truth applied to the negro if proof be needed, and surely the mixture of the two or of the two with the white to the extent that the last is probable, will scarcely give any better. It is very probable that the true African will find in northern Brazil a field of emigration, though the present chances are that he will select the United States unless in our immigration laws we couple Africa with Asia. Already some 50,000 negroes of alien birth have entered the United States; the Cape Verde negro of truest black is coming into New England by the thousands. These islands are but three hundred miles from the African coast, and the day is very near when this fever of emigration will reach the Congo region. Our apathy on this subject is a thing I fail to comprehend. We see the effect of the mixture of

the white and negro races, not alone in Portugal but in Naples, Sicily and Morocco. If one should wish to know the result in Portugal, he should read an article in the *Nineteenth Century and After* for January, 1914.[5] Whatever the good qualities of the negro, I do not think that anyone will claim that his mixture with the white will improve the latter, but it is this mixture which we face as surely as the sun rises and sets. It is only a question in the long run of percentage. This I hold should not be allowed to increase by the new African immigration already in progress. If we have not courage to stop this our decadence has begun. I mention these facts of deep significance though they are not in over-close relation to our subject, for the earnest consideration of those who wish that our own shall not be a negroid people.

It is sufficiently clear that the whole of this hemisphere to the south is peopled by races essentially different from our own; that the ruling element is Iberic in blood (Spanish and Portuguese), becoming modified somewhat by numerous additions chiefly Italian and Spanish, but with many of nearly all European and some Asiatic peoples; that three at least have grown into rich, important and potentially powerful nationalities with stable governments. The Monroe Doctrine certainly does not apply to these as in the time of Monroe when they were weak provinces of Spain and Portugal, and when the Holy Alliance which had taken over the regulating of the continent of Europe threatened to extend its power to reduce to the dominion of Spain the feeble provinces which had declared their independence. One can scarcely imagine more different situations than those of 1823 and today. To apply this doctrine in the sense of standing by as a protector is naturally an irritant to a people in whom pride is a predominant characteristic. We know that intimation of such an attitude does irritate. Thus if we desire friendship, good fellowship and kindly feeling, why hold to an attitude of irritation and prevent this very desirable kindly feeling? I certainly can see no reason for it. No European or other power is ever going to attack Argentina, Brazil or Chile with any idea of establishing dominion over them. Such a thing is not within the possible. As for Venezuela, Colombia, the Central American states and Mexico, these border the Caribbean and for our own purposes of defense we

[5] Francis McCullagh, "Portugal, the Nightmare Republic."

shall never peacefully permit the incorporation by a foreign power of these or any part of the neighboring Pacific coasts. The necessity of holding intact the Panama Canal would force this attitude upon us did no Monroe Doctrine exist. Such a policy is by the fact of the Panama Canal wholly independent of the Monroe Doctrine. Nor is it possible that the United States would ever desire to incorporate any of these regions. The immensely wide differences of race, temperament and character would forbid this even if principle were thrown to the winds. For this country to incorporate these great spaces with such different populations could only end in the overthrow of our system which is wholly unfitted for such a test. Rome failed; we should much more surely fail. There is, if I know anything of the American people, a strong and deep feeling against anything savoring of such adventure. Had it been otherwise an American army would have been in occupation of Mexico many months since.

I do not see that there is any wish on our part to play the rôle in America of the Holy Alliance in Europe. There can be little doubt that the three greater powers of South America would unite against any real foreign aggression. A true reading of the Monroe Doctrine today would thus be in such case to act as a friendly fourth power, as an equal among equals. To assume more would defeat our own purposes which, as I have said, I take to be the establishment of friendly and more intimate relations among the American republics.

And let us not forget the subject of manners. From the South American's point of view we have none, and he is not far from right. To explain in some degree what I mean I would have every one read chapter XII of Mr. Charles Macomb Flandrau's most capital book, *Viva Mexico.* We send abroad too many such as he there describes, who seem to think that in a foreign country reserve and propriety are useless restrictions. The conduct of persons of undoubted good standing at home but too often gives one the impression that our $400,000,000 spent yearly on our public schools is spent to very small purpose if a better result be not obtained than that Mr. Flandrau describes, and which I am sure he does not exaggerate, for I know of worse in much more highly placed of our countrymen than such as he mentions.

Many have looked upon our actions in later years in Santo

Domingo and in some of the Central American states as exceeding that which is proper and just. I do not see it in this light. If we want precedent we need but look to Europe. I do not pretend to justify all or any that the Holy Alliance caused to be done in the suppression of revolution in Naples, Piedmont and Spain and still less its thought of reducing to Spanish dominion Spain's revolted American provinces. Its whole action under the domination of Metternich was hateful. But the action of the Powers in the Greek revolution, and in latter years in Crete, of England in Egypt, all of which worked for good, and the many cases of interference which might be cited which sometimes do not deserve praise are ample precedent for such action as we ourselves have taken and which has thus been correct diplomatically and has been equally correct ethically. It has not been stamped in anywise with selfish interest, but has been in the interest of general well-being and most particularly of the regions specially concerned.

Referring again to the Panama Canal we must take into account a fact not generally recognized: which is that the canal does not bring us commercially nearer to the east coast of South America. The great wall of the Andes will always be a barrier to trans-continental traffic. There is, it is true, a railway from Argentina to the Pacific and in time there may be others across the great range, so much more difficult of passage than the Alps, but it will be long before they will be in a position to make it preferable to transport cargoes between the United States and Argentina and Brazil to sending it by sea around Cape St. Roque, though in so doing ships must go 2,400 nautical miles east of the longitude of New York. The immensely greater convenience and cheapness of water transportation will long hold us to the all-sea route from our own ports to those of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina which are our chief South American customers. An able authority[6] estimates the cost of land carriage as twenty times that by sea; it is thus evident that bulk will never be broken so long as the sea will serve.

As these countries are so much more closely bound to Europe by race ties and by the habits, social and commercial, of generations, it will require much effort, much tact, a much greater study of usages and language and a cultivation of much better manners

[6] Gibson Bowles, *Sea Law and Sea Power.*

than we usually show, besides the establishment of thoroughly good diplomatic and consular services to obtain an equal footing with our European rivals.

I repeat that above all else I would place the study of the temperaments, the psychics of the South American. In such study is the crux not alone of this but of every international problem, or of any problem concerned with the conduct of men, for in the study of psychics lies the study of the problem of all human thought and action. We have certainly ignored this as far at least as the South American is concerned almost *in toto*. It is time we were taking another course and knowing something of the soul of other races.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Rear-Admiral Colby N. Chester, U.S.N.,
Washington, D. C.

The Monroe Doctrine is the cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the United States. It has been so construed for nearly one hundred years of our national history, and it so remains today, in spite of some statements that have been made to the contrary. "It is," as Jefferson said, "the offspring of the American revolution and the most momentous question offered to my contemplation since the Independence." When promulgating the doctrine as the basis of our foreign policy, President Monroe said in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823:

> It is impossible that the allied powers (of Europe) should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. . . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

Two distinct and far reaching principles are laid down in the Monroe Doctrine. The first is the principle of "self-defense." Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and it is the first law of nations. In the case of the United States the national defense required, when the doctrine was enunciated, that the country should hold a protectorate throughout the entire western continent. The second principle is that South American republics, which followed our lead in declaring their independence, should have our protection in maintaining this doctrine for themselves. As Secretary Bayard once said: "The United States proclaimed themselves the protector of the western world in which she was the strongest Power," as "it was manifest," said his successor Mr. Olney, "that it was the only power on this hemisphere capable of enforcing the doctrine."

The first principle of the Monroe Doctrine—self-preservation—is axiomatic and immutable, and all other considerations must give

way to it. The second principle, like the constitution of a country, is amenable to changes or amendments that will bring it into accord with new conditions that may arise in the country. The question now is, therefore, do the same conditions prevail on the western continent today, that existed at the time President Monroe sent his message to Congress in 1823?

There have been so many different interpretations placed upon the Monroe Doctrine, by theorists and others, who know but little of its practical applications, that it is necessary to recall a little of its history in order to obtain a clear understanding of the subject. In the early twenties of the last century, the whole of Europe became alarmed at the unsettled political outlook caused by the American and French revolutions, which had shaken every throne on the continent, and bid fair to undermine monarchical government. Three of the great powers, Russia, Prussia and France (once again a kingdom), then formed what is known as the "Holy Alliance," on account of their common religious affiliation, for the purpose of staying the tide of freedom which threatened to overwhelm them. They then prepared to recapture the South and Central American republics, which had recently severed their connection with Spain, and make them appendages to European monarchies. England was, at the time, the only constitutionally governed country in Europe, and fearing that the "balance of power" between the European states might again be disturbed by such a combination, she, with no desire to promote republican institutions, however, proposed an alliance with the United States. Naturally neither country could harmonize its views on such a matter, and no political combination was formed, but an understanding was reached that England would not interfere with any action that America might take in the matter, thus giving her quasi approval to the message sent to Congress by President Monroe. Had it become necessary for the United States to take any overt action, at that time, in support of the Monroe Doctrine, this country would have had the moral support at least of the British government; but we now could hope for no aid from that country, and it is doubtful, indeed, if we could count on the approval of the Latin Americans, for whom, more than for ourselves, the doctrine was established, unless we harmonize some of our conflicting interests with them.

We should not fail to remember that the South American republics were in their infancy at the time the Monroe Doctrine was de-

cleared, and were struggling for freedom against great odds. The United States proclaimed herself the protector of the western world as a matter of necessity, for without her aid the newly formed republics were helpless to battle against the great odds opposing them. The declaration of the Monroe Doctrine constituted, therefore, the most significant and decisive act towards guaranteeing the independence of all the American states that could have been devised. It produced the prompt recognition of the infant republics of South America by the English in 1823, and performed a service for Great Britain herself, of which Canning, the secretary of British foreign affairs, said: "I have brought out a new world in order to reëstablish the equilibrium of the old."

The question today, as far as our own national defense is concerned is, would it be a menace to interests centered so far away as the United States, if a European power, whose political and even religious aspirations may be the same as our own, should attempt to acquire territory in Argentina for instance? Such an assault would of course affect the interests of that country, but should the United States attempt to interfere in the matter unless asked by Argentina to aid her in throwing off the menace that assailed her? In case of assisting her we would become her ally, and probably one of many powers that might join with her in resisting the attack. It would seem, now that the continent is cut in twain by the construction of the Panama Canal neutralizing if not destroying the value of the old trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans via Cape Horn, that it would have no material effect on the "vital" interests of the United States, if a forcible attempt should be made by some European power to take one of the Argentine islands, situated at the extreme end of the continent. It is such changed conditions in the political relations with our South American brethren as this, that call for some new arrangements concerning the application of the Monroe Doctrine.

The principle that the affected country had paramount importance in its own affairs, unless they related to interests of a combination of which she was a part, was admitted by President Cleveland, in his celebrated message sent to Congress in 1895, commonly known as the "Venezuela case." In this message he stated (with some logical defect, I think, as far as Venezuela is concerned, as I shall endeavor to show later on), that if that country wished to *sell* any

portion of her territory to Great Britain, she had a perfect right to do so, and the United States had no right to interfere in the matter. This principle might apply to Argentina, at the present time, but such an act of selling a portion of her territory to a European state would not have been tolerated by the United States in 1823, under any circumstances; for Mr. Monroe then said in no uncertain words, that, "any attempt on their part (Europeans) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere (would be) dangerous to our peace and safety."

On account of changed conditions in South America at the present time, there is a growing disposition on the part of some well informed Americans to limit the territorial extent to which the Monroe Doctrine should apply to the states that lie to the northward of the Amazon River; but such a limitation would be met with difficulties surpassing, in my opinion, those we should attempt to escape. By holding a protectorate over this restricted field only, we throw out of consideration all fellowship with the states to the southward of this line of demarcation, at once causing jealousies among the larger and more important of the South American republics, making them enemies of our defensive policy as selfish in its nature, and would most likely tend to add their moral support to our many commercial rivals and antagonists.

Leading statesmen of Brazil and other South American republics have declared that the Monroe Doctrine is discredited in the republics for whose benefit it was devised, not that they do not appreciate the good intentions of the United States, but they deny the right of this nation to appoint itself a guardian over their welfare. A doctrine founded upon the principle laid down by James Monroe, but giving the right of a protectorate to the powers in general and not to any country in particular, would be the ideal doctrine, in the belief of the people of Latin America.

As exemplifying the interests and aspirations of the South Americans in this connection I would relate the following:

On the 15th day of November, 1894, the fifth year of the foundation of the republic of Brazil, in the presence of the representatives of the principal American republics, including the United States, was laid in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the corner stone of a monument to American solidarity. Under this stone this official record lies: "The monument which will be erected on this spot in which this stone is laid, and which will symbolize the political union of

the different nations of the continent of Columbus, will be surmounted by the figure of James Monroe, author of the celebrated doctrine known by his name, which teaches that the nations of the new continent should unite for the purpose of preventing any undue interference of the nations of Europe in the internal affairs of America. Around the principal figure will be grouped the great national liberators of America, Washington, Jefferson, Juarez, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Bolivar, Jose Bonifacio and Benjamin Constant."

I give you this incident and picture to study in contrast with another view depicting the scowling faces of many South Americans, from whom we are just now seeking commercial advantages, who spurn the foreign policy of the United States as it now stands, shun its commercial policy and belittle its domestic policy.

No, it were better in my opinion, to maintain the original jurisdiction of the Monroe Doctrine, but to recognize the fact that many of the twenty other American republics are no longer the weaklings they were when the policy was formulated, unable to defend themselves, but are now strong enough to share in the common defense of the continent, and act in consonance with them in maintaining the political rights of all.

We cannot, however, with propriety form an "alliance," for that word has been tabooed by an unwritten law of the land; but we can engage in an "entente," as foreigners call it, with the republics of South America that will give them a share in the responsibility of maintaining a policy which looks to the general good of all parties concerned.

Let us form then, not an alliance, but a "concert of action" after the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, similar to that established in Europe for the support of the doctrine known, there, as "the balance of power," which will show that all the states interested hold the same opinion regarding this doctrine. The moral effect of such an "entente" will be sufficient to stay the hand of any European nation, which may seek political annexation of American territory.

Aside from all considerations of our own self-interests, should the United States arrogate to herself the right to dictate a policy to the Latin-American states, which concerns their vital interests quite as much as our own, and which they resent as "bossism," now so universally abhorred, and which is belittling to their self-respect? Should we not, on the other hand, urge such powerful nations as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and such others as may be useful to the cause, whenever they may be able to maintain stable governments

for a sufficient length of time to warrant it, to join with us in carrying out a general policy that is of mutual advantage to all republics on the continent? Call this part of our international policy by the name of the Monroe Doctrine, if you will, or by the term "America for the Americans," which will probably better please our confreres in the south, and at the same time be in accord with the general principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

Having made a compact with the South American republics as suggested the United States would be in a better position to devote attention to those matters which more especially affect her interests at home and in nearby states, where foreign aggression would jeopardize its vital interests.

There is a field, in which the interests of the United States as far as they relate to the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine—"self-preservation"—are paramount, the protection of which cannot be shared with any other nation. This district comprises the countries lying contiguous or adjacent to our own, bordering on the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. The right of the United States to protect these countries from foreign aggression has been recognized in many ways by European countries, and the protection of "the father of republics" has been called for, and accepted so many times, as to establish this policy of the American government as an inalienable right. Notable instances were when the United States drove the French out of Mexico in 1865, and again when Spain was forced to give up her control in Cuba in 1898.

But aside from the fact that "self-protection," the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine, compels the United States to take cognizance of the political affairs of Mexico, the Central and South American countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, we have assumed an obligation here in behalf of the interests of the whole world, that makes it imperative that these countries and seas shall be under the supervision of the United States, and we have also by treaty stipulated that no other country shall share in this protectorate. By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, and the one recently made with Panama confirming its main features, the United States agrees, not only that the American "canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations," but, guarantees that "the canal shall never be blockaded nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any hostility be committed within it.

The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as shall be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder." This is a most sweeping assumption of responsibility, and the fact is the United States cannot protect the world's interests in the Panama Canal, without maintaining naval control of the seas that wash her shores on the south, as well as holding supervision of the foreign relations of the countries bordering on those seas.

The Caribbean Sea holds the base of the American fleet at Guantanamo, Cuba, and its advance base at Culebra, Porto Rico. In fact all the essentials for properly defending the canal lie in the region covered by its waters and those of the Gulf of Mexico. For all military purposes, therefore, these seas must be considered "The greater Panama Canal Zone," and the naval policy of the United States the only guide to perfect peace within their limits.

In defending the continental policy of "America for the Americans" the United States will have ample cause for keeping up an efficient navy, and to protect the seven thousand miles of coast line, including "the greater Panama Canal zone," she will need every ship that our non-military people will authorize to be constructed.

It has been well said that the Monroe Doctrine is as strong as the navy of the United States, and in view of the fact that our countrymen insist on maintaining but a small navy as compared with those that might be brought against it in combination, our people should avoid creating enemies, who might be tempted, in order to protect their own interests, to form an alliance with more power than we could bring to bear against them. In this connection I would recall the visit of Senator Root to South America in 1906, which, at the time, produced a friendly feeling between the North and South Americans, that lately has been greatly augmented by the forceful presence of his then chief, President Roosevelt, in that country. The sojourn of these two greatest of American statesmen in the South, has done more to cement the ties of fellowship between the two sections of the continent than anything that has occurred in the political lives of its people in many years. Dr. Edward Everett Hale once said of the first visit, that it was the most important event that had taken place in the history of the country during the first decade of the century, not excepting the peace of Portsmouth, and nothing has yet arisen in the second decade, which, I believe, will have greater influence in

strengthening this feeling than the expedition of Colonel Roosevelt to South America. As this last occasion took place at a significantly opportune moment, just before the opening of the Panama Canal, when we are about to inaugurate a new departure in our foreign trade relations, its commercial value is very important.

Let the United States follow up these auspicious visits of our countrymen to the Southland, and, in the words of the Hon. John Barrett, director of the Pan-American Union, "take advantage of the opening of the Panama Canal, to signalize formally, as it were, the beginning of a new Pan-American era in which the Monroe Doctrine, which represents the dictum of one government in the family of nations, shall evolve into a greater Pan-American doctrine, which shall represent the mutual interest and protection of all."

It is better to make friends than to build guns.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO HAITI

By William A. MacCorkle,

Former Governor of West Virginia.

The Original Monroe Doctrine

In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

* * * * *

The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

* * * * *

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any por-

tion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord.

* * * *

President Roosevelt's interpretation of the later doctrine:

We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of the continent once and for all that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us. There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order, and prosperity, that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this Doctrine. These republics we now meet not only on a basis of entire equality, but in a spirit of frank and respectful friendship which we hope is mutual. If all the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need for us to be the especial champions of the doctrine will disappear, for no stable and growing American republic wishes to see some great non-American military power acquire territory in its neighborhood. All that this country desires is that the other republics on the continent shall be happy and prosperous; and they cannot be happy and prosperous unless they maintain order within their boundaries and behave with a just regard for their obligations toward outsiders. It must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression. We desire peace with all the world, but perhaps most of all with the other peoples of the American continent. There are of course limits to the wrongs which any self-respecting nation can endure. It is always possible that wrong actions toward this nation, or towards citizens of this nation, in some state unable to keep order among its own people, unable to secure justice from outsiders, and unwilling to do justice to those outsiders who treat it well, may result in our having to take action to protect our rights; but such action will not be taken with a view to territorial aggression, and it will be taken at all only with extreme reluctance and when it has become evident that every other resource has been exhausted.

THE LODGE RESOLUTION

Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see, without grave concern, the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes. . . . .

That the Monroe Doctrine made its apparent advent in the history of nations so late as the time of the President of that name, has,

to a certain extent, diminished its importance as a part of the fundamental and international life in the thought of the nations of the world. Whilst this doctrine did not form part of the written law of this country, still it originated in the very life of the American Republic, and is not, as a matter of truth, the doctrine of President Monroe but rather the doctrine which was part of the actual life of this republic in its inception. It was enunciated as a foundation proposition of our government by Washington, was interpreted and insisted upon as part of our fundamental life by Jefferson, and finally upon the historic occasion, established as the Monroe Doctrine.

Writers are fond of frequently repeating the statement that the Monroe Doctrine is not part of the international code, but that it is merely a policy of this government and only so understood in the law of nations. Whilst this may be the thought among other nations, the Monroe Doctrine is as absolutely part of the life of this republic, in its dealings with the nations of the world, as any doctrine of international law expressed and published as such by the nations of the world. It is fundamentally the Doctrine of the greatest and most powerful nation on earth, and so understood to be a primary doctrine by the hundred millions of people forming the great western republic. If it is not technically part of the code of international law, it is the belief of our people that it forms an essential part of the structure of our national life.

Secretary Foster stated:

> It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine has no binding authority, first, because it has not been admitted into the code of international law; and, second, because it has never been adopted or declared by Congress. In reply, it may be said that the principle which underlies the Monroe Doctrine—the right of self-defense, the preservation of the peace and safety of the nation—is recognized as an elementary part of international law. . . . . It stands today as a cardinal policy of our government.

While this doctrine may be a policy and not a part of the technical code of international law, it has for one hundred years held the hands of the mightiest nations on earth, who have recognized its potency equally with the recognition which they have extended to any principle of international law. The law of self preservation is the most fundamental and absolute of all the laws of nations. The Monroe Doctrine is the one vital doctrine, which in our intercourse with other

nations most vitally controls "our peace and happiness" and "our peace and safety." It is idle for any authority to contend that a principle so vital as this does not have the real potency and effect of international law. Throughout the discussions by the fathers and by those who latterly placed the doctrine in active effect, the one continuing thread runs, that underlying this doctrine are "the peace and safety" and "the peace and happiness" of the American nation. This doctrine was in one sense of the word a negative proposition. With the life of the world it has changed, not in its fundamental idea, for it is founded upon the preservation of the safety and peace of this republic, but the change has come, to a certain extent, with the altered condition of the times and the surroundings of our life, in the mode of our application of its principles.

In this discussion we found our argument upon the Monroe Doctrine, both in its original and its later construction. We believe, as a cardinal principle of its application, that independence is fundamental. To differ with another country in its ideas of government will form no reason why we should deprive any country of its governmental life and existence. We concede that because of the difference in thought, as to governmental policy, we should not interfere with, or establish over any government a suzerainty or control. We do not contend that the Monroe Doctrine applies to a country, unless the acts of that country interfere with the doctrine in our interpretation of its principles as to control by European nations, or unless it interferes with the preservation of our peace and safety, or unless it commits a breach of international law.

The distinguished president of the Academy has assigned to me the subject of "The Monroe Doctrine, Especially Considered as to its Application to the Republic of Haiti." Let us see if the conditions arising in this island interfere with any of the canons of this doctrine.

The island of Hispaniola, containing Haiti and San Domingo, includes about 28,250 square miles, and the Republic of Haiti about 10,200 square miles. The island is about the size of the combined States of Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Next to Cuba, it is the most important strategical point in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. It is directly on and commands the two great passages of the Atlantic Ocean into the Caribbean Sea from the eastern coast of the United States to and from

the canal. It thus practically controls the great bulk of the commerce of the United States to the East and the Pacific Ocean.

This island has within its shores more natural wealth than has any other territory of similar size in the world. By reason of its rich valleys and splendid mountains it has every temperature known to man. All tropical plants and trees, as well as the vegetables and fruits of the temperate climes, grow in perfection. The best coffee known to commerce grows wild without planting or cultivation. Sugar cane, indigo, bread fruit, melons, mangoes, oranges, apples, grapes, mulberries and figs all grow with little labor or care. Mahogany, manchineel, satin wood, rose wood, cinnamon wood, log wood, the pine, the oak, cypress and palmetto grow in rich profusion in its splendid soil. Here are the best dye stuffs known to commerce, and in the earth are silver, gold, copper, lead, iron, gypsum and sulphur. We hazard the statement that this island is more capable of supporting life in all of its phases, more able to create wealth and diffuse happiness to its people than any other land on the face of the earth. Its harbors are incomparable and will float the navies of the world. Its atmosphere is salubrious and its climate healthy. It is a natural paradise and the description of its beauty and resources by Columbus is absolutely true as of today:


> In it there are many havens on the seacoast, incomparable with any others I know in Christendom, and plenty of rivers, so good and great that it is a marvel. The lands there are high, and in it are very many ranges of hills and most lofty mountains incomparably beyond the Island of Centrefei (or Teneriffe); all most beautiful in a thousand shapes and all accessible, and full of trees of a thousand kinds, so lofty that they seem to reach the sky. And I am assured that they never lose their foliage, as may be imagined, since I saw them, as green and as beautiful as they are in Spain in May and some of them were in flower, some in fruit, some in another stage, according to their kind. And the nightingale was singing, and other birds of a thousand sorts, in the month of November, round about the way I was going. There are palm trees of six or eight species, wondrous to see for their beautiful variety; but so are the other trees and fruits and plants therein. There are wonderful pine groves and very large plants of verdure, and there are honey and many kinds of birds, and many mines in the earth; and there is a population of incalculable number. Espanola is a marvel; the mountains and hills, and plains, and fields, and the soil, so beautiful and rich for planting and sowing, for breeding cattle of all sorts, for building of towns and villages. There could be no believing, without seeing, such harbors as are here, as well as the many and great rivers and excellent waters, most of which contain gold. In the trees and fruits and plants, there

are greater diversities from those of Juana (Cuba). In this there are many spiceries and great mines of gold and other metals. The people of this island and all others that I have seen, or not seen, all go naked, men and women, just as their mothers bring them forth.

The seas which are today actually and prospectively most important to mankind are the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. These seas, in their importance, have waxed and waned as have all other lands and seas of the globe. Whilst the Mediterranean has been important throughout history, today, as a part of the chain of communication to the East, it is probably more vital than ever in its history, for it commands the Suez Canal and is virtually part of the Suez route. The two great twin seas, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, are, if possible, more vital than the Mediterranean in their effect upon the commerce of the world. From their position they will be more world-wide in their direct influence upon commerce than the Mediterranean, because these two seas will embrace a greater part of the world.

It is necessary to our subject briefly to discuss the location of Haiti, (see p. 34) both in its strategical and trade positions. We would say that in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea there are five great strategical positions, the mouth of the canal, the mouth of the Mississippi, Cuba, Haiti, and Jamaica. The mouth of the Mississippi necessarily will command the great central valley of the United States, and here will be one of the great positions in the trade of the world. From the mouth of the Mississippi to Colon our commerce will have a straight course, passing Cape Catoche, the outermost point of Yucatan, and Cape Gracias a' Dios on the Mosquito Coast. This route will pass the island of Mujeres, which is not important, but will be within easy striking distance of the great island of Jamaica owned by Great Britain.

The island of Cuba is the great controlling strategical influence in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. It lies across the route from North America, and largely commands the route from the mouth of the Mississippi to the eastern opening of the canal. It controls the passage from the Gulf of Mexico into the Caribbean Sea through the Yucatan Channel, and into the Gulf of Mexico from the Atlantic by the Florida straits. It is the great controlling strategical influence in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.



Map showing location of Haiti.

The second great strategical point is the island of Haiti.

The two great routes to the mouth of the canal from North America are, first, the route by the Windward Passage between the island of Cuba and the island of Haiti. Second, the route by the Mona Passage between the island of Haiti and the island of Puerto Rico. This latter passage will be that chiefly used by the sailing vessels to and from the canal to the eastern portion of North America. The other important passage to the mouth of the canal is the Annegada Passage by the island of St. Thomas and Puerto Rico, and will be the route used from the isthmus to the Mediterranean and Central Europe. The travel to the British Islands and northern Europe will also use the Mona Passage between Haiti and Puerto Rico. In other words, every ship sailing from New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, Canada, Baltimore, Newport News or the eastern coast of North America on its journeys to the infinite world of commerce will be compelled to pass by the island of Haiti, either through the Windward or the Mona Passage, and the travel to the greater part of Europe will use the Mona Passage by the East Coast of Haiti. This world-wide commerce, in case of stress and storm on its voyage to the commercial world, must utilize this great island in the necessities of sea life. It is the first great harboring place on its way to the canal, and on its return it is the last stopping place. It will be as necessary to the commerce of this country as Malta or Aden or Gibraltar are to the Suez route. It lies athwart the greatest commerce that will cleave the seas.

In the present governmental condition of Haiti, and with its relation to this country, the island of Jamaica will be supremely important from a strategical standpoint, if controlled or held by an unfriendly power, and it could cripple our commerce passing through the Windward or the Mona Passage. With the friendly influence of Cuba and Haiti the commerce of the United States would have a tremendous advantage in case of war or unfriendliness on the part of any nation, even if Jamaica was held by an unfriendly power.

It is usual to speak of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico as the American Seas, and to consider them as part of our life and practically within the control of this great nation. It is important to glance at these great seas and appreciate how they and the canal are environed about and controlled by islands, which would become vital to our commerce in case of war or unfriendliness of the nations

of Europe. First, is the island of Jamaica owned by Great Britain, which is practically at the mouth of the canal. Of almost equal importance is the island of Curacao, which in the hands of an unfriendly power would be disastrous in its effect upon the commerce of the canal. To the east and within striking distance are Martinique, in the hands of France, Santa Lucia owned by England, St. Thomas owned by Denmark, the Bahamas and the Bermudas in the hands of England, with Cuba and Haiti in independent control, neither of which last two could be utilized by the United States in case of conflict with the other nations of the world. In other words, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea are environed by islands in the control of the two great nations of the world, France and England, and by two great islands, Haiti and Cuba, the latter of which are strategically so situated that they could largely control the commerce of practically half of the world. In this sea the United States, to which this commerce is supremely vital, with the exception of the harbor of Guanatanamo in Cuba, controls only the relatively insignificant island of Puerto Rico. Outside of these unimportant exceptions the United States has no right to fortify any of the islands or to use them as bases from which we can protect our commerce and our rights in the canal.

Let us consider, as briefly as possible, the governmental and social condition of the republic of Haiti, so importantly located as it is, and the probability of its becoming a menace to the fundamental principles of the Monroe Doctrine. It is important for us to see if it offends against the peace and safety of this country. This is not a pleasant subject of discussion. No one cares to indict a whole people, but the question of the future of this island in its relations to this republic, is one of deep and abiding importance to the American people, and surely in the conditions of today worthy of discussion in the publications of this society.

It is practically part of the shore line of our republic, and is in control of the avenues of our greatest routes of commerce to the world, and lies at the mouth of the canal which has cost us untold sums of money. Through its great passages will flow the bulk of our commerce to the East, and the question for consideration with the American people is whether this commerce should oftentimes be placed in the control of a government continuously engaged in internecine war, revolution and insurrection and sunk in religious

and governmental degeneracy. The question is vital to us, as to whether the condition of this island, so important to us, will ultimately lead to interference on the part of European nations or compel us, in order to preserve the peace and safety of our country, to provide, by some means, that its present condition be changed, and, instead of being a menace to the peace and safety of our republic, it may become a blessing to the world and a protection to the commerce, which will be the greatest ever witnessed since the keels of mankind's ships began to cleave the water in their quest for knowledge and riches throughout the world.

Let us, as briefly as may be, answer this question by giving the condition of this island as set out by those who have visited its shores and who are conversant with its conditions. That which shows the real life of a nation is its governmental policy and its religious ideals. To these two propositions I invite your attention.

Since the evacuation by the French, Haiti has been a land of seething revolution, despotism and crime against religious and governmental law. With the forms of a free government, yet it has been a despotism unrivaled in its disregard for human rights. A general of a department, with a ragged army of banditti behind him, who by blood and rapine seizes control of the government, oftentimes without the pretense of the forms of an election, has generally furnished the horrid phantasmagoria which since the French evacuation has posed in the Haitian Republic under the guise of free government.

Says Ober:

> Founded as it is upon force, with the strongest man at the head, nominally as president, but in reality a dictator, the Black Republic cannot endure another century as it is going now, without calling to it the attention of the world, and exciting its strongest reprobation. It is the desire of more than one government that the United States should take this irresponsible island republic in hand and administer to it a salutary lesson. Nothing short of extermination, some aver, could effect a reform in the Haitian body politic; but as this age does not tolerate the radical measures of the olden time it is not probable that the present generation will experience a reformation. Sir Spencer St. John, who was formerly the English Minister-Resident in Haiti, and who wrote an exhaustive account of the doings in the Black Republic, says, of it, amongst other things not complimentary: "No country possesses greater capabilities, or a better geographical position, or more varied soil, climate or production, with magnificent scenery of every description; and yet it is now the country to be avoided, ruined as it has been by a succession of self-seeking politicians, without honesty or patriotism."

Says Froude in *The English in the West Indies.*

The island being thus derelict, Spain and England both tried their hand to recover it, but failed from the same cause, and a black nation, with a republican constitution and a population perhaps of about a million and a half of pure-blooded negroes, has since been in unchallenged possession, and has arrived at the condition which has been described to us by Sir Spencer St. John. Republics which begin with murder and plunder do not come to much good in this world. Haiti has passed through many revolutions, and is no nearer than at first to stability. The present president, M. Salomon, who was long a refugee in Jamaica, came into power a few days back by a turn of the wheel. He was described to me as a peremptory gentleman who made quick work with his political opponents. His term of office having nearly expired, he had reëlected himself shortly before another seven years and was prepared to maintain his right by any measures which he might think expedient. He had a few regiments of soldiers, who, I was told, were devoted to him, and a fleet consisting of two gunboats commanded by an American officer to whom he chiefly owed his security.

Says Rear-Admiral Colby M. Chester, U. S. Navy, a most careful and distinguished observer, in his article in the *Geographical Magazine* on "Haiti: A Degenerating Island:"

It is not possible within the limits of this paper to go into details regarding the turbulent history of Haiti. The fact that of its twenty-one rulers, from Dessalines to the one now holding power, four only have completed their terms of office, the most of them being driven out of the country, will show the general tendency of the people to revolution. History is here constantly repeating itself, summed up in the general statement that the "outs" are always struggling to get into power, while the "ins" are striving to retain possession of the spoils of office.

It is said that Haiti is getting blacker and blacker, the white element having been practically exterminated or removed from the island. . . . .

In all its political history, Haiti, the beautiful, has been torn almost to shreds by its turbulent inhabitants, led on by a few aspiring chiefs, who rarely have had any other object in view than personal gain.

Says Stephen Bonsal in *The American Mediterranean*:

Of course, if Haiti were a true republic the people would have an opportunity to correct the abuses from which they suffer by exercising the manhood franchise to which, under the constitution, they are entitled, but, of all farces and travesties of popular institutions which are so prevalent in the Black Republic, that of the so-called popular elections is the most flagrant. Elections to the chamber are held or not held, not as prescribed by law and at the proper intervals, but simply when and how it may suit the personal convenience and private profit of the supreme military chief of the day. If he can secure

more money in bribes from the deputies already assembled and in session than is offered by those desirous of legislative honours and opportunities for corruption, then the old chamber remains on indefinitely. If the new men offer to the military chief a sufficiently substantial inducement, the legislature in being is dismissed, although it may have enjoyed only a month of life, and new elections offered.

Again says Bonsal:

In the winter of 1907–08, when twenty-two of the adherents of Dr. Firmin fell into the hands of the administration general at St. Marc, that officer walked them out to the nearest cemetery, and after they had dug a trench deep enough to hold their bodies, had them shot and buried. He then reported to his commander-in-chief, President Nord Alexis, the occurrence textually as follows: "Feeling confident that my procès verbal of the affair, which I shall have drawn up at the earliest possible moment, would meet with your excellency's approval, to save time, I have executed the twenty-two prisoners—provisionally." This butcher never received a word of censure, but, on the contrary, was promoted by his chief.

The first effort is to obtain possession of the custom house, so as to provide the sinews of war and to obtain perquisites for those in charge of the revolution. Then ensues a massacre of those who followed the unsuccessful aspirant for the presidency.

At its head is a president assisted by two chambers, the members of which are elected and hold office under a constitution of 1889. This constitution, thoroughly republican in form, is French in origin, as are also the laws, language, traditions and customs in Haiti. In practise, however, the government revolves itself into a military despotism, the power being concentrated in the hands of a president. The Haitians seem to possess everything that a progressive and civilized nation can desire, but corruption is spread through every portion and branch of the government. Justice is venal, and the police are brutal and inefficient.—*Encyclopedia Britannica.*

Says Hazard in *San Domingo and Haiti:*

But the same causes which tended then to demoralize the country and unsettle its people are those that render it a hotbed of revolution today. The bankruptcy of its treasury, the ambition of aspiring chiefs, the hatred of disappointed ones, and the want of any regular system of commerce and agriculture, with the incubus of an army living in idleness and eating up the substance of the land, must have their effect.

Official peculation, judicial murder, and utter corruption of every kind underlie the forms and titles of civilized government; the religion, nominally Christian, is largely vaudoux or serpent-worship, in which actual and horrible

cannibalism is even now a most important element. Instead of progressing, the negro republicans have gone back to the lowest type of African barbarism. —*Chambers Encyclopedia.*

A land of continuous revolution.—*Encyclopedia Britannica.*

A fair illustration of their system of election is exemplified in the so-called election of Nord Alexis in 1902. Being in control of the government forces and not having been known as an aspirant for the presidency, upon the assembling of the national assembly, Alexis demanded that he should be elected president. To his repeated demands the national assembly paid little attention. On the eve of his so-called election his troops in the field surrounded the palace, falling into firing groups. In the palace preparations for a banquet were in progress. Entering the national assembly he notified it that its members could elect him president and go to the banquet, or face the firing squads being formed in the yard. He was elected by acclamation. This is but one of hundreds of illustrations of the hollow pretense of free government in this island. An election means nothing but a revolution flowing with blood. It is a battle or a massacre, and this has been practically a continuous proposition ever since the French evacuation. The government is a despotism pure and simple, which fattens upon the blood of an ignorant people, and is only a horrid pretense of free government. It is gradually and surely degenerating and its conditions must ultimately become worse. Read the record of its unstable and gory governmental life:

1804. Dessalines crowned as emperor.
1806. He is assassinated; war between Haiti and San Domingo.
1807. Christophe becomes king under title of Henry the First, war.
1811. Petion president of southern part; civil war.
1820. Boyer declared regent for life; after tremendous insurrection and flow of blood Christophe commits suicide.
1843. Boyer deposed and exiled after revolution.
1844. Rivirere exiled after one year; war.
1845. Guerrier in office one year.
1845. Pierror abdicated.
1846. Riche proclaimed president; died in one year.
1847. Soloque declared emperor after many wars and much bloodshed; exiled in 1859.
1858–59. Geffrard president until 1867, and then exiled.
1856–67. Dreadful revolution where Salnave revolts, takes refugees from British consulates and kills them; English ship drives them out and helps Geffrard; Geffrard banished, Salnave made president with a new constitution; revolt suppressed amidst torrents of blood.

1868–70. Continual revolution; Salnave massacres his enemies; proclaims himself emperor, is finally defeated and shot.
1870–74. Nissage Saget completed his four years.
1874. Domingue seized the government, and after bloody revolution exiled in 1876.
1876. Canal after bloody revolution seizes power; after many revolutions he is expelled in 1879.
1879. Salomon elected; reëlected 1886.
1888. Salomon deposed and exiled; civil war between Hipolyte and Legitime; Legitime placed in office for one year and exiled.
1889–96. Hipolyte after many insurrections died in office; supposed to be poisoned.
1896. Simon Sam president; trouble with Germany; numerous disorders until 1899.
1900. Sam takes all the funds and leaves the country.
1902. General Nord Alexis proclaimed president.
1908. Nord Alexis retired by revolution; powers sent warships to stop massacre.
1911. Cincinnatus Le Conte proclaimed president; killed in 1912.
1912. Tancrede Auguste appointed president; killed in May 1913.
1913. Michael Orresti proclaimed president; was retired by revolution January 27, 1914.
1914. Orresti Zamor assumed the presidency February 8, 1914, and at last accounts was still alive. In other words, the constitutional office for a president in Haiti is seven years, and President Salomon, who held office from 1879 to 1886 is apparently the only Haitian president to fill out his term of office. He was killed, however, within two years after his reëlection for a second term in 1886.

A writer occupying a high position in the Haitian government has lately put forth a masterpiece of special pleading in defense of his government. Any defense of this kind is idle. The island is a land of despotism and wicked government, which is increasing and not decreasing in its terror. Within a month it has reeked with blood under the throes of one of its almost continuous revolutions. Our government has been again compelled to intervene and save the lives of many of the parties engaged in this internecine war. A number of times, by reason of this situation, war has been almost precipitated between the Haitian government and the European nations. The action of the German government is fresh in the minds of our people, and the warships of Great Britain and France are only too frequent in the harbors of Haiti, protecting their subjects, demanding redress for grievances and saving human life. This means, sooner or later, that the irresponsible government of the Republic of Haiti will commit the act

which will involve us, under the first clause and original application of the Monroe Doctrine. It seems that if it was not for the Monroe Doctrine, backed by the strong hand of this government, this island today would be under the control of a European nation.

Let us pursue this investigation and consider further the moral and religious condition of this island, almost part of our shore line. Religion is but a pretense. The worship of the green snake and the control of the voodoo are everywhere prevalent. The island has degenerated from its once high estate, and there is no pretense but what the Papaloi and the Mamaloi are as potent as any of the figures in its life. It seems to be true, that on any night the horrid rites of the voodoo can be witnessed in the heart of the capital of Haiti, surrounded by the soldiers in the uniform of the Haitian government. In the book mentioned this statement is denied, and the assertion is made that Haiti has been slandered by the book writers and the magazine makers, by "unscrupulous writers and travelers." This assertion is unbelievable. I do not quote Spencer St. John, the English minister, who resided in this island for many years, who states in detail the horror of despotism which governs the island, and who gives the details of the dreadful practice of the voodoo, and who charges child stealing and cannibalism to these people. I will leave him out of the controversy entirely, and quote only a few of the many other proofs:

Says Stephen Bonsal in *The American Mediterranean:*

> A man, of course a general, is in prison for treason or a detournement of funds. (This is a delicate way they speak of stealing in Haiti when they will speak of it at all.) It is a question of such minor importance, simply whether the man shall live or die, that the president will not defer it to the Papaloi or Voodoo priest, who lives in the hills behind the city, so he drops a manikin of clay upon the floor. If it breaks, the man dies; if it remains intact, then he lives—as long as the noisome atmosphere of a Haitian prison will let him. . . . .
>
> Again the doubt, the President would draw a line across the floor of his sanctum and then pitch manikins, this time made of wood and attired in the gaudy glory of Haitian generals. If the puppets passed the line, it meant one thing; if they lagged behind, it meant another, and so the State papers were fashioned and the presidential decrees inspired in Haiti.
>
> But of course upon the graver questions the Papaloi and the Mamaloi, the high priest and the high priestess of the Voodoo sect, sat in judgment. The Papaloi, or Guinea coast prophet, with his fetich worship and his Congo prayers, is the one solid, substantial fact in Haiti. Around about him turn Haitian life and politics. In some administrations the doors of the Black House

have not been as wide open to these prophets of the night as they were while Nord Alexis ruled, but never have they been closed except in the reign of the mulatto Geffrard some forty years ago, and his was a short and little day and ended with exile to Jamaica, where, under the guidance of intelligent and sympathetic white men, the Afro-American is accomplishing more, perhaps, than anywhere else.

The cannibalistic feed is only indulged in on rare occasions and at long intervals and is always shrouded in mystery and hedged about with every precaution against interlopers; for, be their African ignorance ever so dense, their carnal fury ever so unbridled, the Papalois and Mamalois, the head men and head women worshippers never seem to forget that in these vile excesses there should perhaps be found excuse enough for the interference of the civilized world to save the people of the Black Republic from the further degradation which awaits them.

Within the last fifteen years human victims have been sacrificed to the great god Voodoo in the national palace of Haiti. Last February there was assembled in the national palace what might justly be called a congress of serpent worshippers. During the life of Mme. Nord, which came to an end in October, 1908, not a week passed but what a meeting of the Voodoo practitioners was held in the executive mansion, and her deathbed was surrounded by at least a score of these witch doctors.

Says Ober in *The Wake of Columbus:*

The serpent is the deity of the Voudous, and he is represented by a high priest, called the Papaloi, and a priestess, the Mamaloi; meaning the father and the mother king. Their demands are absolute, and no sectary dare disobey them. In this lies their menace to good government, and it is well known that even some of the rulers of Haiti have been dominated by them. The worship of the serpent is carried on as secretly as possible; the sectaries are bound by oaths of secrecy, and their incantations take place in the night. The serpent is consulted, through the priest or priestess, and the devotees then indulge in dancing and song, generally ending in the grossest forms of debauchery.

Froude in *The English in the West Indies* says:

But this is not the worst. Immorality is so universal that it almost ceases to be a fault, for a fault implies an exception, and in Haiti it is the rule. Young people make experiment of one another before they will enter into any closer connection. So far they are no worse than in our own English islands, where the custom is equally general; but behind the immorality, behind the religiosity, there lies active and alive the horrible revival of the West African superstitions; the serpent worship, and the child sacrifice, and the cannibalism. There is no room to doubt it. A missionary assured me that an instance of it occurred only a year ago within his own personal knowledge. The facts are notorious; a full account was published in one of the local newspapers, and the only result was that the president imprisoned the editor for exposing the country.

A few years ago persons guilty of these infamies were tried and punished; now they are left alone, because to prosecute and convict them would be to acknowledge the truth of the indictment.

Rear-Admiral Chester further says:

No accurate history of Haiti can be written without reference to the horrible sorcery, called the religion of Voodoo, which was introduced into the country with the slaves from Africa. Its creed is that the God Voodoo has the power usually ascribed to the Christian's Lord, and that he shows himself to his good friends, the negroes, under the form of a non-venomous snake, and transmits his power through a chief priest or priestess. These are called either king and queen, master or mistress, or generally as Papalois and Mamalois. The principal act of worship consists of a wild dance, attended by grotesque gesticulations, which leads up to the most disgraceful orgies. A secret oath binds all the voodoos, on the taking of which, the lips of the neophyte are usually touched with warm goat's blood, which is intended to inspire terror. He promises to submit to death should he ever reveal the secrets of the fraternity, and to put to death any traitor to the sect. It is affirmed, and no doubt is true, that on special occasions a sacrifice is made of a living child, or the "goat without horns," as it is called, and then cannibalism in its worst form is indulged in. Under the circumstances of taking the oath of allegiance, it should cause no surprise that the Haitians claim that this is not true and defy any white man to produce evidence of guilt. But, notwithstanding, no one can read the horrible tales published by one of the British ministers to Haiti, which described in detail the revolting practices of the voodoos, together with the proofs he brings to substantiate the truth of the allegations, without coming to the reluctant conclusion that cannibalism is resorted to in these meetings. Of course, no white man could long live on the island after having given testimony leading to the conviction of culprits in such cases, and therefore the negroes' demand for proof can never be satisfied. Indeed, it is said that even some presidents who have openly discouraged the voodoo practices have come to violent deaths from this cause.

The character of the meetings of the voodoos, which take place in secluded spots in the thick woods, is well known, and I have been given a description of one of them from an eyewitness, who is an officer of our navy, which no one could hear without a shudder. He states in brief that one day while out hunting he abruptly ran into a camp of worshippers, which was located in a lonely spot in the woods, and the horrors he there saw made an indelible impression upon his mind.

When his presence was discovered he was immediately seized by a frenzied crowd of men and women, and for some minutes there did not seem to be a question but that his life was to be forfeited; but the Papalois called a halt and a council, apparently, to determine what action should be taken, and while this was in session a handful of coin, judiciously scattered diverted the thoughts of the negroes for the time being from their captive. The usual sacrifice of a live white rooster was now brought on, seeing which the people were called back to their worship, and the ceremonies went on in his presence.

In the horrible struggle which took place for possession, the bird was torn literally to pieces, and he had no doubt that its accompaniment, the "goat without horns" would soon follow. While this was in progress his presence seemed to be forgotten, and, watching a good opportunity, he ran for his very life, not stopping until he reached the protection of his ship.

Says Prichard in *Where Black Rules White:*

But there is one thing common to the whole country, of which every Haitian denies the existence. Vaudoux is the one thing which they declare they have not. They tell you there is no snake-worship (I am speaking of the higher classes) within the bounds of the republic. But when you betray certain knowledge of the subject, they admit that though sacrifices and savage dances may take place in other departments, no such things are known in that one in which you at the moment find yourself.

Thus in Jacmel they told me I should find Vaudoux in Port-au-Prince and the Plain of Cul-de-Sac. In Port-au-Prince as I was actually returning from witnessing a sacrifice within the limits of the town, I was advised to go to the Cape, where alone such rites flourished. And at the Cape they told me to take ship for Jacmel, for there I would assuredly find them. As a matter of plain fact, the traveller riding across the country in any direction is quite likely to come suddenly in view of the ceremonies in full swing. He will see the tell-tale dances, the faces smeared in blood, perhaps even the body of the black goat, the sacred sacrifice.

In *The Wake of Columbus*, Ober further says:

It may bear away the palm of being the most foul-smelling, dirty, and consequently fever-stricken city in the world. Every one throws his refuse before his door, so that heaps of manure and every species of rubbish encumber the way.

As to the streets, they do not seem to have been mended for the last hundred years. The Haitians have a saying, "Bon Dieu gâte li; bon Dieu pareé li." God spoilt them, and God will mend them. As the "bon Dieu" only helps those who help themselves, and as the Haitians have no desire to help themselves in the way of making or repairing their roadways, their condition is frightful beyond description. The gutters are open, pools of stagnant and fetid water obstruct the streets everywhere, and receive constant accessions from the inhabitants using them as cesspools and sewers. There are few good buildings in town, and none in the country, the torch of the incendiary being constantly applied, and no encouragement offered to rebuild, through protection of the government or local enterprises. Buildings destroyed by earthquake or fire are never replaced, and the nearest approach to rebuilding is seen in the slab shanty leaning against the ruined walls of a large structure demolished.

Rear-Admiral Colby M. Chester in his article on "Haiti: A Degenerating Island," further says:

Of the eleven ports of Haiti open to foreign commerce, Cape Haitien and Port-au-Prince are the largest and most progressive.

Cape Haitien, or "The Cape," as it is commonly called, is situated on the northwestern coast, at the foot of a hill that slopes back to the sea, with most picturesque surroundings. It has a commodious harbor and supports a population of 30,000 or 40,000 people. Under the French, it was the capital of the colony, and its wealth, splendor and luxury gained for it the name of Little Paris; but now the structures erected by the French in colonial days are a mass of ruins, the parks overgrown with tropical weeds, the fountains choked with debris, the gutters filled with filth, all producing pestilential emanations from which foreigners speedily run away, if they are forced into its environments.

Port-au-Prince, the present capital of the Republic, as well as its largest and most important city, is likewise most picturesquely located at the foot of hills, where one may escape from its blistering and filthy streets to mountain resorts that would be popular if located in almost any country of the world. Unlike Cape Haitien, the city is cut off from the trade winds, to which this island owes so much of its salubriousness, and therefore it is hot; but still the traveler caught in the town may frequently felicitate himself when he reads that cities in our own country have higher temperatures by 10 to 15 degrees than is usually found here. The city is well supplied with the most delicious mountain water, and if its 60,000 inhabitants used it as freely as do Americans, it might be as clean as nature made it. As it is, it may well hold the palm for being the most filthy, foul smelling and, consequently fever-stricken city in the world. The gutters of the streets, which may be said to cover the whole roadbeds, are filled with stagnant waters and are used as cesspools by the people. But for the torrential rains, which pour down the mountain sides and carry off all the filth, into the beautiful bay, even a Haitian could not live there. But the bay, thus polluted, is quite as much of a menace to health as the city itself. During the visits of American men-of-war to the port, most of the time is spent in keeping the people from the pestilential vapors which emanate from the sea itself. The water of the harbor is so bad that it cannot be used even for scrubbing the decks of the ship.

Froude in *The English in the West Indies*, further says:

No one can foretell the future of the Black Republic, but the present order of things cannot last in an island so close under the American shores. If the Americans forbid any other power to interfere, they will have to interfere themselves. If they find Mormonism an intolerable blot upon their escutcheon, they will have to put a stop in some way or other to cannibalism and devil-worship. Meanwhile, the ninety years of negro self-government have had their use in showing what it really means, and if English statesmen, either to save themselves trouble or to please the prevailing uninstructed sentiment, insist on extending it, they will be found when the accounts are made up to have been no better friends to the unlucky negro than their slave-trading forefathers.

Mining is largely an unknown occupation in Haiti. Agriculture has languished, although it is true that in 1912 the coffee crop increased and concessions have been made to some timber enterprises, but little has been done in the way of enterprise and action in this island, situated athwart the commerce of the world. If this condition was sporadic and lasted but for a time it would be a proposition for consideration, but when the island is lapsing practically into degeneracy, when the government is a continuous revolution and the state of religion is as the proofs indicated in this paper, are not the peace and safety of this country constantly in peril by reason of the condition of this island, so near to us and so important to our life?

These statements are not pleasant. They are not made for any sinister purpose, but rather to bring to the attention of our people a condition of affairs at our very doors which is of vital and increasing importance to this nation. It is easy to apply the Monroe Doctrine as to non-interference on the part of European nations with our hemisphere. The great question is our own position with the nations of this hemisphere, which may offend against the doctrine which conserves the peace and safety of our government. With the world movement of today, with the enormous changes which have taken place by reason of the building of the Isthmian Canal, it is idle to say that our peace and safety can be preserved if we sit by and allow an international nuisance to bring upon this country the interference of the nations of Europe, and compel us by blood and treasure to enforce the original application of our doctrine of European non-interference. Free Cuba and the free Central and South American states attest the fact that one of the great fundamental desires of this republic is that it shall be surrounded by free people and governments. Is it not apparent, however, that the time has arrived when the conditions in and along the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea can no longer be tolerated? These seas, for many years, have been silent seas. The conditions are now reversed and the great trade routes of the world will pass about these islands and over these seas, and they will be noisy with the whirl of the propeller and bright with the sails of ships. This island will be in the midst of a world-wide traffic and commerce, whose freedom and non-interference are practically guaranteed by this country.

Can the peace and safety of this country be preserved unless we adopt the measures which are the inalienable right of every nation? The world, with the shortening of trade routes, the touching of nations, and their demands for sure commercial conditions, is arriving at the thought that there is no inalienable right on the part of any people to control any region to the detriment and injury of the world at large. This is not a covert statement, that under the Monroe Doctrine this nation can take control of the affairs of other states of this hemisphere, when the policy of that country does not suit our theories and ideas. It means, however, that when a country of this hemisphere persists in being an international nuisance, when it shows to the world a condition of general degeneracy by which it practically gives notice that there will be no improvement, that this government, under the Monroe Doctrine, will adopt measures for its own peace and protection and for the preservation of the trade and commerce of these seas, which are practically within its commercial life.

The Monroe Doctrine, I repeat, is nothing more nor less than a doctrine of self preservation. To permit the condition of the island of Haiti to exist, without interference or protest on our part, is illogical. Under the Monroe Doctrine we practically say to European nations that they shall not for any cause lay their hands heavily upon a country in this hemisphere. At the same time, in accordance with the views of many people of our day, we ourselves have the right to do nothing. Hence, unless we interfere or permit the European nations to interfere, there must be a continuance of the status of that country.

The original object of the Monroe Doctrine was to prevent the control and colonization of the independent states of this hemisphere by European nations. As I have before stated, this does not mean that with any orderly or stable government this government should occupy the position of suzerainty or implied control. No American believes that great states, like Argentina, Brazil or Chili, with their stable governments, should be under our implied or actual control. Still, every one who understands the conditions of the day, believes that a logical corollary of the Monroe Doctrine demands that the nations of this hemisphere shall, in their governmental affairs, do nothing which would infringe upon or impair the peace and safety of the American government. Since the construction of the canal this condition has become intensified. This government is practically a

trustee for the world in its possession of the Isthmian Canal. Is it conceivable, that with our enormously increased interests we should sit idly by and allow the peace and safety of this country to be interfered with by a country which is a plague spot to the nations of the earth? A great part of American commerce and a large part of the traffic of the world will be through the American seas between the walls of this canal and by the shores of this island. These seas will become more populous with commerce than any other section of the world. They will be a gathering place and crossing point for the east and the west, and their possession, either forcibly or otherwise, will carry with it more potentiality than the possession of any other body of water on the face of the earth. It will be absolutely necessary that the outposts of the canal shall be in the hands of strong and stable governments, and it cannot be thought that the harbors necessary for that commerce and the islands by which it will pass, and in whose broad bays it will be compelled to anchor, shall be rife with revolution and dangerous to that commerce. Is it reasonable that this country, which is practically guardian of this commerce, will allow a condition to obtain which will be a daily menace to this great American commerce, and surely bring about the complications which must interfere with the peace and safety of this country? This great traffic must be clear and uninterfered with, and the responsibility is upon us to see that within these seas the rights of a hundred million people and their unborn descendants shall not be interfered with by countries which are not able to preserve a stable government for themselves.

The government believes that the fundamental principles of a country's life should be freedom and consent of the governed, yet it is idle to speak of the consent of the governed in an island which has never known anything but a blood stained despotism.

Ex-President Roosevelt in "Chili and the Monroe Doctrine," says:

> It is untruthful folly to assert that it is possible for the United States, or for any other great nation, to treat an anarchic and wrong-doing country on a footing of real and full equality of which I have above spoken as representing that plane of conduct which should characterize all the dealings between my nation and your own, and my nation and certain other South American republics. I hope, and I am reasonably confident, that the less advanced nations of the New World will in their turn gradually advance just as my nation and yours, as well as certain others, have already advanced. As soon as any such nation

in the course of its advance reaches a position of self-respecting strength and orderly liberty and achieved power to do and to exact justice, then it should at once step out from any position of tutelage in any respect.

A distinguished writer in advocating the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine speaks of it as if all danger to the South and Central American republics was over. Permit a little plain speaking on this subject, for it is sometimes helpful in the great as well as in the small affairs of the world. I believe if it had not been for the promulgation and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine by this republic, there would not today be on the continent of South America or in Central America a government independent of European control. Let us look at the situation of today throughout the world, and ascertain if there is any change in the desires of the nations since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. The earth hunger of the European countries is fiercer than ever in its history. Their vastly increasing populations demand an enlargement of their national life, and the peoples of the European governments demand more food and more labor than their countries can furnish. The great new markets of the world are South and Central America, China and some parts of Africa. China has been practically delimited into the spheres of influence by the European and the Japanese governments, and Mongolia has been raped from her bosom. The gaunt breast of Africa has been seized and marked out for their own by the European governments. The whitening bones of Italian, Arab and Turk in Tripoli, the fierce anger of France and Germany only last year over Morocco, the busy colonization plans of Europe in Northern Africa, the strife of the dying Moslem Empire, the seizure and occupation of Egypt by England, and the tremendous conflict between Russia and Japan, which in its last analysis was a conflict for territory, all attest that today the earth hunger is not satiated by the peoples of Europe. I say it solemnly and with all the earnestness with which I can express it, that I believe, were it not for the power of the Monroe Doctrine, within ten years, excepting Argentine, Brazil and Chili, there would not be a free and independent government in South America. Their marvelous natural wealth, their splendor of climate, their richness of flora and fauna, and their wealth of precious metals, would more surely provoke the desire of the European nations than the gaunt, fever stricken and the fierce sunburned wastes of Africa.

Those who feel that the Monroe Doctrine is outworn and that it should be abrogated evidently do not remember very modern history. My meaning is illustrated by one of the great A B C nations of the South American continent. Many of us remember the incident as of yesterday, when the revolution against the republic was inaugurated in Brazil. For the purpose of reëstablishing the empire the navy of Brazil was in favor of the overturning of the republic and the restoration of the Braganza family to the head of an imperial Brazilian government. In the harbor of Rio Janeiro was congregated an assembly of the warships of the monarchies of Europe and the Republic of the United States. The commanders of the European squadrons were in sympathy with the revolutionists and unwilling to do anything which would interfere with the plans of the Imperialists. When the Imperialists attempted to establish a blockade, to carry out their plans of revolution, the American commander, acting under the Monroe Doctrine, by direction of our government in Washington, was the only naval commander who objected, and he cleared for action and forced the admiral commanding the Imperial forces to desist from his purposes. It must be remembered that this was only in 1893, and happened to the great republican government of Brazil, our friend and neighbor.

Let us take another modern and well known application. So late as 1894, the British government attempted to force a situation with Venezuela, which would bring about British control of the Orinoco region and practically shut up in British hands the control of one of the greatest rivers of commerce, a region which has imperial potentialities of trade and commercial life. Had it not been for the strong hand of this government, acting through and under the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine, today an important field of commerce, a vast region of South America, a great portion of an independent republic, and the control of a mighty river would be in the grasp of the British empire.

The question of European interference today is not dead. To every one who reads, there arises the question of the settlement of the position of the great foreign colonies in South America. Every well informed student of public affairs and international matters is looking forward to the time when friction will develop between the home governments of these colonists and the republics within whose territories they live.

Secretary Olney says:

> The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of states to each other depend, not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of the powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our civil war to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past and may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To abandon it, on the other hand, disregarding both the logic of the situation and the facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has proved both an easy defense against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal progress and prosperity.

We desire to go in peace and equity with the peoples of this hemisphere, to that consummation where all will be kindliness and trust between this republic and our neighbors. Still, the great thought of this republic is that it is best for all to maintain the Monroe Doctrine in all its virility. With our President we expressly disclaim any desire of conquest, nor do we wish any suzerainty or control of the stable nations of this hemisphere. Here is where the correct differentiation is lost sight of in the Latin countries. It is idle to speak of the great nations, stable and orderly as they are, as standing on a level with disorderly, revolution-ridden despotisms, such as have been discussed and which in many instances obtain in Latin America. This great doctrine is fundamentally necessary to the existence of the peace and safety of this country, yet we wish the help and the assistance of the great and stable nations of South America to carry it to its great fruition.

The application of these propositions to the subject under consideration is plain. Whilst this government has no desire for conquest, yet the great advance in the world movement and in the vital commercial affairs of the globe, demands that the peace and safety of this hemisphere shall not be needlessly and wickedly broken, and that the peace, happiness and safety of this nation and the commerce of the world within the bounds of our governmental life shall not be im-

periled in the future as they have been in the past. The tremendous impetus, which under the world movements of today, has been so potent and plain, demands order in all of the affairs and details of its life. The conditions of the times and the dependence of one part of the globe upon the other, brought about by the easy interchange between the nations, mean that no disorder in that great world commerce will be again lightly tolerated.

Under the plainest and fairest interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine it reaches easily the subject under discussion. Under its original application it will not allow a situation to obtain which will give the opportunity for foreign nations to interfere in the governmental life of countries of our hemisphere. Under the fundamental meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, it will imperil the peace, safety and happiness of this country if an island, lying at our doors, within touch of our daily life, athwart our greatest line of commerce, shall continue its life of disorder in the future as it has in the past. This position of our country should breed no distrust among our self-respecting and stable neighbors on this hemisphere. We will go along with them, hand in hand, and with their assistance help the nations which are weak, and do what we can to place them on eternal foundations of freedom, prosperity and order, so that they may become part and parcel of this great free brotherhood on the western hemisphere.

A great writer speaks of the abrogation of the doctrine, and voices the distrust and suspicion among the nations of the southern hemisphere. To this we reply with the pages of history, and ask under what government, people, or system, that has ever existed since history began to write its pages, have there been preserved, in their freedom and governmental life, so many weak nations as have existed on this hemisphere, side by side with this powerful republic? He has cited as cause of distrust California and Mexico. These were life movements, absolutely instinctive in their being, and demanded by the very existence of this nation.

Distinguished writers so frequently discuss the jealousy of the South American nations towards the United States by reason of the Monroe Doctrine. One has gone so far as to give in detail the size and strength of South American dreadnaughts, and to deal with immense particularity as to the amount of beef and wheat raised and shipped by these nations.

It is true that some jealousy does really exist. That cannot be

avoided. The thinking statesmen of the South American countries, however, do not believe in the unjust aggression of the United States. Those of them who know the situation and understand it do not fear the Monroe Doctrine or its consequences. There are professional politicians in South America who fan the embers of distrust for their own uprising and their own purposes, but the great trend of sentiment and thought on the part of the leaders in the great states of South America is not in this direction.

I quote the statement of Señor Zabellos of Argentina, as a fair indication of the thought of those of South America who know the real feeling of our country towards its southern neighbors:

> What other countries of America have the same world problems as Panama and Mexico, the latter on the frontier of the United States, and the former the throat of the continent itself? They have nothing in common with the problems of the River Plata, or the shores of Brazil, or the coast of Chili. The Monroe Doctrine is necessary today to the United States. The Caribbean Sea washes the coast of the richest part of the United States, and it is necessary that it be dominated by them, in order to guarantee the independence and security of the United States. Under these circumstances, when there is constant danger of European intervention, as in the case of Venezuela, the United States said to the powers, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, "You can urge your claims in accordance with international procedure, but you cannot take territority, because if you do you will have to deal with the armed forces of the United States." The powers thereupon became less aggressive and the matter was settled by arbitration. This action of the United States emphasized once more the doctrine that no European power will be permitted to acquire territory on the continent of America.

Thoughtful men do not agree with the contention in some directions that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced under an agreement with South American states. It seems that this would be impracticable. The Monroe Doctrine necessarily is an emergency doctrine. While it is fundamental the demand for its action is immediate and decisive. It is a doctrine which demands absolute and direct action to make it effective. Very many serious questions arise as to the practicability of the carrying out of any such agreement between the states of South America and the United States.

In the first place, the interests of this government are greater than the interests of any other government on this hemisphere. What relative power would this government have as against the other contracting powers? The Monroe Doctrine is a doctrine peculiarly

applying to the United States. When this doctrine is divided, so that it applies to other governments, necessarily the very essence of this doctrine is done away with.

Again, it has been the history of international affairs, that agreements between nations, diverse in thought, life, sentiment, situation, and race, have never been successful. Here would be an agreement for the enforcement of the doctrine between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin nations absolutely different in temperament, and also between nations whose whole financial and local situation is absolutely different from that of the United States.

Suppose, for instance, a question should arise between England and some of the South American states, and that the contracting powers for the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine would be the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chili. Those who know the situation in Argentina would not suppose for a moment that Argentina would oppose England in some controversy as to some minor state, which would be important to the United States, but relatively unimportant to Argentina. This illustration applies with equal force as to the other South American states. The money with which these great states are being developed, and the population which is largely engaged in developing them, come from Europe and Europe could injure these states financially if they opposed European interests in and about the enforcing of the Monroe Doctrine.

This is a mere illustration of the multitude of troubles which would come by an agreement that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced by a joint action of South American states and the United States. The questions are so absolutely diverse as between the United States and these countries, that no unity of action could be brought about so as to make the enforcement of the doctrine effective. While this is true the Monroe Doctrine should not be enforced with a strong hand, but should be carried out in justice, in courtesy and in fairness between our country and the countries of South America. This honesty and respect obtain among nations just as among men and by the immutable laws of cause and effect, and the action of this government upon a high plane will surely obtain and hold the respect of the countries of South America.

The Monroe Doctrine within its very nature is a doctrine which is fundamental and peculiar to the United States. While it should be carried out in justice, the mode, the time, the place and the manner

of its operation should be, and I believe will be, directed and controlled absolutely by the United States. To place it in other hands would be the destruction of the doctrine, which has been vital to this country and to this hemisphere, and cause the weakening of the hands of this government in the direction where international trade and life will demand that our hands should be strong, and absolutely free to act decisively in the great international emergencies which arise so unexpectedly and which are fraught with such momentous consequences.

The doctrine of Monroe is a doctrine of help and peace. It is true that those who love our country believe that this Republic "looks hopefully to the time when by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American." Still these governments and their systems are here and are part of the life of this hemisphere. They will surely demand that we preserve order and conserve the safety of the commerce within our sphere. This means absolute order. To bring about this order this government will not hurt the self-respect or pride of any great and stable nations of our hemisphere. We will work with them along the lines of mutual respect and esteem. Touched by the new life, which is making them so vital and important a part of the world affairs of the day, they will understand that the conditions of other days cannot continue, and that the responsibilities brought about by present world conditions demand that our safety and peace, as well as theirs, compel the continued existence of the Monroe Doctrine in its full virility. When this is understood there will be no distrust. There will be the co-mingling of nations with the same governmental freedom. It will be a great brotherhood, and the only one, of free people and free nations marching onward hand in hand to the consummation of that blessed time when the strong will not oppose the weak, and when filled with mutual esteem, confidence and regard, and touched by the wondrous vitalizing life of freedom, the nations of this hemisphere, great and little, Latin and Anglo-Saxon, will show to the world the splendor of freedom in its highest and best development.

THE LATIN VIEW OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Leopold Grahame,

New York.

Although there are many conflicting opinions as to the ramifications of the Monroe Doctrine, it seems to me that the Latin view is that which must ultimately prevail in defining its status. The issue is clean-cut. It is whether the Monroe Doctrine is to be unilateral, or continental, in its operation; and upon this issue the retention of the doctrine as an integral part of the national policy of the United States must alone be determined. The considerations involved in this aspect of the question are vital to the commercial and political interests of the entire continent. Irrespective of the scope, or the limitations attaching to the famous pronouncement of President Monroe, its application must, in future, be dealt with even more from the standpoint of policy than from that of technical or convenient construction. The doctrine was ostensibly conceived and formulated exclusively in the interest and for the protection of all the American countries; and no selfish motive has ever been attributed to its original framers by any of the parties comprehended within its provisions. Its position, therefore, rests entirely on the territorial integrity of the American republics; and any other interpretation would make it an object of antipathy, not only to the Latin-American people, but to all the civilized powers of the world.

It has been urged by many eminent public men, including ex-President Roosevelt, that the very conditions which led to the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine conferred upon the United States not only by implication, but by necessity, the right to extend its protection of the Latin republics to the point of active intervention when the existence of disturbing conditions in any one of them might be thought to jeopardize its national independence. It should be remembered, however, that the United States has never assumed responsibility for the acts of those countries, but has, on the contrary, always maintained that, whilst it would not sanction the acquisition or occupation of the territory of an American republic by a foreign power, it would assist such power to protect its subjects from moral or

material injury in cases of national wrong-doing; and to that extent the doctrine, though not incorporated into international law, has been accepted without reserve by practically all of the European governments. Nor, indeed, are there to be found, so far as I am aware, any historical records to sustain the contention that the Monroe Doctrine is anything more than a logical culmination of an order of political ideas initiated by the declaration of American independence to separate the interests of the two hemispheres and to prevent European intervention in the internal affairs of the countries on this side of the Atlantic.

Let me ask in what cases the relations of a Latin republic with a European government might call for the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States? The answer, I think, would be civil wars and insurrections; outrages inflicted upon foreigners; failure to fulfil contracts with them; their unlawful expulsion; and default in payment of public or private debts. These, in the abstract, would constitute the most likely reasons for a possible future application of the Monroe Doctrine; and within the last ten years we have had practical demonstration of the willingness of the great powers of Europe to accept the American view and to submit the differences arising out of such matters to the judicial methods of international courts of arbitration. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine, in its original and real sense, is universally established and admitted; and I cannot conceive either the moral or legal grounds upon which the United States can lay claim, in regard to the Latin republics, to a right so admittedly and so strongly denied to the nations of Europe.

We know from the fully recorded proceedings of the negotiations between President Monroe and the British government, preceding the formal declaration of the doctrine, that Mr. Canning, whilst adhering to its principles, steadfastly refused to allow the British government to become an official party to its formal establishment. The American minister, Mr. Rush, repeatedly informed his government of his belief that Great Britain had suspicions that the United States entertained designs of securing commercial advantages and of creating a hegemony on the American continent. Is it, then, surprising that, with latter-day occurrences in mind, the Latin-American republics should also entertain suspicions as to the motives underlying the various and frequently strained interpretations placed upon the Monroe Doctrine by many leaders of American thought?

It must be borne in mind that although successive Presidents of the United States, in recent years, have often stated, with undoubted sincerity, that this country has no idea of obtaining an inch of Latin-American territory by conquest, circumstances have arisen to justify the belief in many of the smaller republics of this continent that their complete independence is not quite so secure as they would wish. Common sense points to the conclusion that if, rightly or wrongly, the British government harbored doubts in the matter of American policy, in the early twenties of the nineteenth century, even in the face of the solemn declarations of such men as Monroe, Clay, Adams, Madison, Jefferson, Rush, Gallatin, and other equally conscientious and patriotic citizens, it can hardly be a matter of surprise that the Latin-American sense of security has been weakened by what has transpired in the recent past in the policy of the United States towards the sister republics. I do not for one moment assume or believe, that enlightened public opinion in this country, official or unofficial, regards either as desirable, or justifiable, encroachments upon the sovereign rights of the Latin-American nations. On the contrary, I assume and believe that the main purpose of the policy of the United States in relation to the other republics is to maintain and perpetuate their absolute independence. Therefore, I would further ask, what advantages are to be secured by the extension of the scope of the Monroe Doctrine beyond that so specifically expressed by its original founders?

The people of Latin America are of common origin. Their emancipation was secured by arduous struggles with their former oppressors; and an attack upon the dearly-bought independence of any one of the republics is reflected throughout them all. Their view of the Monroe Doctrine is that, although it has its origin in the United States, it is part of the international law of the American continent, where each nation is a distinct unit, with equal freedom and sovereignty and with no prerogative extended to any single one of them to control a continental policy. They regard the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument designed to proclaim the existence, in the western hemisphere, of independent nations, with the right to implant laws and institutions for the government of free people, without interference or dictation at the hands of the monarchies of Europe; but those republics would consider their last condition as worse than their first, if a distorted interpretation of the doctrine were to lead to any of

them becoming, what, for all practical purposes, would be vassals of the United States.

In a brilliant address recently delivered in Chile, Mr. Roosevelt dwelt at length upon the scope of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to the acquisition of territory on this continent by a European power; and referred specifically to two cases in which its operation would supersede treaty obligations. He said:

> It was announced the other day in the South American press that the United States was about to agree to a treaty with Denmark which should provide that all questions, even those affecting national honor and interests, should hereafter be arbitrated. Under such a treaty Denmark would have the perfect right to sell the island of St. Thomas to any great military nation of Europe, and any arbitral court would decide that she had the right. Yet, no patriotic American of courage and sound intelligence would hesitate for a moment to say that, treaty or no treaty, such action could not be tolerated by the United States. In the same way, if Mexico chose to sell Magdalena Bay to some great Old World power, any arbitration court would decide that Mexico had the right to do so. Yet, it would be a criminal act for the United States to permit such a sale. As regards St. Thomas and as regards Magdalena Bay alike, not only would the Monroe Doctrine forbid the transfer of either to any foreign power, but, even if it did not, and if no such doctrine were in existence, the United States, if it possessed the slightest wisdom, could not permit such transfer to take place. It is worse than folly, it is mischievous hypocrisy, to make promises which ought not to be and would not be kept.

The same principles were enunciated in the Lodge resolution adopted by the United States Senate at the time of freely current rumors that Mexico was on the point of effecting a sale of Magdalena Bay to Japan. I make bold, however, to differ from the view implied by the distinguished authors of those pronouncements, for the simple and logical reason that the other parties to the arbitration treaties are fully acquainted with, and, in most cases, have recognized the purposes of the Monroe Doctrine; and so, in the event of such a point arising, could not reasonably demand its submission to arbitration, unless the transaction involved had been carried out with the express object of challenging enforcement of the doctrine. But it is not in this phase of the matter that the real danger exists. The doubts and suspicions of the Latin republics as to the ultimate aims of the United States are accentuated by the widening of the Monroe Doctrine to ends never contemplated by its authors. It is such incidents as those which have occurred in Mexico, in Nicaragua and in Colombia, that have led to a growing belief in the supposed desire on

the part of the United States to establish a suzerainty over some of the republics of Central and South America; and, even though there be no payment of a money tribute, or no open claim to the right of veto, or to the right of intervention in the internal affairs of the other states, the repetition of such acts as are here indicated, would, to all intents and purposes, confer the power of suzerainty upon the United States.

All Latin-American publicists concede that the Monroe Doctrine has indirectly conferred benefits upon the world at large and that the extraordinary development of some of the countries of South America is within certain limits, due to its existence and operation. This recognition may be seen in the subsidiary doctrine so ably expounded in December, 1902, by my distinguished friend, Dr. Luis M. Drago, then minister of foreign affairs of the Argentine Republic, and accepted by the Latin republics, as well as, with very slight modifications, by the United States. It may also be seen in the address delivered by the late Mr. Emilio Mitre, to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, on the occasion of a visit to that country of Mr. Secretary Root. In one passage of his speech, Mr. Mitre said:

> When President Monroe formulated his doctrine, he decreed peace between Europe and America. In short, the Monroe Doctrine was the veto of war between the countries of the two hemispheres; and from the ashes of the conflagration which had occurred prior to the declaration of that noble policy, there have grown up youthful nations which, today, are themselves strong enough to proclaim the same doctrine as the motto upon their national shields.

Ex-President Roosevelt truly describes the situation when he says that the Monroe Doctrine is looked upon with favor and is even welcomed as an American policy by the leading statesmen of South America; but what they approve and welcome is the Monroe Doctrine as they view it; and not as it is viewed by a great number of the public men of the United States. The Argentine Republic has special reasons for gratitude for the past existence of the Monroe Doctrine, not least amongst which are, that it was the first of the Latin-American republics to be recognized by the United States; and that it was enabled, largely through the re-assertion of that doctrine, to remain over a long period in undisturbed possession of the extensive and then undeveloped Patagonian territory, which is now becoming such a valuable national asset. Yet, knowing as I do, the honorable and liberty-loving character of the Argentine people, I venture to assert that

there is not a public man of that country who would sanction, for one moment, the further endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine, if he believed it implied a claim to intervention in the domestic concerns of even the least important of the American republics. The comments of the Argentine press on Dr. Drago's famous note to the minister of that republic at Washington clearly confirmed this view of their attitude towards the Monroe Doctrine. Some of the authorities of that country went even so far as to assert that if the official interpretation of that instrument, by the United States, is of such a character as to become a menace to the commercial interests of the European powers, the Argentine Republic would find itself unable to favor a policy whereby it would be drawn into a conflict with the countries whence it had derived its immigration and the capital which had developed its resources.

Looking at all these circumstances and at the change of conditions in all the American republics from those existing in their early stages of nationhood, there would appear to be little reason and less justification for the assumption, by the United States, of anything in the nature of a protectorate over them. This country has the right to adopt measures to secure the fullest protection of its citizens and their interests on the borders of a turbulent neighbor, such as every nation enjoys in other parts of the world; but it derives no prescriptive right from the Monroe Doctrine to encroach upon the independence of any other sovereign state.

Briefly summarized, the situation, as already stated, must be viewed alike from the standpoints of justice and expediency. Justice unquestionably demands the complete independence of all the republics of the New World. To deny this is to stultify the utterances of every President of the United States since the declaration of its independence. On the other hand, expediency dictates that "honesty is the best policy;" and that moral as well as material loss must necessarily follow the pursuance of a course of action which would alienate the sympathies and friendship of the twenty independent nations described as the Latin Republics of America. In other words, it would involve the sacrifice of commercial and industrial expansion to political considerations that would bring no corresponding advantages. The really sane view of the Monroe Doctrine is that its provisions should be enforced only against those who seek to violate them and not against those in whose interest they were framed.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN VIEW AS TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE[1]

By Paxton Hibben.

It is not my purpose to speak to you at any length on the Monroe Doctrine, albeit I have very positive opinions on every phase of that most vital international question, which has been so ably treated by other speakers. I wish merely to protest, and to protest very earnestly, against what I must believe the impractical idealism of a view, not only of the Monroe Doctrine, but of the proper Latin-American policy for the United States to pursue, which seems in recent years to have grown like a prodigious snowball, simply by being pushed about from hand to hand by the political philosophers of this country. I refer to that view so eloquently presented to you this morning by Mr. John Barrett—that the United States invite to join them, in their maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, those nations of South America which, in Colonel Roosevelt's phrase, have "risen to a sufficient point of economic well-being, of stable and orderly government, of power to do justice to others and to exact justice from others, and therefore of potential armed strength to enable them thus to act as guarantors of the doctrine."

In my own humble opinion the Monroe Doctrine is not and should not be a cardinal principle of Pan-American policy, nor a tie to bind us to our sister republics of the south. It has had its privileges through ninety years that we have been comparatively free under its operation from the threat of European aggression in this hemisphere. It has its responsibilities of which I, for one, think we may not in honor lightly discharge ourselves. But the privileges and the responsibilities are ours, and ours alone. We may not share them. And, frankly, not one of the three great republics at the southern extremity of South America for a moment desires to share them with us. Those who claim that the Argentine, Brazil and Chili, and perhaps Uruguay, are eager or even willing to join with us in any closer bond than that which unites friendly nations, have erected in their imagination an alluring mirage which they will never, I believe, attain.

[1] Remarks at the session of the Academy, Friday afternoon, April 3, 1914.

Colonel Roosevelt's words on this subject have been quoted to you. Yet curiously enough, those of Dr. Marcial Martinez in reply to Colonel Roosevelt's address before the University of Chili, on November 22 last, make no part of the record of these proceedings. It is that they shall be recorded here that I have ventured to intrude upon your time.

For Dr. Marcial Martinez is a very old and a very wise and prudent statesman. In his lifetime he has himself seen the growth not only of his own country, but of the Argentine and Brazil as well, to a condition of power to do justice to others and to exact justice from others, and his words reflect better, I think, than those of any other man in the countries of which I speak—a crystallization of opinion which is the product of the development and prosperity of those nations in whose history he has played no minor rôle.

I quote only part of Dr. Martinez's remarks:

"My frankly stated opinion," he says, "is that the Monroe Doctrine has lived out its time, has ceased to exist." And again: "Clear and definite situations are always preferable to the vaguenesses, the uncertainties and the anomalies to which the lapsed Monroe Doctrine lent itself"—unminced words to address to one bearing the suggestion that the Monroe Doctrine be accepted and maintained by certain republics of South America in concert with the United States! And Dr. Martinez goes on to define very clearly that situation which he and, I believe, the ablest minds of Latin America consider preferable to the Monroe Doctrine.

"The eminent Mr. Roosevelt," he continues, "has frequently spoken, in the course of his present triumphal journey, of 'confidence.' But confidence, like religious faith, can be no matter of agreements nor of decrees, nor of contracts, unless it be an actual fact, emanating from a reciprocal experience, from individual conviction and personal conscience."

And in regard to all the treaties which we have been at such pains to make or the making of which we have been at such pains to stimulate, since the idea first occurred to Mr. Elihu Root to legislate peace into the hearts of the denizens of this hemisphere, by means of a fine network of conventions of arbitration, Dr. Marcial Martinez pronounces this final judgment:

I believe it will always be a wise counsel to suggest to the American Republics: that they celebrate few if any new treaties with the idea of strengthening

their reciprocal friendship. What is of real value are cordial and effective demonstrations of palpable good faith, of probity and disinterestedness in political and commercial relations, which conduce to the result for which we all hope, instead of words evaporating into nothingness. . . .

Another point upon which I would touch briefly is that of international arbitration. My way of thinking, deeply rooted in my mind, brings me to this complex conclusion: I think that the very ancient idea of universal peace, which nowadays is enjoying an extraordinary recrudescence, is a beautiful illusion, a noble chimera which lends itself to dangerous sophistries. . . .

One idea which is absolutely fixed with me is that arbitration is not an adequate means to the conservation of peace. Extensive study and careful observation have convinced me long since that this method suffers from numerous and very grave defects. This is not the moment to enlarge upon these ideas; what I advise, and what I wish is that those distinguished men, who busy themselves in recommending arbitration, shall regard with favor the employment of every energy to promote the idea of direct understandings, of conciliation, of compromise and fraternal agreement. This is the great formula for friendship, and consequently for international peace. An understanding leaves no bitterness behind it, whereas an adverse decision leaves ice on the soul of the loser. . . .

Whatever must be brought about between this powerful country, the United States, and the South American Republics, will come of itself. Sympathy, loyal and honorable treatment, proximity, an intimacy as close as possible between the men directing the destinies of these peoples, and especially reciprocal interests will of themselves effect a political and an economic entente. There is need of no artificial measures, for they are ever fragile and often unproductive. The play of the natural laws of human progress must be left free.

As it has seemed to me manifestly inadequate to consider the present status of the Monroe Doctrine without taking into account this view of the relations between the United States and their sister republics of this hemisphere, which I firmly believe is the prevailing view in the greater part of what we call Latin America, I am grateful to this assemblage for this opportunity to read into the records of the American Academy of Political and Social Science a conception of our relations with Latin America which has found no other expression here.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND LATIN AMERICA

By Joseph Wheless,

Attorney at Law, St. Louis, Mo.

The single purpose which moves me to a discussion of the phase of this subject indicated by the title of this paper is to endeavor to clear away the obscuring mists of misunderstanding which have been blown up around the Monroe Doctrine in its immediate relation to Latin America. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free," is the inspired text of the evangel of better understanding which I come to preach. It is the same high desire as actuated Mr. Calhoun in his great speech in the Senate on the same subject—"I remove a false interpretation, which makes safe and proper declarations improper and dangerous." To accomplish this, I shall rely not upon arguments of mine own, and but a few North American interpretations, but shall appeal to the best accredited utterances of the most authoritative statesmen and publicists of our neighboring states of Latin America.

That a false interpretation and misunderstanding of the Monroe Doctrine, and of the policy of the United States thereunder, do exist, and have been responsible for no little ill-feeling and irritation, is unfortunately true and cannot be ignored. This fact was regarded by President Roosevelt as of such importance as to be made the subject of special comment in a message to Congress. In his message of December, 1905, he refers to this fact, and seeks to dispel the error underlying it in emphatic language:

> In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States towards the other American republics. An idea has become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied, or carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that doctrine applies. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet that impression continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade. The impression was so widespread that apparently it could not be reached by any ordinary means.

Certainly no one has been more earnest or used more emphasis than has Mr. Roosevelt, in proclaiming the true gospel of the policy and mission of the United States in respect to the American nations, and in striving to allay the baseless fears of aggression and aggrandizement which many profess to feel towards the government at Washington. The truth of his so often repeated declarations of the good will and peaceful designs of the United States regarding Latin America cannot be gainsaid. From his repeated utterances on the subject two representative and official statements may be cited. In his message to Congress of December 3, 1901, the President said:

> The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. . . . . This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires.

Again in the message of December, 1904, President Roosevelt states strongly his views of the policy and duty of the United States:

> It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards other nations of the western hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship.

One of the most friendly critics of the Latin-American policy of the United States is Señor Alejandro Alvárez, of Chile, whose work, *Le Droit International Américain*, is a luminous study of this and kindred subjects. Frequently, in this and other published works, he calls the Monroe Doctrine "the political gospel of the New World." But this same writer expresses the further truth that there exists in the minds of many persons, even statesmen and writers on international law, a serious confusion of ideas as to what is the Monroe Doctrine; they confuse with it and attribute to it every action and policy of the United States having any relation to Latin America. Señor Alvárez goes directly to the root of the matter, saying: "Distinctions should be made between (1) the Monroe Doctrine in its primitive form; (2) the hegemony of the United States on the American continent; and (3) the imperialistic policy of that Nation." Failure to make these very obvious distinctions, due to confusion of thought

or to inadequate knowledge of American history as it relates to Latin America, is responsible for the whole unfortunate crop of hostile criticisms of the Monroe Doctrine and of ill-will towards the United States as sponsor for that doctrine, except such part of these attacks as is due wholly to the ignorance or malevolence of their authors. This fact is clearly recognized by Señor Alvárez, who says: "Publicists have not only failed to see the real origin and nature of the doctrine, but have disfigured its true meaning;" and he adds: "For the majority of persons, it is the basis of the policy of hegemony which the United States is developing on the American continent." Further, on this latter point he says:

> These points of view are inadmissible, since the idea of hegemony does not grow out of the Monroe Doctrine nor is its development dependent upon it; and the same objection may be made to the attempt to include within the category of "hegemony" every step taken by the United States in international policy in the American continent.
>
> The hegemony of the United States is the fruit of the prodigious and rapid development attained by that country, outdistancing the other American republics, and the *de facto* recognition of this circumstance not only by the states of Europe but also by those of America. . . . .
>
> The United States as the most powerful of the states of America becomes the natural spokesman of the continent and charges itself with the duty of making its ideas respected, to the mutual advantage of all.

This "confusion of ideas" in respect to the Monroe Doctrine, and the very prevalent disposition to make it a sort of scapegoat for all the manifestations of the policy of the United States, which are regarded by our neighbors as acts of "hegemony" and of "imperialism," has had a recent striking exemplification. This was the failure of the gracious and just act contemplated in the Fourth Pan-American Conference looking to an expression of appreciation of the benefits of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America. The Latin-American delegations feared, as expressed by Señor Alvárez, that "while approving it, they might sanction along with it many acts of hegemony committed by the United States by which more than one country had felt its sovereign dignity to have been wounded."

This state of facts should give sober pause to all those in the United States who are charged with the important and delicate task of shaping the relations between our country and our neighbors of Latin America. The latter, it will be seen, cordially approve "the principles which properly belong to the Monroe Doctrine," while they

have taken offence at and cherish resentment of "certain trends of policy which are foreign to it," but which they undiscerningly confuse with the Monroe Doctrine, to its disparagement and to the detriment of the good relations which it is our desire and our duty to cultivate with our sister republics. It behooves us then, who desire to steer our course along the safe and pleasant paths of international friendship and goodwill, to do our utmost to dispel the misunderstanding, at home and abroad, of the true import of the Monroe Doctrine, and by future considerate conduct avoid all offensive "acts of hegemony" which are complained of, even by friendly critics, as having wounded the sensibilities and the sovereign dignity of our neighbors.

The most succinct, as well as authoritative, statement of the Monroe Doctrine is found, naturally, in the text of President Monroe's historic message of December 2, 1823. It embraces two separate but correlated propositions, the essential words of which are:

> 1. . . . . the American continents . . . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . .
>
> 2. . . . . we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.

In THE ANNALS of this Academy for May, 1911, Señor Alvárez makes an analysis of President Monroe's Message, and deduces the generally accepted estimate of its political content. He thus summarizes:

> The declarations of an international character contained in this document may be reduced to three:
>
> 1. No European country may gainsay the right gained by the nations of the New World to their independence and sovereignty.
>
> 2. The right is recognized of these same American nations to organize such forms of government as best suit their interests without the intervention of any European country in the affairs relating to internal regulation; and
>
> 3. European nations are prohibited acquiring by occupation any part of the American continent.

The foregoing simple propositions are the "whole of the law and the prophets" of the Monroe Doctrine. As Señor Alvárez proceeds to say: "These declarations, by their preciseness and definiteness, became henceforth the political creed of all the nations of the New

World. . . . . And this is so true that all those nations strove for the solemn proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine at the American International Congress which met at Panama in 1826." No candid mind can justly discover in any of the propositions of this traditional American policy any broader scope or ulterior purpose than those stated.

In view of the carping criticism of our American patriots-at-large in aid and comfort of its ill-advised maligners abroad, we must discover what really is the status of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, officially and among those whose opinion is authoritative.

With the utmost enthusiasm and gratitude was the message hailed by the South American states, whose independence was forever assured by the policy declared by President Monroe; their governments, and the heroes of their independence, declared their hearty approbation of its principles. Bolivar proposed it for general ratification at his projected Panama Congress; and from that date, says Señor Alvárez, "all the Latin states have not only striven to proclaim it solemnly but also to unite to make it respected"—for, he says, it "expressed the aspirations of all America." A distinguished Spanish publicist, Exmo. Señor Alejo Garcia Moreno, in a study of "The Monroe Doctrine," in 1909, says:

> These principles proclaimed by Monroe were accepted universally, in the first place, in the opinion of the people of the United States, and then in that of the other American republics, and the Monroe Doctrine was thus converted into a principle of American public law, which received its solemn consecration in the Congress of the States of the South, reunited in Panama in 1826.

The highest and most authoritative men of the states of Latin America are outspoken in approval and praise of the Monroe Doctrine, which has indeed long been an acknowledged Pan-American principle. Señor A. de Manos-Albas, called by the late William T. Stead "one of the shrewdest and ablest public men to whom Latin America has given birth in our time," says: "There was an element of prophetic inspiration in the declaration of President Monroe, uttered in 1823. It rang through the world like a peal of thunder; it paralyzed the Holy Alliance, and defined, once and for all time, as far as Europe is concerned, the international status of the newly constituted American republics." The brilliant Peruvian, Garcia-Calderón, in his justly celebrated new work, *Les Démocraties Latines de L'Amérique*, says, in grudging admission of the truth: "The United States proclaimed

the autonomy of the continent and contributed to the preservation of the originality of southern America, by forbidding the formation of colonies within their vacant territories, by defending republican and democratic states against reactionary Europe." Before the Fourth Pan-American Conference, Dr. Victoriano de la Plaza, Argentine minister of foreign affairs, recognized the same truth: "This condition of precarious autonomy and liberty of action, and the constant danger of being subjugated or suffering the mutilation of their territory, would have continued among those weak states but for the wise and famous declarations of President Monroe, to which we ought to render due homage." I present a final citation from the highest authority, the eminent Argentine, Señor Luis M. Drago, whose words are commended especially to those who persist in a misconception of the spirit and purpose of the Monroe Doctrine. In his famous note, in 1902, formulating the "Drago Doctrine," he appealed to the saving grace of the Monroe Doctrine as against European aggression in Venezuela; elsewhere he calls it "the formula of foreign policy of the new world." In a recent exposition of his own celebrated doctrine, he uses these measured and weighty words:

> The Monroe Doctrine is in fact a formula of independence. It imposes no dominion and no superiority. Much less does it establish protectorates or relation of superior to inferior. It creates no obligations and no responsibilities between the nations of America, but simply calls upon all of them, with their own means and without foreign aid, to exclude from within their respective frontiers the jurisdiction of European powers. Proclaimed by the United States in the interest of their own peace and security, the other republics of the continent have in their turn proceeded to adopt it with an eye alone to their own individual welfare and internal tranquillity. This moral consort of intentions and tendencies constitutes in itself alone a great force without need of treaties or formal alliances or definite obligations. Thus understood, the Monroe Doctrine, which in the end is nothing more than the expression of the will of the people to maintain their liberty, assures the independence of the states of that continent in respect to one another as well as in relation to the powers of Europe.

Such illuminating statements of the principles which inspire the policy known as the Monroe Doctrine, and its hearty acceptance in Latin America, should have the happy effect of dissipating the misunderstanding of that doctrine which is so prevalent among many not only in Latin America and Europe, but among some in the United States who should better understand their government

and its historic polity. It may be added, that every nation of Latin America, admitted through the action of the United States to the last "Parliament of Mankind" at The Hague, has, in concert with all the other nations of the world, given its express assent to the Monroe Doctrine as an essential Pan-American principle.

The last word of authoritative interpretation was uttered but the other day by ex-President Roosevelt in his address before the University of Buenos Aires, in which he declared:

> The Monroe Doctrine is meant to express the fact that the western hemisphere is not to be treated as Africa or mid-Asia is treated, as a subject for conquest by any Old World power. It is a doctrine which the United States promulgated, partly as a matter of policy in its own interest, partly as a matter of policy in the interest of all the republics of the New World.

And in expression of a very patent, but often perversely unrecognized truth, he added:

> But as rapidly as any other republic grows to possess the stability, the self-respecting insistence upon doing right to others and exacting right from others, just so soon that country becomes itself a sponsor and guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine with which the United States of the North no longer has any concern, so far as the doctrine relates to it. . . . . As far as you (of the Argentina) are concerned, we have no more concern with the Monroe Doctrine about you than you have about us. If ever it became vitally necessary to enforce it, each would help the other.

The Monroe Doctrine, in its pristine significance, is thus seen to stand accredited, approved, and adopted by all America; it has won universal acceptance on its merits, and needs no defender or apologist. It will endure as an active principle until its protective and civilizing mission is accomplished with the emergence of all the American countries into self-sustaining nationality; until, in the eloquent words of Exmo. Señor Bermejo in his closing address before the Fourth Pan-American Conference,—"the day when America entire shall have finished her institutional evolution in the sense of forming 'an indestructible union of indestructible states,' as runs the phrase consecrated by the most authoritative Areopagus on earth." Then only may the Monroe Doctrine be dubbed, by irreverent schoolmen, an "obsolete shibboleth;" but it will be cherished by the emancipated nations as of blessed memory through all coming time.

As a ward against European aggression, the Monroe Doctrine is not yet "obsolete." Those who so passionately demand that we "abandon the Monroe Doctrine," show that in their zeal they reck not the lessons of history and that they "ignore the plain facts of the present." Señor Alvárez recognizes that it is still the welcome shield and buckler of Latin American independence and integrity, saying: "These states not only do not reject it, but have sought and always will seek protection under it whenever it may operate for their benefit." The Peruvian, Señor Calderón, who virulently assails the United States because of his own "confusion of ideas" respecting the Monroe Doctrine, terrified by the spectre which he raises before himself of a Japanese invasion and conquest of Latin America, "to erect there a new Japan," takes comfort to his fears, exclaiming: "The Monroe Doctrine, which liberated Latin America from the tutelage of the Holy Alliance, is perhaps destined to protect it also against the Orient." He begins his chapter "Le Danger Allemand," with the fearsome words: "The Teutonic invasion disquiets the Hispano-American writers. The tutelary protection of the United States does not suffice to make them forget the European peril." Elsewhere he dwells upon the fact that "tenacious Teutonic colonizers" flow into Brazil, Chile, and other countries of South and Central America, —"the German danger remains." As for Japan, he says: "her statesmen and publicists consider that Peru, Chile and Mexico are lands for Japanese expansion," and he gloomily predicts "a struggle between half-breed America and stoical Japan, in which the former will lose its autonomy and its traditions."

History has been a long record of expansion of active and populous nations into the territories of weaker and less populated states. There is nothing to indicate that this movement has reached its final period. Indeed, the struggle for expansion for over-flowing populations is reaching its most acute stage. The possibility of a "scramble for South America" does not exist alone in the fears of some South American theorists. Practical men of state openly express them, and some of the land-hungry have been frank to avow their annoyance with the restraints of the Monroe Doctrine. An English writer in the *Nineteenth Century Magazine*, December, 1896, speaks cynically and covetously of the alluring possibilities in a "scramble for South America," and says, "if it once begins, neither the latent resources nor the moral influence of the United States

will avail to protect its clients without the display of effective military strength."

Again an English writer, Mr. Somers Somerset, in the same magazine, for April, 1903, at the time of the Venezuela troubles, defines the "new economic necessities" which look towards Latin America for a solution, and says:

> In proportion as the available surface of the earth that is suitable for colonization decreases, it becomes more and more evident that not only is there no time to be lost in founding an empire, but that the price which a people may be able to allow itself to pay for the acquisition of that territory is greatly rising. The constant pressure of the peoples of Europe, the commercial struggle, and the natural desire for national aggrandizement are bound to be powerful factors; and the consideration of "now or never" will very soon mark the policy of various European chancelleries. We have already seen that the Old World offers few attractions—there remains only the New World to be considered.

The veto of the Monroe Doctrine, in the opinion of this writer, has up to this time saved the American countries from European aggression; but he adds: "it must be remembered that during that time the world afforded many opportunities for colonization in other regions, and that that period is drawing to its close, and it is scarcely to be expected that a mere formula or opinion will continue to protect those countries for long." That this is a real condition, and not a theory, is the belief of the most accredited Latin American statesmen. The events in Venezuela, says Dr. Juan A. Garcia, are not isolated facts, measures of policy, or reparation of wrongs, "but the opportunity which materialized a tendency latent in Europe since the middle of the past century which in the last years has been emphasized and fortified by the new economic necessities." This subject is treated at length and very seriously by Dr. Luis M. Drago, in a recent explanation of his action, in 1902, in appealing to the protection of the Monroe Doctrine in behalf of Venezuela as against the aggression of England, Germany and Italy. His note pointed out, he says:

> A danger that lay very near and it aimed to forestall it. At the time when it was transmitted everything combined to inspire the greatest alarm. There was rife in political and diplomatic circles a constant agitation which was dominant, and was disseminated by the greatest newspapers of the world, the most important and best accredited reviews and the books of thoughtful men, and which pointed out these countries as the best fields for the colonial expansion of the great powers, once the doors of Africa and the Orient were closed.
>
> Thinkers of the highest rank have suggested the advisability of turning

in this direction the great efforts which the principal powers of Europe have hitherto made for the conquest of sterile regions, with rigorous climate, lying in the most distant corners of the world. There are also many European writers that point out the countries of South America and their great wealth, with their sunny skies and propitious climates, as the natural theatre where the great powers with their arms and instruments prepared for conquest have yet in the course of this century to dispute dominion. . . . . The act of coercion attempted against Venezuela seemed consequently to be the beginning of the hostilities predicted against America.

Writing about a year ago in the English *Review of Reviews*, Señor A. de Manos-Albas calls Latin America "a tempting field for expansion," and frankly states the incentives which the American El Dorado offers to the avidity of the land-grabbing expansionists of Europe:

The territorial responsibilities of the Latin-American nations are greatly in excess of their respective populations. The seventeen republics from Mexico to Cape Horn, with an area several times that of Central Europe, contain at best seventy million inhabitants, who could be comfortably housed in any one of the larger republics, leaving the immense remaining territory available for European expansion. Can Tripoli compare with the broad and fertile plains of Northern Venezuela, bordering on the Caribbean? Or Morocco with the Atlantic coast section of Colombia? Can the Congo compare favorably with the Amazon, or Madagascar or West Africa with the inner lands of Peru, of Bolivia, or of Ecuador?

The consideration of such possibilities implies no wanton spirit of alarmism. If Tripoli has been thought worth Italy's present effort, and Morocco France's recent venture, why should not the infinitely richer Caribbean coast fare likewise? No one in his senses, surely, would outrage the powers by supposing that their abstention has been prompted by moral considerations; their reputation is too well established.

From the foregoing, which are but a few of many similar expressions of covetous desire towards the teeming possibilities of Latin America, may be better appreciated the significance of the avowal of Señor Alvárez when he frankly declares the reality of these fears and the only hope of salvation, saying: "The Monroe Doctrine, far from being a thing of the past, as some publicists pretend, is still of present importance in the sense that it denies the existence of territories '*nullius*' which could be acquired through occupation by European countries."

It is needful to consider briefly that "confusion of ideas" which associates the welcome and approved Monroe Doctrine with so-

called "acts of hegemony and imperialism," of which complaint is made, and which are, rightly or mistakenly, the cause of existing suspicion and ill-will. Knowing the truth and justice, or otherwise, of these charges, we may better be able to make any proper *amende honorable* for the past by more considerate action in the future.

The writer who most formally makes these charges and formulates the specifications of grievance, is Señor Calderón, in his recent *Les Démocraties Latines de L'Amérique*. He opens his chapter entitled "Le Péril Nord-Américain" with these ominous words:

> In order to defend themselves against Yankee imperialism, the American democracies would almost accept a German alliance or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere, the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles, in Central America, the hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the character of a Latin crusade.

It is well to examine for a moment his catalogue of grievances, which he reiterates as reasons for what he calls "an accumulation of hates" against the United States, and because of which, he declares, "the statesmen of the South refuse to believe in the friendship of the Yankees." After citing the "incessant territorial expansion" of the United States, from the Louisiana purchase to the Panama Canal Zone, he concatenates every cause of complaint which he can conjure to his imagination, as follows:

> Interventions become more frequent with the expansion of frontiers: in the territory of Acre, in order to found there a republic of rubber-hunters; in Panama, to develop a province and construct a canal; in Cuba, under the cover of the Platt amendment, to maintain internal order; in Santo Domingo, to supervise the customs; in Nicaragua, to sustain civilizing revolutions and overthrow tyrants; in Venezuela and in Central America, to impose on those nations, torn by intestine discords, the political and financial tutelage of the imperial democracy. In Guatemala, in Honduras, the loans closed with the monarchs of North American finance reduce the peoples to a new slavery. Supervision of customs, expeditions of pacificatory fleets which defend the interests of the North Saxon, forced tranquillity and peace, such are the means employed . . . . The fortification of the Panama Canal, the possible acquisition of the Galápagos Islands in the Pacific, are new manifestations of this imperialistic progress.

A quite similar catalogue is set out in the open letter addressed recently to President Wilson by Señor Manual Ugarte, the foremost apostle of the proposed Pan-Latin crusade against the "colossus of

the North." True, neither Señor Calderón nor Señor Ugarte shows wherein Latin America is wronged by any of the acts recited; none of the acquisitions of territory, for over half a century, has been at the expense of any country of Latin America; and every "intervention" has been in signal benefit of the country concerned and of civilization. The United States has expanded, in obedience to its "manifest destiny," until it fills out its continental domain; that is an accomplished fact, and justified by national necessity and by civilization. However, and far from a spirit of recrimination, but in justice to the truth of history, which is now past, and never, it is to be hoped, to be repeated, must it be said, that if any of the events instanced have, indeed, tended to give occasion for the irritation attributed to them, the acts complained of have been abundantly provoked. The United States, in all conscience, has been far "more sinned against than sinning." The truth of this is witnessed by the Hon. James Bryce, who very justly says:

> United States statesmen found themselves from time to time annoyed by the perversity or shiftiness of military dictators ruling Spanish-American countries. The big nation has, however, generally borne such provocations with patience, abusing its strength less than the rulers of the little ones abuse their weakness.

One further citation of complaint from Señor Calderón. He quotes the eloquent and earnest words of Secretary Root, at the Third Pan-American Conference, where, "before assembled America the lay preacher of the new evangel" said: "We wish for no victories except those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic." Over against these golden words, which Señor Calderón calls "the solemn declarations of a Puritan politician," he sets, misquoted and out of its context, the language of Secretary Olney to Lord Salisbury, in defense of Venezuela against Great Britain, to the effect that "the United States is practically sovereign on the American continent;" and Señor Calderón asks "Where is the truth, in the imperialistic declaration of Mr. Olney or in the idealism of Mr. Root?" I cannot

stop to demonstrate the fallacy of this mis-quotation, as I have done in my book on this subject; I will only say that these words, well qualified, were used in a "defi" to Great Britain, and to define the attitude of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine as towards Europe, and not as respects Latin America, as a reading of his note shows. And in 1907, before the American Society of International Law, Mr. Olney himself clearly defined the relations of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America, declaring:

> The United States under the Monroe Doctrine assumes no protectorate over any other American state; attempts no interference with the external any more than with the internal affairs of such a state; asserts no right to dictate the domestic or foreign policy of such a state; and claims no right to use force in the affairs of such a state except as against its enemies and to aid it in defending its political and territorial integrity as against any European aggression.

To persist, after reading the foregoing words of Mr. Olney, in appealing to his "practical sovereign" talk to Lord Salisbury, either to bolster up baseless attacks or to create prejudice, would savor much of the trick of a shyster lawyer in citing to a court an *obiter dictum* from a case which he knows to have been overruled. All fears of imperialistic expansion of the United States, at the expense of Latin America, should be considered as foreclosed by the emphatic and official utterances of President Wilson, at Mobile:—"The United States will never seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." Furthermore, whatever may have been the modicum of justified complaint in the past, the present is very pregnant with roseate prospects for a happier era of good feeling and better relations for the future. In this regard the earnest words of President Wilson in his Mobile address to Latin America are of propitious augury, and should find hearty response with every good American:

> The future is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. These states lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now be drawn closer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of common understanding of each other. . . . . It is a spiritual union which we seek.

While the Monroe Doctrine protects Latin America from Europe, some of our neighbors cherish the fear that it is not a sufficient guaranty of protection against its own champions. *Quis custodiet*

custodem? queries Señor Calderón. And while Señor de Manos-Albas says that the Monroe Doctrine was like a gift in the cradle of the nascent nationalities, the latter have acquired the classic superstition expressed in *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.* A remedy to remove such fears, and to realize the auspicious avowal that "the future is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past," I feel will be very welcome.

To broaden the Monroe Doctrine from a North American policy into a genuine Pan-American principle is the easy and welcome solution. Happily this is one of the most manifest tendencies of the times, as is witnessed by many authoritative acts and utterances in North and South America. As early as 1862, in a note addressed by the foreign minister of Costa Rica to the Colombian government, this "old, old story but yet forever new," of fears of the United States, is recited, together with some suggestions of current significance:

> If our republics could have the guaranty that they had nothing to fear from the United States of North America, it is indubitable that no other nation could be more useful and favorable to us. . . . . The idea has occurred to my government that a new compact might be drafted by which the United States should bind themselves solemnly to respect, and cause others to respect, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the sister republics of this continent. . . . . Resting upon a treaty of this kind, our republics would admit without diffidence, and without preoccupations in regard to the future, the idea of an intimate alliance with the North American people; they would feel as if they had entered into a new life, and be possessed of greater strength; they would get rid of the serious and just fears which our race has felt; they would march together with a firm step towards such a unity of institutions and interests as would change the face of the American nations, and lay the strongest foundation of our great continental alliance.

Señor Manos-Albas, writing on this subject in the English *Review of Reviews,* stated his plea for "a new declaration of Pan-American policy" in very earnest words, from which I briefly quote:

> The means to accomplish unity of sentiment and to dispel the misgivings between the United States and the Latin-American republics is not far to seek. It is only required to amplify the Monroe declaration to the full extent of its logical development. . . . . If the United States should declare that the era of conquest on the American continent has been closed to all and forever, beginning with themselves, the brooding storm of distrust will disappear from the Latin-American mind, and an international cordiality of incalculable possibilities will ensue, not only for the welfare of the American nations, but universally for the cause of freedom and democracy.

Commenting on this, which he calls "a masterly presentation of a plea for taking a forward step towards the world's peace," Mr. Stead says:

> As there is not a citizen of the United States who desires to make any such conquest, the acceptance of such a formula by the Government at Washington would have as its first and immediate result the removal of the one great obstacle which hinders the extension of the influence and the interests of the United States in Latin America.

Practical recognition of the wisdom and desirability of a co-operative policy, and practical steps towards its realization, have been taken, and, as I have said, mark one of the most manifest tendencies of our international relations. In the first Pan-American Conference at Washington, in 1889, a resolution was unanimously adopted "That the principle of conquest shall not . . . . be recognized as admissible under American public law." At the present time there is pending in Congress, twice favorably reported by the House foreign affairs committee, a resolution of which Mr. Slayden, of Texas, is the author, reciting that "the peace and commercial development of the American continent would be more certainly and speedily assured if the various South, Central and North American governments were reasonably assured against the forced permanent loss of territory as the consequence of war or otherwise," and resolves, "that the President of the United States be requested to enter into negotiations for the making of a treaty that will forever quiet the territorial titles of the various American states." It is understood that the executive branch of the government heartily approves the principle of this resolution and is working towards the end suggested.

Another step, already begun, and the ideal of Pan-American confraternity is happily consummated. The republics of Latin America have long been silent partners, and indeed the chief beneficiaries of the North American doctrine; that they would welcome being invited into full partnership, sharing in both its benefits and responsibilities, is evidenced by many tokens. Taking as an instance a possible intervention to secure the establishment of peace and order in Mexico, Mr. Sherrill, late Minister to Argentina, well expresses the advantage of a sort of American concert of powers, suggesting that, rather than action by the United States alone, that Argentina, Brazil or some other American country be invited to join with us. The effect of such

joint action he says, in the case instanced, as well as whenever "an occasion for armed intervention in this hemisphere arises," would

> have two marked tendencies, both of which would be highly desirable. First, it would entirely remove any idea among our South American neighbors that our purpose was land-grabbing. . . . . Furthermore it would be the best and most convincing form of invitation to Latin America to participate equally with us in the responsibilities and development of the Monroe Doctrine. The great Doctrine would at once become continental, and cease to be unilateral, which is today its one great defect.

Precedents for joint action, with the happiest results, may be cited. A signal example was the coöperation, in 1907, of the United States and Mexico in bringing order out of chaos in Central America, resulting in the notable series of treaties signed at Washington between the five republics. Later, in 1911, the United States, Argentina and Brazil by their joint representations, prevented the outbreak of war between Peru, Ecuador and Chile. These instances, as said by Dr. Blakselee, "show that the United States has already made a beginning of working in unison with Latin-American states in enforcing the police power of the continent. It only remains," he justly remarks, "to extend this occasional coöperation into a definitely formulated and generally accepted policy. The new Monroe Doctrine," as he terms it, "would accomplish everything that the present Monroe Doctrine accomplishes, and much more. It would create a genuine Pan-Americanism."

The advantages of such an international *entente* for the welfare of a hemisphere, inestimable in making for peace, friendship and civilization in America, are admirably stated by ex-Secretary Olney in a recent public address:

> That an American concert of purely American states would occupy a position in America practically equivalent to that of the European concert in Europe; that it would tend to avert wars between states as well as insurrections and revolutions within states; that it would do much to further trade and commerce and intercourse of all kinds between the various American states; and that the United States, as a leading member of the concert, might be counted upon as an agency for good even more potent than if acting in the invidious rôle of sole and supreme dictator, seem to be tolerably sure results.

In South America there exists a great league and confederation between its three leading powers, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, popu-

larly known as "The A B C of South America." These great powers, among the most friendly to the United States, might readily be won into such a peace-making concert. These three great countries occupy much more than half the extent of the South American continent, and contain much more than half its population. The language of Secretary Blaine, in 1882, in reference to Brazil, is, *a fortiori*, much more significant if applied to the great A B C league:

> Brazil holds, in the South, much the same relationship to the other countries that the United States does in the North. Her domanial extent, her commerce, and her advancement in the path of successful progress exerts a beneficial and lasting influence in South America. . . . . All this tends to make that empire as necessary a factor in securing peace and harmony in America as the United States itself, while its interests in the great and humane results proposed are fully commensurate with our own. . . . . What, then, is more natural than that these two great powers should earnestly unite in a movement which, it is hoped, will mark an historical epoch in South America, and exert its influence on countries beyond the seas, and on generations yet unborn.

Such an invitation to an American co-partnership, extended to the partners of the A B C league, together with several of the other stable republics, would, no doubt, be welcome and cordially accepted. The United States exchanges Ambassadors with Brazil and Mexico, thus recognizing them as equals on the highest plane of international society. A like exchange with Argentina and Chile would signalize our deserved respect for these potent nationalities and their welcome into the new American concert; a congress of these American ambassadors could readily consummate the "spiritual union" which President Wilson assures that we seek with the nations of America. The basis of such a union would be recognized friendly equality, and would necessarily carry the pledge of respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, so much desired by our neighboring republics. As said by the well-known Argentine political writer, Señor Leopoldo Lugones, in the *Revue Sud-Américaine:*

> Never has the realization of Pan-Americanism been more necessary in the New World than now. . . . . But Pan-Americanism means nothing without the United States, which represents in America the realization of the right to independence and the triumph of democracy. The first formula of Pan-Americanism, limited to the needs of the policy of defence, is the Monroe Doctrine. Its declarations constitute the most significant and decisive act towards guaranteeing the independence of the Latin-American states. Thanks to the Monroe Doctrine our territorial integrity has been preserved—and that in itself

is enough to insure the United States our everlasting gratitude. . . . . If the Monroe Doctrine guarantees to these states the integrity of their territories and their institutions, Latin Americans have nothing to fear, ... secure in the belief that the Monroe Doctrine, which yesterday assured our independence, will preserve it to us tomorrow.

I wish to close by quoting the eloquent words of Hon. John Barrett, Director General of the Pan-American Union, in a recent address which I heard him deliver in Washington:

I believe that the time has come when there can be evolved from the Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle, and there can be substituted for the "Monroe Doctrine" as a phrase, the principle and phrase of a "Pan-American policy." . . . . The Pan-American policy would adopt, absorb and enlarge the Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States into a greater and "All-American" policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position, and the same sense of independence as the United States now has. . . . . By the substitution of "Pan-American" for "Monroe" and thus including all the American nations as sponsors; and by the substitution of "policy" for "Doctrine," and thus removing the hard, unyielding, dictatorial and didactic suggestions of the word "doctrine," a long step will be taken towards a new era of Pan-American comity and confidence. . . . . Then we will have achieved that ideal, unselfish and fraternal relationship of the American governments and peoples which will give a new, worthy and permanently accepted significance to Pan-American relationship, Pan-American accord and Pan-American Union.

I have sought to present a consensus of American opinion as to the Monroe Doctrine, its past signal services, its present significance and its high potentiality to the future welfare of all America. I trust to see the early transmutation of the Monroe Doctrine into a Pan-American policy.

THE EFFECTS OF THE PANAMA CANAL ON OUR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

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The Panama Canal, Mr. Bryce tells us in his book on *South America*, is the greatest liberty man has taken with nature. He then proceeds to propound some very interesting questions as to the probable effects of the canal on world commerce and, in a less degree, on world politics, also as to its effects on the political relations of Central and South America. He does not answer his own questions, however, the political effects being too delicate a question to be discussed by a diplomat, and the commercial effects being as yet too problematical to warrant a forecast. On the latter point he says: "If a dozen of the most competent experts were, in 1914, to write out and place in the library of the British Museum and the Library of Congress their respective forecasts bearing on this subject, sealed up and not to be opened till A.D. 2000, they might make curious reading in that latter year."

While it may not be safe to make a forecast as to the commercial effects of the canal, I believe that we can point out pretty definitely some of the political changes that it will bring about, for these changes are already well under way. New policies suggested or rendered necessary by this great enterprise have already been formulated to a far greater extent than is generally realized. This paper is, therefore, not a forecast so much as a statement of policies now in the making.

The building of the canal has, in the first place, rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in the Caribbean Sea, and, in the second place, it has led to the formulation of new political policies to be applied in the zone of the Caribbean—what Admiral Chester calls the larger Panama Canal Zone—that is the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. The policies thus far formulated include the establishment of protectorates, the supervision of finances, the control of all canal routes, the acquisition of naval stations, and the requirement that governments shall be constitutional and based on the consent of the governed.

Taking up a discussion of these policies my first proposition is

that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was a turning point in the history of the West Indies, in that it was a formal recognition of the transference of naval supremacy in the Caribbean from Great Britain to the United States. The Spanish war contributed in no little degree to that consummation; the economic decline of the British West Indies and their growing dependence on the American market had, no doubt, something to do with it; above all the rapid naval growth of other European powers presented to Great Britain so serious a situation that she wisely decided to cultivate friendly relations with the United States and to remove all causes of possible conflict; she deemed it unwise, therefore, to continue to insist on the joint control of the canal recognized by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty half a century earlier. The advance of the United States in the West Indies has been rapid: Porto Rico was annexed at the close of the Spanish war and Cuba became a protectorate; the Dominican Republic a little later came under the financial supervision of the United States; and the canal zone was leased on terms that amount to practical annexation. The supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean is now firmly established and in fact unquestioned. The political relations of the countries bordering on the Caribbean will of necessity be profoundly affected. Our Latin-American policy, if you object to the name Monroe Doctrine, has been enlarged in meaning and limited in territorial application so far as its new phases are concerned.

The original Monroe Doctrine announced our purpose to protect all the independent Latin-American states against political interference by European powers. We have now gone a step further and established formal protectorates by treaty over Cuba and Panama guaranteeing them not only against outside interference, but against internal disorders, and a similar protectorate over Nicaragua has been proposed. On July 19, 1913, a treaty signed with Nicaragua by Mr. Bryan was submitted to the Senate. It embodied almost word for word the Platt amendment, which defined our relations with Cuba. Nicaragua agreed not to declare war without the consent of the United States; not to sign treaties giving foreign powers a foothold on her soil; not to contract any foreign debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the country; and to recognize the right of the United States to intervene for the purpose of protecting the independence of Nicaragua.[1]

[1] *Am. Year Book, 1913*, p. 91.

There were other equally important features of the treaty which will be considered in a moment. But the Senate refused to ratify it. The committee on foreign relations reported it unfavorably by a vote of eight to four.[2] The press reports indicate, however, that this treaty project has not yet been finally abandoned, but that ratification will be again urged upon the Senate as soon as more pressing matters are disposed of.

President Roosevelt's Dominican policy added an important corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. He held in brief that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt American republic in the hands of receivers, the United States must undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its finances; that to allow a European power to take possession of the custom houses to collect the duties, the only effective method of paying the foreign debt, would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctant Senate to acquiesce. In spite of the criticism that this policy encountered, the Taft administration adopted it and proposed to extend it to Honduras and Nicaragua. In January, 1911, a treaty placing the finances of Honduras under the supervision of the United States was signed by Mr. Knox, and in June a similar treaty was signed with Nicaragua. These treaties provided for the refunding of the foreign debt in each case through loans made by American bankers and secured by the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by the President of the United States, and to make an annual report to the department of state.[3] These treaties were not ratified by the Senate.

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to the Senate. By the terms of this treaty Nicaragua agreed to give the United States an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval base in Fonseca Bay in return for a payment of $3,000,000. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the Taft administration was at hand. In July Mr. Bryan submitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition the provisions of the Platt amendment, as already stated above. This arrangement has so far failed to receive the approval of the Senate. It is to be noted that

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1911, p. 97.

the second Knox treaty and the Bryan treaty did not propose financial administration by the United States, but the Bryan treaty bound Nicaragua not to create a public debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the island.

President Wilson's attitude toward foreign concessions is a matter of importance and carries our Latin-American policy a step further. As he expressed it, it is this:

> You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege, and the states that are obliged because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs—a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . . .
>
> What these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate.[4]

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This concession covered practically all of the oil interests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harbors and dig canals in the country. As oil is coming into use as a naval fuel, the occupation of the Colombian oil fields and harbors by a foreign corporation presented a serious question. However, before the meeting of the Colombian Congress in November, 1913, which was to confirm the concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the United States.

The next policy which we shall consider is that of acquiring control of all possible canal routes so that no competing canal may at any time in the future be dug by other powers. The manner in which we acquired the Panama Canal Zone produced a very bad effect throughout Latin America. Following Roosevelt's assertion of the big-stick policy and of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the western hemisphere, his seizure of the Canal Zone—to adopt his own

[4] *Ibid.*, 1913, p. 91.

view of the transaction—aroused serious apprehension and made the countries of Latin America believe that the United States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy to a policy of selfish aggression. His hasty recognition of the Panama Republic tended to strengthen belief in the reports that he had instigated the revolution. Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling was not alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech to the students of the University of California in which he boasted that he had taken the Canal Zone, and that if he had not acted as he did the matter would still be under discussion.

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root had undertaken to reëstablish friendly relations with Colombia by means of a tripartite treaty between the United States, Panama and Colombia. The proposed agreement provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and for the transference to Colombia as Panama's share of the public debt of the first ten instalments of the annual rental of $250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaty was ratified by the United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia. The Taft administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, which resulted in the formulation of a rather remarkable proposition by Secretary Knox shortly before the close of the Taft administration. His proposals were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaty just referred to the United States would be willing to pay Colombia $10,000,000 for an exclusive right of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual lease of the Islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence. These proposals were rejected by Colombia. The American minister, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsibility, asked informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox in reporting the matter to the President said that Colombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.[5]

In his message to the Colombian congress, September, 1913, President Restrepo referred to the concilatory attitude of President

[5] 62d Cong., 3d sess., H. Doc. 1444.

Wilson, and added: "The probability that the service of the Isthmian Canal will soon be available, the advantage of cultivating frankly cordial relations with the United States, the clear and progressive development of our nationality, and the peculiar needs of our maritime departments, are making every day more close our *rapprochement* with the great Republic of the North."[6]

It would probably be wise policy as well as an act of justice on our part to agree upon some compromise with Colombia. While ordinarily a political act like the recognition of a new state is not a proper subject for arbitration, there are certain features of the Panama case which possibly afford legal ground for Colombia's demand for pecuniary damages. I refer to President Roosevelt's interpretation of the treaty of 1846. That treaty was a contract between the United States and Colombia, and yet President Roosevelt construed it as an obligation assumed by the United States for the benefit of the world at large, and under this interpretation he refused to allow Colombia to land troops in Panama for the purpose of putting down the insurrection. If Colombia should continue to insist on arbitration, basing her claims on President Roosevelt's forced construction of the treaty, it is difficult to see how the United States could refuse to submit the question to arbitration.

The Nicaraguan treaty, signed by Mr. Bryan but not ratified by the Senate, provided that the United States should have an exclusive right of way over the Nicaraguan canal route. It was stated at the time that this treaty was negotiated that Germany was considering the possibility of getting the right of way for a canal through Nicaragua, but such a suggestion seems extremely improbable.

Another important policy is the acquisition of naval stations in the Pacific and in the Caribbean. The Bryan treaty with Nicaragua, as we have already seen, provided for a ninety-nine-year lease of a naval base in Fonseca Bay and also for the lease of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean. The Knox proposals to Colombia provided for coaling stations on the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence in the Caribbean.

The last policy to which I shall refer is President Wilson's requirement that the governments of Latin-American states shall be constitutional in form and based on the consent of the governed, or,

[6] *Am. Year Book, 1913*, p. 89. Quoted from *London Times*, September 30, 1913.

to state it negatively, the doctrine of non-recognition. This is of course the policy that the administration has adopted in the case of Mexico. In his Swarthmore speech President Wilson said: "I would like to believe that all this hemisphere is devoted to the same sacred purpose and that nowhere can any government endure which is stained by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the governed." The refusal to recognize a revolutionary government is not as novel a policy as some of the opponents of the Wilson administration would have us believe,[7] but as this question has a special place in this volume I shall not venture to discuss it further.

The building of the canal has thus led to new developments of the Monroe Doctrine, developments not applicable to firmly established states like Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, but limited to what we Americans erroneously regard as typical Latin-American states, that is, the states within the zone of the Caribbean. The new applications of the simple principle announced by President Monroe in 1823 have aroused the apprehensions of certain Latin-American writers, and their denunciations of what they are pleased to call this pseudo-Monroeism have not failed to win the sympathetic support of a more or less limited number of writers in this country. Some of these writers appear to cherish a personal grievance against this cardinal principle of American diplomacy and one writer in particular has vehemently denounced it as an obsolete shibboleth.[8] It is in vain that the critics point out the difference between the doctrine of 1823 and the doctrine of 1914 or the difference between the international situation then and now. If the original policy had not expanded with the lapse of time or taken on new phases with the development of new situations, it would long since have ceased to be of any value to us, for the exact situation that called forth the original declaration in 1823 can never again arise. The Monroe Doctrine is merely a name that Americans have given for ninety years to our Latin-American policy, which in the necessity of things has undergone changes and will continue to undergo them, and it is no more likely that the public will repudiate the name than that the State Department will repudiate the policy.

Señor Calderón, in the Atlantic Monthly for March, 1914, takes

[7] Moore, *Digest of International Law*, I, 138–168.

[8] Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth.*

issue with Professor Bingham's recent attack on the Monroe Doctrine on several points. He says:

> It is not true, as Professor Bingham maintains, that amongst the republics which form the A B C alliance, Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, powerful and solidly organized states, one finds any jealous opposition to the neo-Saxon power—such as would explain, according to Professor Bingham's theory, the alliance of these ambitious peoples. On the contrary, among these nations, out of range of North American action, the liveliest sympathy with the politics of the United States is discernible. . . . . It is rather in the "zone of influence" of the United States, between the northern frontier of Mexico and Panama, in the Antilles, in Colombia and Venezuela, that hatred against the United States has become a popular passion.

His final conclusion as to the future of the Monroe Doctrine we may safely accept: "The wisest statesmen have no thought of divorcing this doctrine from the future history of America, even though they criticize its excesses most severely."

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE CANNING MYTH

By Charles H. Sherrill,

Former Minister to Argentina.

On the twelfth of December, 1826, George Canning, then prime minister of England, made the proud statement in the House of Commons: "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." This striking sentence, pronounced as it was by one of the greatest figures which the English parliamentary system ever produced, has received wide credence ever since, even our own writers admitting that his suggestions had much to do with the wording and promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. In South America, the belief of the people in his controlling part in the acquisition and preservation of their liberty has caused the erection of more than a few monuments to his memory. It is to the credit of those warm-hearted peoples that these testimonials to him were not affected by the frank admission of his boast that he was actuated not by a love for liberty, but by his need for something new to support his foreign policy in European affairs.

The credit for the calling into existence of the New World belongs not to Canning, but to the splendid patriotism of those colonists who by means of many a pitched battle and arduous campaign drove out the Spanish, and even defeated an English army by the River Plate. Theirs is the glory of having alone and unaided gained for themselves the great boon of political independence. All hail, then, to San Martin, to Bolivar, to Sucre, to all their glorious and victorious brothers-in-arms! We shall see that Canning was equally unentitled to the credit of guaranteeing their hard-won independence against the land-hunger of Europe, which has made of Africa a congerie of European dependencies; this credit belongs to the people of the United States who, by means of President Monroe's message, that first clarion call of Pan-Americanism, cried out to all the world, "Hands off! these are our sister republics of this, the hemisphere of freedom."

It is our purpose to show from documents, some long forgotten, some recently published, that Canning himself knew that his boast was an empty one, that his remarks to Rush (American min-

ister in London) had nothing to do with framing the Monroe Doctrine, that it was Rush who, entirely without authority, suggested the co-operation of England with America (just as he had suggested it five years before to Castlereagh), that he, Canning, was surprised by the terms of Monroe's message, was opposed to its guarantee of South American liberty as against Spain, and also to its forbidding Europe to plant colonies in this hemisphere.

The chief reason for the credence generally accorded on this side of the ocean to Canning's claim is Rush's expressed belief that Canning's suggestions were largely responsible for the Monroe Doctrine. It was but natural that Rush should have come to believe this. It was only human for him to attach undue importance to certain remarks of Canning's of which he would figure in history as the medium of communication to his own government. He realized and reported the deep impression made in Europe by the policy announced by President Monroe, but we shall see how far Canning's private views coincided with Rush's beliefs.

Rush tells us that toward the end of August, 1823 (the Monroe Doctrine was not announced until December 2 of that year), after he had broached the subject to Canning of England's following our lead in recognizing the independence of the Spanish American colonies (which we had already done in 1822), Canning sounded him as to whether there could be effected some public expression "intimating the joint disapprobation of Great Britain and the United States of any projects which might be cherished by any European power, of a forcible enterprise for reducing the (Spanish) colonies to a subjugation on the behalf or in the name of Spain; or the acquisition of any part of them to itself by cession or conquest." A similar proposition was made by Canning to France October 9, 1823. It seems to have been entirely overlooked or forgotten that Canning, when interrogated in Parliament "whether the King of Spain would be allowed by this country to seek to cover His Transatlantick Colonies," contented himself with stating "that the mother country had the right to attempt to recover her colonies, but that no foreign power had the right to make that attempt in her behalf." How quickly this was forgotten appears from the fact that shortly thereafter Canning, himself forgetting it, made his famous boast. The struggling colonies heard only of his boast and not of his willingness to return them to Spain from whom they had just won their independence. Also there

has been generally overlooked Rush's report that on November 24, 1823, Canning expressed his belief that a monarchy would be the best form of government for the Spanish colonies—a true friend of struggling republics indeed!

In many writers there may be noted a certain restlessness—a note of protest that so inspiring a triumph for liberty in our hemisphere as was the continued freedom of the Spanish colonies, should have to acknowledge a source no higher up the stream of international ethics than the scheming of a politician who openly claimed that he had created South American liberty to use it as a pawn in his game of European politics! Must we admit that the Monroe Doctrine had its rise in the whirlpool of European chicane, and only later joined the majestic stream of liberty whose fountain head was the Declaration of Independence? I have long felt how glaringly incongruous it was that a cause so far removed from international altruism should have produced so glorious a result, but it seemed impossible to find anything from an English source to disprove Canning's words, although many indications were available to show clearly that President Monroe was but announcing a widely cherished policy of the American people, and not launching a doctrine either invented by himself or suggested to him by any one European or American statesman. All of these indications antedate Canning's suggestion to Rush. The diary of John Quincy Adams, then secretary of state, shows that on May 13, 1818, President Monroe propounded the following question at a cabinet meeting: "Whether the ministers of the United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South Americans, which should not be to promote the complete independence of those provinces; and whether measures shall be taken to ascertain if this be the policy of the British government, and if so to establish a concert with them for the support of this policy." When, as a result of Rush's having introduced the subject, Castlereagh sounded him July 31, 1818, as to coöperation with the United States in respect to mediation between Spain and her colonies, Rush was already authorized to answer that we would not take part "except on the basis of the independence of the colonies." . . . . "A determination to which his government had come on much deliberation." Note this "on much deliberation," and also that this was a full five years before he heard the suggestion from Canning upon which the latter and his

admirers based so much. Jefferson, in a letter of August 4, 1820, to William Short, says: "The day is not far distant when we may formally require a meridian of partition through the ocean which separates the two hemispheres, on the hither side of which no European gun shall ever be heard." No, there should never have been any misunderstanding, at least on this side of the water, as to how generally accepted was this policy of our people to maintain ours as a hemisphere of liberty, nor any ignorance of the fact that Monroe but enunciated an established policy instead of launching a new doctrine. It was but the natural outgrowth and development of Washington's famous declaration against entangling foreign alliances.

Notwithstanding how easy it has always been for a student of American history to show that Canning did not suggest the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, it was not until very recently that anything appeared by way of new evidence, which could conclusively prove that Canning knew when he made this boast that it was not a true one. The discovery to the world of this new evidence adds another chapter to the romance of historical "finds," the unearthing of which is so delightful to the student seeking the reasons for great events. Let us accompany him into the erudite atmosphere of his library where lie piled the dusty tomes and unpublished letters that smugly keep their own counsel and their writers' secrets. By such assiduous delving into ancient records did Funck-Brentano learn from the Archives de la Bastille the real identity of the mysterious wearer of the iron mask about whom Alexander Dumas wove so delightful a web of fiction. John Fiske tells us in his *American Revolution* that it was a similar quest among the old books in the library of the Strachey family at Sutton Court, in the county of Somerset, England, that brought to light the letter of General Charles Lee, written while in a British prison during the revolutionary war, which, some eighty years after the event took place, proved him to have been a traitor. How rightly Washington relieved him from his command after his then inexplicable behavior which so nearly lost us the battle of Monmouth! Imposing is the array of ghosts which have thus accusingly arisen from ancient documents to correct the history of events long misunderstood or incorrectly reported. And from whose forgotten writings shall we obtain unanswerable proof that Canning was not responsible for the Monroe Doctrine, and did not seek to guarantee the freedom of Spanish America? What source could be more convincing than his

own letters to Bagot, English minister to Russia, recently published by a member of the Bagot family? At last we can discard the dramatic statement of a politician made at a strategic moment to support his political purposes, and read the facts as privately written by him at the time to an intimate friend.

In an official letter dated at the foreign office, January 9, 1824, just after receiving news of Monroe's famous message, he says to Bagot: "How far that part of the speech of the President, which relates to Spanish America may . . . . . have been prompted by a knowledge of the sentiments of His Majesty's government upon that subject, it is impossible to say." Speaking of the differences between those sentiments and this speech he goes on to say, "The first and most essential difference is that the government of the United States has actually acknowledged the independence of the late Spanish Colonies, while His Majesty's government continues . . . . still to withhold such recognition. . . . . If the message of the President is to be considered as objecting to an attempt to recover her dominions on the part of Spain herself, there is again as important a difference between his view of the subject and ours as perhaps it is possible to conceive." The "New World" which he later claimed to have created could have again become subject to Spain, if only he be first allowed to use it in "redressing the balance of the Old!" Continuing he says: "It is hardly necessary for me to add . . . . that the principle (if principle it may be called) which is brought forward in the President's speech, prohibiting all further colonization on the continents of America, is as new to this government as to that of France." A frank and full statement that Canning would not oppose our sister republics losing their liberty to Spain, nor wished them closed in the future to European colonization! Could anything be further from the Monroe Doctrine? Their temporary liberty was only to suit his political policy, and then, so far as he cared, they could be turned back to Spain, or colonized as has been India, or Egypt, or Algiers or Tripoli! At last the cat is out of the (letter) bag. As to the long-believed theory that he and Rush (he as the originator and Rush as the transmitter) had contributed greatly to the preparing of the famous doctrine, hear this excerpt from the same letter of Canning: "I lost no time in applying amicably to Mr. Rush for an explanation for that part of the President's speech. Mr. Rush professed to be wholly unprovided with instructions on the subject

He says that he has not heard from his government since the opening of Congress, nor even received officially a copy of the President's speech." This was privately written in January, 1824, and in December, 1826, Canning had the effrontery to make the public statement in the House of Commons; "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old!" He outdid Little Jack Horner in that he not only shouted "What a big boy am I," but also claimed the credit both for pulling out the plum and for baking the pudding. Why not carve on the base of his statues in South America, "He approved the return of Spanish rule. He preferred monarchies instead of republics in South America."

His lack of interest in the continued freedom of the South Americans either from a renewed Spanish rule, or from their colonization by some other European power, makes it but natural that his first minister accredited to those newly born republics, Lord Ponsonby, should entertain such an attitude of mind toward them as to write home in 1826: "No eye ever saw so odious a country as this Buenos Ayres. I will not trust myself to speak of it;" and on October 17 of the same year, to write even more disparagingly of the Brazilians in a letter which tells of "Mr. Canning's approbation of my conduct." It is uplifting to be able to turn from such a viewpoint of the South Americans to the following: "We behold there the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people struggling to burst their chains and be free." So spake Henry Clay, the man who had more to do with the recognition of the independence of those colonies, both in baking the pudding and in pulling out the plum, than did ever the boastful Canning. From 1816 on, both in Congress and outside, Henry Clay never ceased his efforts. In the winter of 1821, long before Canning's suggestion to Rush, Clay secured the passage in Washington of the resolution that "the House of Representatives participate with the people of the United States in the deep interest which they feel for the Spanish provinces of South America, which are struggling to establish their liberty and independence, and that it will give its constitutional support to the President of the United States whenever he may deem it expedient to recognize the sovereignty and independence of any of the said provinces." In 1822 President Monroe published the formal recognition, which was the crown to Clay's long struggle. The modern South Americans have forgotten the persistent and intelligently strenuous friendship of Henry Clay, so deceived

have they been by constant reiterations of the Canning Myth. Their forefathers loved him so well that more than once were there read aloud at the head of their revolutionary armies portions of the speeches he was making in Congress from 1816 to 1820, urging the recognition of their independence. His altruistic efforts in their behalf and interest in their war for freedom, find an echoing note in the touching friendship of Lafayette for our own people under similar circumstances. Henry Clay was actuated by no other motive than admiration for the struggles of a gallant people, and a passionate yearning that their independence be once and for all time recognized by his own beloved land, which had by so short a time preceded them in entering the family of nations. Henry Clay was tainted with no wish to use their liberty as a pawn in the game of politics, nor was he willing to give them back to Spain, nor to allow European colonization later on to rob them of their hard-earned sovereignty!

Now that the dusty tomes of old correspondence have given up their secrets, we may at last cast away the belief that there was due to the play of intrigue in European courts, that great boon to South America of freedom forever from their intermeddling. No longer need the boasts of a sharp-witted politician continue to enjoy the confidence of credulous peoples who knew only of what he publicly said, and not of what he privately wrote. Away with the long-credited myth that put the Monroe Doctrine out of step with the majestic onward march of republican free government! The tree of American liberty becomes all the more symmetrical, since we learn that the Monroe Doctrine is one of its own branches, and not an alien growth grafted upon it. Let the policy announced in Monroe's message fit into its proper place in the orderly sequence of benefits won for political liberty in this hemisphere by that immortal document, the Declaration of Independence, which in express terms acknowledged as its inspiration a power immeasurably higher than politicians for whom political liberty is but a tool to use, and, when used, to discard.

THE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE TOWARD THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By A. Maurice Low, M.A.,
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I have been asked to explain the attitude of Europe toward the Monroe Doctrine, but that would be an easier task did Europe know what the Monroe Doctrine is. That is where you have us of Europe at a disadvantage. We have to take the Monroe Doctrine largely on faith not unmixed with doubt, hoping for the best and always fearing the worst.

So far as England is concerned, she craves no additional territory. I know there is a well established belief among Americans that England never refuses to pick up any unconsidered trifle in the form of an island or a continent that may be lying around loose, and that her diplomacy is always directed with the view of putting another patch of red upon the map. That might have been true in the past, but it is not true today. What she wants is peace and to be allowed to develop her empire commercially. To buy American cotton, turn it into cotton goods and sell them to America is more profitable than adding a few thousand square miles of jungle to the area of the British Empire. Modern statesmanship is "dollar diplomacy," and although that is a discredited term in the ears of some people, it is the true diplomacy of the twentieth century. The lust for land no longer exists. Wars of aggression or to satisfy dynastic ambitions belong to the past. The real diplomat of today is the hustler who carries a case of samples and speaks the universal language of "thirty days, less two off for cash;" terms incomprehensible no doubt to many of us here, but which are as well understood by the guileless trader of the Middle Kingdom as by the merchant of Bombay, the Manchester manufacturer and the Pittsburgh foundryman.

When British manufacturers sell goods or bankers lend their money or contractors build railways or docks or investors develop mines and plantations in a foreign country, they do not care about its politics. They want to feel sure that their contracts will be

observed, that life and property are secure, that the foreigner will have justice done him. In the past, in various parts of the world, the British trader was encouraged by his government to seek new markets and extend the commerce of Britain, and he went forth as a commercial pioneer, taking risks and meeting hardships, but knowing that he could rely on his government for protection. His reliance was not misplaced. In some of the darker corners of the globe we had to administer justice in summary fashion. There is much virtue in a six-inch shell if properly aimed. We went up and down the world teaching civilization with ships and armies, and making the commerce of the world safe and open to all nations.

In the last few years there has grown up what I venture to think is a decidedly immoral doctrine, and it is in the territory particularly under the protection of the United States that this doctrine, I regret to say, is most flagrantly exploited. Europeans are encouraged to furnish Latin America with the capital and enterprise needed for its development, but when contracts are repudiated or property destroyed by revolution, courts make a mock of the law and simply register the decree of a dictator, men are badly treated and at times killed; punishment, we are told, may not be inflicted, because the foreigner went there on his own volition and knew the risks he was taking. In theory these countries are supposed to be civilized and are to be treated with the respect and consideration one free and independent sovereign state has the right to expect of another. So far has this theory been carried that the Pan-American Congress, in the City of Mexico in 1901, declared that:

"America, as well as Europe, is inhabited today by free and independent nations whose sovereign existence has the right to the same respect, and whose internal public law does not admit of intervention of any sort on the part of foreign peoples whosoever they may be."

Here is a platitude wrapped up in high sounding words, as most platitudes are, stating a truism with all the solemnity of a vital discovery, and enunciating a declaration impossible of acceptance. Nations similar to individuals are entitled to receive precisely that respect which they give. A nation that administers exact justice, that treats foreigner and citizen impartially and respects its obligations, similar to a man who is considerate of his neighbors and keeps his word, is entitled to and is accorded respect. To try to write into the Code of Nations a declaration so contrary to morality and so

subversive of an advanced civilization—that the law of any state may not be questioned by "foreign peoples"—is a declaration opposed to public policy. It is much as if the promoters of get-rich-quick enterprises should meet in conference and declare that the post office department has no right to question their operations. It is only the lawless that have no respect for the law.

Rhetoric may conceal truth, but cannot create it. To put all the nations on the same plane, to bracket them together as entitled to the same respect, is an absurdity. The half barbarous nations of the Balkans are lower in the scale of civilization than England or France or Germany. The civilization of Central America has not yet been brought to the high standard of North America. This somewhat blunt way of stating facts may offend the sensibilities of the peoples of the Balkans, as it may those of the states of Central America, but they have the remedy in their own hands. If they want to be treated with the same consideration as the great nations, they only have to show the same veneration for law and the same observance of a constitutional form of government. Nor is it true, as they so often assert, that the smaller states of Central America have to submit to being bullied because they are small and defenseless. Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, could be packed away in Nicaragua with room still left for several thousand persons to move about without being crowded. Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Sweden could be stowed away in Venezuela with a margin still left to allow expansion. Yet while Venezuela and Nicaragua constantly furnish work for the diplomats and continually threaten their neighbors' peace, the little nations of Europe that I have just mentioned cause no uneasiness. The banker feels as secure when he lends them money as he does in dealing with the United States or any of the great European powers. In the sisterhood of nations, it is not size but character that counts.

To speak quite frankly, the Monroe Doctrine is not popular in Europe, and that unpopularity comes not from what the Monroe Doctrine is, but rather from what it is not. We have no objection to the United States taking such precautions as may seem necessary to safeguard itself. England has done the same thing and has a Monroe Doctrine in the Persian Gulf. Japan found it necessary to go to war to protect herself from the menace of attack through Korea. The right of a nation to take adequate means for its protection

will not be denied. But those rights involve corresponding obligations. It is as dishonest for a nation to seek to obtain undue advantages and render no service to humanity as it is for an individual to grow rich by preying upon the credulity or avarice of his neighbors.

Some thirty years ago a conference was held in Berlin, of which the United States was a member, to discuss spheres of influence. It was agreed that a power claiming a sphere of influence must make its jurisdiction effective; in other words, in return for the advantages conferred by dominating or controlling territory it must assume certain obligations, and one of the most important of these is the protection of foreign subjects and their property.

The territory embraced by the Monroe Doctrine is the American sphere of influence, and I think Europe has a right to expect that the United States will not shirk its obligations. The United States cannot play fast and loose with its compacts. It cannot in honor say that Europe shall not take the territory of Latin America in satisfaction for debt or as punishment for the murder of its subjects, and yet at the same time refuse on its own account to take measures to compel defaulting states to pay their just debts or make reparation for their crimes.

The United States by its policy of "hands off" to Europe, and its refusal to accept responsibility for orderly government must be held —and I say it with regret—largely to blame for the revolution, disorder, and insecurity that have so disgraced Latin America. If there was no Monroe Doctrine, Latin America would have a wholesome respect for British and German battleships. Latin America now laughs at Europe and sneers at the United States and wallows deeper in the pit of anarchy. That, as I see it, is the great result of the Monroe Doctrine. Let me add that I use the term "Latin America" generically, and while some of the states of Latin America are faithful in the observance of their obligations and considerate in their treatment of foreigners in Latin America, as elsewhere, the just have to suffer for the crimes of the unjust.

I have said that Europe does not know what the Monroe Doctrine is or means, and I doubt very much if any one in America is better informed. All that we know is that the mere suggestion of any European power taking measures to protect itself in Latin America immediately arouses the active dislike and even open hostility of the United States. Some Americans, however, who have generously

attempted to interpret the Monroe Doctrine for the benefit of benighted Europe have said that there is nothing to prevent us from seeking reparation provided we do not occupy territory. I presume those persons have a profound belief in the efficacy of absent treatment. It recalls the old nursery rhyme of the daughter who asked her mother for permission to bathe, which the mother granted to her darling on condition that she would not go into the water. If we are not permitted to occupy territory, how can we exert pressure? If we cannot seize a custom house until a fine is paid, what redress have we?

Not long ago in a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, an eminent American asserted that "the Monroe Doctrine does not stand in the way of a just war between any South American state and European state." What constitutes a just war the speaker did not define, but we may be sure the stronger power would always maintain the justice of its cause and the weaker would proclaim to high heaven its infamy; but after the war was over there would be at least this consolation, the question could be referred to The Hague for determination. It will be remembered that a few years ago Great Britain, Germany and Italy, feeling they had just complaint against Venezuela, established a pacific blockade of one of its ports, much to the delight of the natives, who never having seen such a gallant spectacle believed it was arranged solely for their amusement, and enjoyed it hugely. But not so Washington, where there was much perturbation among the guardians of the Monroe Doctrine and much searching, if not of hearts at least of precedents, to discover whether profane hands had not been laid upon the palladium of Latin-American debt repudiation. It was admitted by your President and his advisers that a pacific blockade was permissible, but it was also intimated to the powers concerned that the sooner they found it convenient to order their ships away the better it would please the United States. A pacific blockade, however, not producing any tangible results in the way of cash, and the Monroe Doctrine prohibiting the allies from seizing and occupying territory, which the Venezuelans knew, a few shells were thrown into the port to remind its people that the ships had not been sent there to make a Latin-American holiday. When the news reached Washington of the firing of those shells there was much excitement. What would have happened had the powers really struck a blow instead of being content to show their teeth, I

do not venture to say, but I can easily imagine that a somewhat awkward situation might have been created. If any European power should seriously go about to make war, just or otherwise, on one of the states of Latin America, I do not think it would be long before the United States would ask explanations. It is not necessary to call attention to the message sent to Congress by President Cleveland that brought the United States and Great Britain almost to the verge of war.

What Europe thinks of the Monroe Doctrine cannot be told until Europe knows what Americans think of it. After careful investigation I reach the conclusion that as three schools of Monroeists exist in the United States the foreigner is apt to become somewhat confused in his attempt to reduce the Monroe Doctrine to terms. To the first school belong the men who believe it is for the best interests of their country that the Monroe Doctrine should purposely be left vague, so that, as Secretary Hay once unofficially and somewhat jocularly defined it to me; "The Monroe Doctrine is anything that the American people choose to make of it of any particular time to fit any particular emergency." President Wilson has recently been reported in the newspapers as saying, "There is much discussion, but no doubt, as to what the Monroe Doctrine means." And Mr. Taft, with equal brevity and no less lucidity, wrote not long ago, "Any question dependent upon or involving the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine." Clearly then from this school we shall receive no precise definition.

To the second school belong the men who fear there is something in the words "Monroe Doctrine" to offend the sensibilities of Latin Americans, and therefore they would abandon the name while retaining the principle. They tell us that Latin America does not desire to be under the protection of the United States as enforced through the Monroe Doctrine, and that, instead of solidifying the relations between the United States and Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine creates friction. But while the colonization of Latin America by Europe is not to be permitted and the European powers are not to be allowed to take means to secure redress in case of wrong doing, there is to be no obligation imposed upon the United States to act for Europe when the necessity demands it.

To the third school belong those men who display a curious

timidity about a great nation executing its own mandate. The Monroe Doctrine they tell us is good, but when anything is to be done under its operation, the United States must ask for the assistance of some of the Latin-American powers.

Many well meaning but I fear short-sighted persons have urged with great persistence and more or less vehemence the wisdom of the United States incorporating the Monroe Doctrine into a joint stock concern and inviting some of the states of Latin America to acquire proprietary rights therein, tinctured, I presume, by the prevailing belief that a monopoly is vicious, but by some magic arrangement a bad trust may be made good, and if there are Latin-American stockholders the curse will be taken off the Monroe Doctrine. It is not for a foreigner to instruct Americans, but whatever affects the United States is a matter of vital concern to an Englishman, and I cannot refrain from pointing out the grave danger you will run if the Monroe Doctrine is transformed from a purely North American polity to a Pan-American policy.

In the first place, it is contrary to the teaching and experience of history, and history is valueless unless we make the past a guide to the present. History shows that an alliance between nations of different blood and different speech and different traditions, whose concepts of justice and society are not the same, whose civilization is not the same, has never endured and eventually is certain to involve the contracting powers in grave complications. And where shall this alliance end? Certain Latin-American states are now mentioned as eligible to admission in this partnership. How long, do you think, it will be before other states will claim the same right, insisting upon it as evidence of their high cultural development and if refused will naturally be bitterly resentful, as it would be public advertisement that they are inferior and not worthy to rank with states of the first order? Instead of a Pan-American doctrine bringing peace and order to Latin America and satisfying Europe it would throw another discordant element into that political cauldron and change the whole status so far as Europe is concerned.

If the United States is anxious to invite Europe to challenge the Monroe Doctrine it cannot adopt an easier course than to admit Latin America into partnership, for I think it must be evident to every one that while Europe will accept a doctrine maintained by the United States it will properly enough resent the dictation of Latin

America. I do not say that Europe considers itself "better" than Latin America or regards Latin America as inferior, as I dislike very much the assumption of national superiority or the calm condescension of foreigners. We need not go deep into reasons, for certain things are so well understood that explanations are unnecessary. An Englishman will go into an American court of law and have no fear that his nationality will prejudice him. An American feels secure in the impartiality of British justice. An Englishman in America has no dread that his property will be seized because his sympathies were with one political party or he hoped for the success of a rival political leader. An American may live in England, and without risk to his person or fortune hold in contempt monarchial institutions. When the same stability and the same liberty of thought and action exist in the states of Latin America as in the United States and Great Britain it will then be time enough to consider the wisdom of making the states of Latin America the mandatory of this continent.

A further objection is that an alliance of the kind suggested is unworthy of a nation so great and powerful as the United States; it is a confession of weakness that the United States ought not to make. If the United States is not strong enough and courageous enough—and no one doubts either its strength or its courage—to uphold and enforce the Monroe Doctrine it ought to abandon it and not ask assistance to infuse it with vitality.

If the United States is to regard the Monroe Doctrine simply as a means to obtain special privileges and hamper the legitimate expansion of Europe in Latin America, Europe will always resist it and be irritated and it will be the cause of continuing friction, but if, while safeguarding the interests of the United States, it is also to be a means of keeping the peace and inducing Latin America to observe its obligations it will have the cordial support of the great powers of Europe. It would promote the harmony of international relations were the United States either frankly to declare what the Monroe Doctrine is, so that all nations might no longer remain in doubt, or with equal frankness impress upon the states of Latin America that they cannot hope to escape the penalty of wrong doing by shielding behind the nebulous uncertainty of the Monroe Doctrine.

WHAT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THINK OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE[1]

By Dr. Herbert Kraus,

University of Leipzig.

It would be interesting to present a picture of the many international conflicts which the Monroe Doctrine has prevented, and at the same time to attempt to portray what would have been the probable condition of affairs on the American continent had the Monroe Doctrine never been promulgated. But it is impossible for any human brain to furnish a detailed picture of this imaginary situation. To do so would require the prophetic vision of a seer.

No stretch of imagination is necessary, however, to recognize clearly that Central and South America without this great *principle of isolation* would be a field of great rivalry for colonization; a rivalry which, on account of the higher value of the prizes offered, and also on account of the greater power of resistance of the American States in question, would make the struggle for the division of Africa seem small in comparison, and cause the shedding of rivers of blood. This side of the Monroe Doctrine is, as a rule, not yet sufficiently understood, and hence not appreciated, by the public opinion of Europe, which follows, registers, notes and criticizes the circumstances in which this dogma of American politics is applied.

European interest in the Monroe Doctrine, at least in the three countries chiefly concerned, viz., Germany, England and France, is uncommonly great. In Europe as in America it is only necessary to connect a particular incident with the Monroe Doctrine in order to arouse a lively public interest. Very different, however, are the feelings which this word arouses on the opposite shores of the Atlantic. In the United States one always finds confirmed the words of one of its leading statesmen, who once wrote me that "it may, indeed, almost be said that all our government has to do to rally the people to the support of any measure . . . is to couple it with the revered title of the Monroe Doctrine."

[1] Compare with the following my book, entitled *The Monroe Doctrine in its Relation to American Diplomacy and to International Law*, published by J. Guttentag, Berlin, 1913.

European opinion, on the contrary, generally taking a critical attitude towards such matters as are coupled with the Monroe Doctrine, oscillates between a dignified reserve and a certain distrust which soon develops into open hostility on the part of the chauvinistic press. That Europe has not fully appreciated the causes, aims and accomplishments of this doctrine, and that the full comprehension of its character and its tasks only slowly and hesitatingly makes its way in the public opinion, is hardly to be wondered at. Is the situation, after all, very different in the United States? How many are there in that country who really have a correct idea of the purport and limitations of the Monroe Doctrine, based on an intimate and unprejudiced knowledge? How often, for instance, is it associated with affairs with which it has no connection whatever? For example, what relation has it with the much discussed question of the Panama Canal tolls? This controversy is nothing more than a dispute about the interpretation of treaty rights. And yet the Monroe Doctrine is incessantly drawn into the discussion. Even such a man as Champ Clark declared in his recent speech, in the House, against the amendment to the Panama Canal act, that "repeal would mean practical abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine."

Although some German papers recently went so far as to express the opinion that the journey of Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser's brother, to South America, was a protest on the part of the Kaiser against the Monroe Doctrine, and that he was thereby showing that he did not feel himself bound by it, nevertheless the people of Germany treat such a groundless statement with the contempt it deserves.

The chief difficulty the European experiences in interpreting the doctrine lies in the fact that he unconsciously judges American conditions and affairs by European standards. It would require a conscious effort for the people of a continent whose political sense and feeling are at present influenced by an incessant rivalry for colonial expansion, to conceive that a state may have any other political ideal; that its ambition may not necessarily strive for increase of power by colonial acquisitions.[2]

That the United States, until now, has not shared such ambi-

[2] Not to be confused with the tendency always alive in the United States to extend the existing boundaries at the cost of its neighbors. See my book, noted above, p. 339.

tions is proved by the history of her foreign policy. This policy furnishes an almost unbroken line of examples to sustain such a contention, with the single exception of the wave of imperialism directed toward colonial expansion which arose at the time of the war with Spain, but which quickly subsided. It is impossible to understand American foreign policy, and with it the Monroe Doctrine, without thoroughly considering this difference between the political ideals of Europe and the United States—a difference which, at present, undoubtedly exists.

On the other hand, I may venture to say that the feeling in Europe towards the Monroe Doctrine is slowly changing. It is true, one sometimes reads, even now, heated arguments against this doctrine, in which, unfortunately, is often quoted that remark made by Bismarck when he called the Monroe Doctrine "an international impertinence." But such arguments seem to become less frequent, and, on the whole, the number of sensible and more reasonable critics, who consider the merits as well as the weaknesses of the Monroe Doctrine, steadily increases. A convincing appeal may be made to the teachings of history. They refute the hitherto generally accepted argument raised against the doctrine, that its purpose was to give to the United States a monopoly of political expansion on the American continent. In fact, not one instance can be proved in which the United States has added territory in America under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. What she has done again and again, acting on this principle, is to prevent the over-sea expansion of any non-American state.

Of particular interest is the change of public opinion in Europe in another direction. Formerly discussion was chiefly centered on question of the justification, or rather the lack of justification, for the existence of the doctrine. This question has now been relegated to the background by two others. One is whether the United States can and will maintain the Monroe Doctrine, or whether, in the course of time this principle will turn against the country which formulated it and become a burden. The second question involves the duty of the United States, resulting from the doctrine, to provide for peace and order in Central and South America, and a reasonable protection for non-American interests. Events in Mexico, prior to the recent active measures on the part of the United States, chiefly the murder of the British subject Benton, have given a number of

European newspapers the opportunity to remind the United States of her duty—to play the rôle of American policeman—a duty which ex-President Roosevelt, in particular, repeatedly emphasized as a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[3] When, however, the United States interfered in Mexico most of those newspapers had, unfortunately, already forgotten their former admonition.

It is clear that Europeans, becoming more and more reconciled to the Monroe Doctrine, accept it as an existing fact and begin to discuss its consequences.

The above refers only to the old style Monroe Doctrine, to the doctrine which wants to prevent the increase of political power of non-American States in America, and which may be styled the political Monroe Doctrine. The affair takes a different aspect when we consider that new tendency to extend the doctrine into a prevention or limitation of the purely economic activity of non-American States, or their citizens, in America.

But one cannot say that the Monroe Doctrine has actually developed in this direction, although such a development would not be inconsistent with its character. Its transformation into a "commercial Monroe Doctrine" is relatively easy, and signs are not wanting that it already tends toward a development in this direction.[4] Recall the last stage of the Panama Canal affair, and recall more especially the Magdalena Bay incident.[5] It is clear that such a claim as "America for the Americans, economically as well as politically" would meet with an opposition and attack far more violent than any which the political Monroe Doctrine has ever aroused. It is probable that these attacks would come not only from the non-American camp, but also from American and even from the United States itself.

[3] Compare his words in the annual message of December 6, 1904. "The adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

[4] One is reminded of Jefferson, who wrote to Governor Claiborne on October 29, 1808: "We shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence; but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours are the same and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere." (Moore's *Digest*, vi, 371).

[5] For further particulars on this point which forbids of enlargement here, see my book, noted above, pp. 217–230.

It is difficult to formulate a decided opinion as to the attitude of European diplomacy toward the Monroe Doctrine. Available material, necessary for that purpose, is lacking. One fact, however, is certain, viz., the Monroe Doctrine, to the present time, has not been expressly recognized as a rule of *international law* by any country.

The question as to whether it has been internationally recognized as a *political principle* of the United States is of no great importance. Since it is, in fact, a political principle of the United States which has been in practice for almost a century, such a recognition would be only the acknowledgment of an existing fact, and as such would have no real significance. It is of much greater importance to note that the other states evidently reckon with the doctrine as a factor which must be taken into consideration.

The last instance in which a European state questioned the validity of the Monroe Doctrine was the controversy between England and the United States as to the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, commonly known as the "Venezuelan boundary dispute." In the settlement of this dispute the United States won its most brilliant diplomatic victory for the doctrine. The victory was so complete that the affair has repeatedly given occasion for the assertion that England, by her attitude, actually recognized the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of international law.

Since the time of the Venezuelan boundary dispute there has been only one dubious example of a disregard for the great American doctrine—the Magdalena Bay incident with Japan in 1912. Even here the Japanese government did not contend that the Monroe Doctrine could not hinder the acquisition by a Japanese syndicate of a concession of land from Mexico in lower California, to which the United States objected, but simply denied that such a transaction was being carried out.

The case of the Venezuelan debts of 1901–1904 gave the German government occasion for the celebrated declaration "that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory,"[6] a declaration which some, incorrectly, have construed as a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by that government.

It is even reported that during the recent Mexican troubles some

[6] Prememoria of the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, December 11, 1901. (Moore's *Digest*, vi, 588)

European governments have directly applied to the United States to act as intermediary in seeking redress for the injustice which their subjects have suffered in Mexico (consider in this connection the Benton case). Should these reports prove true it would be such a perfect acquiescence in the doctrine, of the governments concerned, that the jurist would have to consider seriously the question: Have not these powers actually conceded such a position to the United States on the American continent, that she is entitled to the general observance of the principle that the Monroe Doctrine proclaims?

In conclusion, it is evident and most important, in my opinion, that nations should make every effort to get an impartial and unprejudiced knowledge of their mutual standpoints and respective aims before they criticize one another's actions.

THE MEANING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Charles M. Pepper,
Washington, D. C.

When we began to discuss the Monroe Doctrine I was reminded of the definition which a famous English jurist gave of metaphysics. He said, "metaphysics is two men in a dark room hunting for a black hat which is not there." We have not had any dark room. We have had plenty of light, but when we started out perhaps a good many of us felt we were hunting for a black hat which is not here. But whatever the Monroe Doctrine may be I think before we are through we will succeed in finding it out.

I have noticed the general trend of the discussion is along two lines: First, as to the Latin-American view; and second, as to, not the European view, because Europe never has views, but as to the European attitude regarding the Monroe Doctrine. I confess myself to a great deal of enlightenment on both points.

The general tendency, as reflected by the papers of Mr. Barrett and others, is not to agree with college professors in other cities that the Monroe Doctrine is obsolete. There is nothing more to say there, but I think there is an idea that in some way it is to be superseded by what Mr. Barrett called the doctrine of Pan-American comity, or some general term such as that. We all appreciate what Mr. Barrett has done towards producing Pan-American comity, but as Mr. Barrett said, there is one difficulty in the way. Our Latin-American friends hate to be patronized. We owe a great deal to him and to ex-Minister Sherrill and to Professor Rowe and others for the work they have done in the last few years in educating our people about Latin America. When we come to the Latin-American view it is set forth very clearly, indeed, in Mr. Grahame's paper, especially in reference to Argentina.

The common notion seems to be that if the Monroe Doctrine is superseded, it will be replaced by what is called the A B C doctrine, an alliance of certain large countries in South America, who, in coöperation with the United States, will work for peace there. We all want peace in Latin America and hope it may be gained by work-

ing together. By the A B C doctrine is meant the alliance of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. This has one drawback. Other Latin-American countries are very jealous of their territorial integrity and of their independence. It may not be an independence, it may not be a sovereignty, such as Mr. Low's country after a thousand years' practice has attained through self-government, but they prize it. There is jealousy of the United States, which I regret to say is cultivated for commercial reasons by our European friends, and is one of the reasons why we hear frequently of an Anglo-German alliance advocated in South America.

Yet the South American countries, with a few exceptions among those bordering the Caribbean, are not afraid of territorial absorption or land grabbing by the United States. A year ago a young Argentine poet was in the United States, talking against what he called "Yankee imperialism." He also went to every important Central and South American country and delivered his address there. In Bolivia he was listened to very respectfully but the leading newspaper of La Paz stated that Bolivia needed not to guard against Yankee imperialism but against the imperialism from the south, from its own neighbors.

I have always got along very well with my Latin-American friends by talking plainly. We should be sympathetic with them, as the saying is, but we must look at South America as a whole. Knowing the conditions there we note the constant fear in some countries of absorption by their neighbors. When we come to discuss the Monroe Doctrine historically and view our diplomatic relations and the diplomatic correspondence in the files of the state department, we find numerous instances in which the smaller countries of Latin America have appealed to the United States against the aggression of the larger ones and our good offices have always been exercised, and exercised successfully, in their behalf. But a new doctrine of comity based on the theory that the United States and three South American governments could regulate the rest of this hemisphere would cause much more ill-feeling than now exists. We should work harmoniously, should work with these stronger countries of South America, and should encourage them in what they are doing and depend on them to extend their influence, but I think we can dismiss the idea that the Monroe Doctrine can be superseded by any A B C doctrine.

One reason for this growing restiveness concerning the Monroe Doctrine in South American countries is perhaps the self-consciousness of some of those countries. All countries in their day have had the big head. We had it some years back when we boasted of our national greatness as the result largely of a material growth. Canada had it, and had it quite recently, on account of her growth. Some of our Latin-American friends who are growing very rapidly have got the same feeling now. I do not say it in the offensive sense, but it is an enlarged idea of national consciousness. It is a proper conception of their own power and their own influence. That is one reason that we find so many vigorous objections to the Monroe Doctrine now coming from two or three of these countries, but it seems to me they go to too great a length. Most of you have received a circular letter sent out recently by Dr. Zeballos, who was formerly the minister of foreign affairs in Argentina, and who delivered the address of welcome to ex-President Roosevelt at the convocation of the University of Buenos Ayres. He set forth what he claimed was the Argentine view, henceforth to be known as the Zeballos-Roosevelt protocol, and predicted it would supersede the Monroe Doctrine. Now eminent as any individual may be, eminent even as Dr. Zeballos and Mr. Roosevelt are, I do not think they can undertake to supersede the Monroe Doctrine by a protocol between themselves.

In connection with the Argentina view just one more thought comes to me. The vast British investments there undoubtedly give Great Britain a tremendous influence, but she is not going to war on account of those investments. They are safe. Yet there might be another cause. Argentina today does not recognize British sovereignty anywhere in the South Atlantic. The Falkland Islands have been under the British flag for more than half a century, but the Argentine Republic does not recognize that there is such a government as Great Britain there. Now we can conceive that England for some purpose or other might insist on Argentina's recognizing her sovereignty in the Falkland Islands. Suppose she should send her fleet down there. I am not quite so sure that Argentina would not then look to the United States, would not invoke the Monroe Doctrine in some form. Ordinarily it is not wise to put out strained hypotheses, but sometimes they enable us to understand possible situations.

Another reason why we cannot depend too much upon the most

powerful Latin-American countries to render the Monroe Doctrine unnecessary—and I say it with great respect for what they have done—is because they are yet in the process of evolution. We give them credit for what they are doing for republican institutions but we cannot affirm that all of them have passed the first stages of growth. The other day we read dispatches saying Brazil is liable to have a serious revolution in half a dozen states. These states are as a rope of sand holding the nation together. Those of us who know how little power the general government possesses understand that Brazil has yet great problems before her. It is not improbable that in working out these problems there will be periods of internal disorder and unrest. There have been periods not so very far distant when Germany was threatening to send a fleet to Brazil and she was most offensive in her attitude.

Another point occurs to me. It is no longer possible that internal conditions will prevail in the United States such that a European power would find us unable to enforce our construction of the Monroe Doctrine. But when we review some of the chapters of American history during the Civil War when we had our hands full at home, these reveal that Europe was not then considerate. That was the period when the French invaded Mexico to set Maximilian on a throne. It was an invasion. It was the period when Spain was hoping to resume authority in Santo Domingo. It was the period when the French government under Napoleon the Third negotiated with the Ecuadorian government for a French protectorate over Ecuador. We have more than gathered strength since that Civil War. We will never have a civil war again, God please, but in our relations with foreign nations we are not so sure that war never will occur. We cannot be sure that between now and let us say 2014, we may not have complications with some foreign nation, and are we quite sure then no European countries would take advantage of that situation to establish themselves in South America? We have no question as to what the ultimate result would be, but the possibility is one of the reasons that make me doubt whether it is wise to abolish the Monroe Doctrine.

You all know about the Galapagos Islands off Ecuador. We do not need to lease them ourselves since the Panama Canal is built and we are established off Panama Bay. We do not need them, but it is quite conceivable that if we were in difficulties—I will not

mention Asia, because it is a live wire like Mexico—but if we were in difficulties, I will say with Denmark, some Asiatic power or some European power might want to take the Galapagos Islands. I have not a question then that the American people would say it was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and they would also define the doctrine.

I have just a word in regard to the European attitude, which I have formed from the interesting paper of Mr. Low. I have listened to his instructive address with a great deal of interest, yet after all it occurs to me that there may be such a thing as ignorance in Europe about the Monroe Doctrine—historical ignorance. I was recently in South America where our English friends are so well established that if you want a stenographer you have to go to some English firm for some young Englishman to take your dictation. I had occasion to write a good deal about this Monroe Doctrine, to refer to it in dictating letters, and my friend's fellow countryman wrote it "Munro Doctrine." Now that is a trifling historical error, but it has frequently occurred to me that perhaps after all the great English public does not know as much about the Monroe Doctrine as it ought to know. I perceive one difficulty in the attitude of Europe toward Latin America. The repudiation of debts in the Latin-American states undoubtedly has been a shame, a disgrace to them, but there has been very great improvement in the last few years. My recollection is that the last Hague Conference found a formula on that subject following Dr. Drago's suggestions first laid down in the Argentine note to the United States at the time of the Venezuela blockade. But here comes a question—the European attitude is that they should have the right to go in and by force collect a just debt. That is it, isn't it?

MR. LOW: Yes.

MR. PEPPER: Now if Europe has the right to go in by force to any Latin-American country and collect a just debt—and, of course, to the creditor a debt is always just—that one hundred million debt of Honduras to those English creditors is always just—then they have the right to go into other countries. The newspapers recently published the protest of the British bondholders committee against seven states of the United States which were charged with repudiating their debts. If the Monroe Doctrine is no bar to Great Britain's collecting debts in Latin America by force what is the position with

regard to the United States? If she has the right to enforce debt collection in Latin America by gunboats what could we say, what objection could we make if the British fleet appeared off North Carolina, Florida or Georgia and asked for payment of debts alleged to have been repudiated by those states?

In spite of the scandals of the past in the repudiation of debts by Latin-American countries, these countries have made very great progress, and I do not believe the matter of debt collection is ever going to be of serious consequence in connection with the Monroe Doctrine. The countries will pay their debts. The Argentine Republic after fifty years paid the loan obtained from its English creditors.

Now we come to the Monroe Doctrine proper. It is indefinite perhaps, but it is to the American people after all a live doctrine. It is a flexible doctrine, it changes and is affected by circumstances, as we have recently had very convincing evidences, but the Monroe Doctrine has held for a hundred years. It is more than a formula. It is a principle for our safety. It represents the aspiration of the whole of the people of the United States in regard to Latin America.

It is for whatever government may be in power, for whatever administration, whatever Congress may be in power, to interpret the doctrine in the light of developments, in the light of circumstances; not to confuse it, as with Mexico, with anarchy at our door, but to interpret it in justice to the American people, with the understanding, with the feeling, that it is to be applied in justice. It represents, as Professor Latané has said, a cardinal principle of American diplomacy that is vital to the American people, and without injustice to Europe, without injustice to any Latin-American country, I have no question that fifty years from now we will still be discussing the Monroe Doctrine as a live doctrine.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: A SOLUTION OF ITS PROBLEM

By Philip M. Brown,

Former United States Minister to Honduras.

Since I do not wish to add myself to the category of "doctrinaires," it is with some diffidence that I respond to the request to address you on the topic under discussion. But nevertheless I do respond with a good deal of earnestness for this reason: It was my duty to serve as a diplomatic representative in Central America for a number of years, and to deal with the Monroe Doctrine in its practical operations in peace and in war. I have also witnessed an attempt to experiment with the principle of alliance when the United States endeavored to secure the coöperation of Mexico in dealing with the problems of Central America.

I felt my responsibility very keenly at that time, and I feel it equally so now as a student of international politics residing again in this country. When I left Honduras, I stated to the President that I had come to Honduras as the representative of the United States, but that I left as the representative of Honduras. I particularly feel that responsibility of representing fairly the rights of those countries at this time because of the fact that they are in grave danger from their best friend, the United States. Though we aim to be of disinterested service to them, I believe that their territorial integrity and political independence are in a sense menaced by the mistaken policy we have adopted. At this moment in the little country of Nicaragua, a weak government is being maintained in power by a force of American marines stationed at Managua.

The discussion of the Monroe Doctrine has been extremely illuminating. It has reminded me, however, of what President Taft once said to the newspaper editors gathered at a banquet in New York: "Gentlemen, the truth does not lie in you. It lies between you." With two distinguished newspaper men addressing us, we have this epigram most felicitously illustrated.

It seems to me that this discussion has brought out clearly the following points. First of all it is evident that the Monroe Doctrine is painfully vague, and, as remarked by Mr. Blaine of the hapless

Clayton-Bulwer treaty, "misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious."

Secondly, it is clear that there exists a general apprehension on the part of all Latin America as to the purposes of the United States. When I was serving in Central America, I used to find it extremely difficult to make clear to the people of those countries exactly what we did mean. At that time it was my boast that, except for the impropriety of disclosing certain facts concerning different personalities, the United States need have no fear of revealing all its diplomatic correspondence. I do not believe that there is anything selfish in our policy towards these countries. I believe that it has always been our earnest desire to be of constructive assistance. Yet it must be admitted that "dollar diplomacy" has caused them genuine alarm. Recent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine implying the right of veto by the United States on the choice of their chief executives, and indicating also a right of control over the granting of foreign concessions—all matters of supreme importance—cannot fail to convey to the Latin-American mind a sinister significance.

Thirdly, this discussion has clearly indicated the necessity of insuring the adequate protection of foreign interests in certain of the countries of Latin America. This has been most effectively and brilliantly brought out in the paper by Mr. Low.

Fourthly, this discussion has revealed that reparation for wrongs and damages carries with it the danger of unjust aggression and even the loss of political independence. And in this connection, I would like to refer to the question raised by Mr. Low in regard to the blockade of Venezuela in 1902. It is possible to view the facts in a somewhat different light than viewed by Mr. Low. As a student of international affairs who has carefully gone over all the records of this case, it seems to me that what occurred in that famous incident was somewhat as follows: England, Germany and Italy had been trying for years to get Venezuela to meet its obligations. (I will not say just obligations, though certainly some of them were of that character.) They had been uniformly unsuccessful and felt compelled to resort to the use of coercive measures. Force was employed, and Venezuela, yielding under tremendous pressure—the pressure of the joint fleet which has been referred to by Mr. Low as more or less innocuous in the eyes of the Venezuelans—was obliged to sign a protocol of arbitra-

tion, the United States having used its good offices as a friendly intermediary. Under that protocol, Venezuela was forced to arbitrate, not the question whether she owed the sums claimed—this she had to concede in principle before England, Germany and Italy would arbitrate—but the question as to whether preference in payment should be given to those creditors who resorted to the use of force, over those who proceeded by peaceful means. The consecration of this vicious principle by the decision of the arbitral tribunal should be deeply lamented by all who believe in international fair play.

Now this very situation in Venezuela to which Mr. Low referred seems to me to emphasize eloquently the necessity of facing squarely this whole question as to the meaning and vitality of the Monroe Doctrine. The adverse criticism to which it has been subjected in recent years, the suggestions that it is dead and useless, all tend to mislead people, and particularly to delude Europe into the belief that the United States will never again intervene to defend a Latin-American state from European aggression. This becomes therefore a most precarious situation, and it seems to me that it is our solemn duty as a result of this discussion to try to reach a definite conclusion as to what the Monroe Doctrine signifies to us.

I realize that this task is difficult but I would ask your permission to allow me to indicate briefly what would seem to be the result, the final residuum of all this discussion, the working hypothesis on which we as a nation may proceed in dealing with the problems of this hemisphere.

First of all, we seem to be agreed that the Monroe Doctrine should be clearly defined; and secondly, that it must be defined in terms that are acceptable to all Latin America.

The Monroe Doctrine can no longer be considered as a peculiar possession of the United States, as purely a matter of state policy. To remove it out of the realm of policy; to obviate the unpleasant suggestion implied in the term doctrine; to avoid also the dangerous complications involved in the idea of alliance; I venture to suggest this possible solution, namely, to place the Monroe Doctrine within the safe sphere of absolute law.

In spite of the dicta of statesmen and international law publicists to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine, like the principle of the balance of power, is not a part of international law, it is not difficult so to define it as to make it a fundamental principle (as Mr. Pepper has very aptly called it), of the law of nations.

The great defect of international law today, as you know, is that it has no sanction; no guarantee of enforcement other than the sanction of public opinion. That is the main thing we are striving for: as effective an enforcement of international law as we have an effective enforcement of municipal law. Now if we will reduce the Monroe Doctrine down to the simplest terms; if we will strip it of all the vagaries of statesmen and commentators, we find in the last analysis that it means nothing more and nothing less than that the United States finds itself pledged to the defence of the rights of every nation to independence, sovereign jurisdiction and equality. These are the most sacred, basic principles of international law; and nothing could be more securely a part of international law than an effective sanction of these principles. Such a sanction is to be found in the Monroe Doctrine, which, interpreted in this light, ceases to be simply a question of policy, and is at once put on the solid basis of law.

It seems to me that we as a nation are fast approaching a situation where it is imperatively necessary that in measured but forceful language we make unmistakably clear to Europe and to all Latin America the vital meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. If Europe lacks any effective sanction to international law; if the smaller states such as the Balkan States are without any other protection than that of their own armies, America will not be remiss on its part. Our high aim should be, at least on this western bemisphere, to protect the smaller states from unjust aggressions by the great. In other words, we should boldly proclaim the Monroe Doctrine to be the great basic principle of international law, namely, the defence of the fundamental rights of sovereignty, independence and equality.

But in the working out of the problems connected with the countries of this hemisphere, it is not enough to enunciate principles. We must also have international agreements as to their practical operation especially in the case of nations seeking redress for just grievances. While no one nation should constitute itself the sole judge of its rights, no nation, on the other hand, should be permitted to escape the fulfillment of its just obligations. The determination of these rights and obligations is properly a function of law. We should, for example, have an agreement of the nations of this hemisphere, if not of the whole world, as to the precise rights of international creditors; as to the circumstances justifying a nation to go into bankruptcy; as to the legal methods permissible for the collection of debts; as to the

rights of foreigners to reparation for torts; as to the rights of foreigners to damages for wrongs committed in times of civil disturbance; and many other such questions which give rise to diplomatic friction, reprisals and even war.

If the other nations of the world, owing to political problems yet unsolved, are unable to undertake yet this great task of creating the law which must eventually supplant war, we in this hemisphere have no excuse if we do not whole-heartedly direct our energies in this direction. We have not only the inspiring opportunity but we have the agencies at hand in the Pan-American Conferences and the Pan-American Union so ably directed by the Honorable John Barrett. Already important steps have been taken in this sense. Jurists of note from the countries of Latin America and the United States are now at work on the drafting of laws on the subjects already indicated; laws which should bring order out of chaos, which should prove as acceptable to Europe as to ourselves, and protect the rights of the weak as well as of the strong.

Now it seems to me that if we can thus effectively take this whole question out of the realm of discussion of policy and of alliance, and place it firmly on the basis of international law, all Latin America will join with us with absolute unanimity and enthusiasm in the mutual defence of this great principle. In this way, without uncertainty or distrust, we can work together in perfect harmony apart from the maelstrom of European politics in order to solve, if we can, the great problems standing in the way of universal peace. In this way we can leave Europe in no unfortunate uncertainty as to the vital significance of the great principle that underlies the famous declaration of President Monroe nearly a century ago.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

By J. J. Slechta, M.A.,

Formerly of the United States Consular Service.

The scope of this article does not admit of a detailed analysis of the varied phases of the Monroe Doctrine as originally enunciated and subsequently developed into a permanent feature of our foreign policy. It is only necessary to remind students of the subject that the predominant motive actuating President Monroe and contemporary statesmen in promulgating this doctrine was one of selfishness—if anxiety for self-preservation may be called selfish.

The dangers which the United States sought to avert by this means were two-fold: First, the acquisition of territory in the western hemisphere by European powers and the consequent peril to the supremacy of the United States in the western world; and second, the overthrow of newly established republics in South America and the resulting loss of prestige to democratic forms of government, of which this country was the champion and which were on trial before the world at large. Naturally enough, altruistic motives were even at that time suggested as explanatory of this nation's newly expounded policy, but a careful study of the literature of the question convinces that any such motive was subordinate to the conviction that the cause of our own democracy would suffer from any further encroachment of Europe on this hemisphere.

The thesis which the writer has chosen to defend may be stated at the outset and is simply this: The Monroe Doctrine should be maintained by the United States substantially in the form in which it was conceived by its originators. In one particular, only, should this be qualified. In view of the unquestioned supremacy now attained by this country and the impossibility of any successful aggression by any foreign power, the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine can best be expressed in negative rather than positive terms.

Instead of the assertion that no European power shall be per-

mitted to acquire additional territory in this hemisphere, the doctrine should embody the proposition that any aggression on the part of a European power, which may be deemed dangerous to the supremacy of the United States in this hemisphere, shall meet with the forcible opposition of this country.

If it is sought to determine what advantages might reasonably be expected to result from such a foreign policy, it is necessary to consider the changed relationship between the United States and other countries of the new world. In the first place, it has long been evident that leading powers of Latin America not only regard themselves as independent of the protection of this country, but actually resent any attitude of protection from the United States. Those who are familiar with the viewpoint of leading South American nations have no doubt that possible aggression from the United States is really very much more feared by most of them than aggression from any European power.

Any foreign policy, therefore, which contemplates anything in the nature of gratuitous protection of powers which want nothing of the sort from us, leaves this country in a wholly anomalous situation. Another objection to what might be called an altruistic foreign policy is that, whenever this country finds itself obliged to bring pressure to bear upon one of its neighbors in order to settle a claim or controversy of its own, a cry of woe goes up from all Latin America, calling attention in the most ironical terms to the supposedly protective feature of the Monroe Doctrine. This is what happened in the Alsop claim settlement with Chili, when the whole Spanish-American press was united in a severe denunciation of the United States. The point of the whole matter is that if the United States follows the interpretation given the Monroe Doctrine for the past sixty years, Latin America takes our protection as a matter of course; expects it, in fact, when it is needed, and disclaims any desire for it when not needed.

The Monroe Doctrine, as originally conceived, would leave Latin America free to work out its own salvation, as it very much wishes to do, and would relieve the United States of any responsibility in connection therewith except in so far as its own destinies might be affected. Then if, in case of unjust aggression from Europe, a Latin-American country should appeal to the United States for assistance, such assistance might be given quite apart from any obli-

gation arising from a fixed policy. In that way only will Latin America recognize this country's foreign policy as genuinely disinterested.

It is the failure of American foreign policy to recognize the fact that disinterested statesmanship is not accepted at its face value in Latin America which constitutes its greatest weakness. An impartial analysis of the causes for this consistent failure at once discloses the underlying weakness in all our international relations with Latin America. Probably John Hay was the only secretary of state this country has ever had who knew how to handle Latin-American questions properly because he was great enough to see every issue from the Latin-American point of view. This great asset of a statesman can come, not merely from a knowledge of history, but from an appreciation of its significance. Only an administrative authority totally destitute of the attributes of an intelligent statesman would choose to disregard the certain effect of a nation's antecedents and of the character of its people upon their method of thought in shaping a foreign policy. Few and far between have been the American statesmen who possessed in a high degree the ability to gain from an intelligent retrospect of a country's antecedents a perspective which should enable them to determine a foreign policy based upon strong future probabilities and not upon utter impossible eventualities. The holiest and best of intentions are trash without such an understanding of the significance of history and national character.

Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the need of such farsightedness than the blundering policy of this country in the Mexican situation. We deal with an unfortunate neighbor whose only political heritage has been that of centuries of oligarchy and autocracy. For a century and a quarter the Mexican people have had the benefit of close contact with a free people, governed under a democracy. The ignorance of the masses and the cupidity of the governing classes have made it impossible that precept alone should lead to the establishment of genuine constitutional government in Mexico. This nation cannot reasonably hope, therefore, to create a real democracy in that country by stipulating some condition or change in a contemporaneous régime, which in itself is the product of a nation's heritage.

Another distinct advantage to be gained from such a restriction of the Monroe Doctrine as indicated in the foregoing may also be

illustrated by reference to a feature of the current Mexican trouble. There can be no reasonable doubt that the interests of peace in Mexico could have been served best by the joint intervention of European countries and the United States. The present interpretation placed upon the Monroe Doctrine has made this seem inexpedient. There has been much misconception on this point, indicated by the apparent belief that such a course involved some danger to this country's foreign policy. It does not seem to have occurred to our statesmen that this may be very good evidence that there is something wrong with our foreign policy.

Citizens of Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy have interests at stake in Mexico at least commensurate with those of American citizens. There is every reason to believe that such interests were acquired quite as legitimately as were ours. Those countries should share with the United States the responsibility of securing protection for such interests. A joint treaty between these six countries embodying an agreement on the part of each to share financial and other responsibility and an obligation to refrain from accepting any indemnity in territory or funds in any eventuality would cause a light to break over Mexico such as can be supplied in no other way. This country can have no reason to doubt the absolute good faith in which European powers would participate in such an agreement.

The present policy is essentially that of a "dog in the manger." We cannot settle Mexico's troubles ourselves and we foolishly fear to ask those equally interested in peace there to help us effectively. It matters not what solution of the question comes from the present denouement, anarchy and chaos must return to Mexico under any circumstances to be determined by the United States alone, short of absolute conquest. The elimination of any one political despot is temporization, which can bring Mexico not one step nearer civilization, since it removes an effect and not the cause of that country's misfortune. The result, on the other hand, of European representation, jointly undertaken with the United States, would be so to overwhelm public opinion in Mexico as to force the few disinterested leaders to the fore and so bring about at least the beginning of a new era in Mexico. It is highly probable that such intervention would take the form of an international police for Mexico, to enforce the proper observance of constitutional provisions for free government.

But whatever might be the form of actual intervention, there can be no doubt that only in the hands of powerful European nations acting in concert with the United States can intervention become a wholly effective instrument, without involving loss of life or property to any considerable extent.

The United States has constantly faced the danger of serious international complications arising from the implied obligation which exists under the present form of the Monroe Doctrine. We do not concede to European powers the right to protect their nationals in Latin America, because such a course might endanger the continued application of more or less vague principles of that doctrine. We must, therefore, assume the responsibility of affording protection not only to our own nationals and to their property, but to the nationals of all European countries. The farcical manner in which even American citizens have been given protection to which they are entitled under the circumstances prevailing in Mexico indicates in a measure how absurd it is for this country to continue the voluntary assumption of this wholly unnecessary and dangerous burden. Far more critical situations may at any time result from such an assumption than could conceivably arise from an abandonment of this pernicious feature of our foreign policy.

There can be no manner of doubt that the policy followed by the United States in its application of the Monroe Doctrine to Spanish-American countries has served rather to estrange our neighbors than to make them our friends. In some countries on the west coast of South America there is a sentiment approving a kind of passive American paternalism, but only because the South American hegemony is feared more than aggression from the United States. This hegemony is a phase of international relations which has as yet been completely disregarded in this country's foreign policy. Chili and the Argentine Republic wish above everything else to eliminate the United States as a factor in South American international affairs. Brazil, for her own protection and more or less against her policy, is forced to participate in a sort of gentleman's agreement, which has become, in fact, the A B C hegemony of South America.

Argentina and Chili are both most vociferous in their objection to any form of Pan-American political union, believing that this means domination, in one form or another, by the United States.

They fear nothing from Europe, so if undisturbed by the United States, they could quickly dominate the west coast countries.

The Monroe Doctrine should not interfere with such ambitions, any more than it should prevent this country from settling with quick despatch any trouble it may have in South America. Should such a policy of *laissez faire* result in attempts of a stronger country to oppress the people of weaker nations, there could be no possible objection to the same kind of intervention which is proposed above as the proper solution of Mexican troubles.

The great nations of the world, with their advancement in civilization, their high standards of education and of what constitutes free government, owe much to the weaker nations of the western hemisphere. Their nationals have invested capital there with profit to themselves and their respective nations. Industrial and commercial conquest has taken the place of conquest of territory. The least that these nations can do in return is to unite in an effort to guarantee to the people of less advanced nations an opportunity to work out in peace their own problems looking to the establishment of governments, liberal in fact, and not liberal merely on paper.

The Monroe Doctrine, as originally conceived, although selfish in its specific intentions, was nevertheless calculated to assure the attainment of this very purpose. Its various interpretations have since modified it so radically that under existing circumstances it not only fails to do what is expected of it, but it serves as a serious obstacle to the employment of other means which can reasonably be expected to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problem.

(The author desires to state that this paper was submitted for publication May 14, 1914.)

COMMUNICATIONS

THE MONROE DOCTRINE[1]

By Prof. Achille Loria,
The University of Turin, Italy.

[*Translation*]

The pressure of other duties together with the short time within which it was necessary to send you a reply have made it impossible for me to respond to your invitation as fully as I should have desired. I must, therefore, confine myself to a few observations.

As I view the situation, the Monroe Doctrine possesses a significance which is exclusively historical. It is the product and the expression of that period in the history of American trade in which even those portions of the American continent which had acquired political independence found themselves in a condition of economic dependence with reference to the countries of Europe; a condition of dependence which manifested itself in a vexatious interference on the part of European states in the affairs of the newly born republics. Against this form of interference the Monroe Doctrine represents a protest, and within these limits one must recognize its justification.

Today, however, after the American continent has been emancipated from every trace of the suzerainty of the Old World, and is free from every form of intervention on the part of European countries, the Monroe Doctrine is hardly more than a diplomatic pleonasm, or the useless repetition of a truism. Furthermore, the Monroe Doctrine now finds itself included in a larger principle, namely, that a state does not possess the right to submit its affairs to the control of another state, a doctrine which is universally recognized, and which is applicable to American as well as to European affairs. If there have been some violations of this rule, it is to be hoped that such violations will soon disappear.

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that a new series of relations which have acquired great importance in our times may be the cause of seriously undermining the principle above formulated. I refer to the conditions created by international credit. The states which owe large sums to foreigners find themselves, whenever the payment of interest on such bonded debt is for any reason delayed, exposed to the intervention of the creditor states. This intervention usually begins by the appointment of a mixed commission, but often ends by actual political intervention. If the republics of Central America persist in the policy of a wasteful use of their natural resources, and at the same time con-

[1] This communication was in the form of a letter to the President of the Academy.

tinue increasing their foreign indebtedness, it is altogether likely that their political independence will be seriously undermined. This was clearly seen by President Roosevelt, who in several of his messages stated that the United States would strenuously oppose any attempt on the part of European powers to control the political destinies of American states.

If the Monroe Doctrine leads to these consequences, there is no doubt that it will profoundly modify the conditions under which American states will be able to borrow money in European countries. The bankers of Europe will not be willing to float loans for American states if they find it impossible to use against such states the recognized means for compelling payment of principal and interest, or if they do agree to loan money it will be at an exceedingly high rate of interest and under most onerous conditions. In other words, for these countries the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine means a raising of the rate of interest on their loans and an increase in other financial charges.

In a word, under modern conditions, the Monroe Doctrine is but a part of a larger principle generally recognized, at least in theory, and on this account it has no reason for independent existence. The doctrine possesses no importance except under very exceptional conditions, as when an American state contracts a large indebtedness in European countries and fails to meet its financial obligations. If, however, the Monroe Doctrine is to be applied under these circumstances the debtor states will have to bear the burden through the raising of the rate of interest at which they will be able to borrow. In other words, the Monroe Doctrine is only of practical value for those states that are willing to bear the burdens which its application involves.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE[1]

By Prof. A. Pillet,

The Faculty of Law of the University of Paris.

[*Translation*]

In asking me to present my views on the Monroe Doctrine to the American Academy of Political and Social Science you are doing me an undeserved honor, and one to which I may not be able fully to respond.

What can I say that may be of interest? Many years ago, when I was a much younger man than I am today, I was inclined to consider the principles proclaimed by President Monroe as an encroachment upon the rights of independent nations. It seemed to me that on the vast checker-board of world politics each state should be permitted a free hand in the assertion of its rights, and that in such assertion it should not be hampered by any outside power. The right of every nation freely to determine the conduct of its own affairs seemed to me to be the corollary to national independence and sovereignty.

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[1] *Ibid.*

Subsequent experience has modified my views on this point. I no longer believe in the doctrine of the complete independence of states in their international relations. I have, furthermore, lost faith in the efficacy of abstract principles of international law, or, to express myself more correctly, I believe that if international law is to preserve its influence, it must be exceedingly modest, avoiding the formulation of principles which are far removed from fact, and becoming more and more empirical rather than dogmatic.

These changes in my mental attitude have led me to discover in the Monroe Doctrine certain merits or advantages which I had not before appreciated. America is situated at a great distance from Europe. The interests common to both continents are numerous and important, and it is also well to bear in mind that there is a distinct danger that the conflicts between the two continents will be long and serious. Any practical means of assuring a prompt and satisfactory solution of pending questions carries with it its own justification. Viewed from this standpoint the Monroe Doctrine deserves approval. In the first place, it is a principle that makes for peace and, as such, it may occupy an honorable place in the public law of nations. I am far from being a pacifist, I am even inclined to consider pacifism as one of the vital errors of our times. I am, nevertheless, a strong advocate of peace and, therefore, ready to approve any plan which will avoid the curse of war.

It is clear that the right which under the Monroe Doctrine the United States arrogates to itself to interpose in the quarrels between European and American states may, if discreetly used, be the means of avoiding war, at least in the majority of cases.

It is interesting to note that, although the Monroe Doctrine had its origin in a declaration sustaining the principle of non-intervention, it has led the United States to assert a right of intervention in a series of instances. Nevertheless, the practice of intervention to which the Monroe Doctrine has led the United States may serve to place the political morality of the less advanced American states on a higher plane, and at the same time awaken in them an appreciation of international responsibility. This result, however, can only be secured on one condition, namely, that the Monroe Doctrine be honestly and loyally enforced, not in a spirit of imperialism on the part of the United States, but rather as a means of guaranteeing the liberty of action of the less powerful American states.

It is clear that the Monroe Doctrine makes the United States the protector, and to a certain extent the master (we must not fear to use correct terms) of the republics of North and Central America. This situation involves numerous duties. It means, in the first place, that the United States must require from the states under her control the strict observance of international obligations. The pretention of President Monroe to regard as unfriendly to the United States any attempt to control the destinies of an American state can only be justified if the United States becomes, as it were, the guarantor of the observance of international obligations by the states of North and Central America. If an attack on the independence of a state is to be condemned, it must be borne in mind that such an attack may be the only recourse of a state whose rights have been trampled upon.

The United States should refrain from giving the support of her recognition to a so-called American international law, which only differs from the European system in that it attempts to give to the New World privileges heretofore unknown. International law is either the law of all nations or it is entirely non-existent.

Finally, I venture to hope that the policy of the United States will be exceedingly discreet with reference to everything that concerns the Old World. It is one of the compensations for the existence and recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. President Monroe understood it in this spirit, but the policy of the United States has undergone many changes since that time, and it would seem that the promises made by him have not always been completely fulfilled. It may happen that the constant interposition of the United States, in matters so far removed that they cannot in any way affect the immediate interests of the United States will be interpreted as an unfortunate tendency to assert hegemony on the American Continent. When applied beyond its normal limits the Monroe Doctrine cannot be sustained except by the superior physical power of the United States, and one cannot always be certain of possessing such superior force. It is far better that the Monroe Doctrine should maintain itself by the services which it can render either to Europe or to America.

It was my intention never to write a word on the Monroe Doctrine, but your cordial invitation led me to depart from this determination. If, therefore, these few lines seem naive or inadequate you must place the blame on yourself. I would never have had the audacity to write on this subject, of which I know so little.

THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MEXICO[1]

By Willard Saulsbury,
United States Senator from Delaware.

When Dr. Rowe, the president of this Academy, honored me with an invitation to preside at this session, he was kind enough to say that an acceptance involved no obligation to make an address or to take part in the discussion of the subjects to be dealt with at this meeting. I can assure you that a statement of that kind, coming with such an invitation, adds greatly to one's pleasure in accepting, and realizing that the gentlemen who will speak to you all know so very much more of the Mexican situation, its problems and obligations, than I do, I gladly content myself with the briefest reference to what we all know officially and for publication on that grave subject.

Every patriotic American recognizes that when we come into the field of foreign politics and our interests become involved in the affairs of other nations of the earth, questions of politics in the narrower sense are forgotten, that we cease to be democrats and republicans and are simply Americans. Partisanship in this country, we all feel, does stop and should stop at the seashore.

In the case of the unfortunate and distracted country to the south of us, our political differences stop at the Rio Grande. It may not be improper for me to refer briefly to our official attitude toward Mexico and to the proclamations of President Taft and President Wilson defining the duties of our own citizens toward that unhappy republic. We know in a general way how the long rule of President Diaz ended and how Madero succeeded to the presidency, but it may be well for me to call your attention to the fact that during the term of President Taft and while Madero was in power in Mexico, Congress learning that other revolutions were preparing in that country, and that the shipment of arms and munitions of war promoted domestic violence there, passed a joint resolution authorizing the President, finding such conditions to exist, to proclaim it unlawful to export arms from the United States to that country. On the same day the resolution was

[1] Remarks as presiding officer of the session of the Academy, Friday evening, April 3, 1914.

passed by Congress, President Taft, declaring that conditions of domestic violence were being promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war sent from the United States, admonished all our citizens to abstain from violating the provisions of that resolution.

The death of Madero followed, then came the message of President Wilson, strongly adverse to General Huerta, and subsequently, the disorders continuing with no prospect of an early settlement, other nations being engaged in furnishing both sides to the quarrel with means of warfare, the President on the 4th day of February last, finding that there had been an essential change in the conditions under which President Taft's proclamation had been issued, revoked the same and placed the United States in the same position as other powers with reference to the exportation of arms and munitions of war to Mexico.

That is the position in which we stand today, and the President in revoking this prior proclamation, declared that there was at the time no constitutional government in Mexico and that the existence of the prior order under the changed conditions hindered and delayed "the very thing the government of the United States is now insisting upon, namely, that Mexico shall be left free to settle her own affairs and as soon as possible put them upon a constitutional footing by her own force and counsel."

Thus it will be seen our government has assumed its present position with the expressed desire and hope that our neighbors, embroiled in civil war, may by their own force and counsel and without interference, certainly without intervention, unless our own interest shall be endangered, or our great national policy threatened by an unfriendly act, settle as best they may their internal affairs, preventing our people, so far as possible, from entangling this government therein by advising them to remove themselves from the scene of conflict.

I believe that the action of both administrations, that of President Taft and of President Wilson, in restraining our citizens from taking part in the Mexican conflict and preventing the lives of our own people from being endangered, certainly in refraining from any active intervention in that country, meets the approval of all our people. The horrors, the sufferings, the losses of war are too great to be incurred by any people, if avoidable with honor, and this great American nation can well set an example to all the world of refraining to the last possible moment from engaging in wars, invasions and bloody controversy.

THE POSTULATES OF THE MEXICAN SITUATION

By Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D.,
Professor of Government, Harvard University.

Three years have now passed since the common people of the United States became aware that a volcanic eruption was threatened on the southwest border. At first there was only a little steam in northern Mexico, a gentle earth tremor, which slightly jarred the Diaz administration; then more violent shocks; then a crash and an explosion which blew the whole Diaz government into Kingdom—Gone. After a short period of quietude came another shower of hailstones and coals of fire, and the Madero government went up in smoke. Ever since that time red hot lava has been pouring out from the craters of Juarez and Chihuahua; and the whole land is covered with smoke and fury. Such a calamity falls alike on the evil and the good. The lives and property of foreigners are not respected by these elemental forces.

Is there no protection, no help, no aid? On the slopes of Aetna the peasants build enormous stone walls to deflect the lava streams. Why not try that method in Mexico? Of what use are such venerable institutions as the administration in Washington, the state department, the *North American Review*, and the American Academy of Political and Social Science, if ashes and scoriae devastate our mines and fields in Mexico? Do something! Get busy! Notify somebody! Stop the volcano from such disgraceful behavior! Send a warship to tell it to be good! Pepper it with machine guns! Let loose the Texan Rangers! Among these shouts the chorus of "Recognize Huerta!" has gradually drowned out the rest. It rises like the war cry of "We want Teddy," as it roars through a Progressive convention. "Recognize Huerta!" "Recognize Huerta!" Colonel Harvey waves his arms and wiggle-waggles his shoulders in the finest cheer master style as he shouts: "Now fellows, all altogether, one, two, three, Recognize Huerta! Recognize Huerta! Recognize Huerta! Tii'ger."

No one can deny or would minimize the present dreadful state of Mexico, or the suffering alike of native Mexicans, European foreigners and citizens of the United States. The trouble is that revo-

lution, civil war, battle, pillage, destruction and murder, are not abnormal in Mexico, but appear to be ordinary conditions of that unhappy land, for which no known remedy has ever been found, though they have sought it with tears. The era of Mexican Revolution began in 1810 and in the hundred and four years since that time the land has seen no more than forty years of internal peace; while not less than twenty-five dictators have galloped across the political stage, each brandishing his sword and crying "Recognize me!" as he disappeared in the wings.

As Admiral Chadwick pointed out in his admirable paper, the fundamental trouble in all the Latin-American countries, and particularly in Mexico, seems to be that the population is substantially of native American origin. So far as can be learned, six to eight millions of the fifteen million Mexicans are unmixed native Indians. Six or seven millions are of mixed race and not more than one million are of unmixed European race. The deduction is simple, namely, that Mexico cannot be classed among nations derived from European stock and infused with European traditions. The presumption is that such a population has not acquired the coolness and political reasonableness which are the basis of modern civilized governments.

The common people of the United States are undoubtedly confused upon this issue because of the supposed success of the thirty-two years of the dominion of Diaz, from 1879 to 1911. He succeeded in deluding his own people, foreign nations and even himself into the belief that Mexico had become so tame that it would eat out of his hand. Diaz maintained his government by two strokes of genius. The first was the enlistment of brigands and other uneasy persons into the corps of "Rurales," or national mounted police. The second was the systematic encouragement of railroads which could carry his troops to scenes of revolt. But anybody who chooses may satisfy himself that Diaz for years remained in power only by the despot's favorite method of closing the mouths of those who criticize the government. Important men were banished or reduced to impotence; the less significant went to prison; and a good many literally went to the wall. Listen to the comment recently quoted with approval by the Mexican newspaper *El Dictamen*, "Under the liberal tyranny of Don Porforio Diaz the wealth and culture of the ruling class of scarcely a million and a half of people increased rapidly, but the

great mass of the community continued to live in the same abject misery."

The world heard much of the enlightened policy of Diaz, but what are the evidences? What did he do to relieve his countrymen from the dreadful curse of peonage which has practically set Mexico very close to slavery? How many boys and girls did his so-called system of popular education teach to read and write? How many communities were allowed even the rudiments of self government? What efforts did he make to break up the crushing system of immense landed estates? How far did he conserve the resources of his country against unfavorable contracts and concessions? What is the size of the fortune which he accumulated as a reward for his immense dignities and powers? The real proof of the hollowness of the régime of this strong man is that though he had behind him the government, the army, the sympathy of foreign powers, and the prestige of thirty-two years of success, his empire crumbled beneath him at last.

The American public does not deny to its neighbors the sacred right of having dictators it they want them; but it is hard to convince the people of this country that dictators self-appointed, backed up by paid armies, and dependent for support upon brute force, can furnish a really good government. Diaz has the same justification as Hiero of Syracuse, or Xerxes of Persia, or Ivan the Terrible of Russia, but no such despotism can ever keep alive without murder, for the despot is a vampire who must always have fresh blood. A few months ago I inquired of a Bulgarian gentleman, who as a boy had lived under the Turkish dispensation, what was his complaint against the Ottoman government. "What was our complaint? That they crushed us to the earth; that whenever a young man arose who might conceivably become the leader of his people, that young man was rooted out." Woe to the country in which the ruler's policy is that of the East Indian monarchs, each of whom as he succeeded to the throne began by putting out the eyes of his younger brothers!

Believing as we Americans do, that the only justification of arbitrary and despotic government is the acquiescence of the people concerned many of the common people have an instinctive feeling that General Victoriano Huerta, the present self-styled president of Mexico, would not under the most favorable circumstances be likely to endure longer than the one year to three years which has been the term of most of his predecessors.

Colonel Harvey draws a heart-rending picture of the mental sufferings of this provisional constitutional President: "Branded—as an accessory to assassination, deprived of the opportunity to borrow money—cajoled, threatened, cut off from aid whenever possible—remarkable for the consistent dignity, courtesy and consideration exhibited by the old Indian." What is the life history of Victoriano Huerta? Up to 1911 he was a not very conspicuous officer in the army of Diaz, without reputation of any kind beyond the boundaries of his own country. We first heard of him in February, 1913, in the campaign northward to Juarez as a leader of an army of President Madero. Then he used his military authority to depose, imprison and supplant President Madero who had given him his dignity and opportunity. At once he applied for diplomatic recognition, which was accorded by most of the powers of Europe.

The next mark of surpassing greatness was the murder of his former friend and principal. The tale of that transaction as related by this powerful chieftain, is that he sent his predecessor, who was a helpless captive in his hands, from one prison to another at night, with an escort so slender that when the cortege was attacked it was unable to protect its prisoner, and he was consequently shot by his friends. The "strong man" takes refuge from the obvious charge of murder, behind the plea that he was so inept an administrator, and so timorous a commander, that he could not secure the safety of a state prisoner, nor obedience to his orders by his most trusted troops, within a mile of his own palace.

To some minds the proof against Huerta is incomplete; and the title to the presidency rests on an assumed constitutional basis. The facts seem to be as follows: Huerta arrested Madero and the vice-president and declared their offices vacant. Thereupon the minister of foreign affairs constitutionally became president. His term lasted about a quarter of an hour, and his only official acts were to appoint Huerta to a cabinet office and then to resign; whereupon Huerta, as holder of the highest cabinet office, became "provisional president." A few days after Madero's murder he styled himself "provisional but constitutional president."

The next evidence of statesmanship was in October, 1913, when a senator of the Mexican Republic, who unlike Huerta, had gone through the form of an election, was seized by the orders of the head of that state, who was so powerful that he was afraid his government

would be overthrown by a public criticism from a fellow Mexican. Then he imprisoned 110 members of Congress because his policy was so generally approved that he could not allow a single man to stand up in his place and express his mind in opposition.

Even such assassins frequently have the animal attribute of personal belligerency, and the willingness to risk their lives for the defence of their rule; Santa Anna, one of the most slippery and contemptible of all Mexican tyrants, commanded two armies which measured swords with the American forces. But where has General Huerta been during the fierce campaigns of the north? Town after town under his protection has been taken by forces of Mexicans which were little better than organized brigands; and the general and president has remained serenely in his capital. A short time ago the city of Torreon, the gateway to the city of Mexico, was beseiged, and battered, but the military head of the republic has not stirred to animate his own troops, or to share their danger. Such amateurs as Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Bolivar, found time in the intervals of state-craft to lead armies to victory. Somehow, the uninstructed think President Huerta is a *roi faineant*, who sends others to fight his battles, but avoids the villainous powder smoke.

Every such dictator in the experience of Mexico has had to suffer from dastardly contra-dictators, who have felt that their superb courage, popularity and patriotism gave them the same right as the head of the state to dispense with ordinary humanity. Among the rivals to Huerta the most notable is Carranza, who to the uninstructed American public seems to be a badly carved figurehead, animated with Huerta's desperate determination that other men shall fight and die for him at a distance. Nevertheless by his published instructions to Villa to murder his prisoners he has put himself outside the pale of civilized men. If he really possesses authority, he must take the responsibility of committing the conduct of his campaigns to General Villa, a professional brigand, skilled in making war in the benign fashion of the Tartar, the Kaffir, and the Apache, a man who combines the qualities of a train robber, a pickpocket and a New York gunman.

In international law, in ordinary morals, and in the sight of Almighty God, Villa's habit of killing non-combatants, men, women, and children, is nothing else but plain, despicable murder; murder without any military advantage; murder for the sake of killing. One

of his recent achievements has been to order the homicide of two hundred men (who had thrown down their arms) on the plea that unless he shot them they would form up again, automatically arm themselves, and attack him in the rear. Villa's plea is that of the bull-dog, that he must eat the rabbit because otherwise that animal will bite his tail off. He has as much capacity for civilized government as a bull in a ring. The plain American people have just the same aversion for Villa that they have for Huerta or for any other man who seizes upon power in order that he may benefit himself and massacre his enemies.

In international law it is a safe rule that every government which actually represents a nation is entitled to recognition and to diplomatic intercourse. But amid the dust and gore of Mexico it is difficult to distinguish a figure which seems to deserve official recognition by the United States of America. I freely accept the principle that the personal character of Huerta or of Villa, though a factor in forming a judgment as to Mexican character and government, is not a determining reason for refusing to recognize one or the other. So far as the President and secretary of state have made the personal behavior of those leaders a reason for refusing to have relations with them, they have departed from the precedents of American diplomacy. Our government has been rather under than over solicitous as to the private character of the heads of other governments. A country which three times recognized Santa Anna, and which recognized the most recent dictator of Peru by return mail, has no right to be finicky over Huerta's behavior. But behavior is a different thing from legal authority. Colonel Harvey denounces President Wilson for not giving a full opportunity "to the only government, however discreditable, that does exist, and the only really strong man, however disreputable, who has appeared." To his mind the policy of the administration is as if "one president declares war upon another president." Against this dictum I confidently protest. The rightful policy of our government is negative rather than positive. The probable and sufficient reason for not recognizing Huerta as President of the Mexican Republic is simply that he has never given evidence that he is President of the Mexican Republic, or indeed that he is the choice of the Mexican nation for any office or dignity. Who was it that declared him to be "provisional president" February 19, 1913? General Victoriano Huerta. Who proclaimed him to be "provisional but con-

stitutional president" February 27? General Victoriano Huerta. How did the vacancy occur in the office of constitutional president? Through the assassination of President Madero and Vice-President Suarez, while in the custody of men acting under the orders of General Victoriano Huerta. Who profited by this crime, and thereby made himself at best (or at worst) an accessory after the fact? Victoriano Huerta. Who has arrested people who questioned his title, imprisoned, banished or executed, right and left? Victoriano Huerta. Who dissolved the coördinate legislative branch of the Mexican government and sent its members to prison on the tyrant's usual charge of conspiracy? Victoriano Huerta. By whose directions have taxes and forced loans been made? That of Victoriano Huerta. If the question were that of recognizing a newly created nation of Victoriano Huerta by its sister power the United States of America, the case would be absolutely complete; every person, corporation, entity, and unit of government, comprehended within the broad term Victoriano Huerta, is unanimous in placing the entire public authority in the hands of Victoriano Huerta.

Nevertheless, the only question of international law and practice which the department of state has been called upon to decide is whether the man who calls himself president of Mexico is either *de jure* or *de facto* the president of Mexico. Geographically he is plainly not the president of all Mexico, for at least a third of its area is outside of his authority. From a military point of view he is not the head of the Mexican republic, because his forces have been defeated by rebel armies in every pitched battle for many months. Constitutionally he is not president of Mexico for he is not flanked by a congress chosen in an open election. As the wielder of supreme authority for the time being he is not entitled to recognition, because he is visibly afraid to leave his capital even to defend his government against armed enemies.

It is true as Colonel Harvey says that "the manner in which the Mexicans see fit to change their rulers is none of our business;" but is it not our business to observe whether the Mexicans have changed their government? Colonel Harvey feels sure that if Huerta had been recognized he would have brought about peace by this time, because he is the strongest man in sight. And Huerta makes the plea that all he needs to secure his power is recognition by our govern-

ment. What better proof could there be that his power is feeble, unstable and temporary? The United States would have been glad to be recognized by our neighbor Spain in 1781, but no such recognition was necessary: the United States was independent simply because it was independent. From 1821 to 1826 Mexico lacked the recognition of Great Britain, yet cheerfully maintained independence. When Louis Napoleon seized the power in France in 1851 he was not dependent on the recognition of other nations but on the acceptance of his rule by his countrymen. In what manner has the United States, as Colonel Harvey asserts, "deprived Huerta of the means of effective striving?"

Another argument for recognition for Huerta is that otherwise our government must recognize the Constitutionalists. To the uninstructed mind this point of view recalls the colored minister's appeal: "Oh, my hearers, do you realize that there is stretching before you at this moment two roads—one of those roads leads to eternal damnation, and the other to everlasting perdition—oh, my hearers, which road will you choose?" The common people look upon the two political organizations which are wrestling with each other in Mexico as about equally removed from the third and narrow way which leads neither to damnation nor perdition; and some Americans congratulate themselves that the government of the United States has taken no responsibility for either of those so-called governments.

The most familiar starting point for the Harvey cheering section with its "Recognize Huerta!" is that he is the strong man, who only needs recognition by the United States to bring about order and good government. It is fair to ask why this particular strong man should succeed where failures were recorded by Iturbide, Bustamente, Aristomente, Santa Anna, Comonfort, Miramon, and Madero. The *Berliner Tageblatt* which ought to know a strong man when it sees him, is sure that Huerta is "exactly the man that Mexico at this juncture needs." But if Mexico needs him, what prevents Mexico from having him? If by a "strong man" is meant only one who can by brute force compel 15,000,000 people to obey him against their will, then the man for President of Mexico is evidently not Huerta but Hagenbeck, the lion-tamer, with his whip and revolver to encourage his loving subjects. The mention of lions suggests Wallace Irwin's conception of a strong character:

Adolphus I am hungree,
And rather faint am I,
Pray be so good as give to me
A morsel of your pie.

The lion ate Adolphus' pie
With all politeness due,
Then pausing with a grateful sigh
He ate Adolphus too.

Then rising with a thoughtful roar
He sauntered down the plain,
A stronger, better lion for
Adolphus' deed humane.

I for one, protest against the argument that it is the moral duty of the United States to help into power a man of a type against whom every man would take up arms, if he were an American and tried to make himself dictator of the United States. What is the use of dubbing as "Constitutional," a process of murder and seizing on offices which would justify revolution, if it were tried here? Why excuse and extol a man who, if he tried his policy within the bounds of the United States, would be stoned out of civilized society!

Doubtless many people are led to believe that Huerta is the government of Mexico, because he occupies the national capital, gives orders to an army and is supported by his troops so long as he is able to pay the price. After General Miramon in 1858 became "president substitute" and was recognized by most of the European powers, Secretary Cass instructed Minister McLean that possession of the Mexican capital was not an essential condition of the recognition of the government; that he should recognize no government unless it was "obeyed over a large majority of the country, and the people, and was likely to continue." President Buchanan thought that since Miramon "was himself a military usurper, having expelled the constitutional president from office, it would have been a lasting disgrace to the Mexican people had they tamely submitted to the yoke."

The fact is that there is no constitutional or international reason why at present anybody must be recognized in Mexico. It would have been well for the world if earlier administrations had been less hasty in recognizing dictators whose careers were destined to be short. It is not true, even though the *London Spectator* says so, that "the

alternatives are to recognize whatever president has at the moment climbed to power (or) to act as though Mexico were no longer an independent country." If there are now two organizations in Mexico, neither of which can show any proof that it is desired by the Mexican people, the obvious common sense course would seem to be to recognize neither of them. As Lincoln said in his famous speech in Chicago about slavery, "I protest now and forever, against that counterfeit logic which presumes that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave, I do necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I need not have her for either; but, as God made us separate, we can leave one another alone, and do to one another much good thereby."

Is there a Mexican people? Is there a popular will? Is there any known means of determining that will? That is of course the radical issue for Mexico and the Mexicans. Inasmuch as since 1821 there have been over twenty military despots, and only two elections at which there was an open and unstressed opportunity for the Mexicans to vote for a president, the prospect of a genuinely popular government is discouraging. Apparently most of the Mexican people would accept any just and moderate government which was once firmly seated; but with the single exception of Diaz, the "strong men" have never furnished anything approaching a just and moderate government,—certainly not Huerta. The Mexican tyrant loves the trappings of tyranny. Our American despots are satisfied with the actual control of conventions, legislatures, governors and parties; but the Mexican wants all that, and in addition, a cocked hat, sabre, presidential palace, and bullet-proof automobile. We are not too far from the ordinary habits of Mexican life; bandits have recently attacked railroad trains in Massachusetts and Illinois; and a candidate for the governorship of a southwestern state seems to rest his claims on the fact that he served a term in prison for being captain of brigands; the beginning of civil war may be seen in Colorado. But the American people have the habit of accepting a defeat in a political election, cordially recognizing the candidates elected by the other party, and then organizing to beat them at the next election. Such patience and forbearance seem lacking in the Mexican character; with them it is rule or ruin. So long as recognition waits upon the existence of a stable government, it may have long to wait.

There is a positive and pressing need for official understanding

with some authority in Mexico because the property and lives of foreigners, including many American citizens, are in daily danger. Some of that property arises from questionable dealings with defunct governments, much of it is fairly and honestly won against great difficulties. Most of the Americans who have established themselves in Mexico did so under a government which seemed likely to retain its authority and keep the peace. Our government owes to those people moral support at all times, and protection in case of need. Of course that protection can be offered without recognition of this or that Mexican government; and it is difficult to see how a constitutional president who cannot defend the lives and property of his own adherents in the north, could by recognition become suddenly powerful enough to defend Americans in the south. The main difficulty is not recognition, nor even the weakness of Mexican government, but in an instability of Mexican character, which seems to make good government impossible. We have been misled by the exceptional endurance of the Diaz régime. Leaving that one administration out of account, no government in Mexico has ever been much aided by American recognition, or much marred by the lack of it.

Then what is to be done? How is the United States to protect its nationals, or to make effective those claims for millions of dollars which will soon come pouring in, and which in the last resort will have to be paid by the Mexican taxpayer? Failing recognition, intervention has been demanded. If by intervention is meant the military occupation of Mexico with a view to the pacification of the country, and then the withdrawal of troops, there have been some experiences that seem like precedents. Buchanan vainly sought from Congress in 1859 authority to send an army into Mexico, to break up the Miramon government, and thus open the way for the Juarez government. Even when the French were in Mexico, no American troops ever crossed the border.

It seems tolerably clear that any American expedition would forthwith bring about some approach to a real national government by making every decent Mexican ready to meet the Americans, as Tom Corwin put it in 1846, "to welcome them with bloody hands to hospitable graves." For, strange as it may seem, the Mexicans, who have never learned how to develop the resources of their country, or to give it dignity among nations, have an inveterate love of their own land, a furious hatred of those who attempt to diminish their

territory, and a willingness to die in its defence, which among more highly organized nations might be called patriotism.

Allowing that intervention should begin, when and how is it to end? That is a question of more significance to us than to the Mexicans. Excellent military authorities think that a force of 200,000 men would not be too large for the purpose, which would be by far the largest army ever moved from one country to another in America. And when would that country be ready to take care of itself again? Sixteen years we have been civilizing the Filipinos up to the point where they are unanimous only on one thing, namely, that they want us to leave. Nothing less than a similar experience of education in language, science, and self-government would much affect the disposition of the Mexican people.

Supposing that our physical means are sufficient for the task of holding down Mexico, have we not sufficient race and color questions already? Are we so far advanced in the amalgamation of European races, much nearer to us than the Mexicans are in culture and standards, that we can undertake a similar task at long range upon an unwilling people? Is Cuba so certain to remain a dependency instead of to become an integral part of the United States, that we can undertake a problem many times more difficult? Have we been so successful in the fair treatment and civilization of our own 300,000 Indians that we wish to be responsible for 14,000,000 more? Is the government of Boston, New York and Philadelphia so firmly established on principles of truth and righteousness that we can now transfer our energies to the uplift of Tampico and Mazatlan, and the city of Mexico? Von Moltke used to say that he had worked out three different detailed plans for the invasion of England by a German army, but he never could contrive a plan for getting the army back again. A stroke of the pen can send an army into Mexico! How many strokes of the sword will be needed to keep it there?

ERRORS WITH REFERENCE TO MEXICO AND EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED THERE

By Henry Lane Wilson,

Former Ambassador of the United States to Mexico.

I. The Character of the Government of General Diaz

Diaz was not a tyrant, but a benevolent autocrat who understood the Mexican people and knew them to be unfitted for self-government. Though not elected by constitutional methods, he governed according to law. He ruled Mexico for thirty years with a hand of iron, but possessed withal undeviating personal honesty, loyalty to obligations and a profound patriotism, together with a lofty conception, as to Mexico's needs and future. His foreign policy was clear and fixed from the first days of his power. It consisted, among other things, of the cultivation of the friendliest relations with the government of the United States coupled with the invitation to American capital and American energy to go thither and develop the marvellous resources of the country, affording them generous profits but reaping in return much greater ones for Mexico.

He had two great domestic policies: First, the development of the material resources of the country; second, the quickening of the moral life of the nation. The first of these policies he accomplished with a high measure of success. The second he would have accomplished but for the undermining influences of advancing years and the realization that the task was beyond his endurance and power. If Diaz had carried the torch of enlightenment into the dark places of Mexico, the history of the last three years might have been differently written. He covered Mexico with a network of railways; he developed her resources by concessions and by encouragement to foreign capital; he fostered her manufacturing, mining, agricultural, and commercial interests; built hospitals and innumerable public institutions; established her credit at home and abroad; and, with his army and rural police, made life as safe on a Mexican highway as on one of the public thoroughfares of the state of Massachusetts. He did more than this. Witb the materials which be had at hand he

tried to establish justice, and no man who could present to him an honest cause ever suffered through a miscarriage of justice; and no man who observed the law and kept the peace needed to fear his avenging hand. The legend, however, existed that those who broke the law, that those who committed crimes, must pay the penalty, and this made peace.

II. Diaz was not Overthrown by Madero, but by a Universal Public Sentiment which Madero neither Created nor Represented

The government of Diaz was not overthrown by Madero; it collapsed and on its ruins Madero, who represented only a small fraction of the active opposition, rode into power through the default of any other organized movement.

The vast majority of Mexican public opinion was hostile to Madero from the first days of his government, and this hostility augmented as it became evident that his administration was insincere in its promises and incompetent in the performance of its obligations. Madero came into power pledged to a platform which declared for free press, free elections, free lands, free education, and a free judiciary, but after more than a year of his administration not a single pledge of his altruistic program had been kept. A free press existed neither in theory nor in fact. Of the metropolitan newspapers three were owned by the government, and the editors of five were in jail. The press and the international news service were censored and only that which pleased the government was sent abroad. In the matter of elections, the government interfered with every gubernatorial election from the Rio Grande River to the boundary of Guatemala, and it used all its power and influence to elect a friendly legislative body. Pledged to free and universal education, the government did not appropriate for educational purposes a single dollar beyond the amount already established by precedent. Neither was a single additional school-house built, nor an additional opportunity afforded a Mexican child to receive education. To the great and preëminent problem of furnishing lands to the people through some intelligent system of redistribution no attention whatsoever was paid, and when Madero fell not a single acre of land had been distributed, nor did there seem to be the slightest probability of any effort in that direction. In the last days of the government a profound pessimism suc-

ceeded the altruism which had been so bravely heralded in the earlier and more sanguine days. The leader of the revolutionary protest against the despotism of Diaz became himself a despot, practicing all the forms of tyranny against which his revolution and his election were protests; the dreamer of Coahuila, who essayed the rôle of Moses, shriveled rapidly to the dimensions of a Castro. Thus, after the sacrifice of thousands of human lives, the destruction of vast material interests, aggravation of the condition of the poorer classes, and desolation and ruin spread over a third of the area of the republic, the Mexican people discovered that their lives and their property were subject to the same type of despotism which had aroused a national protest against Diaz, and that the dangers and difficulties of the hour were vastly increased by the impotence of the government and its apparent inability to maintain the national prestige and credit.

III. The Supposition that Madero was Elected by Constitutional Methods and by the Majority of the Mexican People

Madero received a total vote of 19,987, out of a population of 15,000,000 people. There is no such thing as a constitutional method in Mexico. There is no machinery for carrying out the national will through democratic channels. There are no precedents to guide the Mexican population in the exercise of sovereignty, and the people themselves are totally unable to distinguish between right and wrong, between an autocracy and a democracy. If left to their own inclinations they would choose an autocracy.

IV. The General Belief that the Madero Government was pro-American

At the close of the Taft administration relations between the United States and Mexico had become severely strained. At the beginning of the revolutionary government there were in Mexico somewhere between fifty and seventy-five thousand American citizens and American capital invested to the extent of probably a billion of dollars. As the Madero government continued in power, it became evident, not only to the official representative of the government of the United States in Mexico, but to all observing foreigners, that there existed a strong anti-American sentiment among a large number

of the more ignorant part of the population of Mexico; a sentiment which, if not in some measure shared by the Mexican government, was at least not discountenanced nor reproved by it. In no single instance, that can be recalled, did an official under Madero voice an appreciation of the unselfish attitude of the American government and people, or express the smallest measure of gratitude for the material benefits which American intelligence and energy and American capital had bestowed upon Mexico. On numerous occasions, however, public orators, the press, and all the organs capable of influencing public opinion, were busily engaged in inflaming the public mind and in rendering more unsafe the situation of Americans and their properties in Mexico.

This lack of sound and civilized public policy bore its fruit, as might have been expected, in a wide and indiscriminatory attack upon everything bearing the stamp of American origin. American interests honestly acquired, and on which vast amounts of capital had been expended, were everywhere attacked on baseless and absurd pretexts, by persons in collusion with friends of the government, and were harassed by confiscatory taxes and by the denial of the protection which the most elementary conceptions of government would afford them. American citizens, to a great number, were arrested on frivolous and insufficient charges, and incarcerated in filthy and uncivilized jails, from which neither the protests of our own government nor the palpable and proven injustice of their imprisonment could release them. Scores of American citizens were foully and brutally murdered, and neither diplomatic representations, entreaties nor threats served to procure the trial or punishment of the offending criminals. The property of our citizens was destroyed, yet the Madero government turned a deaf ear to their complaints, and denied them that justice which it is incumbent upon all civilized nations to afford. To such an extent did this persecution grow that, at the time of Madero's fall, probably thirty thousand American citizens had been obliged to abandon their homes, their factories, their mines, and their haciendas, and return to the United States.

The American property confiscated or destroyed reached a sum of vast proportions, and yet from all indications the Madero government had no intention of recognizing its responsibility for the damage. The inability to secure adequate protection for American citizens, the unprovoked murder of many Americans, the failure on the part of

the Mexican government to secure the arrest, detention and punishment of the murderers, the disposition of the executive to attack legally acquired American interests through trumped-up court processes, the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of Americans on frivolous charges, the failure of local governments to remedy such abuses, the savage and barbarous character of the warfare—by all of these intolerable conditions our government was finally forced to take a decisive stand. Hence, on September 15, 1912, the embassy, under instructions from Washington, addressed to the Mexican government a note which not only evidenced the virility and alertness of the Taft administration, but induced the Madero administration to dispatch the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Lascurain, to the United States with instructions, couched in general and vague language, to make concessions to Secretary Knox, and also incidentally to see President-elect Wilson for purposes unknown to the author but presumably connected with the policy towards Mexico of the administration which was about to come into power. This occurred coincidentally with the withdrawal of Señor Calero, Mexican ambassador at Washington, and his public announcement in connection with his resignation, that he had been instructed by the Madero administration systematically to misrepresent conditions in Mexico.

V. Character of the so-called Constitutionalists and their Leaders

The so-called constitutionalists are merely large organized bands of bandits who were in arms against the government of General Diaz, and then in arms against the government of Madero, and are now in arms against the government of General Huerta. These bandits learned of their new opportunities in the last days of the Diaz government; they improved them under the government of Madero; and they have now become professional bandits who loot to live and live to loot. The designation "Constitutionalist" has been assumed solely for the purpose of enlisting the sympathy of the Washington government, which should long ago have discovered the shallow pretense and mockery of the disguise. These people have no comprehension of the meaning of the word "democracy." Their idea of an election is a revolution, and they have no intention whatsoever of aiding in the maintenance of an orderly, peaceful, democratic republic.

The duties of my position during nearly four years of arduous and responsible work in Mexico, have brought me frequently in contact with the methods of these northern brigands, and I may say without the slightest hesitation that, as a whole, they are not only entirely out of keeping with our conception of what an honest people struggling for liberty should be, but are mere natural savages dressed up in the habiliments of civilization. Of their chiefs and leaders it can only be said that their crimes are greater and their responsibility more heavy because of their greater intelligence.

Carranza, the dummy and opera bouffe president put forward by this band of outlaws, is an ineffectual politician. He is responsible for the massacre of Durango. He was chased out of the state of Coahuila by his subordinates, and he has remained until the last few weeks, by the order of Villa, in complete isolation in the state of Sonora. Whatever part he takes in coming events, the American public may understand that it is purely opera bouffe in character, and that, when he is not needed for spectacular purposes, his services will be promptly dispensed with.

Villa, the real leader of the revolutionary party, has been a bandit for twenty-five years, and has to his credit more than one hundred murders. He has pillaged and looted the larger part of the state of Chihuahua. He is responsible for the massacres of Juarez, Ojinaga, Chihuahua and Torreon, and he may be depended upon to murder and loot whenever he can do so with safety.

Aguilar, the third chieftain, was in arms against Diaz, and then in arms against Madero, and is now in arms against Huerta. His contribution to the cause of constitutionalism was the massacre of Victoria. The fourth in this galaxy of patriots is Zapata, who is responsible for the desolation and spoliation of the states of Morelas and Guerraro. Zapata is known to all the world. He has been in arms against Diaz, against Madero, and finally against Huerta, and will be in arms against any government established in Mexico City.

With these elements the Washington administration must deal when it shall have overthrown the government of General Huerta, and no government will be permitted to exist which has not the seal of their approval and support.

VI. Character of the Mexican Population as a Whole

The character of the Mexican population as a whole is very greatly misunderstood in the United States. At least 80 per cent of the population is of the indigenous races, without an abiding place except by sufferance, with no more than a nominal part or interest in the politics and affairs of the country, unable to read or write, who, while preserving the vices and traditions of their ancestors, have been made infinitely worse by the ingrafting of the vices of the white man and by the consciousness of a feeling of injustice arising from the realization that they are pariahs and outcasts. Here lies, in large measure, the root of the evil conditions and that which will constitute a menace for all time to come, unless righted by a strong and vigorous government moving on definite lines of policy with the sympathy, advice and assistance of those civilized powers which, instead of attempting to set up an altruistic republic among a people unfitted for it by education and tradition, may furnish those effective aids which will lead to a system of universal education, the implanting of sound political ideas, and a patriotism which shall be something higher and nobler than hatred of the foreigner.

VII. Character of Madero

Madero was a man of imperfect education and vision. He was a disciple of the French school in politics and economics, but never gathered its threads of philosophy for practical application nor comprehended in the least the deep, practical common-sense which lies at the root of all French political opinion. He was a dreamer of dreams, and a singer of unknown songs which met with no echo. He came into power as an apostle of liberty, but he was only the man who happened to be in the public eye at the psychological moment. Remote from the great position where his misguided ambition carried him, he would, doubtless, have remained a quiet and simple country gentleman of benevolent ideals and blameless life. Clothed with the chief power of the nation, evil qualities, dormant in the blood or in the race, came to the surface and wrought ruin to him and to thousands upon thousands of the Mexican people.

VIII. Events of the Bombardment of the City of Mexico and the Overthrow of Madero

With reference to the bombardment of the City of Mexico, which culminated in the overthrow of Madero, it may be useful to illuminate a few points which have been matters of public discussion.

1. The representations unofficially made to Madero urging his resignation by the American ambassador and the British, German, and Spanish ministers, with the approval of all their colleagues, were made after it was known that a large number of army officers under Huerta were untrue to the Madero government. Also they were made only after the military attaché of the American ambassy had informed the ambassador that the citadel held by General Diaz could not be taken by the Madero government, even with the sacrifice of its entire military force. These representations reflected the views of all foreigners in Mexico City. They were made, not only for the purpose of saving the lives of foreigners, but for the purpose of saving the lives of Madero and his family.

2. These representations were enforced on the same day by similar representations from the Mexican Senate, and they were followed on the next day by similar representations from a committee of the army, at which time Madero killed with his own hand Colonels Riverol and Izquerdo. I believe this is not disputed. Following this act Madero was made prisoner by General Blanquet. Had he acted upon the advice given him by the members of the diplomatic corps and handed over his powers to Congress, the Mexican revolution would have avoided all the tragedies which followed.

3. After the overthrow of Madero was announced to the American embassy for transmission to the diplomatic corps, a new situation immediately developed. All civil power had ceased. Two hostile armies occupied the City of Mexico, which had been devastated by ten days of bombardment, during which the lives of some five to seven thousand people were sacrificed. In the poorer quarters of the city, thousands of people were starving. Bandits were beginning to appear in every quarter intent on pillage. Human life was safe nowhere. Some twenty thousand foreigners were depending upon the embassy for protection and for guidance. Fifteen hundred Americans had been brought out of the firing zone and furnished with homes in the immediate vicinity of the embassy which undertook to afford

them protection and supply them with the necessities of life. Lights and water for the embassy had been cut off, and one side of the building riddled with bullets. The scarcity of food increased, and the difficulty of feeding the vast number of people dependent upon the embassy for supplies grew hourly greater. It seemed to the ambassador that his duty was clear, and he immediately sent, on his own responsibility, for General Felix Diaz and General Huerta to come to the embassy, as neutral ground, for the purpose of arranging, if possible, for some cessation of hostilities. Eight hours after the overthrow of Madero these generals came to the embassy. The ambassador had met these men only once before in company with his colleagues, but he was able after six hours of discussion—sometimes of a highly irritating character—to induce these men to agree to turn over their powers to Congress. This was done, and on the morrow the people of the City of Mexico resumed their peaceful occupations.

4. Madero died as the result of a military conspiracy formed for the purpose of avenging the deaths of General Reyes, General Ruiz, Colonel Riverol and Colonel Izquerdo. The embassy's investigations brought no certain conclusions except to indicate that General Huerta was in no way privy to the killing of Madero, but that it was his well-defined purpose to send him out of the country. At one time a train was prepared for this purpose, but when telegrams from some member of the Madero family to the military governor of Vera Cruz urging him to rise, were intercepted, Huerta decided it would be unwise to let Madero depart. The most that may be said of Huerta in connection with this crime, so repugnant to civilization, was that he did not take sufficient precautions to guard against it. Madero was killed in precisely the way it was related, namely, by his guards after an attack had been made upon the automobile. It may be mentioned here that Madero was being transferred from the guard house in the palace to the penitentiary at the request of the American embassy, which acted in the matter in response to Mrs. Madero's prayers that more comfortable quarters should be assigned to the ex-president.

5. It is believed by a great many honest people that Huerta slew Madero for the purpose of succeeding him in the presidency. This is a chronological error. Madero had resigned and Huerta had succeeded to the provisional presidency before Madero was killed. Thus while Madero was violently overthrown, his death did not occur until after his successor had been chosen.

IX. Legality of the Government of Huerta and its Support by Public Opinion

The government of General Huerta was as legally constituted as any Mexican government in the past. President Madero and Vice-President Suarez resigned. Mr. Pedro Lascurain, the Madero minister of foreign affairs, then succeeded under the constitution to the presidency. He assumed the office and appointed as his minister of the interior, General Victoriano Huerta, and then resigned. General Huerta then took office in accordance with the provisions of the Mexican constitution, and his powers were approved by Congress without a dissenting voice. The government came into power accompanied by the hopes of fourteen million Mexicans who were not enamored of Huerta, but who were sick of disorder, blood and violence and the wasting of the national resources. These people wanted a government which would stand for law and order. They believed Huerta to be a man of the type of Diaz, who would be fearless and prompt in the protection of society and in the punishment of those who violated the law. Huerta is a soldier. He has spent his entire life in military service. He is an able, adroit, courageous man. His desire is to protect society and to restore peace, and he is not over particular as to the methods employed to accomplish this end. He will fight to the last, and if eventually overthrown will go down in the midst of the ruins.

X. Errors of the Washington Administration

1. The announcement of the new doctrine that governments owing their origin to violence would not be recognized by this government. This was an error for the following reasons:

a. It was announced before the President had access to the records of the department of state and the history of our foreign relations, which should have served as his guidance.

b. It was purely an expression of the President's personal views, being contrary to the traditions and precedents of this government since its existence.

c. It was uttered without foresight and without that comprehensive view of its effect on our foreign relations which should have obtained. This is made evident by the inconsistent attitude of the administration in refusing to recognize the administration of Huerta,

and subsequently recognizing the new government of Peru—where the president had been deposed by violence and was in jail, and the minister of war had been as assinated—and by the recognition of the government of Haiti. These inconsistencies subject the administration to the charge of insincerity.

2. The refusal to recognize the provisional government of General Huerta. In taking this position this government was acting within its rights, but it nevertheless contributed to the discredit of a government which was endeavoring to restore peace and order in Mexico, and which had the support of ninety-eight per cent of the Mexican public and of the American and all other foreign colonies, as well as of all European governments. The consequences following the withholding of our recognition have been most grave. Our attitude has been interpreted and is now recognized as favoring and supporting rebels in arms against a regularly constituted government. It has fed the flames of rebellion, stimulated the revolutionary movement, and is responsible for the destruction of millions of dollars worth of property and thousands of human lives. It has financially ruined thousands of Americans, and it has afforded advantages to European commercial, manufacturing and exploiting interests, to the loss and detriment of those of the United States. It has excited the suspicion and hostility of every Latin-American country, has grievously affronted every European chancellery and has placed this nation in such imminent peril in its foreign relations with three great governments that it has found itself obliged to determine its course in a great international question by the pressing necessities of the difficult position which it has created rather than in response to the call of high national and moral obligations. It has forced a further distorted and amplified interpretation of the already exaggerated Monroe Doctrine, and launched us upon seas of imperialism from which no man may see the shore. Persistence in such a policy can be justified only by the supreme necessity of saving the pride and prestige of an administration committed to a national blunder. It can therefore be justified only as a policy of "expediency" and not as one of "morals."

3. The dispatch of the Lind mission. The dispatch of Mr. Lind to Mexico, as the official representative of the President in dealing with the Huerta administration without the approval or consent of the Senate of the United States, was an act at variance with our precedents, and was an assertion of over-lordship toward the sovereign

Mexican nation through direct though not armed intervention in its affairs. The representations made through Mr. Lind had already been made, under instructions from Washington, through the sworn and constitutionally appointed officer of this government, without success, and their repetition through the President's personal representative, a person without diplomatic character or training, was an act of needless offensiveness toward a friendly and sovereign state. The Huerta government was convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors upon *ex parte* testimony. Huerta was told that he was unfit to be president and was asked to join in an expression of his own condemnation. Huerta's government was furthermore asked to give guarantees for a constitutional election, whereas every person versed in Mexican affairs knows that a constitutional election is impossible in Mexico. Finally, the diplomatic maneuvers of the Washington government having been conspicuously baffled and defeated by the fearless Mexican president and his astute minister of foreign relations, Mr. Gamboa, the administration made an irreparable mistake in retaining Mr. Lind in Mexico, after his mission had terminated, thus further irritating the Mexican government, exposing our own government to additional ridicule, and the unfortunate Mr. Lind to the dubious delights—though assured safety—of the seaport of Vera Cruz.

4. The attempt to discred t European nations accredited in Mexico, and to misrepresent their attitude with reference to recognition.

The European governments accredited in Mexico have no political interests in that country, but they have large commercial ones and large colonies. France has $900,000,000 invested in banking and manufacturing enterprises. Great Britain has close upon a billion of dollars invested in mines, banks, railways and plantations. Germany and Spain have each over $500,000,000 invested in the country at large. The representatives of these governments have experienced, not only nearly two years of the misgovernment, but also the terrors and insincerit es of the Madero government—a government in theory totally unsuited to Mexico, and in practice worse than the autocracy of General Diaz. They desired to p ovide for the safety of their nationals and to secure for them an opportunity to pursue their peaceful occupations. They therefore recommended the recognition of the Huerta government, and for those reasons only their representations were approved and acted upon by their governments. The refusal of this government to accord recognition became therefore

equivalent to a rebuke to the European, Asiatic and Latin-American nations which had accorded recognition. This implied rebuke was distressing to them not only because they were deprived of the moral support of this government in aiding the Huerta administration to restore order, but because they were offered no compensation for the loss of the benefits expected to flow from their action.

5. The attempt to destroy the financial credit and standing in Mexico.

This was the second act of intervention in the affairs of Mexico, designedly expected to prevent the Huerta government from securing the means necessary to put down rebellion and disorder. For the purpose of carrying out this policy this government and this nation were made responsible for the destruction of vast material interests, for a protracted period of bloody warfare, for the unnecessary sacrifice of thousands of human lives, and for the permanent impairment of cordial good feeling between the two nations. This policy, initiated without any knowledge of the resources of the Mexican government, has been a ridiculous failure. Huerta's revenues today are larger than they were six months ago. They are composed of $5,000,000 a month from the customs revenue, and $6,000,000 from special taxes that are not burdensome, thus giving a total revenue of $11,000,000 a month to be used for administrative and war purposes.

6. The lifting of the embargo on the importation of arms and ammunition into Mexico.

This was an error (a) because it was dictated by considerations of "expediency" and not of "morals." Placing arms in the hands of civilized people bent on destroying one another is an immoral act and contrary to laws human and divine. How much more reprehensible, therefore, is the placing of arms in the hands of savages and vandals with the power to take human life and destroy the property of law-abiding people. By this policy our government, acting upon the promptings of mistaken even though honest motives, became accessory to the crimes committed by the hands of barbarians. (b) Because the act convicts the administration of insincerity, since the President some six months ago announced his determination never to take this step. (c) Because, with the failure of some established Mexican government to become responsible for damages growing out of the disturbed conditions existing in northern Mexico, we as a nation will become liable, under international law and under the interpre-

tation of the Monroe Doctrine, for money compensation for the lives and property of foreigners taken in that territory. These damages will amount to probably seventy-five or one hundred millions of dollars.

7. The assumption that constitutional elections can be held in Mexico.

There has never been a constitutional election in Mexico, and there never will be until a radical change is made in the habits and character of the people. The work of making the nation democratic must be begun at the bottom and not at the top. We cannot justly saddle an ignorant nation with responsibilities such as are borne with difficulty by highly civilized nations. Eighty per cent of the population is Indian, unable to read or write, and having no comprehension of the theory and practice of democracy. As well expect the statue of liberty in New York harbor to stand if built upon quicksand as to expect a constitutional election under present conditions in Mexico. Every government there has been shot in and shot out of power, and a revolution is an election. The truth of this view is sustained by the history of Mexico since the time of the revolution against Spain. Where else throughout the world have there been more turbulence, more violent overturning of government, more hallelujahs of triumph, or more anathemas of death and defeat? The hero and patriot of one hour becomes in the next hour the fugitive from justice with a price upon his head. He who rules marches through slaughter to a throne. Power is seized by ambitious hands, but the victor ends his career in the dungeon, in exile, or by the dagger. From the time of the revolution against Spain down to the time of the establishment of the government of General Diaz, the rulers of Mexico pass across the stage like the ghosts of Banquo. The ambitious Iturbide, the tyrant Santa Anna, and the unhappy and misguided Maximilian, along with a multitude of vulgar and bloody tyrants, held sway over the destinies of this unhappy country, despoiling its population and leaving in their wake only the tragic echoes of disappointed ambitions. Philosophers should have learned the lesson taught in the pages of Mexico's bloody history, that the practice of democracy, which is a burden at times to the most civilized nations, cannot be successfully imposed upon an illiterate nation clothed only with superficial vestments of modern civilization.

NOTE. *This paper was read at a meeting of the Academy April 3, 1914.*

THE MEXICAN SITUATION

By Henry Clews, Ph.D., LL.D.,
New York.

The situation in Mexico at the moment is about as bad as it could be, and unless some outside influence is brought to bear, I can see no chance of immediate improvement.

The recent murders of an Englishman and an American have stirred the blood of all who speak our common language. Fortunately for us, England has kept her hands off, leaving it to us to see that the factions in Mexico atone for their crimes.

Were it not for the Monroe Doctrine, it is more than likely that several foreign powers would have landed marines in parts of Mexico, for the reason that citizens of their countries were being deprived of their business rights, and had suffered large money losses on account of the chaotic state of affairs. If these countries once made a landing it might be a long time before they withdrew, if ever, as they are hungry for a portion of the territory of this hemisphere, and now would be their opportunity for acquiring it.

President Wilson, in his policy of non-intervention, is trying an experiment which we all hope will prove a success, for no one wishes to see bloodshed, or money lost, by settling quarrels between the citizens of our near neighbors. With England approving of our waiting policy, other nations are lookers-on, and for the time being are willing to wait for the tide to turn when they can seek reparation for money losses.

The future of Mexico is inextricably bound up in social, political and economic problems of the most complex character.

Socially, the conditions in Mexico are such as to make successful government almost impossible at this time. The great mass of her population is a mixed race of Spanish and Indian blood raised but a step above the savage state. The people are uneducated and grossly ignorant, highly excitable, and given to spasmodic outbursts of passion, outlawry and violence. To have ever given such a population the vote before it was able to exercise an approximately decent use of it was a blunder of the most grievous sort. Mexicans not only

have no conception of how to use the ballot, but their inability to comprehend its inestimable privileges converts them unconsciously into tools of crafty and unscrupulous leaders who brutalize the voters and exploit them for purely selfish and personal ends. There is probably no more ignorant voter in the world than the Mexican. Our own colored people are infinitely better citizens and better voters than the Mexican peon. The ballot in that anarchy-ridden country is not merely a farce, but a curse, inasmuch as it perverts every branch of the government and only serves to strengthen the grip of an oppressive and greedy aristocracy upon the entire population.

Politically, the present system of government in Mexico is an absolute misfit. Her constitution is modeled after that of the United States—a nation that has in its blood the traditions, principles and habits of generations of self-government behind it. It is self-evident that what fits the United States cannot fit Mexico where racial conditions and traditions are so entirely different. Successful self-government in Mexico can only come through many years of gradual change in the public character by means of experience, education and the influx of a better population.

What Mexico primarily needs for the time being is a strong central government. Perhaps an intelligent and just despotism would best fit the present situation in Mexico. But can such be found? Does Mexico produce men of the necessary type? Can Mexico turn out a Lord Cromer of Egyptian fame, or a Colonel Goethals of Panama, or a Taft of the Philippines? If the destinies of Mexico could be controlled for a few years by men of this type, she might be educated gradually to take care of herself. The most successful government Mexico ever had, in spite of its gross abuses, was a despotism; but that government was notoriously corrupt. Its members grew enormously rich, and the people were taxed to death in order to support a political machine which simply crushed the taxpayer, and kept him in practical slavery. Human nature was bound to revolt against such oppression.

My suggestion is to bring Huerta and Carranza together and see if they cannot agree on a provisional president to be appointed or elected, and that suitable recognition in some official capacity be given to each of these leaders. Both must realize, though neither will admit it, that if the present struggle keeps up both must lose, as intervention will mean ruin to them. No lasting peace can be

secured unless it guarantees protection to the lives and property of all foreign residents, and metes justice to the people of Mexico of all grades and conditions.

Economically, Mexico is entirely dependent upon foreign capital. It is estimated that there are about five thousand millions of dollars of foreign investments in Mexico, a considerable portion of which belongs to the United States. Her railroads, her mines, her oil wells and her banks are all chiefly owned and controlled abroad. The Mexican people work largely for non-resident owners and masters. This, of itself, creates fatally weak economic and social relations, for there is no doubt that Mexico would be much better off if a larger proportion of these owners lived and spent their money in Mexico, and exerted their steadying influence upon political affairs.

There is still one more economic and social weakness of far-reaching importance, and that is this, the great bulk of the land in Mexico is owned by a few wealthy families who have grown rich by extracting from the natives all they possibly can. There are practically no small land owners in Mexico, and there is no peasant class, which, if it existed, would be an element of stability and result in a more equitable distribution of the national wealth. No domestic peace can be expected in Mexico until the present unwholesome land system is broken up. Mexico is suffering from a state of practical slavery against which human nature is bound to rebel. To a savage the life of brigandage is vastly more interesting and attractive than any orderly self-government could be.

What Mexico should have is, first, a strong, wise and unselfish government, with more or less autocratic powers.

Second, a change of laws which would give opportunities to small land owners; and third, the encouragement of a better class of immigration—all with the purpose of keeping a large share of the nation's profits at home. Finally, above all, Mexico needs men—strong men, men of high and unselfish purpose, men of great executive ability who will consecrate themselves to the upbuilding of Mexico on the lines of justice and sound economic development. Mexico has a brighter future than is supposed even under the present clouds of revolution. When these pass away, as they ultimately will, there will spring up a new and better Mexico. There is a grand opportunity for a statesman of constructive genius. This is far and away the first and greatest need of Mexico. Can she produce such? If

not, can she find one elsewhere, and if not, what will happen? Nobody can predict the consequences of the present protracted state of anarchy, except that it must end, and if not by inside force, then by outside force.

I am a most earnest advocate of peace by arbitration, and it would be a grand day for humanity if the Mexican troubles could be settled in that way as it would mean the dawn of a new era. Many of the leading lights in Mexico are yearning for peace and saying to both Huerta and Carranza, in the words of Shakespeare, "A plague on both your houses!" In our own country the right man has been found in every great crisis. Let us hope and pray that a Moses may arise in Mexico who will be able to lead his countrymen in the path of peace with honor to all who deserve honor.

THE CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY IN MEXICO: WHAT IT IS FIGHTING FOR

By Señor Don Roberto V. Pesqueira,
Confidential Agent of the Carranza Government in the United States.

It has been stated with much persistency throughout the United States and Europe that the real object of the present revolutionary movement in Mexico is merely to avenge the death of the late President Madero and to restore to power his administration. This fallacy, based entirely upon imperfect information or misconception of the real facts, merits immediate correction, and it is my purpose to accompany it by some words of explanation that may possibly clarify in some degree the general subject under discussion.

The revolution of 1910, led by Madero, was not one inspired by personal ambition or thirst for power. Madero's critics admit that. Even Porfirio Diaz, after the fall of Juarez, reluctantly recognized the movement as one based on economic and social considerations, and of a character so serious as to demand his resignation as president of the republic, indeed, his withdrawal from the country. For thirty years Diaz had ruled Mexico with a tyrannical hand of iron. During that period he granted many valuable and monopolistic concessions to foreigners, and surrounded himself with a group of favorites who were permitted to control affairs of state and barter away the rights of the people, without corresponding benefit to them. Through the construction of railways and the development of other industrial enterprises, however, some prosperity ensued, but such more particularly served to benefit the concessionaires and the already wealthy landowners than the masses, to whose educational and social advancement no thought was given. At the same time while the cost of living rose rapidly, the pay of the wage-worker failed to increase correspondingly, the landed proprietors, sustained always by the government, dictating terms of employment. The tribunals of justice became a mockery, the judges for the most part, corrupt, and supinely obedient to the executive. Diaz himself in violation of his pledge to retire, procured his reëlection and settled down, as he thought, to the enjoyment of six years more of power. Smarting under their exploitation by the conservative element and

without the lawful means of redress, the masses began to show signs of discontent, and, indeed, a purpose to resort to arms rather than to submit longer to conditions approximating abject slavery.

Madero and his followers believed that the first step towards practical reform was to limit the tenure of the presidency to one term, since the ills from which the country had so long suffered were manifestly due to the corrupt influences made possible only by the long-continued occupation of the office by General Diaz. With this and real popular suffrage, agrarian reforms could be enacted, and it was believed, the people would forthwith come into their own. But Diaz and his followers gave no heed to repeated warnings. The revolution of 1910 followed. Diaz retired; but before doing so and in order to check the reforms demanded by the people, he effected a compromise by which Francisco De la Barra, then minister of foreign relations, became provisional president, pending an election.

De la Barra, an uncertain character, lacked a positive policy during his *ad interim* administration. As a creature of Diaz, and intimately allied with the aristocracy and the corrupt element of the old régime, he limited himself merely to the discharge of the revolutionary forces, as a method by which he pretended that peace could best be established. On every hand he minimized the purpose and effect of the revolution, and sought to prepare a sentiment in favor of reactionary principles. The same men who surrounded Diaz and urged the continuation of his policies now returned to the country convinced that they were not be be prosecuted, and initiated a campaign against Madero and the aims of the revolution. It was during this period that efforts were made to concentrate public opinion in favor of General Reyes and even De la Barra himself, as candidates for the presidency against Madero. It was also at this time that the Clerical party, which since the downfall of Maximilian had shown no signs of life, was suddenly revived under the name of the Catholic party, and cast its baleful influence in favor of the discredited policies of the past. De la Barra, while he had received the government in trust, to be turned over to the revolution, did all possible to maintain himself in power and to avoid the advent of the new régime, thus demonstrating hostility to Madero personally, as well as to the reforms for which the revolution had been fought and won. Casting aside De la Barra as useless the reactionaries now proceeded along more cunning lines.

Madero once elevated to the presidency by means of a free election, his administration was quickly beset by intrigue and treachery on the part of this group who pretended to be his friends. Protesting an ardent and patriotic desire to forget the past and to coöperate in upholding the new government and its proposed reforms, they did so only to obscure their perfidious purpose of discrediting the latter and to cloak their treasonable intent to overthrow the constitutional chief magistrate. The conspiracy assumed such proportions that Madero, believing as he did in those who pledged their honor to his support, was rendered helpless for the time being in carrying out the program of the revolution. At this moment, with malevolent deception, the conspirators, assisted by a large group of corrupt officers of the army, struck the blow known as the insurrection of the Ciudadela, which offered General Victoriano Huerta, commanding general of the government forces, opportunity treacherously to assume the dictatorship of Mexico. The president and vice president were brutally put to death, and a reign of terror inaugurated that horrified the world. Such were the incidents that induced the Constitutionalist movement of today, a movement, that in reality, is naught save a continuation of the revolution of 1910, a movement that demands government by the governed.

While certain of the governors of states, and a majority of the military commanders accepted Huerta in the rôle that he had assumed, the governor of the state of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, refused to be cowed and boldly declared himself in opposition to the dictator and his so-called government, and with his state militia, commenced immediate operations for armed resistance. He was soon joined by others of prominence, governors of states, members of the national congress, officers of the army and professional men, as well as by thousands of artisans and wage-earners who saw in the movement of which he was spontaneously proclaimed the first chief, the only hope of restoration of constitutional government. Notwithstanding their inability to purchase arms and munitions of war in the United States, through much heroic sacrifice a respectable army soon was formed in the border states, which within twelve months, has now been so augmented and armed that it controls a respectable portion of the republic.

Under the leadership of Governor Carranza, the Constitutionalist forces now occupy Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, most

of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, most of Nuevo Leon, northern Zacatecas and a part of San Luis Potosi. Added to this, they control various parts of Guerrero, Michoacan, Hidalgo, Vera Cruz, Puebla and Morelos. Yet the men who have accomplished this military feat are artfully called bandits by those whose personal interests would be best served by the continuance of the Huerta régime. Bandits they may be, according to some advanced standard of military ethics of which I am ignorant; but if they are bandits, then I presume their accusers consider themselves fortified by the attitude of the British press, which, during the war for independence, so vociferously denounced Admiral John Paul Jones as a pirate, and three-quarters of a century later, described General Grant as a heartless butcher.

The average foreigner in discussing Mexico will tell you that the country needs the mailed fist to govern it, because, he will say, that in such quality of government lies the sole safeguard of life and property. That was why the mailed fist of Diaz made him popular among the foreign concessionaires and the favorites who surrounded him—the group that finally sapped his imperious will and made him their plaything. It was a government of this character that prevented the people from regaining the lands taken from them through fraudulent and corrupt means; that ever protected him who was willing to pay, in one way or another, for protection. Therefore, many foreigners at this time, overlooking entirely the Mexican point of view, and the moral issues involved, are disposed to favor any man who is "strong" enough to impose a peace that will admit a resumption of their profitable industrial operations. But the government of the mailed fist or the iron hand can never impose a permanent peace. Such a peace can be secured only through a proper adjustment of political, economic and social conditions. To that adjustment the reactionary element in Mexico is opposed, but the Constitutionalist party is intent on making it effective by armed force.

The real interests of foreigners, as well as those of Mexicans, can only be conserved by means of reforms calculated to promote the general welfare of the masses, and by maintaining an equilibrium between capital and labor. It would seem but natural, therefore, that foreigners, if they seek peace, should contribute towards the development of conditions that would insure a peace that would be permanent.

The purposes of the Constitutionalist movement, which seek to bring about a permanent peace in Mexico, are better defined than were the motives of the revolution of 1910. These purposes contemplate, not only the reëstablishment of constitutional government, but the reformation of the constitution itself and a revision of the laws made under it, to meet, by practical means, the plain requirements of the situation. In sustaining this movement, which has now reached the dignity of a civil war, Governor Carranza has the support of a vast majority of the agricultural population, who have demonstrated a patriotic readiness, even eagerness, to sacrifice their lives and fortunes for the common good.

While the soldiers of the Huerta forces are unwilling conscripts, taken on the streets, or from the jails of the cities, those in the Constitutionalist ranks are volunteers, pure and simple, intent on fighting for principle rather than for pay. According to the latest advices by the intelligence office of the Constitutionalists, Huerta has but 55,000 men available for real service, despite his boast that he has 205,000 under arms. Carranza has not less than 50,000 well-armed officers and men in the northern states alone, and can count on as many more in the south, as soon as they can be better equipped. The desperate fighting at Torreon and vicinity is but typical of the intensity of purpose with which the Constitutionalists are animated. Their attacks against fortifications considered impregnable, and the desperate and successful assaults of their infantry, against a withering fire of artillery, serve to indicate their devotion to a cause which they believe merits the notice of all Americans who stand for law and liberty.

I have not overlooked, however, the fact that the Constitutionalists have been charged by the press with many acts of violence and brigandage, of executing prisoners of war, of plundering captured cities, and the like. In discussing this matter I need only to allude to General Sherman's remark that "War is hell." But in reference to the charges so recklessly hurled against our troops, I desire to make a plea by way of confession and avoidance. While it is true that violence has been employed and houses sometimes sacked, though never to the extent charged, it is also true that those who have suffered were previously engaged in giving aid to the enemy. General Sherman and General Sheridan did not hesitate

to burn and pillage in their respective marches through Georgia to the sea, and through the valley of the Shenandoah. Throughout the enemy's country, at that time, railroads, warehouses, residences, buildings of all sorts and their contents, were ruthlessly destroyed, banks looted, livestock driven off for the use of the army, and the inhabitants, if not more harshly dealt with, left without even the bare necessities of life. It is true that certain captured officers have been shot by our forces as well as a class of deserters known as "red flaggers;" but these officers were among those who participated in the treason of February 9, 1913, and received the punishment imposed by law, in the precise manner as treason under similar circumstances is punishable in the United States. In respect to the execution of the "red flaggers," I have only to recall the hanging of fifty deserters from the American army, at San Angel, Mexico, in September, 1847, and the lashing and branding of some fifteen more, at the same place, by order of General Scott. Also, I might refer among other incidents, to the hanging of twenty-two prisoners of a federal regiment alleged to be deserters, by order of the famous General George E. Pickett in 1863. I merely mention these historical references to show that incidents of this character are not confined to the present struggle in Mexico. War necessitates stern and sometimes cruel measures.

In lieu of seizing the property of the inhabitants for the use of their forces, the Constitutionalist commanders pay for such in local currency redeemable hereafter in gold equivalent, and at present accepted by merchants and banks at twenty-eight cents to the gold dollar. It is also accepted by the authorities in payment of taxes of all kinds, thus greatly lessening the burdens of the people which they continue so cheeerfully to bear. Meanwhile, the bullion derived from export duties on the precious metals is being coined into pesos, and also placed in circulation.

It is well to note that throughout the territory occupied by the Constitutionalist forces, excepting where active military operations are in progress, the people are pursuing their usual avocations; the fields are tilled; the mines are being worked; factories are in operation, and merchants are buying and selling as in time of peace. This is notably so in Sonora, where no semblance of the Huerta régime exists, save for a small garrison at the port of Guaymas, protected

by strong fortifications and by warships in the harbor. Almost similar conditions prevail in Sinaloa and will very soon be extended to Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.

Contrary to current reports that certain of the estates belonging to the great landowners have been confiscated by the Constitutionalist authorities, the fact is that no such action has been taken, though, as a military measure some of them have been provisionally seized and the proceeds devoted to the maintenance of the troops, and towards aiding the poor. The Constitutionalist program does not contemplate summary confiscation or partition of estates of this character, such as for instance the Terrazas holdings in Chihuahua. Questions of such gravity, directly involved with the great agrarian problem, the first chief insists must, upon restoration of the Constitutional order, be submitted to the Congress for determination. In respect to the attitude of the Constitutionalist party towards concessions, it is safe to say that when such have been granted in strict accordance with the law, and when all the requirements of the latter have been fulfilled by the interested parties, their rights will be respected; but when concessions are, however, tainted with fraud or corruption, then it is equally safe to say that their legality will be tested.

It may not be improper for me to refer at this time to the relations between Americans and natives in Mexico. Some of the press would have the public believe that there exists a sentiment of underlying hostility towards Americans, and that in consequence, many of them have been killed and their property destroyed or stolen. This is untrue. Throughout the country Americans are held in higher esteem than any other class of foreigners, and the laborer will invariably seek employment from them rather than from Europeans, not because they pay higher wages, but because of their reputation for fair treatment; and I venture to assert, on the highest authority, that since this war began, not one American citizen has lost his life because of his nationality. Some have been killed in personal quarrels and bar room brawls, such as take place daily in New York, for instance; some have been killed because of their presence in the line of fire during engagements, and some have been murdered by thieves. But, I repeat that no persons have been killed because they were Americans. The Constitutionalists, I may add, entertain a deep appreciation of the kindly sentiments that their cause

has awakened among the thoughtful people of the United States to whom treason was ever odious, and to whom constitutional rights are so dear. We appreciate, too, the spirit of fairness that led the President to raise the embargo on the exportation of arms and munitions of war, and if we have not demonstrated our gratitude, it is because there has been no fitting opportunity to do so. Nor have we Mexicans forgotten Seward and the degree of moral support he gave President Juarez in his noble struggle for democratic government against the reactionaries who sought to impose on Mexico a monarchy, the same reactionaries who now so strenuously seek to sustain Huerta in his unbridled career of usurpation.

There has been much talk of intervention, but there is no more need of it in Mexico today than there was half a century ago in the United States. We are confronted with a great problem now, as you were then. Our problem must be settled by Mexicans, as yours was settled by Americans. I regard suggestions favoring intervention as emanating mostly from those interested in the restoration of dividends rather than in the restoration of peace. Such was certainly the case in 1862–1863. And I am happy in the belief that the majority of public men are of the same opinion. When peace comes, the government of Mexico, following the example of the United States, will meet all obligations imposed on it by international law in respect to losses suffered by foreign citizens and subjects. To this, the Constitutionalist government has already pledged itself.

As the war progresses and as the Constitutionalist forces, increasing both in number and power each day, press their campaign upon the city of Mexico, there will be heard suggestions of compromise, the selection of some personage not identified with either side, to assume the presidency pending an election, or maybe, the establishment of a government by commission or *junta de gobierno*, or some other suggestion discreetly calculated to delay or avoid the establishment of the headquarters of the victorious army in the national palace as a prelude to the restoration of constitutional government. Indeed, the influence of certain of the European powers may be exerted to this end. Save in the days of Juarez, practically every revolutionary movement in Mexico intended to wrest the control of the government from the clergy and the aristocracy has, with victory in its grasp, failed in purpose because of some cunningly devised compromise. Such was the cause of Madero's downfall—

his temporizing with the reactionaries—by which bitter experience the Constitutionalist cause will nevertheless profit. Therefore, no suggestion of compromise with an element identified with the treacherous overthrow of constitutional government, can or will under any circumstances be considered. That element must be crushed, and those who have directed its destinies must answer before the law for their crimes. Such is the unalterable determination of the first chief of the Constitutionalist forces, in which he is supported to a man by his subordinates, and the present war will not, therefore, cease until this end, of such transcendental importance to the future, is assured. Then there must be a period of national purification and house cleaning, to be followed by the election of members of a new congress, which body upon its organization will, in accordance with the constitution, fix the date for the election for a president and vice-president. This done, and the successful candidates inaugurated, constitutional government will once more reign supreme. But, meanwhile, Mexico will be governed in a manner prescribed by the first chief of the Constitutionalist forces, and not by a compromise provisional government like that of De la Barra. No compromise means as much to the people today as the old cry of "liberty and constitution."

NOTE. *This paper was submitted to the Academy April 8, 1914.*

THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MEXICO

By Frank W. Mondell,

Member of Congress from Wyoming.

Our relations with the government and the people of Mexico are controlled and affected by three somewhat distinct elements of relationship and obligation. They are:

Primarily, the reciprocal duties and obligations incumbent on all civilized nations and enjoined by international law and usage.

Secondly, those duties and obligations, and the problems they present, as affected by the fact that we are Mexico's only important immediate neighbor and, as secretary of foreign affairs, Gamboa, puts it, "Mexico's nearest friend."

Finally, those duties and obligations as enlarged by the responsibilities we have assumed under the Monroe Doctrine.

The maintenance of a correct attitude toward the government and people of Mexico is rendered the more difficult by reason of the fact that our proximity to Mexico tends to make our border people partisans in case of civil strife in that country, and multiplies the opportunity for, and the likelihood of, losses and injury to our citizens and their property under unsettled conditions. On the other hand this intimate relationship and the responsibilities we have assumed under the Monroe Doctrine, as applied to Mexico, increase the importance of the maintenance of a correct and defendable attitude in our dealings with that neighboring state.

A brief résumé of recent occurrences in Mexico may aid in elucidating the character of the problems there and our relation to them.

The unfortunate Madero revolution started from our border. The Diaz government which it overthrew had, in my opinion, abundant ground for criticising our failure to exercise proper precaution to prevent the hatching and launching of revolutionary movements aimed at the life of a neighboring friendly power. However that may be, the revolution was successful and was promptly recognized by our government. But the Madero government was destined to be short-lived. Undermined by plots and conspiracies and overpowered in

the seat of government, President Madero was forced to resign and Huerta was proclaimed as provisional president two weeks before the close of the Taft administration.

For more than a year the government, of which Huerta is the head, has exercised practically unchallenged jurisdiction over twenty-three of the thirty-one political subdivisions of Mexico, including the capital city, covering more than two-thirds of the territory and three-quarters of the population of the republic.

That government has, in the main, maintained order and protected life and property in the extensive and populous regions under its control. A very large portion of this territory has at no time been seriously disturbed, and the orderly processes of civil government have been but little affected by the civil strife which has been in progress elsewhere.

The government of Mexico under Huerta has long been recognized by most of the powers of Europe and has apparently faithfully endeavored to fulfill its international obligations. The attitude of this government toward our own, even under the trying conditions we have established of unofficial communication through various intermediaries, has been straightforward, frank, and remarkably free from ground for criticism.

The conspiracies and conflicts which preceded the inauguration of the government of Huerta, the lamentable assassination of ex-President Madero which stained the first days of its establishment occurring, as these events did, but a few days before the close of the Taft administration made it incumbent on the outgoing, to leave the incoming administration free to deal with the situation unembarrassed by prior act of recognition.

The new administration adopted an attitude which the President later referred to as one of "watchful waiting." How watchful it was must remain a matter of opinion—that it was one of waiting cannot be disputed.

But this attitude of "watchful waiting" was not maintained down to the time when the President so characterized the attitude of his administration. The policy of our government was substantially modified when the President sent John Lind as his personal representative to, as the President phrased it, "those who are now exercising authority or wielding influence in Mexico."

This mission modified our attitude from one of "watchful wait-

ing" to one of energetic advice, or meddlesome interference, depending on how one views it. The unusual nature and remarkable character of the demands made were very forcibly pointed out in the spirited reply of secretary of foreign affairs, Gamboa. The declaration by those "exercising authority" in Mexico of the impracticability of fully acceding to the President's demands was followed by another period which might, perhaps, be properly called "watchful waiting." This, however, did not long continue.

A radical change in our attitude was clearly indicated by the President's message delivered to Congress December 2, 1913, in which he declared in effect that the government exercising authority over the major portion of Mexico would never be recognized, or dealt with, by our government so long as Huerta was at the head of it, no matter how extensive its authority or control might be, because he said this is a military despotism and we are the friends and champions of constitutional government in America. One will search the annals of American history in vain to find such a note of personal prejudice and individual ill-will toward the head of any government as is found in the language with which the President makes these declarations and in which he predicts the downfall of what he calls a "precarious and hateful power."

Some time after the delivery of this message of the President, the predicted overthrow of the Huerta government not having occurred, the embargo on the shipment of arms into Mexico was raised with the explanation and declaration that there now existed no constitutional government in Mexico entitled to the benefits of that embargo.

Up to the time of the dispatch of John Lind with his very extraordinary instructions to "those exercising authority" in Mexico our attitude, while open to criticism as to its wisdom, was undoubtedly not censurable from the standpoint of international usages. The demands contained in Mr. Lind's instructions upon those "exercising authority" in Mexico did, however, unquestionably establish a new precedent in our international affairs; while the declarations contained in the President's December message, to which I have referred, involve a radical departure from the past policy of our government in dealing with the republics on this continent.

One of the primary obligations resting upon civilized governments is to abstain from meddlesome interference with the internal and domestic affairs of other nations. It is true we are the friends of

constitutional government, we are also its champions as the President states, but we are under no obligation, and have no right or authority, to determine what constitutes constitutional government in other countries. On the contrary we are bound by our international obligations, while favoring the establishment of governments which we deem to be constitutional in form, to recognize such governments as foreign peoples may establish, maintain, and give their adherence to.

We are certainly getting on dangerous ground when we in effect declare that we shall refuse to have official relations with any government, no matter how well established or long maintained, unless it be a constitutional government according to our interpretation. When we further assume the right to pass not only on the legitimacy of governments without regard to the extent, character, or permanence of their authority, but to dictate who shall preside over them, we have assumed an international task that will keep us very busy and much embroiled in the future.

Our national policy in the recognition of governments has been well defined and uniformly adhered to.

In 1830 Secretary of State Van Buren, wrote to Mr. Brown, our chargé d'affaires to Brazil as follows: "Your business is solely with the actual government of the country where you are to reside, and you should sedulously endeavor to conciliate its esteem and secure its confidence. So far as we are concerned that which is the government *de facto* is equally so *de jure*."

The government of Juarez in Mexico was recognized by President Buchanan, though not in possession of the capital, on the ground that it was "obeyed over a large majority of the country and the people."

President Pierce, in a message to Congress of May 15, 1856, relative to the situation in Nicaragua, said, "It is the established policy of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source or organization, or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a government *de facto* accepted by the people of the country."

Secretary of State Evarts, in a letter written in 1879 to our representative in Venezuela, Mr. Baker, stated that recognition of a government did not depend on its constitutionality; that as our international compacts and obligations were with nations rather than political governments we should be watchful lest our course toward a government should affect our relations with the nation.

In 1899 Secretary Hay authorized our minister to recognize the government of Castro in Venezuela "if the provisional government is effectively administering government of nation and in a position to fulfil international obligations."

Mr. Hill, acting secretary of state, in a letter of September 8, 1900, to Mr. Hart, United States minister at Bogota, stated that it had been the policy of the United States for more than a century, "to base the recognition of a foreign government solely on its *de facto* ability to hold the reins of administrative power."

These are a few of the many declarations by our government of our policy to recognize a government fully established exercising control over the major portion of a nation and disposed to meet its international obligations.

The Italian historian, Ferrero, in a recent review of the Mexican situation, characterized our present attitude toward Mexico as one of masked or indirect intervention, an attitude he said that was accomplished "by giving support to one of the two parties at war, generally the weaker one." In the present case this masked or indirect intervention has been accomplished by giving aid and comfort to every foe of law and order in Mexico, like Zapata, and every enemy of those whom the President has recognized through Mr. Lind as "exercising authority" in Mexico. It has been done by withholding recognition from the Huerta government, by demanding its virtual overthrow, by continued official prediction of its early downfall and, later, by encouraging the sale of arms and munitions of war to its enemies.

These acts are of a character which might easily prompt reprisal on the part of the Mexican government. As a matter of fact, however, they have apparently failed to affect or disturb the very proper attitude of that government toward ours, or to change or modify its disposition and purposes to protect, as far as possible, our citizens and their property in the regions over which that government exercises jurisdiction.

I realize that the American people are not at this time particularly concerned as to the propriety, according to the usages of international intercourse, of the acts and attitude of our government toward the government and people of Mexico. I doubt if they are particularly solicitous over the question as to whether or no the attitude of the administration toward the government of Mexico, in indirectly intervening in favor of its enemies, may be a straining of the authority of the President in dealing with international affairs.

An overwhelming majority of the American people are, however, sincerely anxious to see peace established and are earnestly solicitous to avoid the necessity of armed intervention in Mexico. They have therefore a lively interest in knowing whether the attitude of our government toward Mexico is one calculated to aid in establishing peace and averting the necessity of intervention.

In a speech I delivered in the House of Representatives on Friday, February 27, 1914, I said:

> I am persuaded that the acts and attitude of our government have had the effect of prolonging and extending the lamentable condition of appalling disorder and distress which prevail in Mexico; that a continuation of our present policy, or lack of policy, tends to retard indefinitely the establishment of orderly conditions and constitutional government and will, eventually, if persisted in, compel armed intervention, with its inevitable horrors and calamities.

Let us examine the situation for a moment with a view to determining whether the views thus expressed are well founded. The President, in his message of December 2, said: "Mexico has no government" and declared that General Huerta, who is exercising an authority which the President himself has recognized must surrender that authority. It is true that if Huerta were to eliminate himself from the affairs of Mexico and some one else were to take his place whom Zapata, in the South, and Villa, Carranza, and other lesser chieftains in the North would all acknowledge and give loyal adherence to, and no other aspiring revolutionary chieftain appeared, the miracle of thus establishing order might be accomplished.

Such an arrangement would still leave our administration confronted with the embarrassment its recently announced doctrine, relative to constitutionality, would present. Assuming that difficulty could be overcome no one familiar with the situation has the slightest notion that such a program of general conciliation and unanimous self effacement on the part of the rival leaders could be carried out. There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who has followed the developments in Mexico but that the warring leaders and factions must, some of them at least, be eliminated or persuaded by force before there can be a full restoration of peace.

Assuming that the demand of our administration for the overthrow of Huerta and the government of which he is the head is accomplished by the united forces of the so-called constitutionalists in the

North and the outlaw Zapata in the South, is there any ground for hope that in such a contingency order and constitutional government would be speedily established in Mexico?

Is there anything in the character or past record of the so-called constitutional chieftains to justify the expectation that they could or would attempt to establish a government which would meet its international obligations, or be satisfactory to the majority of the people of Mexico? One must be sanguine indeed who can bring himself to believe that the people of southern and central Mexico and the strong and influential men of the nation, the vast majority of whom now give at least nominal adherence and support to the government of Huerta, would approve or support a government established by the joint efforts of Villa and Zapata even though presided over by so well intentioned an individual as Carranza is reported to be.

Our qu'te general approval of the unfortunate Madero, our abhorrence of the manner of his untimely taking off and our natural and proper disposition to hold those at the head of the Huerta government responsible for that act inclined our people to approve, for a considerable period, the withholding of recognition, the refusal officially to recognize the Huerta government. The time came, however, when the refusal formally to recognize a government, for the time being at least, firmly established, widely supported, reasonably fulfilling, or attempting to fulfill, its international obligations involved not only a complete reversal of our national policy but a surrender of the only adequate means of protecting our citizens in Mexico and their property and of fulfilling the obligations we have assumed under the Monroe Doctrine, toward the property and citizens of other nations.

It is not only not denied that our refusal to recognize the government of Mexico under Huerta has greatly handicapped that government in securing the means for restoring order throughout the republic, but our administration has gloried in that fact and prophesied the early downfall of the Mexican government as a result. Our attitude therefore has confessedly lengthened the period and increased the violence of disorder in Mexico. If the present government in Mexico be not a constitutional government the extension of its authority over all of Mexico would not make it so. When, however, we compare the very general protection of life and property which has prevailed in the territory controlled by the Huerta government with the confiscation, plunder, murder, rape and rapine which have, in many localities, char-

acterized the victories of the opponents of that government we shall find abundant ground for the belief that our duty to aid and encourage the establishment of peace and order in Mexico would have been better performed had we taken the usual course of recognizing conditions as they are, the Mexican government as it exists, and holding it responsible for the protection of life and property throughout the republic.

No one familiar with the situation in Mexico believes it possible, out of the conditions of turmoil and disorder which now exist there, to bring at once a government of unquestioned constitutionality, perfect in its aims and personnel. Only a strong arm and a determined purpose can establish order there. If we persistently use our influence to weaken the strong arm of the government and to encourage further revolution we are following a path which will inevitably lead us to the point where we must be the strong arm which restores order. Our present attitude therefore is one which leads to intervention as certainly and inevitably as though it were thus planned and purposed.

The only way in which we can hope to perform our duties and obligations reasonably and avoid intervention in Mexico is to cease giving aid and comfort to the guerrilla forces, the outlaw chieftains, the well-meaning figure-heads of revolution, masking under the guise of constitutionalism, and return to the usages of international law and our long established policy and look to the government which is in authority to establish order and protect life and property.

MEXICO[1]

By Austen G. Fox,
New York.

Its problem. Out of what does it arise? Does it arise out of an absence of a constitution? No, because Mexico has a written constitution, which, upon its face, is fair enough to look upon. Must not the problem arise, therefore, out of the characteristics of the people that make the constitution ineffectual for order?

How does it happen, then, that Mexico's problem has become the problem of the United States? Mexico threatens no invasion of the United States. The concrete problem for the United States must be shall we invade Mexico? We are not asked by Mexicans to invade their territory. If we go, we must go with arms in our hands, and we must intend to use our arms. In short, we must go with the purpose of killing, or maiming those who choose to defend their country against our invasion. Call this intervention, or any other name that we prefer. In fact, it is war, with all that is implied in the term, in a country, larger than France and inhabited by fifteen or twenty millions of people.

When we decree intervention, we declare war, and that means victory, or defeat to our arms. Let us discard the possibility of defeat, and assume victory. It must be a complete victory, however, and how long must we wage war before our rule shall be complete? Who can tell, how many of our best must fall in order to establish our rule? The waste and cost in material, who can estimate? Who knows, today, the cost of subjugating the Filipinos?

When we shall have put Mexico under out feet, what then—what next? Are we to retire, or are we to stay? It must be one or the other.

If we retire, what shall we have accomplished? Will bayonet thrusts in our victims have implanted in the breasts of the survivors that national character and capacity for orderly government, the absence of which is at the bottom of the present disorder in Mexico?

[1] Remarks as presiding officer of the session of the Academy, Saturday morning, April 4, 1914.

War, whether we call it a war of reprisal or primitive expedition, or any other name, is seldom of educational value in fitting the losers for self governemnt. If, therefore, we retire at the close of hostilities, to what result can we point, except that of slaughter and increased taxes?

There is but one alternative, and that is permanent occupation of Mexico by our troops and its government from Washington. It will be easy enough for us to go in, but it may, at least, be impossible to get out, except accompanied by the confession that the so-called Mexican problem remains unchanged. In short, how can we expect successful warlike operations in Mexico to raise the political character of its people? Neither political nor social uplift, as it is fashionable now to call it, is one of the results of the destruction and desolation of war.

We must, therefore, ask ourselves this question: Are we so free of problems of our own that we are ready to take up the burden of establishing through war a stable government in Mexico, and of maintaining it for a period which none can measure, at a cost which no one can approximate?

This is no time for disturbing the peace we now enjoy.

We are told that there are twenty thousand Americans in Mexico and we know that the Southern Pacific Railway Company, the Standard Oil Company and other corporations, as well as individuals, have large investments south of our border. When we find pressure brought to bear upon Congress, or upon our President to begin a war with Mexico, may we not inquire whence the pressure proceeds? Who will be the beneficiaries, if Congress, or the President yields to the pressure? Among the men who will be called upon to lay down their lives in the event of armed intervention, will there be found any one who now clamors for the protection of so-called American interests?

What evidence have we that the American people insist upon a departure from the policy of letting other peoples work out, in their own way, their own political problems? Some there are who say that the President ought not to have done this, or that, or ought not to have done one thing, or another.

Two things, however, he has done, is doing, and may be trusted to continue to do.

He has stood, is standing and we know he will continue to stand for the keeping of public faith pledged by solemn treaty, unshaken by appeals to escape from the common sense meaning of the plain English of our contracts.

We know that we may look to him, with unwavering faith, as one who will act as the trustee for the peace and welfare of the whole people of the United States ready to undergo obloquy if need be, in his unalterable determination that no act of his shall deprive our nation of its right to continue to work out its own great problems and to perform its obligations in peace with the world and particularly with its neighbors, north and south.

Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem;
Ergo magis magisque, viri nunc gloria crescit.

MEXICO AND HER PEOPLE

By Alfred Bishop Mason,
New York.

Some years ago, there was current at Harvard an excellent jest. Though it was at the expense of Yale and though I am one of Yale's loyal sons, I must admit the humor of it. The Harvard question was: "What is autobiography?" and the Harvard answer was: "Autobiography is any Yale man talking." Yet, to justify my speaking on Mexico to an audience like this, I must perforce weave a few bits of personal reminiscence into the web of my talk. And it is sometimes true, as Thackeray says, that the capital letter "I" is the straight line that measures the shortest distance between a speaker and his hearers.

A dozen years ago, when I was building a little railroad from Vera Cruz to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the government of Porfirio Diaz was not corrupt. It was white and pure. For each 31 miles of railroad built, there was a subsidy of $800,000 in government bonds. To get them, I had to have a certificate from a government engineer that the road was built in accordance with specifications and a certificate from a government accountant that my books, accounts and vouchers were in proper shape. Engineer and accountant each had a salary of $1,500 per annum. If, under similar conditions, I had been building recently a highway in the state of New York, what would I have had to pay intermediaries, engineers, officials, bagmen and friends of the powers that be—no, thank God, the powers that were? In Mexico I never paid a penny and was never asked to pay a penny of blackmail, commissions or graft. My experience was that of other Americans. It justifies me, I think, in saying the Diaz government was then pure. It is said that as he grew older, he became a tool of younger men who were grafters. I doubt this, but I do not know.

His government was arbitrary, of course. Most of my 300 miles of railroad were built through a sparsely settled country, where crimes of passion were rife and where theft was a fine art. I asked Diaz to send me some rurales. They were the state constabulary of

Mexico. A dozen of them arrived. The lieutenant in charge came to my office to report the arrival. He saluted, explained his errand, and enquired: "Señor Mason, whom do you wish killed?" He was clearly disappointed at not receiving a list of people to be shot offhand. It was interesting to hold the power of life and death in my hands, but I really could not think at the moment of anybody I wished to kill. A fortnight later, sitting in my car at the end of track, I saw a sergeant of rurales riding by with three troopers, each with a rope around the pommel of his saddle, each rope fastened about a plodding peon. The procession was closed by a sobbing woman. I hailed the sergeant and asked for an explanation. It seemed that one peon, whom we will call A, had quarreled with B about the woman. So A hired C to kill B, paying him his price, a whole peso, 50 cents in our money, in advance. C did not know B by sight. So C hired D for a quarter of the peso to point out B. This done, C knifed B. The rurales had gathered in A, C and D and the woman in the case. "We are taking them to jail, Don Alfredo," said the sergeant. The jail was many miles away. Within half an hour, the rurales came back. "Where are your prisoners?" I asked. "They tried to escape and we shot them." This is the well-known Mexican *ley de fuga*—the law of flight. Prisoners are troublesome and expensive. They are taken into the brush and shot. The *ley de fuga* is the stereotyped explanation.

Again, about 1900, a tribe of mountain Indians killed some prospectors looking for mines because they thought they were surveying their lands. Experience long since taught the Indians, who hold their lands in common, that a survey has as its sure sequel a seizure. These particular prospectors were working under a government concession. Diaz sent a regiment into the mountains. It captured, bound and shot, without a trial, nearly 1,500 Indians, practically all the adult males of the tribe. Not a word of this got into the papers.

Again, the governor of the state of Hildalgo was asked to resign by Diaz. He refused. Nothing happened for a few months. Then at dawn the governor was awakened by a spruce aide-de-camp who offered him a blank resignation to sign. When he demurred, the aide took him to the window and showed him a battery in front of the palace, infantry around the palace, a cloud of cavalry behind the infantry. The governor signed. The brigade melted away as silently as it had come. The papers said nothing.

Elections have always been a farce. A friend of mine sat as a congressman from part of Yucatan for 20 years. He was never in Yucatan and could not tell me the boundaries of his district. All he knew was that every two years he received word from Diaz that he had been elected again. I had been a resident of Mexico a very short time when I received an official notice to vote at a national election. I went to the polls. There were two policemen at the door of the room, three men in frock coats and silk hats within behind a table which held a ballot box. Not a voter was in sight. I explained that I had received the notice, but that I was an American citizen and had no right to vote. "If you wish to vote, señor," said the chairman, "it will give us the utmost delight to have you do so."

There is no middle class in Mexico. From the great land-owners with their retinues of lawyers, agents, favorites, you take one long step downwards to the small, the very small, retailer and the peon. Wholesale business and public utilities are in foreign hands. The peon mass in the north has been leavened by the return there of many thousands of Mexicans who have come across the border, working on railroad and other jobs, as far north as Minnesota, but southern Mexico is still sunk in the apathy of the ages.

There is no public opinion in the country. Diaz was a benevolent despot, supported by the feudal lords who owned the land, the land barons of Mexico. I asked the president once why he did not apply the single tax and so break up the large estates. "It must be done some day," he replied, "but one of my successors must do it."

These lords of land were lords of life as well. Terrazas owned 40,000,000 acres in Chihuahua. That is nearly one and one-half times the size of Pennsylvania. He was supreme ruler of that great state of Chihuahua, whether he, or his son-in-law Creel, or one of his sons, or some retainer of his was nominally governor. The police, the rurales, the alcaldes, the courts did only what he directed, were simply registering machines of his decrees. He used to be major-domo of a Señor Martinez del Rio, whose great estates, confiscated because he supported Maximilian, fell into his major-domo's hands. Del Rio's son told me he had saved a remnant of his father's lands from Terrazas's clutch. "How much is this remnant?" I asked. "Barely five million acres," was the reply. That is nearly one-fifth the size of Pennsylvania.

Mexican labor, fairly energetic when paid by the piece, slow

beyond all dreams and nightmares of slowness when paid by the day, is in every case unsatisfactory because it is intermittent. Here a laborer toils for one of two reasons, either to advance himself or to avoid being discharged. The peon has no wish to advance and if you discharge him he is rather grateful to you for having saved him the trouble of making up his own mind to stop work.

We misunderstand the Mexican, of course. The Spaniard is far more difficult than any other European for the Anglo-Saxon to understand. Mr. Rives, in his monumental book on *The United States and Mexico*, suggests that this may be because the Spanish blood has an Afro-Semitic base, with a strong Moorish intermixture afterwards. He quotes one ethnologist as saying that a Spaniard resembles the son of a European father by an Abyssinian mother. Be this as it may, the man was right who said: "Three deep gulfs divide mankind—age, sex and race. And of these the deepest is race."

Of one most beautiful Spanish characteristic, courtesy, we have scant share. The average American in Mexico behaves like a cad, with vulgar disregard of well-nigh sacred customs he cannot appreciate and of a delightful and stately courtesy he cannot approximate. Nor is it only the average American who so disports himself. When the second Pan-American Conference was held in the city of Mexico, Mrs. Diaz gave a *fête* at Chapultepec for the delegates and others. It was a scene from fairyland. I was talking with her when at her elbow the president's chief aide-de-camp said to the chairman of the United States delegation: "Senator, supper is about to be served and the President would like to have you give your arm to Mrs. Diaz and lead the way." "Well," said the old man, looking at his watch and closing it with a snap, "tell the President I'm much obliged, but its gettin' late and I'm goin' back to the hotel now. Come along, Mother." And thereupon he and his wife departed, without even saying good-bye to the President's wife.

The fundamental question in Mexico is the land question. The Mexican revolution will never be settled until it is settled right—by giving back to the people the land of which they were despoiled nearly four centuries ago. No statute of limitations runs against the right of men and women to free access to land. Those of you who are not single taxers may well weigh that pregnant fact. Its offspring may some day astound you. The three great forces, stronger

than laws or constitutions or armies or privilege, are men's hunger for food, men's hunger for women, men's hunger for land. Until the peon has an opportunity to get his 10 or 20 hectares of land, the peon will not be at peace.

What is there for the United States to do? Simply to watch and wait. It is weary work, this waiting, but as a great captain of industry once told me: "Waiting is the finest of the fine arts." Professor Patten's able argument in favor of our intervening because Mexico is not an industrial unit and our breaking it up into smaller states which are industrial units fails to convince me. Mexico is much more of an industrial unit than the United States were up to 1865. If economic forces are to break it up into smaller units it is still neither advisable nor right that those forces should be pricked into activity by American bayonets. We can occupy any part of Mexico we choose, at much cost of life, more cost of money, a colossal cost for pensions thereafter, and a terrible cost in the awaking of the devilish war-spirit which debauches a nation and its politics for a generation. When we have occupied it, what then? The French went where they would in Mexico, but whenever a French garrison marched out of a Mexican city Maximilian's rule ended in that city. The witty Pierre Bonaparte said of Napoleon's Mexican experiment: "My cousin is finding out that you can do anything in the world with bayonets except sit upon them." If we occupy Mexico, we shall simply sit upon our bayonets. Let us still watch and wait. Emerson says every institution is but the lengthened shadow of some stout and resolute person. Some day some stout and resolute person will rise from the southern welter, put the Mexican people back upon the lands of Mexico, and then—not till then—will there be abiding peace in that great country.

A REVISION OF AMERICAN POLICIES

By Simon N. Patten, Ph.D.,

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In every age and nation two conflicting forces are active in determining national policies. One of these is the national sentiment generated in the past, which in connection with social tradition tends to perpetuate old and often useless policies. The other force is the commercial needs upon which present national prosperity depends. In our national history both of these forces have been active and each in turn has been dominant.

During the period of the American Revolution, sentiment prevailed over interest, while in the period of constitutional development commercial interests were dominant. Both sentiment and interest played a part in the great Civil War, but interest was the chief motive and it in the end determined the course of events.

Today we are entering a new epoch in which interest and emotion again conflict. The national policies of the preceding century have evoked the emotions that at present are dictating our foreign policy. It is equally plain that a new group of commercial interests have arisen creating an opposing force as great if not greater than that which in our early history gave rise to the desire for a constitution. We should therefore contrast these two forces and see where their opposition lies and in what way the two can be adjusted without too great a break in the national policy.

American sentiments are in the main aggregated around five principles: the Monroe Doctrine, local independent states, Anglo-American unity, foreign complications and a paternal attitude on the part of the nation towards the smaller states to the south. These sentiments developed during the earlier epoch of isolation when commerce was internal. There were then no great interests to counteract in foreign affairs the sentimental opinions generated by our earlier history. When we expanded we did so by annexa ion and thus brought within the nation the various parts of the continent commercially valuable to us. In this way national and race homogeneity was preserved and those foreign complications avoided

which might easily have created trouble. A new commercial situation, however, has arisen, which demands the development of a foreign policy based on the same elements that up to the present time have created our internal demands and interests. Under the old condition our industries were in the main local. Wheat, meat, corn and cotton were our great products, and they could all be produced within our borders. The old theory of social progress assumed that national and race vitality could be found only to the north of the frost line, and that the nations to the south were bound to be defective and dependent. All this has changed in recent years through the increased control of disease and the spread of better industrial conditions to southern regions. The center of civilization at the present time is 15 degrees south of what it was a century ago. As good a civilization can now be maintained on the 25th degree of latitude as formerly on the 40th.

In addition to this, radical modifications in our diet have taken place by which southern foods have become important—so important that they are today as vital an element in our diet as are the older products of northern regions. Sugar, fruit, rice, bananas and other tropical plants have now become an essential element in our food supply and only through further development of these products can a low cost of living be restored. At least one-third of the national diet should be obtained from regions south of the 25th degree. This means that they must be obtained in regions beyond the present limits of the United States. The only way, therefore, to reduce the present cost of living is the utilization of this great region for the production of foods for which they are best fitted. It is no overestimate to say that if these changes were effected a reduction in the cost of living of 30 per cent could be made. This is important to eastern cities which can more readily obtain their food from southern regions than from the western states. It is also of importance in places where immigrants from southern Europe live. These races are used to a vegetable diet and will therefore more readily adjust themselves to southern foods than will older northern races.

These changes, therefore, mean the transference of industry from chilly New England to the sunny South and from the lakes on the north to the gulf on the south. The present advantages of the region from Philadelphia to Charleston are 20 per cent greater than those to the north, and a shift of population and industry must take

place which will bring the center of American civilization within this region.

Another element of importance in deciding future policies is the change in social morality now taking place. Formerly people limited their responsibilities to their family, their locality, their state or at most to their nation. They felt responsible for what took place in their own town as opposed to other towns; to their neighborhood as opposed to other parts of the city. They thought that crossing some artificial state line relieved them from responsibility for the people on the other side. This provincial tone is now disappearing. We are beginning to realize that we are as responsible for what takes place in the slums as for what takes place in our own families, for what takes place across the river as well as in our own ward or city. National responsibilities are correspondingly changed, for our moral interests lie quite as much in what is outside of the artificial limits of the United States as in what takes place within them.

Social responsibility goes with trade. We control the lives and morality of those who supply us goods or furnish us with service, and this responsibility is quite as great if the individuals who serve us live in a foreign land as if they are in parts of our own city or as members of our own family. It has been often asserted that trade follows the flag. It might be better said that moral responsibility follows commerce. There is no way of avoiding this larger responsibility except by narrowing our moral horizon and rendering less effective the principle of social service to all mankind.

Let me make clear the principle involved. In primitive communities each locality is industrially independent, creates its own supply of food and satisfies its own wants. This simple economy of our forefathers is disturbed by the introduction of larger industrial units. The laborer now loses his industrial independence; he must go where capital is and have his situation determined by its needs. The laborers in Philadelphia are not there because they desire it; they are there because they are dependent upon capital for employment, and the capital finds its location in Philadelphia. Whenever this disturbance takes place, the community becomes from that time responsible for the laborers' condition. They are where they are either to create a higher return on capital or to create lower prices for consumers. The capitalist and the consumer, therefore, become socially responsible as soon as they take labor from its

natural environment and put it in places where it satisfies the wants of the community at large.

Under these conditions it is shortsighted to assume that responsibility ceases at the crossing of political lines. The real question is, Have you as a result of your altered consumption or from your desire for a larger income forced laborers to move from their accustomed environment to surroundings where they serve your ends? If so, your responsibility is met only when the condition of the laborers is brought up to the normal level of the community.

In the copper region of Michigan, for example, many laborers have been aggregated to satisfy the wants of the nation and to secure profits to the owners of the mines. Neither mine owners nor the consumers of copper goods can disclaim responsibility for the evils existing in this region. They have created the conditions under which the laborer lives and must accept responsibility for the laborer's welfare. Our country and the world at large have many such problems. It means a moral responsibility on the part of any community or class that has disturbed the natural conditions under which laborers have existed by forcing them into a new environment where their independence is subordinated to the general good. Exploitation and degradation are the results of these changes, unless a moral awakening on the part of the community brings to the dislocated population a return to their earlier social independence.

The first question, therefore, to ask concerning the region to the south of the United States is, Have we dislocated their industries? Has Mexico been disturbed by the demands of foreign consumers or foreign capitalists? If this is so, then the various commercial or national groups creating this dislocation are responsible for the disorder, confusion and misery prevalent in Mexico. It is not constitutional rights that we should uphold. Rather should we see that the conditions on which an industrial civilization depends are realized in Mexico. These conditions may be divided into three groups: political rights, economic principles with the resulting social responsibility and social ideals that are a consequence of our civilization.

I shall not attempt to formulate our political rights nor the principles of constitutional government that have followed their application to national life. It is, however, important that the economic principles and the social emotions of our civilization should

be formulated so that we can see our responsibility and recognize what are the real motives prompting our action towards other classes or races. The economic principles are these:

1. The maintenance of order
2. The freedom of exchange
3. The education of the masses
4. The ownership of land
5. The security of capital
6. The sacredness of contracts
7. The prevention of industrial exploitation
8. A living wage

Each of these has been found essential to the prosperity of America, and can therefore be assumed to be the basis of our relations to any external industrial group. We must prevent exploitation; we must give a living wage; we must make capital secure; we must see that the masses in every community whose industrial relations we dominate maintain their industrial efficiency.

The social emotions arising from our civilization may be formulated as follows:

1. Brotherhood of man
2. Joy in mutual prosperity
3. Respect for manly labor
4. Love of intergroupal contact
5. Subordination of personal, group and national interest to the general good
6. Subordination of legal rights to social welfare
7. Pride in Anglo-American ideals and civilization
8. Self and group sacrifice for the benefit of backward races

These emotions have been growing through the past two centuries and must be taken into consideration in the settlement of foreign affairs. Group interest must be subordinated to social welfare, a keener love for our brother man must be evoked, respect for manly labor must be encouraged, and a pride in Anglo-American ideals and civilization must grow with the spread of our industrial institutions. Last but not least is the sacrifice which is demanded of us to help the backward races enter upon the civilization that we enjoy.

Political action must depend upon these economic principles or upon the social emotions that result from them. What we should insist upon in our dealings with neighboring states is not constitu-

tional government but the reality of an industrial civilization. The question is not whether the Mexican constitution harmonizes with ours, but whether Mexican industry conforms to the conditions of a higher civilization. Our feelings toward the Russian people, for example, should not be determined by the fact that they have an absolute monarchy, but by the violation of economic principles that the present government in Russia may favor, or by the suppression of the social emotions that have become the common heritage of mankind. Only on one or the other of these grounds have we the right to interfere in foreign affairs or to demand conformity on the part of other nations to the principles which our civilization has evoked. We should be proud not of our constitution but of our civilization. Our guide should be justice not liberty.

These newer ideas and standards profoundly modify our external relations. With those parts of the world in which our commercial interests are slight, we have little responsibility; but this responsibility increases as our trade and industry grow, and it becomes imperative when these interests are so dominant that regions with which we trade left to themselves would fail to maintain political and industrial stability. Our industrial relations with South America are slight and will always be so. No greater mistake can be made than to assume that the Panama Canal will make South America a part of our industrial system. We should view the Canal as a contribution to the general prosperity of the world in which we will gain not as we seize or maintain control of South America, but as we share in the general prosperity that comes to all through industrial gains. A broader policy should be adopted towards the South American states. They should be made responsible for their own stability, and for their own internal development. Our interest in them is no greater than in Africa or in Australia. We should take our hands off and allow that progress to take place which will come naturally through their internal development. This means the withdrawal of our assumed control, and the granting of complete independence on their part and also a complete responsibility for their own acts. They should be treated exactly as the Balkan States are now treated in Europe—as an independent unity that must struggle with and successfully overcome their own internal difficulties.

The situation is different when we consider our relations to Central America and Mexico. All of this region is an integral part of our

industrial system. We cannot prosper without their prosperity, and they can maintain neither industrial prosperity nor political stability without our aid. To have our policy under these conditions controlled by sentiment is a fatal mistake. We must either control or let disorder continue and if disorder continues not only will they suffer but we shall have corresponding losses due to the lower standard of life and higher cost of living thus imposed upon the American people.

Control may cost lives and may cost money but lives are now lost in far greater numbers than could be through any effective policy of control. The waste of wealth under present conditions also far exceeds any loss that we might undergo in establishing permanent industrial relations throughout this region. We cannot draw an imaginary line between them and us without moral degradation on the one part and commercial loss on the other.

This control if properly exercised would create stable industry, a redistribution of population into regions now fitted for full physical development, and a movement of our colored population to the south instead of to the north, with a resulting mitigation of difficulties with the negro race. It would also mean a great extension of the field of capital and enterprise, offering inducements for saving and personal development which would otherwise be absent. But more than all these, we should think of the social uplift which would come to all the tropical races through the improvement of their health and industry. There is no reason why this region for whose welfare we are socially responsible should not be made as prosperous and its population as virile as the northern races.

This creates new political problems since our expansions in the past have been over territory of like industrial qualities and filled with people of similar traits and character to those of the adjacent states. Such a union as we have had in the past would not be advantageous under the more complex conditions which an expanding commercial policy creates. There is, however, no reason why we should not have *adjunct* states for whose social conditions and industrial prosperity we are responsible without creating the difficulties which would arise if they were admitted to our union. We must conscientiously face these industrial problems, whether they relate to our recent immigrants, to the colored race, or to the races to our south. In the solution we could serve the world in as important a

way as we did in our early history by securing our independence and establishing our political unity.

The really difficult problem in this modification of our external policy relates to Mexico. We must, however, remember that Mexico is not an industrial unit, and that the real weakness in Mexico at the present time lies in the fact that the different sections are bound together only by weak sentimental ties. The economic interests of these sections are so different and the class interests are so intense that no political unity can be maintained in Mexico except as some sections dominate others or some classes control those differing from themselves. Each new conquest will be that of a class or a section and thus revive the evils that caused the present revolution. To think that under such circumstances a unity can be maintained in Mexico is to fly in the face of experience. Political independence cannot be upheld except through economic independence, and any region that is not economically self-sufficing must sooner or later become a component part of some larger unity that is economically independent.

The principles that I have enunciated apply not merely to the Mexican situation, but to the whole Anglo-American civilization. Both England and America have arrived at a point where old constitutional restraints have broken down and where new principles of common action must be developed. England has the same situation to face in regard to Ireland and to South Africa that we have in regard to Mexico. Our responsibilities are not diminished by the fact that Mexico is external to the territory of the United States, nor is English responsibility reduced on the plea that England is giving local self-government to various parts of the British Empire.

Ireland cannot become a political unit, because she is not an industrial unit. Belfast does not trade with Dublin, but with the outside world. Dublin in turn has its external trade independent of other parts of Ireland. This means that any decision interfering with the industrial prosperity of Belfast will not be felt in Dublin, and hence will not tend to create a reaction that will set it aside. Our western states may not be much interested in eastern prosperity, but eastern depression is sure to be felt in the western states and to produce in them a reaction in favor of conditions in the east that would give them prosperity. No such mutual conditions exist in Ireland. All that would hold such a unit together would be a weak

local sentiment which could not under any circumstances be powerful enough to prevent the aggressions of one locality against another. The same lack of common interests prevails in South America. Its mining industry creates abnormal conditions for the benefit of the world at large. We can not expect a dominant class in such a locality to respect the interests of other classes. The only method by which the balanced prosperity of these localities, groups and classes can be insured is by some outside control imposing upon the whole region the economic principles and social emotions that have developed in the larger Anglo-American world.

Our policy towards Mexico should be based on these principles. We should break up the Mexican state and put in its place natural units, the people of which have common industrial interests and who would therefore feel any burden that may be imposed on some one class. There must in addition be an abrogation of class privileges. There should also be a definite policy about public utilities. These are so influential that they cannot be controlled by the different localities. All this could be done without any break in our political precedents. It would, however, force a reconstruction of our economic ideals and a greater emphasis on our social emotions. Both these changes are much to be desired; if the Mexican situation leads us to a clearer perception of the economic and social principles on which our civilization depends, we shall not only be the gainers in our foreign policy but also in all our domestic relations.

Let me restate fundamentals to make my position clear. Economic interests should determine the extent of the region over which we exert effective control. In this whole region our responsibilities are the same whether a given portion be in or without our national union. We should not control regions like South America where our ties are sentimental. We should control Mexico even if sentiment on both sides of the national boundary is opposed. Social responsibility must dominate over regional feelings.

Two groups of sentiments are wholesome: the Anglo-American, which reflect our whole civilization, and those evoked by local interests. Class sentiments, regional sentiments, race sentiments, language sentiments and denominational sentiments are bad and should be displaced either by the broader sentiments of our civilization or by economic interests. To treat Mexico as a whole would be as fatal as to have treated the South as a unit at the close of the Civil

War. Had we done this an intolerable situation would have arisen only solved by another war. We want no southern sentiment, no eastern or western sentiment, no more than we want Irish, German or Jewish sentiment. Mexican sentiment is a bar to their progress and to ours. It should be faced and suppressed just as southern sentiment was fought and defeated.

Local political units should be economic and so demarked that people of similar interests can act together for common ends. No other sentiments except those generated by our whole civilization can be tolerated. That which goes beyond the locality should be broad enough and true enough to arouse all men. Interests are local; sentiments are universal. We should avoid the mistakes now committed by England in relation to Ireland and South Africa. Irish and South African sentiment is regional. Like southern sentiment or Mexican sentiment or the class sentiments that are now forming, they are against social welfare, and should be repressed. Only as they are blended into a larger unity that is not regional or class can our civilization expand and flourish. Both regions and classes must lose their emotional appeal in the march of events giving to localities their economic rights and to the whole world one religion, one future and one civilization. Away with all besides this goal in which political, economic and social interests unite into a harmonious whole and lift us above the strife of regional and race emotions.

MEXICO: ITS PEOPLE AND ITS PROBLEM

By Major Cassius E. Gillette,
Philadelphia.

Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as international law, for there is nobody authorized to pass such laws, no tribunal to interpret them, and no executive authorized to enforce them. Nations in this are in precisely the condition of a group of men in a mining camp in a wilderness where there is no government and no established laws.

Yet in both cases certain fundamental principles are recognized and those who violate them are likely to have a fight on their hands in which disinterested parties are likely to take sides against them. Thus in the mining camp it is recognized that each man owns his own claim and can work it by any method he pleases provided he does not thereby interfere with the rights of his neighbor.

So with nations; each nation is considered to own its territory, to have certain attributes called sovereignty. It can work its lands as it desires, provide its own government, and regulate its own affairs as it pleases and settle its internal disputes as it sees fit. In general no nation has a right to interfere with the sovereignty of another and remain its friend. Any such interference is really an act of war.

Nations have the inherent right to change their governments by any method without other nations having the slightest right to interfere even though it be difficult at times for those other nations to determine what faction to recognize as the actual government.

Under ordinary conditions no nation is bound to recognize or hold diplomatic relations with a government of whose character it disapproves. There is one very exceptional case, however, in this behalf. The relations of the United States to other American republics, particularly Mexico and Central America, are different from those between any other countries. The Monroe Doctrine is the cause of this. Privately suggested primarily by England to prevent the Holy Alliance from helping Spain to recover her colonies, its real justifiable meaning is that we claim the right to try, on this continent, the experiment of government by the people unhampered and uncontaminated by European monarchical systems. It has not inherently

the force of law, but we will fight for it, and that makes it about as good as law.

There is one important point, however, generally overlooked. The doctrine does not contemplate for a moment any right to dictate the form of government of other countries on this continent, especially those existing at the time of President Monroe.

We have not a shadow of a right to demand that Canada become a republic, and no one has ever even suggested such a right, and we have not a shadow of a right in the same behalf as regards Mexico.

Spain colonized and owned that country for a hundred years before England established her colonies here. We will prevent and did prevent Europe from making a monarchy of Mexico, but if Mexico wants to make a monarchy of herself the Monroe Doctrine does not apply. We have made it apply but we have no moral right to do so. We have the right to be what President Wilson calls "the champions of constitutional government," within our own borders, and to encourage it elsewhere, but we have no right to interfere with the sovereignty of Mexico. If she wishes or finds it unavoidable to change rulers by force it is really none of our business.

It would seem that we should have the full right of non-recognition in such cases, but even this is not true. The rights that we have almost automatically arrogated under an extension of the Monroe Doctrine have been acceded to by foreign governments and the result is practically that if we do not recognize a *de facto* government of Mexico, we can kill it and even destroy that country simply by non-recognition as we are doing today.

The big nations that divided up Poland have been condemned by civilization ever since. But the partition of Poland is a very mild matter, in comparison to the horrors of what we are doing in Mexico. That our people stand for it for a moment is only explainable on the ground of ignorance of the true facts.

This ignorance of ours concerning Mexico is one of the most amazing things of the age. The average American really knows less of our next-door neighbor to the south than he does of Germany or Japan.

The typical and crowning error of this is the apparent assumption by the President, press, and people, that the so-called "Constitutionalists" of Mexico are analogous to our revolutionary sires trying to establish a true democracy in the so-called republic of Mexico. On the contrary they are vastly more similar to the followers of Geronimo, Sitting Bull, Cochise, or Rain-in-the-Face.

When the Spaniards came to Mexico they found two kinds of people—civilized Aztecs, Toltecs, Oaxacans, etc., probably of European origin, and the western Apache-like people, probably derived from Asiatic barbarians. The Spaniards intermarried with the civilized races and made peons of the barbarian element. So today there are two races in Mexico, one a cultured Latin race and the other uncouth savages more or less "tamed."

Absolutely the only difference between the common peons of Mexico and our reservation Indians lies in the fact that we killed off most of our Indians, and put the remnants upon reservations, while the Spaniards "converted" theirs (with an axe if necessary) and put them to work. They have not changed a whit in four hundred years. They have the habits, the food, the clothing, the houses, the superstitions, and the vermin, that they had when Cortez came. I have seen thousands of their abodes, never one with a chimney, never one with anything but a dirt floor. They build the fire on the floor and the smoke gets out as best it can. They have acquired nothing from civilization but its diseases, firearms, horses, a few crude cooking utensils, and a very thin religious veneer for their old superstitions, mostly used with a view to better luck in gambling.

Their clothing is exactly what Cortez found, substituting a little cheaper cotton cloth for some of the skins, and omitting the feathers.

Beginning at the feet this costume consists of rude, homemade, leather sandals, worn part of the time on feet more nearly resembling hoofs. It can safely be asserted that 50 per cent of Villa's "patriots" have cracks a quarter of an inch deep in their hoof-like heels. They encase their legs generally in "pants" made of unbleached cotton sheeting, held up by a kind of shawl or sash twisted around the waist; a blouse or jumper of the same material; no underwear or socks; a blanket made by hand, with a central slit for the head to go through—and a straw sugar-loaf hat 18 inches high, with a brim 2 feet wide—unkempt hair, generally "inhabited." It can safely be guaranteed that there are not a dozen combs in Villa's camp, nor any soap used for bathing.

It is also a safe assertion that not 5 per cent of Villa's "army" knows that they are called "Constitutionalists" at all; not 1 per cent could spell or pronounce the word constitution, nor identify a single letter in its make-up; not one in a hundred would know what was meant by a constitution nor would care a continental about it if you

talked to him for a week. And if you handed him a ballot, he would not have the slightest conception of its use except possibly to roll a cigarette and he would prefer a corn husk for that.

Their highest ideal of life is an uncurbed freedom, to ride a horse, carry a gun, and "earn their bread by the sweat of their squaws" in true Indian fashion. They have no desire for "votes for men," but are willing to compromise on "work for women." The women, like savages the world over, are willing to work. The men work only when compelled to do so by hunger, and then only enough to get corn and beans. The problem of every wise employer of labor in Mexico is to get the peons to have use for higher wages. Better food and better shelter will give more work for each dollar invested than corn, beans, and a blanket, and make a better country to live in. But every increase in wages beyond the pittance required for those almost invariably goes for pulque or idleness.

They seem to have only two emotions above those necessary for racial preservation,—fear, and the joy of destroying. Where the occasion would seem to call for anger, joy, resentment, patriotism, playfulness, or hate, the average peon smashes windows, preferably those of plate glass.

When Mexico threw off the Spanish yoke in 1821, the peons in the out-of-the-way places filled up, walled up, and hid, every possible mine. A few months ago the "rebels" blew up with dynamite a coal mine which they knew belonged to the family of Madero, destroying about half a million dollars' worth of property and equipment. These rebels, who are the desperate offscourings of the peon class, have destroyed everything in northern Mexico that means "work for men," so far as they have been able to reach it, bridges, houses, banks, railroad stations, tunnels, theatres, cars, locomotives, culverts, everything. They have looted churches, missions, residences, banks, stores, and have murdered and held for ransom many persons of all nationalities.

The civilized people number perhaps two millions, a race proud and ambitious—individually too ambitious, because too many do not seem able to perceive that in trying to govern a country in which there are less than three million intelligent people against over twelve million untutored savages, absolute unity is necessary in the civilized ranks.

The fundamental trouble with the country, though, is that the

two million own all the land. The twelve million own nothing. Millions of them have no home but a blanket. The rest live in shacks, huts, or cabins, built generally by themselves on other people's land, and they generally work for the land owner. In this they are exactly in the position of the few scattered Indians in our West who live under precisely similar conditions, the only essential difference being in their relative numbers, most of ours being gathered on reservations.

Between the few civilized land owners and the numerous landless savages, is a small class of intelligent people who are neither peons nor land owners, and who are naturally dissatisfied with conditions. Many of these are ready for any disturbance that may bring a change.

Add now the fact that all three types come from fighting stock, and that to all the original natives bloodshed was a routine matter, and you will see that "government by the people" is here a preposterous dream. No republic nor anything like a republic ever has been or ever can be made out of Mexican peons or any other North American Indians, except after a long period of gradual development of small landholders. We have never even attempted it with our own; why should we try to force it upon Mexico? We have several times given some of them land in severalty; they promptly drank or gambled it away. Nothing is so easy as to start a "revolution" in Mexico, if setting savages on the warpath is revolution; and bandit outbreaks under any pretext from "constitutional government" to "forty acres and a mule" are something to be expected under any government except one of iron which handles both savage and renegade with prompt and severe punishment. Under a lax or hampered government banditism becomes a business, aided wonderfully by the topography of the country. Leaving out a strip from 50 to 100 miles wide around the coast, the body of Mexico is a plateau about 3000 feet above the sea along the northern border and 8000 in the southern portion. This plateau is fringed by a range of high mountains from whose crests down to the sea is an indescribably rough country where roads are practically unknown, all traffic being by pack trains on rough mountain trails. The plateau is cut up by numerous rough mountain ranges with few roads. From these fastnesses bandits are difficult to dislodge. They raid the valleys and then sneak back to their lairs in the mountains.

No matter how many bandits may be ravaging the country, each band is as independent as a wolf. To capture large game like

a city they unite just as wolves that kill rabbits individually unite to pull down a buffalo. There is no organized amalgamation, however skilfully the mob may be press-agented into an army. Their method of taking a city is strikingly like a band of coyotes around a buffalo. They do not besiege the city nor storm it; they camp around it and cut off its supplies until it is starved out. In the sparse semi-desert of north Mexico this plan works successfully—in the richer southern states the garrison can get supplies by sorties. The recent "storming" of Torreon by Villa is probably largely newspaper picturesqueness, though possibly the hordes of savages gathered were sufficiently numerous to venture a capture by assault.

The regular or federal army of Mexico is composed mostly of peons, but they are officered by educated gentlemen, mostly graduates of the West Point of Mexico, Chapultepec. A very creditable discipline is maintained, but irregularities accompany all armies, in war times, our own Civil War being no exception. Skilful press-agenting, however, can make the incidents of General Huerta's army appear on a par with the regular business of the bandit "army" of which the most prominent leader now is Villa.

Now that he has dominated most of the other bandit leaders and been supplied with cannon, his forces may have some semblance of an army.

A typical example of the necessity of severity on the part of the government of Mexico in treating renegades who are willing to risk savage domination to gain personal control, as Madero did, is shown by General Angeles, now with Villa's "army." This man is a trained artillerist. He was imprisoned by General Huerta for treason. His wife pleaded for his release and he himself promised upon his most sacred honor that if released he would remain absolutely neutral in the struggle. Yet he went to the aid of the rebels as fast as he could go, consenting to serve under Villa to help destroy the civilization of his own country. General Diaz was not as kind-hearted a man as General Huerta.

Serious consideration at the moment is being given to the discussion of ways and means of restoring order in Mexico, the President being as firm as ever in the conviction that the solution must be acceptable to the "Constitutionalists." The futility of this can be readily grasped when it is reflected that Madero himself, in whose name they are fighting, was not "acceptable" to them. Practically

not a single leader who helped Madero fight for "constitutional liberty" came in when the fight was won. Orozco alone did so, and he stayed only two weeks when he went back to fight Madero. The others all stayed on in "rebellion" against Madero, exactly as they had fought Diaz. Their business is brigandage and loot, and their pretexts, always high-sounding, are varied to suit the occasion.

Villa pretends to be fighting for Madero's "principles," yet recently he viciously fought a co-worker for the same cause, one Maximo Castillo, Madero's own bodyguard, who recently helped the cause of "freedom" by gleefully wrecking a loaded passenger train in a blazing tunnel. At least Villa says Castillo did. The latter lays it to Villa's men. It should be carefully borne in mind that these outrages are being done, not by Mexico but by the savages who are destroying Mexico.

If Villa became president of Mexico tomorrow, he would have to fight every one of his followers that he did not provide with an office, just as Madero did.

Since 1821 Mexico has been called a republic—it has never been one in reality for fifteen minutes. It was twice an empire, several times a military dictatorship, but never a government by the people for a moment. For fifty years it was one continued succession of revolts, rebellions, intrigues, anarchy, and destruction. One president actually rebelled against himself, as it were, and took the field to become a dictator, saying the country could not be governed under a constitution. Finally, a war hero, a military genius, a great constructive statesman, a skilful diplomat, and last, but by no means least, an "iron ruler" appeared in Porfirio Diaz, who crushed renegade and bandit with merciless vigor, placated respectable opposition, and established peace and order. He worked a miracle of government; a rigorous military dictatorship under all the forms of a pure democracy. For thirty years under Diaz peace prevailed and the country, the richest in the world, prospered.

This continued till the greatest source of wealth the country possessed was discovered. When it was proven that Mexico contains an empire of oil, the richest deposits in the world, the troubles of Mexico began.

Americans first drilled for oil but found little. Later Sir Weetman Pearson, an English engineer, holding some pretty favorable government contracts, drilled much deeper and found oil in enormous

quantities. Standard Oil never drills any pioneer wells. They wait till others find the oil and then go "buy" it—at their own figures. Like the American eagle which never tries to catch a fish, but waits till the osprey catches one and then goes and gets it, without risking taking cold by getting wet. But Sir Weetman was a pretty large fish hawk, and he seems still to have the oil.

The enormous concentration of wealth in few hands that has come from Standard Oil methods is probably the greatest menace to our institutions that exists, and it is possible that Diaz, who was a wise and farseeing ruler, did not want Standard Oil to do to Mexico what it was doing to the United States. Some assert that his friends, and even he himself, were partners with Lord Cowdray. In any event he protected that fish hawk from the oil eagle. Then curious things happened. Diaz, who had been lauded for many years on all hands as the greatest constructive statesman of the age, began to be systematically reviled. One John Kenneth Turner, an impecunious newspaper scribbler, was "staked" by some one to make a ten months' trip to Mexico with money enough to pose successfully as a capitalist looking for big investments, taking along such luxuries as a traveling companion and a private secretary. He produced a scurrilous misrepresentation of Mexico, and especially of Diaz, called *Barbarous Mexico*.

Curiously enough, before oil was discovered in Mexico, Mr. Bryan, presidential candidate of the Democratic party of the United States, and editor of *The Commoner*, paid the following tribute to General Diaz:

> President Diaz has left an indelible impress on his country. His administration covers an area of great and permanent improvement in the condition of that nation.
>
> When I was in the city of Mexico I was especially impressed with his interest in education, and to education the people of Mexico must look for the laying of that broad foundation which is necessary to stable government.
>
> I need not comment upon the executive ability of President Diaz. He has won a place among the great executive officers of the world. As one who feels deeply interested in the future of the Republic of Mexico, I rejoice in the progress that the country has made under Porfirio Diaz.

After oil had been developed he referred to him in the following picturesque language:

What . . . . that bloody old butcher, that bloody old tyrant who has done nothing but murder and butcher for thirty years, and would be doing so yet only that such patriots as Madero, Carranza and Villa rose to throw off the yoke of tyranny which resulted in finally driving him from the country.

On September 9, 1912, Lawrence F. Converse appeared before the sub-committee of the committee on foreign relations of the United States Senate and testified under oath as follows:

I was taken into the confidence (of Madero and his officers) as an officer on their staff. Mr. Madero told me his money was coming from that source (Standard Oil). The three men mentioned (Francisco Madero, Braulio Hernandez, Madero's secretary of state, and Abraham Gonzales, governor of Chihuahua) said that Standard Oil would back them to the last ditch.

Mr. Madero stated to me several times, as also did his other trusted officers, that the Standard Oil Company was back of them. He told me that several times for a positive fact.

They were to have a high rate of interest and there was a tentative agreement as to an oil concession in the southern states of Mexico.

Before the same sub-committee S. G. Hopkins of Washington, D. C., testified that he had been attorney for Madero and his revolutionists from the first outbreak. He is counsel for the rebels now and they have made their headquarters in his office down to the present day. He admitted on the stand that during a part of the time since Madero "broke out," he, Hopkins, was counsel for the Waters-Pierce Oil Company operating in Mexico and owned by Standard Oil. Mr. Hopkins is well known as a press-agent of great resources.

The possibilities of this situation are such as to demand strict observance on the part of the United States of the accepted rules of international law, irrespective of the alleged personal qualities of Mexican presidents or would-be presidents as they appear in the press.[1]

After about the proper length of time for *Barbarous Mexico* to permeate the minds of the people of the United States, Madero began his revolution. His propaganda was "free land to the peons." In this he did not even have the merit of originality. That precise thing had been the shibboleth of every renegade outbreak from 1821 till the time of Diaz, 1876, and there were literally hundreds of them. Not one of his predecessors had ever made the slightest effort to make

[1] See *The Trend Magazine* for April, 1914.

good their lure. All that Madero did in this behalf was to have his brother Gustavo go down to Morelos and buy a large hacienda at $12 a hectare and sell it to the government at $36—for free distribution.

As shown above, the Monroe Doctrine gives an awful power for good or evil. In justice it should limit our normal right of non-recognition. As it stands President Wilson's refusal on March 7, 1913, to recognize General Huerta has absolutely prevented anybody from lending money to the Mexican government, except at their own personal risks, for President Wilson can at any moment recognize Villa as president of Mexico, and what Villa or Carranza would do to Huerta's bonds needs no demonstration.

But we have gone far beyond mere non-recognition. European bankers have refused to lend money to the government of Mexico because of secret requests made to their governments by President Wilson. He also directed the Postmaster-General to demand a settlement from Mexico of about a million dollars at a time when such demand would hurt civilized Mexico most. All these things lie within the power of President Wilson. How unjust and wrong they are, time will surely show.

THE REMEDY FOR MEXICO

By Leslie C. Wells,

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What should be desired in Mexico is not so much immediate peace as a peace that shall be tolerably permanent. Mexico is a land of special privilege and great oppression of the masses. That is one of the two causes of the country's present troubles. The other, complementary to it, is the twofold fact, first, that there is a deep-seated desire among the people for a change in their condition, and second, that large numbers of the more virile part of the population are at last determined to force the change. These two causes must be taken as the fundamental considerations for foreign governments in the formation of a far-sighted policy with regard to the Mexican situation.

For a permanent cure of disease, the cause must be removed. There will not be settled peace in Mexico, and there ought not to be, until the people see the promise of a reasonable degree of relief from their sad condition. This can be realized only through the ascendency of some party pledged to reforms. It is idle to think that a strong man is the main essential. True it is that the man at the helm in Mexico should be one of extraordinary strength, but the movement of the times is greater than any individual; and unless he fall into step with the demands of the generation, no man's personality can long dominate the situation. There was never any substantial reason for thinking that General Huerta, with only his military prestige to recommend him, could prove the salvation of his country. Granting that the recognition of his government a year ago by the United States would have resulted in peace, which is to be doubted, the peace would have been a forced one, maintained by the arbitrary methods of the old régime. Such a peace would have been fatal to itself, the peace that Porfirio Diaz maintained, and at best could have been but a temporary one. It probably would have resulted in a few years in an explosion all the more violent because of the repression.

Not only must there come to power in Mexico a party committed to reforms, but, if settled peace is to result, its victory must come about under such circumstances as to enable it to carry some of the reforms,

where they are most urgent, into immediate execution. This means that their victory must be complete, and not one of compromise. The sad example furnished by the compromise of Madero should be a warning against another, not only to the Mexicans of the reform element, but also to foreign governments which may be inclined to exert pressure upon the contending parties to compose their differences. No steps should be taken which would leave in positions of power men in sympathy with the old régime who might work to undermine the strength of the victors or to delay or neutralize the realization of their purposes. Any such abortion on the part of the revolution would logically result in another popular revolution against the new government, as there were uprisings against Madero when it appeared that he would not bring to satisfactory fruition the aims with which he inspired the soldiers who fought his battles. The leaders of the revolution are but the instruments of the people, in whose hearts it has its real and vital force. If these instruments fail the people in the ultimate work that is to be done after the smoke of battle has cleared away, they will be cast aside for some of truer or stronger steel. It is therefore devoutly to be desired that the leaders of reform should have a clear field for their efforts. This will not be possible unless the Cientifico party and others whom President Diaz favored are so completely defeated and shorn of their strength as to be discouraged for some time to come from attempting to block the progress of the age. These considerations not only justify the Mexican revolutionists in declining mediation, but should deter foreign governments from pressing it.

It may be too early to predict that the present Constitutionalist organization will win a victory so complete, or that the struggle can be ended soon enough to satisfy foreigners, except those who can possess themselves with great patience. But, on some accounts, it is desirable that the Constitutionalists, if they are to conquer Huerta, or any other reactionary to whom he may give place, should make somewhat slow progress in their march to Mexico City. As battles deplete their ranks, to restore them to their necessary numbers they will have to depend to some extent upon accessions of inexperienced soldiers in the country through which they pass. If no time is taken to train and discipline these men, not only will the war be bloodier, but the armies will in moments of stress and temptation be more irresponsible, and possibly the cause of much unnecessary loss

of property and suffering to non-combatants. Moreover, as the Constitutionalist government extends its control to the south, it needs time to organize itself in the new territory, to get its machinery into well coördinated operation, to restore a tranquil and confident state of mind among the people, such as apparently exists in the sections where it has been longest in control, and to bring the daily activities of the people as nearly as may be back to their accustomed flow. If its armies should now capture city after city in rapid succession, and arrive in a rush at the capital itself, the excitement of the populace, as well as that of the soldiers, would run so high that many grave events might take place. In some places the lower classes might take into their own hands the work of reform at which the revolution is aiming, interpret their regained rights in their own crude way, and in seizing upon them commit many acts of vengeance and violence. The fall of Mexico City, if coming as the result of a battle at that point, will at any time be the occasion of great excitement through the entire country. No better provision can be had against the untoward contingencies of that event than the slow but sure consolidation of the power of the Constitutionalist government.

Assuming that after a final victory of the Constitutionalists the civil government of the country will temporarily be in the hands of General Carranza and his cabinet, the peace of the nation will be much better assured in the trying period that will follow, if they have had time in different localities to become acquainted with the conditions and problems that will confront them. They might well go further than this. They might get some of those problems partially off their hands by bringing to them local and provisional solutions. For the masses of the people, probably the most tangible of the many abuses which they are fighting is that of the land tenure. It is the one whose abolition they will demand with the greatest promptness after the war is over. Any delay in this reform will be as perilous for the peace of the country as it proved to be in the time of Madero. In some of the places where land is most sorely needed for individual or communal use, it might be wise for the Constitutionalist government, on the several stages of its southward progress, to seize land and confer it upon villages or divide it among families. This might be done by confiscation in cases where circumstances justify it, and by expropriation, with the remuneration subject to later decisions of the courts,

in places where invalidity of title is not apparent and no other grounds exist for confiscation.

To do this wisely would take some time; but such a procedure would serve to appease the people pending the institution of further reforms, and render more secure the new government to be established in Mexico City. Such a policy as this, moreover, adopted as a military or revolutionary measure, would probably in the long run save time. It would give the government experience in handling the question, contact with its varied aspects in the different regions, and a slight opportunity to test different methods of settling it. Successful solutions of the problem in a few localities would pave the way to its general solution by legislative process, in which it would otherwise probably become subject to the same delay of endless debate as during the administration of Madero.

However, impatience outside of Mexico for an early end to the fighting tends to foster a demand for intervention on the part of the United States. This will generally be recognized as unwarranted unless it can be clearly shown that Mexico has forfeited the sovereign right to settle her affairs according to her own ideas, and in the way that is most likely to settle them permanently. A condition of unbearable anarchy would perhaps constitute such forfeiture if there should be no promise of a cessation through the operation of internal forces. By a state of civil war the right is not forfeited, as by the principles of international law a sovereign state may engage in civil war without interference, unless it is waged with unrestrained irresponsibility. That there is some anarchy in Mexico is undoubted. But the important question is whether this anarchy is not the incidental feature, and civil war the predominant fact, of the situation.

It is sometimes difficult to know whether a domestic strife is to be considered a true civil war or a mere contest of personal ambitions. If, however, grounds for controversy exist such as justify an appeal to arms, no foreign government may properly presume to pass judgment on the motives of the leaders of a revolt, and assume that they are making only an insincere and selfish parade of their issues, unless their conduct of the war is such as to show them almost beyond doubt to be without principles of patriotism. Since a man's fellow citizens may be supposed to be better judges of his character than persons of a different nationality, this principle applies with particular force to a struggle where large numbers of men are assembling under the same

leaders, and proving their confidence in them by entrusting their cause to their direction and their lives to their command.

Mexico undeniably presents the basic conditions without which a struggle should not be viewed as a true civil war, namely, the existence of issues which are of vital concern to the people; and the abuses which give rise to them have been so tyrannical as to justify a revolution in the government, and, if necessary to that end, a violent purging of the nation. The revolt on these issues is under the guidance of leaders, civil and military, representing nearly all grades of society and many walks of life. They include men of character who typify the most substantial products of Mexican civilization. The Mexicans, who have proved their confidence in them by enlisting unde their standard, are so strong in numbers and in spirit as to be a most formidable force against the best armies that General Huerta can send to oppose them. A large part of these troops certainly, and apparently almost all of them, are operating under orders from a single source. Their chief is also exercising the powers of civil government in a very extensive and growing territory. In a large part of this territory, notably in the State of Sonora, in which was located until recently the Constitutionalist capital, foreigners have been receiving complete protection. These conditions seem to establish civil war, and not anarchy, as the predominant fact of the situation.

As for the way in which the war is being waged, comparisons should be made with other conflicts. In the history of the United States, not alone the terrible events of Sherman's "March to the Sea," and those in Arkansas, Missouri and Tennessee during the Civil War, but, in more recent times, many predatory and licentious acts of American soldiers[1] in the war with Spain, despite the efforts of the officers to prevent them, rise up to modify the judgment that might be passed on barbarities that have taken place in Mexico. The war ideals of the nation which may prove the most troublesome of the powers that may attempt to force the hand of the United States in Mexico or influence its action there, may be found in the speech made by the German Emperor[2] in 1900 to his troops embarking for China, in which he enjoins them to emulate the Huns of Attila; while the zeal with which they obeyed his injunction, and the excesses of the

[1] E. J. Benton, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War*, p. 162.

[2] Charles Francis Adams, *Studies Military and Diplomatic*, p. 288.

French, British and Russian soldiers[3] on the same expedition, show that the so-called civilized usages of war are largely a fiction.

How, then, can we expect a nation, the masses of whose population are still in an early stage of their development, to carry on a war that shall fall short of Sherman's definition? Can we expect her to be relatively more refined in warfare than she is in the pursuits of peace? If foreigners are satisfied to live in Mexico in times of peace, for the sake of reaping great profits from her backwardness in exploiting her own resources, and to profit also in many cases from Porfirian methods of preserving peace perhaps quite as barbarous as any of the acts of the present conflict, should they not accept their lot uncomplainingly when Mexico engages in warfare? And, everything considered, have not the warring Mexicans acquitted themselves quite as creditably as, in their own wars, have the soldiers of the five nations whose citizens are now most interested on her soil?

Among the cogent reasons of other sorts why the United States should not intervene, there are some of which little has been said in public discussion. Mention may be made of a few, beginning with those which apply to continued control of the Mexican government.

Americans have more than they can attend to to keep their own house in order. The full attention of their legislators and public opinion is needed on the many great domestic problems of city, state and nation. It is especially pertinent to remember that the American people do not need to cross their frontiers to find alien wards to guide, and aliens who bid fair to bring more sorrow to them than can ever come from the Mexicans if the latter are left to themselves. Recent articles[4] by Prof. E. A. Ross, in which he deals with the economic, political and social effects of recent immigration, offer on this point much food for thought. If America is to wield her highest influence in the progress of the world, she may well apply her energy developing her own civilization to its best within its natural boundaries, instead of spreading it like a thin veneer over a large part of the earth's surface.

An accumulation of foreign dependencies would in time invite great corruption in our public service.

[3] A. J. Brown, *New Forces in Old China*, chap. xxvi; Wm. Elliot Griffis, *China's Story*, pp. 272-3.

[4] See *The Century* for November and December, 1913, and January, 1914.

Though almost nothing is said of it in the journals of the United States, one learns in talking with Mexicans concerned in the present struggle that there are in the air the germs of contention in matters involving the Mexican priesthood. The revival in politics about two years ago of the defunct Clerical party is an ominous indication of this. It is somewhat difficult to get definite information on the form which the matter is likely to take, but enough is apparent to indicate that whoever is charged with the government of Mexico during the next decade may expect to become involved in some serious church controversies. The people of the United States, especially in view of the possibility of a similar development in the Philippines, if they have due regard for their domestic harmony, will strongly prefer to avoid the embarrassments of such controversies.

The problems of Mexico resulting from her past unfortunate history should be solved by Mexicans, who understand them and understand themselves; not by Anglo-Saxons, whose very blood makes it difficult for them to understand the racial needs of Latin Americans. Mexico's problems are exceedingly complex. One of the most difficult, the agrarian problem, is one with which Americans have had practially no experience in their present foreign possessions. It did not present itself in Cuba or Porto Rico, and exists in the Philippines in a very different form from the Mexican problem. Land in the Philippines, for the most part, is divided into very small holdings, and the problem of the Friar Lands was of a special and peculiar kind. The manner in which it was settled, however, though it may have been the best one for that particular case, which is open to question, is perhaps an indication that the American manner of attacking the Mexican land problem would be inadequate and unjust. Undoubtedly much land in Mexico which appears to be legally held is morally open to confiscation. The Anglo-Saxon respect for technical property rights and horror of confiscatory methods are so great that American administrators, in obtaining land for the use of the peon, would probably saddle upon the country an unnecessary and unjust burden. It is safe to say that Mexico's land problem can be solved properly only by an internal revolution.

The chances are great that it would take the United States longer to bring even a temporary peace to Mexico than it will for the Constitutionalist forces.

The above reasons, except the last, apply especially to interven-

tion for indefinite occupation. To them should be added one which applies to intervention with the purpose of remaining only until peaceful elections can be held, and, like the objection based on the agrarian situation, to joint intervention as well as to action by the United States alone. Considering the pride and suspicion of the Mexican people, it is almost inconceivable that in an election presided over by foreigners or in the slightest degree under their supervision, the Mexican electorate would come to the polls in sufficient numbers to make the election representative of the will of the people. The result would probably be the choice of a president and congress who, even if not susceptible to the influence of scheming foreigners of the nationalities represented in the intervention, would lack the confidence of the nation. The logical thing to expect, after the withdrawal of the intervening powers, would be a new revolution.

The United States more than any other country has an interest in Mexico's ultimate arrival at a peace established on solid foundations of social justice, and in her advance as a self-respecting nation. In this are involved its commercial and political relations not only with Mexico, but with all Latin America as well. It may properly claim the right to judge, free from pressure from European nations, what policy will be most conducive to such a development, and to decide that there shall be intervention neither by itself nor by any other power. The writer believes that a new basis should be found for the Monroe Doctrine in an understanding with the other countries of this hemisphere. But, until such a basis is established, that doctrine, tacitly recognized by certain European powers as it has been, should not be thrown away. In the meantime, it can be given a new dignity by being invoked, if necessary, in the name of future peace and good will, to insure to Mexico the right of settling her difficulties without interference either American or European.

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF OUR OBLIGATIONS TOWARD MEXICO

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Any comprehensive discussion of our relations with Mexico involves two distinct questions which, while closely related, should for the sake of clearness of analysis be kept separate.

There is, in the first place, the basic and fundamental problem involved in our relation to that section of the American continent of which Mexico forms a part; a relation so close and intimate that everything affecting its peace and welfare vitally affects our own national well-being.

The concept of national sovereignty has undergone considerable change during the last century. It is true that our modern system of international law rests on the idea of national sovereignty. This principle marked a healthful reaction against the claims of universal dominion of the Holy Roman Empire. Useful as this principle has been in developing a respect for the rights of weaker states, the solidarity of interests of certain groups of nations of western civilization has begun to make serious inroads upon the traditional idea of sovereignty. The growth of the European concert, the interests of certain temporary or permanent groupings, such as the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, all represent forces that have profoundly influenced and modified the doctrine of national sovereignty in European affairs.

Slowly, in many cases almost unconsciously, and in all cases without full recognition of the consequences involved, changes of a like nature have been taking place in international relations on the American continent. It is true that our national thought has not kept pace with the actual changes in international conditions, due to the fact that the foreign policy of the United States has been of a negative rather than of a positive character. We have been content with imposing certain prohibitions on Europe in her relations with the American continent. Even in those cases in which our government has been compelled to formulate the rudiments of a positive American

(in the sense of a continental) policy, the new principles have been invoked for the purpose of re-enforcing the prohibitions on European states rather than because of the desire to develop a distinctive, constructive American foreign policy. The establishment of a kind of trusteeship over San Domingan finances was justified by our government as the only way to avoid the dangers of European occupation and the consequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of resting our action in this case on a frank and positive assertion of a special national interest in everything affecting the stability, welfare and progress of the West Indies, irrespective of the attitude of the European countries, we took refuge behind the purely negative principle of the possible dangers involved in European aggression.

The time has come when we must recognize that the doctrine of national self-protection includes far more than the Monroe Doctrine. As Dr. Patten has so well pointed out, the maintenance and improvement of the standard of living of the American workingman depend, in part, on an uninterrupted supply of tropical products from the West Indies and from Central America. The reduction of the price of meat, or at least the avoidance of an increasing cost, will depend in large measure upon the establishment and development of the cattle ranges of northern Mexico. Our great manufacturing interests look to an increasing extent to the vast mining resources of Mexico.

In short, national economic interests of a basic character, affecting the welfare, the standard of life and the industrial prosperity of our country, are inextricably bound up with the political stability and the economic progress of Mexico, Central America and the West Indies. When we add to these fundamental economic and social interests, considerations of a strategic nature, the vital relations of these sections of the American continent to the United States immediately become apparent. The acquisition of the Canal Zone has made of the United States a Central American as well as a North American power, and our national policy must hereafter be profoundly influenced by this change in our geographical relations.

We are interested in the welfare of Mexico, of Central America and of the West Indies primarily because their stability and progress intimately affect the well-being of our own people, and we are interested in their attitude toward us because that attitude has a distinct bearing on our national safety. This essential solidarity of interests carries with it as a logical and inevitable consequence,

a limitation on the freedom of action of all the parties concerned. Approaching the question from the broadest possible point of view, we are forced to the conclusion that national sovereignty is limited and modified by the larger interests of continental progress.

Approaching the situation exclusively from the point of view of the national self-protection of the United States, it is evident that, irrespective of any question of European interference, we cannot remain indifferent to a condition of disorder or instability in any part of Central America, in Mexico or in the West Indies. There is, therefore, an aspect of the Mexican situation which must not be lost sight of and which will remain one of the most important international problems confronting the United States even after all pending questions with Mexico have been settled.

The immediate problem with which we have to deal, however, and to which I am expected to address myself relates to the principles which should guide us in dealing with the anarchical conditions now prevailing in certain sections of Mexico.

Any discussion of our present relation to the Mexican situation, in order to be fruitful, must be undertaken in a constructive spirit and with a keen sense of the responsibilities involved. Mere destructive criticism not only serves no useful purpose but adds to the difficulties of the administration in dealing with the situation. The purposes which the President has had in mind in the formulation of his Mexican policy are so lofty that they should only be modified or abandoned after it has been demonstrated that the ends which he has in view are unattainable.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the conditions now prevailing in Mexico, it is well to bear in mind that the present unrest in Mexico is traceable to causes far deeper than the personal ambitions of petty local leaders. It is true that local politicians have taken advantage of the feeling of unrest to stir up civil strife, but the reason for their success in fomenting revolutionary movements is traceable to the economic and social changes that have taken place in Mexico during the last thirty years.

When President Diaz assumed power he found the country in the most primitive state of economic organization. The emphasis which he laid on the development of the natural resources of Mexico, the improvement in transportation facilities, the development of the mines, the establishment of manufactures, all contributed toward

raising the standard of life of a portion of the laboring population. This improvement, marked as it was, gave rise to a desire for further betterment, and created a feeling of discontent which soon found expression in secret political agitation.

Amidst this forward movement for improvement, the condition of the agricultural laborer remained practically unchanged. He found himself tied to the soil, with but little opportunity to better his condition. The existence of great landed estates made it impossible for him to look forward to securing a small piece of land, which he might call his own. Conscious of the improvement of the condition of the other classes of the laboring population, but seemingly cut off from all possibility of self-improvement, the discontent of the agricultural laborer added to the flame of political agitation.

There is no doubt that Mexico is passing through the throes of a social re-adjustment, and that it is not possible to return to the conditions that prevailed during the administration of General Diaz. It is evident, however, that this re-adjustment cannot take place without a government worthy of the name. The present anarchical conditions prevailing in Mexico are the expression of a deep unrest, but Mexico cannot advance to a higher economic and social level unless there exists an authority sufficiently strong to command respect for person and property in all sections of the republic.

Another factor which should not be lost sight of and which has contributed in no small measure toward bringing about the present situation, and which now enters as a complicating element, increasing the difficulties in the way of a satisfactory solution, is the conflict of foreign interests which has been raging in Mexico during the last ten years. Those who have watched the course of Mexican affairs have been deeply impressed with the struggle for supremacy that has been waged between two groups of capitalists, represented, on the one hand by a great British syndicate, and on the other by an American capitalist with no less powerful affiliations. This struggle has been usually represented as involving nothing more than a scramble for oil concessions. As a matter of fact it goes far deeper, involving vast railroad and agricultural interests.

The struggle began when President Diaz, apprehensive of the domination of American capitalists, sought to counterbalance this influence by fostering other foreign interests. The nationalization of the great Mexican trunk lines, the construction of the Tehuantepec

railroad by a British syndicate, the granting of important oil concessions to Lord Cowdray and his associates were all intended to establish and maintain a balance of power which would check the influence of the American group in governmental affairs. In other words, Diaz first sought to develop the economic resources of the country by a liberal and even lavish treatment of American capitalists, and then sought to curb their power through the fostering of a British counterweight. It was this change in the policy of General Diaz which enabled Francisco Madero to count on the secret support of at least some of the American companies interested in Mexico. It is exceedingly difficult to estimate the precise effect of this struggle between foreign interests on the domestic situation, but every one is agreed that it enters as an important factor in explaining present conditions, and must be reckoned with in the ultimate solution.

It is evident, therefore, that while some of the elements in the situation now confronting the United States are relatively simple, there are others so complex, and in some respects so elusive that any constructive suggestions should be offered, not in a spirit of dogmatic infallibility but rather as an attempt to throw some light on a perplexing and dangerous situation.

It would be difficult to find another instance in the history of our country in which the real issues involved in a great national problem have been so befogged as in the discussion of the Mexican situation. If the clouds that have obscured our vision simply led to temporary misconceptions, which, in the due course of time, would disappear, and enable us to see the situation in its true light, we might well patiently await this period of clearer vision. Unfortunately, however, the situation presses for early solution and upon a satisfactory solution depend not only the peace of our country but also the well-being and possibly the independent national existence of sixteen millions of our neighbors.

Whether our policy toward Mexico has been right or wrong, we must not close our eyes to the fact that it has aroused serious opposition in all classes of the Mexican population, whether living within the district under control of the government at Mexico City or in the territory occupied by the insurgent forces. It has also aroused the opposition and rekindled the distrust of the countries of Central and South America, and has served to bring together the European countries in a combined determination to protect the interests of their citizens in case the United States fails to do so.

We find ourselves at the present moment in a condition of national isolation, unique in the history of the country, and which stands in marked and solemn contrast with the spirit of good will toward the United States which prevailed immediately prior to the meeting of the second conference at The Hague. With such vast spiritual and material interests at stake and with such consequences impending, it becomes a matter of patriotic duty, to make a careful and searching "*examen de conscience*," with a view to ascertaining not only whether we have adequately fulfilled our international obligations, but also whether the policy which we have pursued and are now pursuing is in harmony with the best interests of our country.

The most serious danger that we have had to face in connection with our recent policy toward Mexico is traceable to the fact that this policy rests on deduction from certain hypotheses rather than on the basis of fact and established principle. The President, in his solemn declaration of December 2, 1913, at a joint session of the two houses of Congress said:

> There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico has no government.

There is something inspiring in the thought that the United States should become the sponsor and champion of constitutional government on the American continent; something which appeals to that spirit of service which is so deeply rooted in American national character. When, however, we stop to subject this policy, with all its implications, to careful analysis we are forced to the conclusion, first that it is unworkable in practice; secondly, that if the attempt is made to apply it, the results may be disastrous to the countries for whose benefit it is intended; thirdly, that it involves principles which will bring us into constant conflict with the republics of the American continent and will thus serve to undermine our influence in American affairs; and finally, that it means responsibilities which we neither are prepared to fulfill nor should be expected to undertake.

We cannot hope to get at the basic and fundamental principles in

the discussion of this question unless we are able to emancipate ourselves from the hypnotism of political catchwords, and squarely face the facts of the situation, however unwelcome they may be. Many years before he was mentioned for the presidency of the United States, Woodrow Wilson said:

> Self-government is not a thing that can be "given" to any people, because it is a form of character and not a form of constitution. No people can be "given" the self-control of maturity. Only a long apprenticeship of obedience can secure them this precious possession.

Between this profound political truth, so felicitously expressed, and the principles contained in President Wilson's message of December 2, 1913, there exists an inherent, fundamental, tragic contradiction, responsible in large measure for the difficulties which now confront us.

Constitutional government does not mean any particular form of written instrument or any special form of governmental organization. No matter how admirable the written instrument may be, it will remain a hollow form unless the political system for which it provides stands in direct and organic relation with the political training, the political capacity, the political traditions and the political antecedents of the people. If this close and intimate relationship does not exist, the pressure of forces far more potent than human desire or human ideals will soon shape a political system which, however imperfect, will at least enjoy the advantage of being workable, and will be vitalized by the strength that comes from the adaptation of political institutions to national character and national needs.

It was the misfortune of Mexico, in 1857, to adopt a constitution which was not, and is not today, in harmony either with the political training or capacity of her people or with the primary requirements of her national development. The constitutional convention of 1857 was made up of a group of political idealists, who labored under the illusion that a written constitution can create democratic conditions but failed to perceive the fundamental truth that written constitutions in order to be helpful, yes, even workable, must faithfully reflect the political capacity, the standard of civilization and the economic and social requirements of the mass of the nation.

Instead of building up a constitutional system on the basis of these fundamental elements, the framers of the constitution of 1857

proceeded to devise a nicely balanced scheme of government, moulded after the Constitution of the United States, adding thereto some of the more democratic features of the French constitution. Instead of recognizing the fact that the long period of anarchy and civil strife which characterized the history of the country between 1810 and 1857 could only be brought to a close through a strong and highly centralized national government, they attempted to provide a system under which the individual states would enjoy a measure of local autonomy almost, if not quite, as great as that enjoyed by the states of the American Union. Not only did the framers of the constitution ignore the manifest political needs of the country, but in their enthusiasm for democratic institutions, they endeavored to build up a system based on universal suffrage in a country in which, at that time, 95 per cent of the population were illiterate.

The attempt to put the constitution of 1857 into operation served to perpetuate the condition of civil strife that had characterized the first four decades of national independence. The individual states not only lacked the financial resources for the building up of vigorous state institutions, but local politicians used their power for selfish personal purposes, which often took the form of aggression and open warfare against the self-constituted leaders of neighboring states. The result was that the period immediately after the taking effect of the constitution of 1857 is an unbroken record of local abuses, of sectional strife, and of a complete disregard of the personal and property rights of the inhabitants.

Whatever may be the ultimate verdict on the part played by Porfirio Diaz in the development of Mexico, the historian of the future must at least give him credit for a clear perception of the fact that the constitution of 1857 was unworkable, that the only hope of preserving the national unity and national integrity of Mexico, and of giving to her a place in modern civilization was to bring about the unification of the country through the subordination of local political leaders to the national government, a process which involved the practical nullification of the constitution of 1857.

These may be unwelcome facts, but it is not my present purpose to form any estimate of the rights and wrongs of Mexican political evolution, but rather to present the actual course of development; a development which shows clearly that the trend of constitutional growth and the conditions of constitutional government in Mexico

cannot be judged, if they are to be fairly judged, by those standards which we are accustomed to apply in the United States. However unwilling we may be to accept the situation, it is nevertheless a fact that the present constitution of Mexico is unworkable, and any attempt on the part of an outside power to force her to operate it is in reality condemning the country to the anarchical conditions which prevailed between 1857 and 1879.

The serious student of Mexican civilization can have no sympathy with the view that Mexico must have an arbitrary and tyrannical central government, ruthless in its methods and unmindful of the personal rights of the inhabitants. There is a wide difference between a strong, centralized, unified government and a tyrannical government. In fact, the real situation in Mexico is that the weaker the central government, the greater the suffering of the poor unprotected Indian because of the tyranny, the abuse and the corruption of local politicians and subordinate administrative officials.

In any estimate of Mexican political conditions, it must always be borne in mind that we are dealing with a nation essentially Indian in its ethnic make-up, and in which the percentage of illiteracy, while not accurately determined, is probably in excess of 90 per cent. It is a mistake to suppose that the population is a turbulent one; on the contrary, there is probably no people of the American continent more easily governed, but there is also none more easily misled by vicious, corrupt and self-seeking local politicians. One of the most difficult problems with which President Diaz had to deal was to free the agricultural and mining laborers from the oppression and the tyranny of the state and local officials. It was a herculean task, in which he was but moderately successful, but the measure of success which attended his efforts fully demonstrates where the primary requisities for political progress lay.

The sentiments expressed by President Wilson in his message of December 2, 1913, are dictated by a lofty idealism, but it is an idealism which bears but little direct or organic relation to the present needs and the present possibilities of Mexico. The intent, no doubt, was to formulate a policy helpful to Mexico, but when tested by the actual conditions of political life, the application of the constitutional standards formulated with such high purpose can have but one result, namely, to condemn the country to a prolonged period of anarchy, the outcome of which must be, either the complete disappearance of

every vestige of civilization or the armed intervention of the United States to preserve the remnants which still exist.

The untenableness of the position assumed by the government of the United States is clearly demonstrated by recent events in Haiti, and especially by the events in Peru. Whatever may be our judgment with reference to the rights and wrongs of the situation, it nevertheless remains a fact that the constitutional government of Peru was overthrown by a military conspiracy, to which, fortunately, our government did not attempt to apply the principle of constitutional sponsorship which is being applied to Mexico. The fact that the participants in this conspiracy base their action on the desire to prevent unconstitutional acts by the president of Peru does not alter the situation so far as the United States is concerned.

The attempt to set the standards to which the governmental organization and governmental procedure of a foreign country should conform must arouse the grave concern of every one interested in preserving the best traditions of American policy. The moment we go beyond our manifest right in requiring that the lives and property of our own citizens in foreign countries shall be duly safeguarded, we not only depart from the accepted principles of international law but embark without chart or compass upon waters so troubled that we run the risk of bringing disaster upon ourselves and disaster no less certain upon the peoples whom we are trying to serve. When we endeavor to dictate the conditions or terms of political activity in any foreign country, even a country toward which we occupy so exceptional a position as Mexico, we are arrogating to ourselves a power which cannot help but arouse resentment and we are attempting something for which we are peculiarly unfitted.

If the history of the last hundred years teaches any one lesson it is that we can best perform our mission on the American continent by the force of our example rather than by attempted interference in the internal affairs of our neighbors. A high regard for the sanctity of all our international obligations, and a firm resolve to promote the ends of social justice in our internal affairs will exert an influence on all the other republics of the American continent far deeper and far more lasting than any attempt to dictate to them the standards according to which their governments shall be organized and administered.

While the precise form of political organization which should

obtain in any country must, in order to be effective, be in close harmony with the training and capacity of the people, there are certain fundamental requisites of civilization indispensable to every country, no matter what its form of government. Unless life is protected, unless the fundamental personal rights are secure and unless adequate protection is given to property, civilization inevitably disappears. We have a real national interest in preserving these fundamental requisites of civilization in every part of the American continent, and this interest rises to the dignity of a national responsibility in countries toward which we occupy such an exceptional relationship as that which exists between Mexico and the United States.

The fact that Mexico is our neighbor, that over twenty thousand American citizens are resident in the republic, and that vast American interests amounting to over a billion dollars are at stake, place the country in a position totally different from that of any of the countries of South America. Everything that affects the peace, the welfare and the progress of Mexico is of interest to the United States. We can no more remain indifferent to the continued existence of disorder and anarchy in Mexico than we could have remained indifferent to those conditions when they existed in Cuba. The primary conditions of national self-protection, the fulfillment of our national obligations to Americans resident in Mexico, the performance of our duty in protecting the vast interests which our citizens have at stake in that country, and, finally, our larger obligations to the interests of western civilization, make it incumbent upon us to do everything in our power to preserve the primary requisites for the continued existence and development of this civilization. The relationship is not a personal one between the President of the United States and the President of Mexico, but involves the present and future welfare of sixteen millions of Mexicans as well as the heavy responsibilities which we have assumed for the lives and properties of our own citizens and the citizens of other foreign countries resident in Mexico.

Although we cannot insist upon any particular type of constitutional government in Mexico, it is our manifest duty to insist on the re-establishment of order, and to do everything consistent with a respect for Mexican dignity and sovereignty to contribute toward that end. It is a significant fact that at every period in our own history at which there has been a clash between constitutional government and the maintenance of order, constitutional government has

always given way. The annals of our country between 1866 and 1871 bristle with illustrations of this fact. Are we then justified in insisting upon the application of political principles in a foreign country which we have not observed in our own? May we, in justice to ourselves and to Mexico, insist on conditions that condemn that country to anarchy, threaten it with disruption and jeopardize the very existence of civilized life?

However widely we may differ as to the proper course to be pursued in the present emergency, it is clear that the President's policy has not only thus far failed of its purpose to bring about the reëstablishment of constitutional government in Mexico, but has produced results opposite of what was intended. The arraignment of General Huerta contained in President Wilson's message of December 2, 1913, brought to Huerta's support elements of the Mexican population that were at first bitterly opposed to him; it aroused for him the sympathy of many of the republics of Central and South America, and gave to him an international prestige which he could not otherwise have attained.

The discussion of the principles that have guided the authorities in Washington in the adjustment of our relations with Mexico should be approached in a spirit of helpful coöperation. It is of little value to discuss what might have happened if a different policy had been pursued. In fact, in the present situation, such criticism is likely to do more harm than good. On the other hand, constructive suggestions may be of real value in furnishing the basis for public discussion, and in contributing toward the formation of an enlightened public opinion.

Through a misconception of the elements involved in the present situation, the violent nature of some of the attacks on President Wilson's policy and the partisan nature of others have created the impression that the first step toward any change in our policy more favorable to the constituted authorities at Mexico City involves the formal recognition of the Huerta government. As a matter of fact, we have been in constant official relations with the Huerta government through our chargé d'affaires in Mexico City. These communications have dealt not only with matters affecting the present revolution, but have covered a wide range of subjects in no way related thereto. The refusal to give immediate recognition to the Huerta government does not violate the traditions of American

practice. Nearly two years elapsed between the assumption of power by President Diaz (November 28, 1876) and the formal recognition of his government (May, 1878).

While, therefore, the President need not reverse his policy with reference to withholding recognition, the present situation demands that the first step in a constructive, positive policy toward Mexico is the removal of the international boycott and financial blockade which the United States has instituted against the Huerta government. This boycott is a serious departure from the best traditions of American foreign policy and amounts to a systematic attempt on the part of the government of the United States to overthrow the constituted authorities of a sister state. It is an open secret that foreign governments have been notified that the United States will regard it as an unfriendly act if they or their bankers advance money to the Huerta government, and it is an equally well known fact that when the fiscal agents of the Huerta government entered into negotiations with European bankers for the floating of loans, these banks were notified by their respective governments that the United States was opposed to any such advances. It is this boycott rather than the withholding of formal recognition which is weakening the Huerta government, and which is contributing toward intensifying the condition of anarchy in Mexico.

The events of the past few months have shown that the government at Mexico City is one that possesses at least some of the elements of national and international responsibility, and it becomes, therefore, our solemn duty to refrain from a policy calculated to cripple the only authority worthy of the name. Unless we are prepared to take this position, we must assume the responsibility for the condition of anarchy to which we condemn the country.

With the removal of the international boycott as the first step in a constructive foreign policy, the next step will be the reëstablishment of the embargo on the exportation of arms and ammunition, authorized by congressional resolution of March 14, 1912, established by President Taft by proclamation of the same date, and revoked by President Wilson on the third of February, 1914. [Since reëstablished. EDITOR.] It is true that the congressional resolution goes beyond the strict requirements of our neutral obligations, but it sets an example to the world of the desirability of placing these neutral obligations on a distinctly higher plane. In a recent report on the

neutrality laws of the United States prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Peace Endowment, Dr. Fenwick, in commenting on the congressional resolution of March 14, 1912, said:

> This conditional restriction of the most important contraband trade may appear at first sight contrary to the rule of international law that neutral states are under no international obligation to restrict ordinary commerce in contraband on the part of their citizens. But . . . . a belligerent, whose territory borders upon that of a neutral, might, by storing supplies in a neutral town on the frontier and drawing upon them at will, practically convert the neutral town into a base of operations for its armies. In other words, the fact that the neutral and belligerent countries are contiguous may create such changed conditions as to overrule the application of the principle of the freedom of contraband trade.

If these principles are applicable to cases in which the United States occupies the position of a neutral toward two belligerents, the necessity for their application becomes more urgent when we are dealing with insurgents whose belligerency we have not recognized. The fact that this embargo strengthened the hands of the constituted government, made it possible for us to contribute within the measure of our power toward the maintenance of a united Mexico. The lifting of the embargo, through President Wilson's proclamation of February 3, 1914, has served to strengthen the insurgent movement, and has practically made our southern frontier a base of operations against the constituted government of Mexico. We are thus contributing not only to the perpetuation of a condition of anarchy, but to the actual disruption of the country.

The United States is interested in an orderly, a united, a progressive Mexico, and must carefully avoid any action that may lead to the disruption of that country. Any attempt, therefore, at a solution of the problem on the basis mentioned must carry with it due notice to the insurgents that the embargo will again be placed on the exportation of arms and ammunition, and that the United States will see to it that the Texas frontier shall no longer serve as a base of operations for the insurgent forces.

There has been much talk within recent months of a secession of the northern states of Mexico, and the formation of a separate republic. If such a disruption of the country does occur, the United States will have to bear part of the responsibility for this calamity. The formation of such a northern republic would be but the beginning of a series

of intrigues between discontented elements in that section of the country and the people of Texas, which would probably end in a movement for annexation. Such annexation would not serve any real national purpose, and would mean a grave wrong to the people of Mexico.

The modification of our Mexican policy to the extent above outlined will pave the way for further constructive measures for the solution of the present difficulties. We can then raise the Mexican situation to the dignity of a continental question by securing the coöperation of the leading powers of South America, namely the Argentine, Brazil and Chile, in the form of an offer of joint mediation coupled with friendly representations indicating the necessity of a termination of the conflict in Mexico, and the desirability of an agreement upon a third person, acceptable both to the Constitutionalists and to the constituted government to assume the provisional presidency pending the calling of a new election. It is hopeless, however, to attempt to secure such coöperation until the United States recedes from, or at least modifies its present purely negative attitude toward the Huerta government.

Although it is desirable that mediation be raised to the dignity of a continental question by the united action of the leading American powers, there is no reason why such mediation should not have the support of the European governments. Such support would be in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. Joint action with the European powers becomes dangerous when it takes the form of joint armed intervention. Such intervention would involve the United States in endless controversies with European powers, and might ultimately lead to armed conflict. The joint intervention of the European powers in Mexico in 1861 demonstrates the worthlessness of any agreements as to the scope and limits of such intervention. On the other hand, we must not forget that the combined investment of European capital in Mexico is second in importance only to that of the United States. The most accurate calculation indicates that the sum total of foreign investments is as follows:

American	$1,057,775,000
English	321,302,800
French	143,446,000
Other foreign nations	118,535,380

The present situation has become intolerable, and it is evident that it must soon be brought to a close or armed intervention will become inevitable. As was recently said by the London *Spectator:*

> Mr. Wilson has become the sport of events. . . . . This terrible state of affairs is the result of the primary error of supposing that you can dictate to a proud and independent country, and at the same time respect its independence. The excellence of his motives remains unquestionable among the havoc of anarchy which they have created. . . . . A policy, however, must be judged by its effects, not by its motives. . . . . Wilson tried to dictate to Huerta while pretending that Mexico was a free and independent country.

The country owes a deep debt of gratitude to President Wilson for the determined stand that he has taken against armed intervention. The sacrifice of life and of treasure which such intervention would involve, and the heavy responsibilities which would be placed upon us for many years to come, make it a matter of vital importance to exhaust every possible means to avoid such a calamity.

The support which the people of the country will give to a policy of non-intervention makes it all the more important that we should adopt a positive, constructive policy. No matter how strongly the President may be opposed to armed intervention, the present anarchical conditions in Mexico must be brought to a close or conditions will arise which will make armed intervention inevitable. There is a logic of events far more irresistible and far more compelling than the logic of the human mind. Unless, therefore, our Mexican policy is adjusted to the re-establishment of order within the republic we will soon find responsibilities thrust upon us which we will be compelled, however reluctantly, to assume.

For my own part I firmly believe that we involve ourselves in hopeless difficulties when we embark upon an international policy which attempts to dictate who shall or who shall not be the governing authorities in a neighboring but independent country. Our attitude toward the republics of the American continent should be inspired by a desire to be of service to them, whenever possible, but we should studiously refrain from interference in their internal affairs, unless such interference is dictated by overwhelming considerations of national interest or international obligation. We may well recognize once and for all time that our government can do but little to accelerate the development of democracy in any foreign country, and that in attempting to do so we are likely to do quite as much harm as good.

The United States must permit the countries of the American continent to work out their political destinies in their own way, confident of the fact that as the masses of their population advance in education, in economic power and social efficiency, the democratic development in which we are so deeply interested will proceed, slowly it is true, but productive of permanent results. Any attempt on our part to force upon them either our standards of conduct or our methods of political action will only serve to arouse their bitter opposition, and thus thwart any higher purpose that we may have in view.

NOTE. This paper was read at a meeting of the Academy, April 4, 1914.

AMERICAN CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

By Robert J. Kerr,
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The period of civil strife through which our neighbor on the south is passing has presented for solution by the American government many important problems. The Monroe Doctrine is involved and through it a number of questions affecting citizens and subjects of European nations and our own relations with their respective governments have come up for decision. The sovereignty of Mexico is at stake. The justice, propriety and expediency of declarations by the United States as to matters lying purely within the scope of the internal politics of Mexico are both upheld and denied. Indeed our government has been charged with having openly favored one faction in Mexican politics as against another, with having assumed a partisan attitude and having maintained such a position in spite of the manifest dangers of complications which might seriously embarrass our government and affect the privileges and rights of its citizens.

In all the discussion that has ensued since the authorities at Washington decided not to recognize the government of General Victoriano Huerta, with all the consideration that has evidently been given by our statesmen to other phases of the problem, it is most strange that the rights of one class of American citizens have been persistently ignored by our government and have apparently not been considered by the American public.

The fifty thousand American citizens who, before the conflict began in 1910, were living in various parts of Mexico, have been vitally concerned in the crisis, not only because, by their nearness to the scene of disorder and war, they have been the first to suffer, but what is far more important because minunderstandings and doubts have arisen as to their rights as American citizens.

Almost at the outset of the first revolution early in the year 1911 the President of the United States issued a proclamation directing American citizens resident in Mexico to return to the United States, abandoning their homes, factories, banks, shops and other enter-

prises and leaving their interests subject to the caprices of the contending factions in Mexican politics or at the mercy of the hordes of bandits who almost immediately began to ply their old trade of highway robbery so long suppressed under the beneficent régime of Porfirio Diaz. This proclamation and the principles or rules derivable therefrom, defining the rights of American citizens in similar circumstances, received the apparent endorsement of the present administration at Washington, because an exactly similar proclamation was issued in the summer of 1913.

Aroused to consider the limits and restrictions, as well as the privileges of their status as American citizens resident in a foreign country, by the promulgation of these two proclamations, the members of the American colony throughout Mexico sought to obtain from their government a definite, clear-cut and comprehensive statement on which they could rely in their future relations as residents in a foreign country. Actuated by motives of the highest patriotism, with the desire of informing their government as to the real conditions in Mexico, many of the prominent members of the colony offered to give to the government the benefit of their years of acquaintance with Mexico and Mexicans. How were these offers received? In every case the first question asked of the American so proffering his testimony was as to whether or not he had material interests in Mexico. Naturally in every case the reply was, certainly, the witness had there his home, his business, his friends and his family. In every case the fact of such material interest was considered by government officials as an absolute disqualification of the witness and he was refused an opportunity to testify. Ordinarily the rules of evidence are less strictly applied by administrative than by judicial officers, but no court would be worthy of respect which would refuse to accept the testimony of a witness simply because he might be interested in the subject matter under consideration by the court.

Not only has the testimony of individual Americans been thus refused time and time again by officials of the United States government, but duly constituted committees representing large bodies of American citizens have been denied an audience by representatives of their government solely on the ground that they were interested materially in Mexico and therefore were absolutely disqualified to testify as to the things which they of all men might be expected best

to understand by reason of their very residence among the Mexican people.

The foregoing statements outline the attitude of the United States government toward its citizens in foreign countries as indicated by its acts during the past three years with reference to Americans in Mexico. Apparently the position of the government is founded on three propositions: First, Americans who go to a foreign country go primarily to further their own selfish concerns; second, being prejudiced by selfish interests the opinions of such Americans are warped and not entitled to respect or consideration; and third, if an American goes to a foreign country, he must be considered as having understood and assumed all the risks of residence in such country and must by the very fact of his expatriation be held to have waived all claim for consideration and protection as an American citizen.

These propositions present to Americans resident in foreign countries, to their friends at home who are interested in their safety and welfare, and to all American citizens at home and abroad who prize their citizenship and love their country, a most astounding situation. Are these propositions supported by the facts and should the conclusion reached by the American government be approved by the American people?

At the very outset of the discussion one fact should be clearly understood and fully appreciated. Whatever may have been the fact in years past, it is most emphatically true today that Americans in Mexico (and the same is true of every other civilized country where American citizens have gone in the legitimate pursuit of commerce, trade and business) are *not* ticket-of-leave men, fly-by-nights, criminals and scapegoats, but, on the contrary, they comprise among their numbers men in every profession, trade and line of industry, to claim fellow-citizenship with whom would confer an honor on the best citizens who remain within the geographical confines of their country. Nor are these men in their self-expatriation actuated solely by the desire to "get rich quick," to make their fortunes in a foreign land because conditions there may be more propitious than in their own country. Modern business is most complex. It is impossible to say at what point the beneficent influence upon the well-being of all the people, flowing from the activities of a great commercial enterprise ceases, even when that point is far beyond

the geographical limits of the country. The humble clerk who assists in the distribution of American goods at some remote corner of the earth is contributing his small share toward the payment of the wages of the men who manufactured the goods, who, in turn, by spending their wages in the markets of the mother country, extend to thousands of others not connected with the industry or enterprise which claims the services of the clerk, shipping agent or salesman in a foreign land, a participation in the benefits realized from the work of the far-away American living under a foreign flag. Even though the influence of the single individual may be small, in the aggregate the efforts of fifty thousand Americans engaged in legitimate pursuits in a foreign land may make all the difference between prosperity and depression in the mother country, so delicate is the structure of our modern commerce.

It is absurd to suppose that the men who are chosen by the executive heads of great business corporations to take charge of their foreign offices, that the lawyers, doctors and engineers who serve their American clients in foreign countries, that the men who in subordinate positions comprise part of the great army of Americans in foreign countries are any less worthy of credence than men of the same class and station who remain in their native land. In fact, where, as in the consideration of the Mexican problem, it becomes necessary to understand and interpret the motives and actions of a people of another race with different ideals and different habits of thought, such men as these Americans of all classes ought to be especially qualified to report on conditions in the country where they have lived and worked, many of them for a quarter of a century.

Unfortunately there are too many of the stay-at-home Americans who passively accept the third proposition announced by the American government as correct. It seems very easy for many to say that the Americans who go to a foreign country must take their chances and fight their own battles. If this attitude were the result of a serious consideration of the various elements entering into the problem, it would be alarming indeed as indicating a decadence of that spirit of loyalty and patriotism which achieved independence, preserved the union and now has welded the elements of American citizenship into a powerful force for the advancement of civilization, peace and prosperity throughout the world. It must, however, be assumed that the American living a protected

life in the midst of the highest civilization the world has ever known, guarded on all sides by the watchful agents of his government, has given no thought whatsoever to the problems of his fellow citizen living in the midst of foreigners and without those influences and agencies which surround the citizen in his home land. It must be not callousness but carelessness that is responsible for the failure of the voice of public opinion to make itself heard when an American citizen comes to grief in a foreign country. Surely the ties of blood, interest and nationality are as strong with us as they are with our British cousins and yet what a different sight is seen in England when a British subject is menaced or harmed! Press and public unite in demanding that the person or nation guilty of treating with disrespect any Englishman, however humble, be forthwith called to account by the officers of the British crown who are the representatives of British sovereignty at home and abroad. It is because of this intense feeling of nationality that the British people have been able to extend their influence into remote corners of the earth and that Englishmen have been found for more than a century living the typical life of English gentlemen in the deserts of Africa, the jungles of Ceylon and the mountains of Mexico.

No patriotic American could wish to see his country's flag capitalized for merely mercenary profits by reckless promoters. Any illegitimate attempt to secure or maintain an improper commercial or legal advantage by claiming American citizenship and the protection that might be afforded on that account by the American government would be justly condemned by every patriotic American, but if we are to acquire and preserve the right ideals of American citizenship, there must be inculcated into the minds of all Americans, and particularly those of the great stay-at-home class, the conviction that American citizenship must be made to be a vital and valuable right and that the man who is so fortunate as to be able to claim that citizenship may count on the moral, political and, in the last analysis, military support and protection of his fellow citizens and of his government.

This conception of the significance of citizenship is not by any means new. The supreme court of the United States, in the celebrated slaughter house cases, in a discussion of the rights involved in American citizenship, announced that it is one privilege of an American citizen to be protected in his person, life and property

while in a foreign country. In other words, the declaration that all men are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, applies not only to all men who stay within the geographical limits of their own country, but also to all men of that country wherever they may go.

As if foreseeing that this question might shortly come to be a vital issue, the Democratic party, the successful party at the last general election held in the United States, incorporated into its platform a principle substantially identical with the declaration of the supreme court cited above. Theoretically, the administration at Washington is committed to the maintenance and support of the idea that American citizenship is a sacred right to be guarded and respected at home and abroad. Practically, from the viewpoint of the thousands of American citizens who are now living away from the home land, that principle, that ideal has not only not been observed but has apparently been entirely abrogated. This viewpoint has been illustrated by a paraphrase written by an American in Mexico of Kipling's well-known poem, "The Vampire," which bears on a story published in one of the recent magazines portraying the experience of a family of three, father, mother and son, in Mexico during the recent disturbances:

Two fools there were and their son they taught—
(Even as you and I)
That for their honor their Country fought—
(But it wasn't the least what their country thought)
Though the fools, in trouble, their Consul sought
(Even as you and I).

But it's not the thought of what time has brought
That stings like a white hot brand—
It's coming to know that our Country don't care
(And what have we done that she should not care?)
And will not understand!

Without considering at all the tremendous loss of prestige throughout Latin America, which has been suffered by the United States during the past three years, the loss of prestige experienced by individual Americans as a result of the known attitude of our government toward them, has been incalculable. Perhaps, though, this crisis may have been necessary in order to bring to the fore this

very question, to rouse the American people and the American government to a proper realization of the seriousness of the subject.

Americans in Mexico have suffered long and patiently through the trying experiences of the past three years and in spite of repeated disappointments their spirits are still buoyed up by the conviction that sometime, somehow, the American public will come to understand their viewpoint and when once there is a general appreciation of the true situation, the ninety million inhabitants of the United States will be found to have just as keen sympathies, just as patriotic devotion as inspired our forefathers to meet other crises and solve other problems in the past; and they will demand that their government, which protects them in the enjoyment of life and liberty, shall also protect all of their fellow citizens everywhere and shall compel every nation throughout the world to extend to American citizens the fullest protections and guaranties and shall require the effective punishment of any individual or body of men who unjustly bring harm to an American citizen.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC[1]

By Rear-Admiral C. H. Stockton, U.S.N.,
Washington, D. C.

The topic of the afternoon is "The Policy of the United States in the Pacific." I think I am quite safe in saying from a governmental point of view that there is no policy of the United States in the Pacific at the present time so far as the general government is concerned. And how could it be so with a lack of continuity in the state department, even when it is carried on under the same party but with different participants, a break occurring in the continuity with a change of party, and an absolute lack of continuity in the diplomatic service in the high grades? Mr. Grahame spoke at this morning's session of subordinates who realize that the moment they attain sufficient distinction to be promoted they will be quickly removed. There is an approaching lack of continuity, I am afraid, in the consular service. Consequently, the phenomenon of the enunciation of what will be the policy of the United States in the Pacific is here entrusted to hands that have no official standing so far as creating that policy, but who will give you their own views as to what it should be. Certainly something constructive should be gained from such enunciations.

There are curious points in connection with the Pacific. The oldest state of California is only three score years and ten of age. The other states are newer still. Alaska with its rich material is simply approaching middle age. What is known as the slope of the Pacific, bordering on the Pacific Ocean, is practically the largest territory—in fact, the only home territory of any great power except that of Japan, and yet it has been isolated on account of its want of direct water communication with us and with Europe. I doubt whether in any Pacific port of the United States there is a line of steamers direct from Europe carrying passengers and freight. To an extent, the result has been that we have created a coastwise

[1] Remarks as presiding officer at the session of the Academy, Saturday afternoon, April 4, 1914.

traffic on the Pacific coast which embraces practically all of the American mercantile marine of any value that we have, the only exception probably being the antiquated American Line running from New York to Southampton. The coastwise traffic and ships, as understood in the United States, are vastly different from those of any other country in the world. Others consider it to mean a continuous coastal traffic without any intermediate stops in foreign territory.

In the United States we first created our intercoastal traffic by the use of the Isthmus of Panama. We enlarged it by the use of Cape Horn and it has been further enlarged by the use of the Hawaiian Islands, and still further by the Philippines, so that practically the Pacific Mail Steamship Company carries coastwise traffic from San Francisco to Manila with incidental stops in China and Japan. Consequently, the comprehensive term of coastwise traffic means all that we have.

THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC

By Ellery C. Stowell, Ph.D.,

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What I have to say about our policy in the Pacific is based entirely upon considerations of our material interests. I do not lose sight for one moment of the importance of the so-called higher motives. They, however, are often only the emanations of material interests; in any event they are so elusive as to escape accurate analysis and must be left to the treatment of speculative writers.

The choice of a wise policy is hardly more important than the faithful and continued adherence to it when once decided upon. In the competition of great powers today, prestige is a very important factor, and vacillation in a country's foreign policy is most disastrous to its prestige.

Before we can formulate the policy of the United States in the Pacific we must ask ourselves what are our material needs and interests. What are we after? Do we want an outlet for emigration? No. Do we want land? Emphatically no. We want to make money; that is, we want to develop our trade with the countries bordering on the Pacific. We want to share in the prestige and the pecuniary advantages to be derived from helping in the industrial development of China. We are looking for a remunerative field for the investment of our surplus capital and a market for our maufactures, besides opportunities for our technical experts. All these advantages, in addition to what we shall gain from a larger importation of Chinese commodities, are our aims in the Pacific.

Of all regions in the world, China offers the greatest possibilities in this field. China is the key of the whole political situation in the Pacific. She is one of the principal factors in shaping the world policies of the great powers; and their efforts to secure commercial advantages have caused the keenest rivalry among them. The simplest method for a power to benefit commercially from a country is to secure its political control and manipulate its governmental

machinery so as to constitute a virtual monopoly of its trade and industrial development. This is the method which China's neighbors, Japan and Russia, have pursued in acquiring control of Manchuria and Mongolia. France has established herself to the south in Indo-China. Germany holds Kiao-Chau and looks upon the province of Shantung as accessory to that port. Great Britain has Hong Kong and claims a primary interest in the valley of the Yangtze in the event of a breakup of the Chinese empire. The United States alone of the great powers of the earth has had no territorial ambitions in China, nor sought to acquire the political control of one foot of Chinese soil. Our traditions and our economic situation have opposed such an attempt. We are well situated for carrying on our commerce across the sea and enjoy a high degree of civilization and industrial development. We have no need, therefore, of privileges or preferential treatment to secure our share in the commercial advantages offered by China. Hence we are opposed to the policy of partition or establishment of spheres of influence. We demand a field free for all. This is the policy of the open door, the maintenance of which we consider so important that we are ready to support it, if necessary, by force.

Now since the principal purpose of any new acquisition of Chinese territory would be commercial advantage, this policy of the open door has acted as a barrier to any such attempt. For what country would make the sacrifices to secure the control of territory, the opening up of which might bring no greater benefit to herself than to the other powers?

The consequence of this attitude of the United States is to secure us the sympathy of China, for she realizes the fundamental importance of our policy of the open door in helping her to preserve her political integrity and autonomy. The resulting confidence and friendship between the two governments is an everpresent—almost a controlling factor—in the actual diplomacy of the Far East.

So much for the positive side of our policy in the Pacific. But what are our apprehensions? What dangers do we foresee? We fear the competition of the Asiatic coolie. Those regions exposed to Chinese and Japanese immigration are united in considering the policy of exclusion a vital necessity. For the American laborer cannot meet the unrestricted competition of the Chinese coolie. The policy of the United States government based on popular approval must and

will exclude Chinese and Japanese laborers, even should this policy lead to war. But just as a corollary of our policy of the open door was found to be our friendship with China, so our policy of exclusion unites us in sympathy with Canada and Australia, no less determined than we, to protect themselves from Asiatic immigration. Having here a permanent basis for the maintenance of a common policy, we should endeavor to eliminate, in a spirit of mutual compromise, all minor grounds of difference. Canada and Australia, loyal as they are to the mother country, would throw over their allegiance rather than open their gates to Chinese immigration.

In the long years of our diplomatic relations with China, this question of exclusion has caused no little irritation. But now that we are determined to adhere to this policy, distasteful as it is to China, she takes into account the friendly diplomatic support our government has afforded her, and accepts the matter as no longer open to discussion. All China now asks is the admission of her merchants and students, and from this only advantage can result. Years hence when the Chinese government becomes more dependent upon popular demands, her laboring classes may force a policy of active opposition to their exclusion from other lands.

But China is not the only country affected by our policy of exclusion. There is the Japanese empire, which, however, has not the compensations which China finds elsewhere in our support of her policy. Quite the contrary. Japan finds us in her path at every turn. She might not object so seriously to our advocacy of the open door, provided the application were not made to Manchuria, which she holds by cession of Russia's twenty-five year lease, expiring in 1923. The fear that the United States will encourage China to assert her sovereign rights at the expiration of this lease was sufficient to reconcile Japan with Russia and led to the formation of an agreement for combined opposition against any attempt of the United States to support China in an effort to regain sovereignty over territory which has escaped from her control. Again in the Philippines the island empire finds rich possessions which but for the protection of the United States might be exploited for the benefit of the Mikado's subjects. Her own great naval strength—paramount in Chinese waters—would have made it possible easily to occupy and defend those islands. Turning toward Mexico she encounters an American veto of concessions made her in that country. In Korea, even, the

success of American missionaries has irritated her. The missionaries assert that the recent sanguinary repression of political conspiracies is nothing but an attempt to crush out Christianity. As if this were not enough, the proudest nation in the world, victor in one of the greatest wars of modern times, finds her subjects excluded from our territory, while illiterate and poverty-stricken immigrants from all parts of Europe are welcomed. It is in vain that the statesmen of the two countries refer to the opening up of Japan as a result of the never-to-be-forgotten mission of Commodore Perry, or recall that the United States was the first country willing to give up consular jurisdiction over its citizens in the Mikado's empire. Japan sees and appreciates the real situation; she wants to remain friends with the United States but her national pride demands she be excluded not by discriminations of race, but only on general grounds applicable to all immigrants. Aside from the sentimental consideration of national pride, America presents great opportunities for intelligent Japanese to amass wealth, and so develop the financial strength and taxable resources of the empire. The situation between the two countries is further embittered by a difference as to the rights which the Japanese enjoy by treaty stipulation to hold land in this country.

We are then face to face with Japan; the atmosphere is charged with electricity. The flash may come at any moment; but it does not seem likely that any such terrible disaster will occur; and one of the principal reasons is the similarity of our situation with Canada and Australia. As we have seen they fear Asiatic immigration even more than we do. Their urgent representations have impressed British statesmen with the necessity of helping them to maintain their policy of exclusion. Consequently Great Britain, the ally of Japan, is ready to go to great lengths to prevent a conflict between her ally and this country over the question; the more so as the last few years have strengthened the cordial understanding between the two English-speaking nations—an understanding which is so important an influence for peace and civilization throughout the world.

Japan will not attack us. If she had intended to strike she would have done so before the completion of the Panama Canal. But may we not question our justification in so vigorously supporting China's very natural desire to regain Manchuria and Mongolia? Might not a friend to China point out the advantages of Japanese and Russian control of these sparsely settled and as yet undeveloped provinces?

Capital, protected by Japanese and Russian credit, will flow in, Chinese merchants will reap a rich harvest, Chinese coolies will swarm over the land and increase the Chinese population manyfold. When all this has been accomplished, China, if she has been able to maintain a firm government capable of solving the difficult problems that face her in the vast territories remaining, will find it possible to regain her lost provinces by peaceful cession or by martial conquest.

In Mexico we can of course tolerate no interference on the part of Japan. She will never be allowed to retain any privileged position nor to establish settlements sufficiently populous to exercise any political influence. But would we be justified in helping the weaker states of South America to repel Japanese immigration? If we hold aloof, these states will of themselves react against an Asiatic invasion, and we shall have supporters in our policy of exclusion. We shall have behind us the strength of the united public sentiment of the two Americas.

Returning to the Philippines: are we justified in protecting inferior races—some of them among the lowest in the scale of human development—from the competition of that magnificent industrial machine, the Asiatic coolie? The European cannot multiply in these tropical islands; why then should we bar them to our brother race, fitted to supplant the Filipino as we have supplanted the red man? The answer is this: we must do it in the interest of the balance of power. China is likely some day to become the greatest power in existence, and the inevitable law of political development will draw all other powers together to check her supremacy. It would then be too late to pluck from her grasp these precious islands. As regards Japan, however, the situation is not quite the same. Japan, with poor soil, more limited population, and ruinous taxation, is never likely to become a menace to other nations. Our exclusion of the Japanese rests upon the exigencies of the present situation. There is also the possibility of Japan's making common cause with China at some future period.

We realize that this exclusion policy in the Philippines can be maintained only by a powerful navy. Unless it should secure the support of other European countries, it would have to be abandoned whenever the United States passed through a period of political embarrassment. An effective neutralization of the Philippines would obviate this danger. At present, however, such a solution does not seem feasible.

Great emphasis should be laid on the fundamental importance of a consistent adhesion to the policy of the open door. Our vigorous support of China in this direction should be balanced by the firm maintenance of our exclusion policy, vital not only to ourselves but also to our kindred communities, Canada and Australia. A powerful navy should protect our possessions in the Philippines, but we should cultivate the friendship of Japan and show our good will by refusing to embroil ourselves in the Manchurian question. We should refrain from interfering with her immigration to South America. After all, the world policy of the United States is based upon friendship with Great Britain and a determination to keep open a fair field for our commercial enterprise within the territories of South America, Asia and parts of Africa. On this continent it is called the Monroe Doctrine; in China, the open door; but the result is the same: to protect the weak; to lend them our support when in danger; and to help them to maintain their political integrity. Other considerations, it is true, enter into the Monroe Doctrine; but this purpose is a fundamental part of the doctrine comparable in its results with the policy of the open door.

Everywhere then we find the policy of the United States one of friendship—support of others, asking only a fair field for all. We are not bound by entangling alliances which Washington's farewell message bade us avoid, but our diplomatic coöperation with Great Britain and China is based on a deeper and safer foundation—permanent common interests and mutual confidence.

In conclusion—We have found the two cardinal principles of American policy in the Pacific to be: (1) The open door in China; (2) exclusion of Asiatic immigrants. A corollary of the principle of the open door is our friendship with China, while the danger of coolie immigration unites us in bonds of sympathy with other countries of European blood and traditions whose possessions border on the Pacific. Our Philippine policy is determined by our actual relations with Japan and by subconscious, almost instinctive, apprehensions that the most populous political entity of the world may become a danger to the independence of other states, should her teeming millions acquire and settle new regions of such strategic and economic importance as the islands ceded us by Spain.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST: AN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROGRAM

By Rear-Admiral Richard Wainwright, U.S.N.,
Washington, D. C.

If the history of the past is to be the prophet of the future, any discussion of the policy of the United States in the Pacific would be purely academic, as heretofore there has been no continuity of action in any direction and only occasional or spasmodic efforts to show what policy was favored by our country. But the growth of our manufactures has been so rapid that the demand for outside markets is becoming increasingly imperative. When the minds of the great business executives are turned toward the policies of the United States, as far as they affect foreign trade, we will begin to adopt a foreign policy. It will be late in the day, but it may be hoped not too late to obtain a reasonable share in the commerce of the world.

In the struggle for the trade of those countries south of us, there would seem to be no great need of intricate diplomacy. Fair play to all, respect for the strong like Chili, and encouragement and aid for the weaker states as Nicaragua, and quiet but firm insistence on the Monroe Doctrine, including the Lodge extension, would be all that would be required of direct diplomacy. We have been frequently unfortunate in our treatment of these countries, especially the strongest, Chili. Time and again she has been unnecessarily offended by our improper actions. Nearly all South American and Central American countries believe us to be individually honest, but diplomatically unsound. First Mr. Root and now Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bacon have helped to smooth our way. A continuous policy with trained diplomats to push it and we would soon be recognized as the best friend of all Americans.

In the Far East the situation is more difficult. Here we have generally been considered the best friend of both Japan and China, but have lost the advantage of the situation by occasional diplomatic blunders. The oriental is more difficult to comprehend than our southern neighbors and is more impressed by forms and ceremonies; this with exterritorial jurisdiction in some eastern countries, makes

the necessity for trained diplomats the more urgent. Besides the policy of a square deal, which to some extent includes the "open door," we have the Asiatic exclusion policy to complicate our diplomatic efforts. This latter difficulty may be lessened if not overcome as we gradually turn against harboring the scum of Europe, and such exclusion acts can be drawn as not to hurt the *amour propre* of the Asiatic races.

Even with trained diplomats and a continuous policy we cannot expect a fair share of the Pacific trade without American ships and American banks. The establishment of banks is necessary to furnish reasonable accommodations to our merchants; and as long as we depend on foreign ships to carry our goods we must expect foreign manufactures to take first place.

The completion of the Panama Canal will not only stimulate trade in the Pacific and add to our natural advantages for the distribution of our goods, but it will also put us in a stronger military position and therefore will make us better able to reënforce our diplomatic efforts. Poor diplomacy may prevent the success of strongly supported policies, but the best diplomacy is futile unless duly supported by naval and military power. All history supports this statement, although there is a tendency to ignore the teachings of history both ancient and modern and to put trust in unregenerated human nature.

Our occasional policy in the Far East is a fair illustration of the use of military power.

Commodore Perry's diplomacy, when Japan was opened to the countries of the world, was backed by a strong show of force for those days. In later days, although in the opening of Korea Commodore Shufeldt was aided by the Japanese, it was known that our fleet was behind him, and they had had a taste of our fleet under Admiral John Rodgers at Chemulpho some years before. Even as late as our declaration of the open door there was considerable power behind the policy. We had shortly before acquired the Philippines and we had large military and naval forces in Asiatic waters.

To strengthen our policies and to defend our coasts we have three strong home bases on the Pacific: Panama, San Francisco and Bremerton. We are forming a strong base in the Hawaiian Islands, and it is to be hoped that Guam will soon be strongly fortified. Now in holding the Philippines we are an Asiatic power and our position in all eastern affairs is much stronger for this, provided we hold them

strongly. But because of their distance from our coast, the Philippines as now held are a source of weakness in case of trouble with Japan. The proximity of that country to the Philippines, with her great military strength, would enable her to throw a large force into the islands before our fleet could arrive. It is extremely unlikely that we will ever maintain a sufficient force of our own army in the islands to ensure their security until the arrival of the fleet. A territorial army seems to me to be the solution of the problem. We have the example of the British in India, and by a continuous flow of short-time men through the territorial army, with a liberal supply of our own officers and non-commissional officers, a powerful force for defense could be soon created. This territorial army would be a valuable part of our educational system in the Philippines and nothing could be better adapted to fit the native races for self-government than a short term of military training. Our Porto Rican regiment and the Philippine scouts form excellent examples. The expense of such an army would not be great as the young men under training would not have reached the self-supporting age and it would only be a question of bookkeeping whether they were supported in idleness by their families or under arms by the government. With the Philippines strongly held our voice for good would be potent in the East.

We need the friendship of all our southern neighbors as an aid to the defense of our country for we need the support of the strong and the acquiescence of the weak in the Monroe Doctrine; but we need all the factors mentioned, American shipping, American banks, a continuous policy urged by trained diplomats backed by adequate force, if we are to obtain our just and necessary share of the trade of the Pacific. Even now our manufactories can seldom run full time, our home markets are glutted and we must reach out for a share of the world's trade if we would have contented workmen and prosperous merchants.

THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

By T. Iyenaga, Ph.D.,

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Before proceeding I beg your leave to say that I stand here not as a representative of any authority, government or association, but simply as a student of international politics and a private citizen of Japan, and consequently, for what I speak I am solely responsible.

In the discussion of such a big and comprehensive subject as that before us, it is well, I believe, to confine myself to one phase of it, namely, "The Policy of the United States in the Pacific," as it is revealed in its dealings with two of the most important factors in the Pacific problem, Japan and China. In trying to elucidate my point, however, I have, to confess at the outset that I find it difficult to get a clear, intelligent understanding of the American policy in the Pacific and am sometimes at a loss to know whether there is any definite policy at all. For the glorious record of diplomacy America has achieved in Tokio and Peking during many decades past has lately been much obscured, if not totally eclipsed, by another story that tells of America's dealings on its own soil with the Asiatic neighbors.

Take the case of America with Japan. In the history of international relations no record is so unique as that of the intercourse between Japan and the United States during the first five decades of its existence—so romantic in its inception, so pervaded throughout by mutual good-will, and so fruitful of untold benefits to mankind at large. Strikingly dramatic is the scene that introduces the first chapter of that intercourse. To the nation still enjoying a torpor of centuries and only equipped with bows and arrows, swords and spears, Commodore Perry suddenly makes his advent with the stately fleet of eight ships, armed with 230 cannons. And, contrary to the world's expectation, the adroit soldier-diplomat succeeds in forcing open the door of the nation that had for ages been hermetically closed against aliens, without a shot being fired, a man wounded, or a junk sunk. For his was truly a peaceful mission. Behind that outward display of force, under that glittering uniform of the Commo-

dore, there was hidden the spirit of American friendship toward Japan which he had been commissioned to disclose. That Japan soon discovered it and remembers it with gratitude is evinced by the monument which now stands on the very spot of Perry's first landing, and which, backed by the everlasting green hills of the Mikado's land, overlooks the blue waters of the Pacific that binds in common embrace the two nations on its opposite shores.

The genuine Americanism found its finest expression in Perry's successor, Townsend Harris. With that simplicity, honesty and frankness worthy of a true American, and with consummate tact and infinite patience, Harris overcame the innumerable obstacles, ignorance, suspicion and prejudice, put in his way, and finally signalized his triumph by becoming the confidant and adviser to the Shogun's government. The American policy of justice, fair dealing, and friendliness, thus inaugurated, was consistently pursued by all the succeeding administrations, and put into practice by able envoys who represented the President of the United States at the court of the Mikado—Pruyn and Bingham, Buck and O'Brien, Griscom and Anderson.

The refunding of the Shimonoseki indemnity, the willing heart proffered for the revision of old treaties, the good office rendered to bring about the peaceful settlement of the Russo-Japanese war, the commercial treaty negotiated under the Taft administration that facilitated the successful conclusion of new treaties with other powers—these are a few instances, the prominent posts on the road of Japanese-American intercourse, that will recall to us hundreds of other instances: herein we witnessed the realization of what General Grant said "Whatever America's influence may be, I am proud to think that it has always been exerted in behalf of justice and kindness."

On the part of Japan, I am also proud to think that she has given a ready and most appreciative response to this generous policy of America, and that it has received its merited reward. Indeed, the sentiment of gratitude toward America has pervaded the whole nation. To be an American was, therefore, the surest badge which commanded respect and love of the Japanese people. Mr. Seitz, managing editor of the *New York World*, well says: "There is something painful about the childlike faith and grateful good-will manifested toward the American visitor by the people of Japan, in perpetual acknowledgment of their debt to the United States."

No record of international relation, let me repeat, is, then, more beautiful and ennobling than that which has blessed the American-Japanese intercourse for the past half a century—justice, moderation, magnanimity on one side, and gratitude and appreciation on the other.

No less inspiring is the story that tells of the American-Chinese relation. From the time of Burlingame to the time when President Wilson took the first step among powers to recognize the Republic of China, American diplomacy in China has singularly been free from selfish motives, and has uniformly sought to be guided by the noblest principles of international intercourse. No wonder, then, that China has at all times regarded the United States as her best friend and trusted adviser. Especially should China be grateful for the masterly diplomacy of John Hay, which, together with the efforts of other friendly powers, was instrumental in saving her from disruption.

Turn from this bright page of diplomatic history to another page wherein is written the story of America's treatment on its own soil of the Chinese. We are at once bewildered by the striking contrast presented on the two pages. While America in common with European powers, prompted by their own humanitarian ideas, has forced thousands of missionaries upon the unwilling Chinese, and proclaimed therein the doctrine of the open door, she has on her own part closed tight her doors against the Chinese. More than this, the Chinese on this shore have been made the objects of derision. They have sometimes been mobbed, outraged, murdered. And these wrongs have seen no due redress. I am not taking upon myself the self-imposed task of an advocate of China. Nor am I picking a quarrel with the American Congress for enacting the Chinese exclusion bill. For my part, I believe there is a just ground for the enactment of such a law; the American nation has every right to protect itself by any means it deems fit from the danger of being overcrowded by undesirable immigrants, whose home government is too weak to control in its hand the matter that affects an international relation. What I am chiefly after is to know what is the American policy in the Pacific. Is there one American policy in the Pacific for this side of the water, and another for the other?

Far more glaring becomes the inconsistency of the policy when it is studied in the light of the recent happenings in Japanese-American relations. That the United States will not place Japan in the same category of nations with China is, I presume, a premise I can safely

take for granted. For, although geography assigns Japan among Asiatic nations, she occupies by culture and civilization a totally different plane from that attained by her Asiatic neighbors. Since Perry introduced her into the family of nations, Japan has by dint of energy reconstructed her whole scheme of life, political and social, and is now evolving a unique civilization of her own, whose standard is not different from that of the west. Moreover, Japan has clearly demonstrated her ability to stand upon her own feet and defend her rights and privileges. Japan has a strong government capable of enforcing its will upon her own people, and of fulfilling any pledge made to foreign governments. She has, for instance, kept the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" with utmost faith, in fact, so rigidly that at the present day no student without means can ever hope to come to this country for education. In short, Japan has every right, I confidently believe, to receive the same treatment accorded to great powers. I would have considered the foregoing remarks as vain and out of place, had not the California episode given me a rude shock and forced upon me the necessity of stating in succinct terms Japan's position, in order to strengthen the point I am soon to make.

There is, however, no need of entering here into the details of the California-Japanese question, still less into its pros and cons. After all, California is only one of 48 states forming the Union. What most vitally concerns our subject is this: Is the American policy in the Pacific such an unsettled, weak policy, as to be over-ruled and dictated by the whim of one state? It is, of course, presumptuous for a foreigner like myself to attempt to give any answer to such a question. He will, however, be permitted to say how difficult it is for him to understand the action of the California legislature in enacting, in face of the strongest protests of the Washington government, the anti-alien land law, which is clearly and distinctly discriminatory against the Japanese, nay, in fact, solely aimed against them, and, hence, unjust, unfair, and at direct variance with the policy America has pursued toward Japan for the past half century. The only explanation that suggests itself to me is that the American people have not yet uttered their voice in unmistakable terms on their policy in the Pacific, loud and distinct enough to command respect and obedience to it by every state in the Union. As a consequence, the strangest of anomalies such as we have witnessed last spring is presented. In that episode it is sad to remember how the good and mighty President of the United States sent protest after protest to

the California legislature, asking it to desist from passing the Webb bill; how the secretary of state flew across the continent to plead at the door of the California assembly for delay in action while efforts were being made to meet its wishes by diplomatic means. These protests and pleadings, however, proved of no avail. California enacted the land law, then went her own way, busying herself with the Panama Exposition and the like. In the meantime the President and the secretary of state took patiently, to use a mild term, upon their own shoulders the burden of devising the ways and means of mending the international issue raised by California's action in which they took no hand whatever, nay, against which they had so strongly protested. I have perfect confidence that the issue will see an ultimate amicable settlement based upon broad and just principles and in harmony with the best interests of both nations, although how and when it will be accomplished is beyond the knowledge of the speaker who is outside the sacred pale of diplomacy.

What we, your neighbors, are most concerned about is to see the definite formulation of the American policy in the Pacific, which would of necessity put to rest such trouble as that in California. Is it to be based upon the same principles of justice, fair dealings, and friendliness that have guided the American policy during the past toward its Asiatic neighbors, and to be put into practice on both sides of the ocean? Will it be an imperial or pacific policy? Will the magnificent navy of the United States which could easily be made the first and finest of all navies in the world, if America so wishes, by the enormous resources she has at her command—will this navy be used for the maintenance of order and peace in the Pacific, or will it be employed to overawe other nations and to perpetuate the wrongs perchance perpetrated by America? Will the splendid position America occupies in the Pacific with Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines as stepping stones over the waters—will these spots stand as sentinels of light and security for the commerce of the world to prosper, or as mere strategic grounds for the American navy to maneuver? Now and then an idle talk of giving up the Philippines is heard among some Americans. We, your neighbors, never wish that such a thing will come to pass. For one, I heartily agree with ex-President Taft in thinking that a grave responsibility has been laid upon the American people that should cause them ever to retain the islands and govern them for the benefit of all—the Filipinos, Americans and the world at large. The Philippines again constitute

an important factor in the Pacific problem. Statesmen have not been lacking who foresaw its importance. Mr. William H. Seward pointed out, fifty years ago on the floor of the American Senate, that "the Pacific ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter." Ex-President Roosevelt declared not many years ago that "the Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all and to bring the whole human race at last into one comity of nations, is just at the dawn." Have the American people as a whole risen to the height of prophetic vision that inspired those statesmen? Have the people at large come to the full realization of the great significance of the Pacific drama? And in the unfolding of this interesting act, I am happy to say, Japan is always ready to join hands with America in heartiest coöperation.

The vast reaches of the Pacific rebuke the narrow suggestions of covetousness and jealousy. The ocean is broad enough to accommodate without jostling all the navies and merchant fleets of the world, now in existence or hereafter to come. Those who have never seen the Pacific's vast expanse or visited its distant shores, are the only people who fall victim to such claptrap, which Professor Coolidge happily calls "mastery of the Pacific" or "dominion of the seas." Peace and amity can reign among great nations interested in the Pacific for thousands of years to come.

To conclude, then, as I began, by referring to the American Japanese relations. That the old relation between America and Japan, of a tutor and a pupil, would continue, is not to be expected. Japan has already attained her maturity. She will look up to America as a friend or an ally; the United States will treat Japan as an equal. If they are competitors in the Chinese market, each will prove to the other a manly and healthy rival. This passing of old relationship, however, never means that with it the former cordial friendship should also go overboard. God forbid. The reasons that urge their closer bond are stronger and louder than ever. The common ideals of civilization which both America and Japan are solicitous to impart to Asia at large, the common policy in China—the maintenance of its integrity and of the principle of the open door—the common interest in the Pacific to develop its vast hidden resources, and the ever increasing importance of trade between the two countries—these are strong arguments for the ever closer American-Japanese friendship, which no sophistry could elude, no local issue overwhelm.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

By Jiuji G. Kasai,

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When the sea-captains of Salem and Boston brought home silks, teas and spices from the Orient; and when the American mariners sailed the seas of Japan in search of whales, it became necessary for the United States to open the secluded empire of Japan which had been kept in isolation for three hundred years. The subsequent rise of American commerce in the Far East at once attracted the attention of the American statesmen. In 1832 when Edmund Roberts was appointed by President Jackson as an "agent for the purpose of examining in the Indian Ocean the means of extending the commerce of the United States by commercial arrangements with the powers whose dominions border on those seas," he was instructed to obtain "information respecting Japan, the means of opening a communication with it," and to seek to establish official relations with the island empire. In 1833 he concluded the treaties of amity and commerce with Siam and Muscat, but the prospect was so unfavorable that he did not attempt to visit Japan. When he left Washington in 1835, on his second visit to the Orient to exchange the ratifications of the treaties he had concluded with Siam and Muscat, he carried with him a message of President Jackson to the Emperor of Japan, and a considerable collection of presents. But Roberts died in Macao in 1836, and his squadron returned to the United States without reaching Japan.

From that time on, several attempts were made by the United States to open Japan until finally President Millard Fillmore sent Commodore M. C. Perry with his message to the Emperor of Japan, with the object of negotiating a treaty to secure "friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and the protection of our shipwrecked people." When, on July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry's "black squadron" appeared in the Bay of Yedo, the people of the whole empire were panic-stricken, and the government of the Tokugawa Shogun was paralyzed with fear. Seeing the gravity of the

situation the Shogun's government refused to treat with the American envoy, and Perry left Uraga on condition that he would return the following spring for a reply. In the meantime the statesmen of Japan were seriously discussing the need of the opening of the country, realizing that Japan could no longer keep herself isolated from the incoming "barbarians." With a reënforced fleet of three steam frigates, four sloops of war and two store ships, all cleared for action, Commodore Perry reappeared in the Bay of Yedo in February, 1854, with his strong determination "to demand as a right, not to solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another—due to the dignity of the American flag."

After careful deliberations, the Shogun's government appointed Hayashi-Daigakunokami and three other commissioners to treat with Perry. Thus, on March 31, 1854, the first treaty Japan had ever negotiated with a foreign nation in the nineteenth century was formally signed at Kanagawa by the representatives of the United States and Japan. The coming of Commodore Perry, therefore, marked a new epoch in the history of modern Japan. By his firm demands and persistent efforts, American diplomacy won the first triumph in the dealings with the island empire.

In the treaty of Kanagawa, it was provided that the two ports of Shimoda and Hakodate be opened to the visit of American citizens, where they would enjoy more freedom than did the Dutch at Nagasaki. To improve this treaty, in 1857 Townsend Harris came to Shimoda as the first American consul-general, and on July 17 he concluded with the government of the Shogun a treaty regulating the commercial relations with Japan. In the following year the treaty of Yedo was signed on July 29, by which the United States secured the rights of trade and residence for her citizens, low import duties and the privilege of extra territoriality to her citizens in Japan. By his honest diplomacy and wise counsel Harris won the confidence of the Japanese nation, and he left the deepest impression of America's goodwill in the hearts of the Japanese people.

Such is the brief account of America's introduction of Japan into the comity of nations. From that time on, the United States has befriended Japan against the perils of foreign aggression, and Japan, in turn, has revered America as her teacher and true friend. When the island empire fought against the mighty Russian colossus upon

the arena of Manchuria, the American people gave moral support to Japan, by their constant sympathy. But unfortunately when the titanic struggle was over, and we had hardly fulfilled the hopes and expectations of the liberty-loving American people, there came the cries of jingoes and demagogues: "Beware of Japan's warlike ambition to master the Pacific at the expense of the United States." The rise of Japan was looked upon with jealousy and suspicion in some quarters, and the friendly feeling of the American people seemed to have suddenly changed into a hostile attitude toward Japan.

At this juncture, the "school question" of San Francisco was fomented through the connivance of Mayor Schmitz of San Francisco, and O. L. Tvietmoe, one of the notorious leaders of the MacNamara dynamite conspiracy. Less than one hundred innocent Japanese school children scattered in the public schools of San Francisco were made the targets of the merciless anti-Japanese labor union men, and the bogey of the "Japanese invasion" was created to threaten the minds of the American people. Tvietmoe thereupon organized the Japanese-Korean Exclusion League, and sent walking delegates to Portland, Seattle, Bellingham and even to Vancouver, B. C., to create an anti-Japanese movement; and they have used, since then, every means to stir up hatred against the Japanese in the United States. President Roosevelt used strong words to deter the anti-Japanese agitators in California, but all in vain. Thus, the "school question" was employed by these agitators as a means of open insult to the Japanese. Thereupon, the Japanese government sent Baron Ishii, the present ambassador to France, then the head of the bureau of commerce in the department of foreign affairs, to the Hawaiian Islands, and the Pacific coast states to investigate the condition of the Japanese. In the course of his investigation Baron Ishii witnessed how his countrymen were treated with injustice and humiliation in a certain part of the United States. While the question was still pending, on December 4, 1906, President Roosevelt in his message to Congress paid high praise to Japanese civilization and culture and recommended to Congress that "an act be passed specially providing for the naturalization of Japanese who come here intending to become American citizens." Later, immigration regulations were made by which the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands, Canada and Mexico were prohibited from entering the United States. Finally, Japan was forced to enter into a "gentleman's agreement"

by which she should henceforth prohibit her laborers from coming to the United States.

The popular feeling in Japan ran high to see such injustice and discriminations against the Japanese in the United States, and the weak and submissive policy of the Japanese government invited severe criticism of the people. When an interpellation was made in the Japanese parliament as regards the government's American policy, the late Count Komura, then minister of foreign affairs spoke on February 2, 1909, as follows:

> As regards the question of measures unfavorable to the Japanese which are pending in the California legislature, the imperial government, relying upon the sense of justice of the American people as well as the friendly disposition of the federal government, confidently hopes that such questions will not lead to any international complications.

Several cabinets have come into existence and ministers have been changed since this pronouncement of Count Komura, yet the Japanese government has been uniformly consistent in her traditional policy toward the United States. The Japanese people on the other hand have hoped to receive justice from the United States which for the last sixty years has been their friend, and which has sent them missionaries to preach justice and equality; but they have been bitterly disappointed.

While the Japanese-American relations were not improved to an appreciable degree, the Panama-Pacific exposition bill passed Congress, and San Francisco was chosen as the site of the fair. Seeing that the success or failure of the exposition depended largely upon Japan's willingness or unwillingness to participate, the directors of the exposition sent special commissioners to persuade the Japanese government to take an active part in the fair. They assured the authorities in Tokio that although California, through some undesirable elements, had repeatedly humiliated the Japanese, they would see that thereafter no such discriminations should be made against the Japanese. Thereupon, the Japanese government voted one million dollars to participate in the exposition and to build a lasting monument to present to the city of San Francisco after the fair, and sent commissioners to choose the site for the buildings. But no sooner had the friendly voice of those American commissioners of the exposition given proof of genuine friendship of the American

people, than the anti-Japanese measure was again introduced in the legislature at Sacramento. Although President Wilson sent his peace-loving secretary of state to Sacramento to prevent the passage of any legislation hostile to the Japanese which would mean an affront to a friendly nation, Governor Johnson with his defiant attitude turned a deaf ear to the supplication of the chief executive of this great nation. The Webb bill was passed and the Japanese were prohibited from owning land in California. Mr. Bryan returned to Washington without being able to accomplish the purpose of his mission. With the agreement of the anti-Japanese leaders in California Mr. Bryan recommended the appointment of Mr. Caminetti, the most anti-Japanese member of the California senate, as commissioner-general of immigration, and he, since his appointment, has made wholesale accusations against the Japanese and has made most stringent immigration regulations particularly against the Japanese.

Already a year has gone by since the passage of the alien land act which is aimed at the Japanese, but no satisfactory solution has been reached by the two governments. Japan has been very frank and sincere in dealing with the California question. What she wants is honor and justice; and to receive, in the words of Commodore Perry when he opened Japan, "those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another." Beyond this she has claimed nothing. Yet there are many writers in this country who have maliciously asserted that Japan has shown the mailed fist to bluff the American government. I ask these people to read the history of the anti-Japanese agitation for the last ten years with their own eyes and without prejudice. The following statement of Prof. J. H. Latané of Johns Hopkins University, in his convocation address at the University of Chicago, August 29, 1913, apropos of this question, represents this class, and would hardly bear honest analysis: "Japan is merely taking advantage of our present embarassment to extort from us certain concessions. In this she displays greater shrewdness than wisdom. It would be a serious mistake, therefore, for the United States to yield to the Japanese pressure." To such a charge no reply is necessary.

There is another serious misapprehension in the minds of the American people, that is the supposed danger of coolie labor undermining the wage system of this country. As a matter of fact no

"coolies" have ever immigrated into the United States from Japan. The Japanese government has always issued passports to her subjects who have come to the United States, and the standard of qualification of the applicant was so high that no one without some education and means could procure a passport. The Japanese immigration cannot be classed with the Chinese coolie laborer. It can be safely stated that the Japanese immigrants are far superior not only to other Asiatics but also to the immigrants from many European countries. Moreover since Japan has entered into the "gentleman's agreement" the regulation has been so stringent that it is almost impossible for even a student to procure a passport to come to the United States for study. When we think of the American-Japanese relations and consider that many Japanese students who have studied in the United States have always been the best ambassadors that America could send to Japan, it is lamentable for the comity of the two nations that these youths of high ambition are prevented from coming. Thus the number of the Japanese in the United States decreased tremendously since the "gentleman's agreement." According to the report of the commissioner-general of immigration of the United States, the total number of the Japanese of all classes entering the Hawaiian Islands and the continental United States for the five years ending June 30, 1913, was 23,496, while those returned to Japan during the same period numbered 46,209, thus showing an actual decrease of 22,709 in these five years. Does this look as though the "Japanese invasion" were imminent?

It is alleged also that the Japanese laborers in California crowd out the white men from the farm with cheap labor. But, according to the report of Mr. John D. Mackenzie, the commissioner of labor of the state of California, the average daily wage paid to the Japanese laborers in agriculture is $1.49 with board, and $1.54 without, while that of white help is $1.38 with board, and $1.80 without. The average daily wage of the Japanese laborers employed by the Japanese farmers is $1.75 with board. Mr. Mackenzie went still further in saying that the skill and efficiency of the Japanese laborers are without equal, and California needs Japanese labor. It has been alleged that the Japanese would own all the fertile land in California. But, out of their patience and toil the Japanese farmers in California have bought only 26,707 acres out of 17,750,000 acres of arable land in that state, —less than one-seventh of one per cent.

Such has been the attitude of the United States toward the Japanese in America. While she has been erecting barriers against the Japanese upon her own soil, and is trying to extend the time-honored Monroe Doctrine to the Far East, she is using her aggressive policy in eastern Asia, to cope with Japanese expansion and development in that part of the world. Japan on the other hand feels that she has an inalienable right in the Far East to preserve her superior position, and to take any course of action required for her self-preservation and defense. But she has no intentions of extending her political sphere upon the western hemisphere. Although Japan has no political intentions in Mexico, the Lodge resolution was passed in the Senate early in 1912, when a certain jingo created the "Magdalena Bay" affair, in order that he might make a fortune by selling a barren land of lichens at a high price. In regard to Mexico, Japan has been extremely cautious not to injure the feelings of the United States. The Japanese government has never tried to have an iota of political control over any bays or harbors in Mexico or in any other part of this continent.[1]

In regard to Japan's Manchurian policy, she has strictly adhered to the principles of the "open door" and equal opportunity. She has never used any discriminating policy against foreign merchants, as has been so frequently alleged, by charging higher tariffs or railway rates than she has charged her own nationals. By her proximity to the market, cheaper transportation, better banking facilities, and superior knowledge of the needs and taste of her customers, Japan has been able to compete successfully with foreign merchants in Manchuria. Moreover, it is patent that international trade is exchange—the exchange of the products of one country with those of another. So with the trade between Manchuria and Japan. Japan, being the only importer of the soya bean, the chief agricultural product of Manchuria, in return exports cotton manufactures from her factories. In discussing the trade relations with Manchuria, Dr. Toyokichi Iyenaga, former professorial lecturer of the University of Chicago, says:

> It is in the trade of cotton goods alone that Japan has played the rôle of a successful competitor of America. Japan has developed the trade in Man-

[1] Just recently, although she was asked to take charge of the Mexican embassy at Washington by General Huerta, she declined because of her friendly attitude toward the United States.

churia from nothing in 1900 to 151,400 pieces of sheeting, 52,000 pieces of drill and 1800 pieces of shirting in 1908, while the American trade of 1,140,620 pieces of sheeting and 442,291 pieces of drill in 1904 has dropped to 515,195 pieces of sheeting, and 194,570 pieces of drill, in 1908. . . .

Further it must be added with emphasis that, if the American cotton industry has suffered to some extent in Manchuria by the Japanese competition, the American cotton growers have by no means been losers. The raw cotton imported in 1910 from the United States to supply Japanese cotton mills was valued at 17,193,128 yen. The American cotton import of 1911 reached a phenomenal value of 60,000,000 yen! We can see no reason why the cause of manufacturers alone should find its defenders, while that of the farmers is left unnoticed.

It is unfortunate to recall the proposal of Secretary Knox to Japan to neutralize the South Manchurian Railway. It was condemned at that time alike by American public opinion and by the Japanese people. This suggested policy, according to Dr. David Starr Jordan, chancellor of Leland Stanford Junior University, was "personal only—was never acted upon, never approved by the American people and no official action was ever based upon it." Next appeared a scheme of American capitalists to build the Chinchow-Aigun Railway as a rival to the South Manchurian Railway. It was followed by the proposal of the four power loan of $50,000,000, the interest to be guaranteed by all the unhypothecated resources of Manchuria and with the provision that China should come to the four powers for future loans, thus dethroning Japan from her primacy in Manchuria. To Japan, Manchuria is hallowed ground. Upon this plain, twice she fought for the sake of her national existence. Two billion yens of her treasure were spent, and the precious blood of one hundred and thirty thousand of her noblest sons was shed for the honor of their beloved Nippon. After the glorious victories at Nanshan, Port Arthur, Lioyang and Mukden, at such an enormous cost of blood and treasure, what has Japan received as the trophies of war? Only 750 miles of railways in South Manchuria, and the lease of the Kwantang province of 1,303 square miles! What answer could Secretary Knox logically expect from Japan? How could Japan be expected to give up the precious prize at the suggestion of a nation which has no vital interests in Manchuria and no comprehension of the deep problems there involved, and has never sacrificed a penny of her treasure or a drop of her blood?

In discussing the policy of Secretary Knox, Mr. Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*, says:

> Our attitude in respect to Manchuria was very much the same as though Japan went to our border state Mexico and said: "See here, Mexico, the United States has a good deal of money invested in your territory. It is a menace to your integrity. We suggest that you let us raise a loan, so that you can pay the United States what you owe her and then tell her to get out. You can come to us only for *all* future loans." If such a proposition were made by Japan to Mexico nearly every editor in the United States would be shrieking for war. But the Japanese are very self-controlled people. They say very little. They feel, however, that they have the same right in eastern Asia that we claim in this hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine, that is an inalienable right to take any proper course requisite for self-preservation.

Thus, this "great blunder" of Knox's diplomacy has served to bring Russia and Japan together for the mutual protection of their property and interests in Manchuria. Japan defended only her true rights when she refused this proposal. She has justly acquired those rights by the treaty of Portsmouth, and by the treaty of Peking of December 22, 1905. She will never relinquish those interests and rights, but will protect them with all her might. But these have nothing to do with the "open door" policy; Japan has always adhered to the principle of equal opportunity, and she will ever maintain that principle.

While the attitude of Japan toward the United States has been very frank, yet from my personal observations, I am inclined to believe that the policy of the United States toward Japan has undergone a complete change since the time of the Russo-Japanese war. Prof. Sidney L. Gulick of Doshisha University, Kioto, who has lived in Japan more than thirty years, in his recent work, *American-Japanese Problems*, says:

> The present Oriental policy of the United States as a whole is, in important respects, humiliating to the Oriental and disgraceful to us. Professing friendship in words, we deny it in important deeds. Demanding an open door for Americans in Asia and equality of opportunity for our citizens with that accorded to citizens of the "most favored nation," we do not ourselves grant these same things to Asiatics in our land.

In summarizing, then, Japan's attitude toward the United States has always been one of extreme friendliness. She has always respected America with that sense of reverence which is characteristic of that island empire. There is no fear on the part of the United States of the so-called "Japan's aggressive policy." It is to the United States that Japan has been turning to bring about a better

solution, and her people have been asking for justice and honor. Japan has struggled for the last sixty years to win the right to stand abreast of the most enlightened nations of the world, and she has by her own exertions won "the right to treatment on a basis of full and frank equality." Will America, that has proudly watched the growth of the island empire during the last half century, now turn to be a *provocateur* to wound eternally the heart of the nation heretofore filled with deepest gratitude? Justice is the basis of international amity and peace. May America ever be true to her praiseworthy traditions of freedom and justice. May the scholars and statesmen of the United States study the Japanese questions dispassionately, free from bigotry and prejudice, and realize that justice is the plea of the Japanese in America and of the nation across the sea. On the high plane of justice and mutual respect alone can our traditional friendship be strengthened in the future as it has so happily prospered in the past.

A CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE POLICY FOR AMERICA

By J. Pease Norton,

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Never in all the ages recorded by the historians of the past have the nations of the earth paused upon the threshold of an era so full of promise. Wonderful inventions together with signal advances in social organization are making a new world. One cloud alone looms black and portentous—the war cloud which in the twinkling of an eye may break into the storm which will impoverish whole nations and defeat the progress of a thrifty generation. Only by clearly discerning the dangers can such conditions be handled adequately, even by our wisest statesmen.

The United States is no longer an isolated country. To the west, we have flung our battle-lines to meet the expansion of the Orient in the Philippines. At Behring Strait, our sentries watch the frontiers of the Czar. On the south at Panama, we clutch by the throat the passageways for the navies of two oceans. Our armies of occupation are now holding by force of arms our outlying possessions. Like the Romans of old, we send forth our governors to rule over the millions of our alien subjects. In this imperial development concerning which discussion apparently no longer can exist because the flag once flying is not easily withdrawn, a greater and a greater care must be exercised lest our defenses are unequal to the probabilities of future danger.

The United States is no longer an isolated nation. Our country has become the storm center of the world. The present silence is suggestive,—almost expectant like the calm before the storm, to be followed by sudden rattling peals we know not when.

Statesmanship consists in the resolution of conflicting racial forces by constructive peace policies in advance of violent disturbances. War is the conflict of unstable racial forces, often caused by the economic pressure of population upon subsistence, always in search of a more stable equilibrium. The fundamental facts of racial geography should influence our determination of a constructive peace policy for America. Take in your left hand a small globe of the world

and place the thumb of your right hand upon Peking, the index finger at Behring Strait, the second finger upon St. Louis and the little finger at New Orleans. Note carefully the relative distances between points in the interior of China and points in the interior of America, first, by the way of the Behring Strait and, then, by way of the Pacific Ocean through San Francisco and Asiatic ports. In the language of relative distances, fundamental geographical and racial principles are often stated. Considering the geographical situation of the United States, does not reason declare that it is more important for us to command the land than the sea? A French engineer, M. Loncq de Lobel, at the International Congress of Arts and Sciences in 1904, suggested that it is possible to tunnel the Behring Strait. Within a few weeks, Congress has appropriated $35,000,000 for the construction of one thousand miles of railway in Alaska. The Russian government has considered favorably the project suggested by Lobel, to extend the Siberian Railway toward the Behring Strait.

Let us add to the great wonder of the world now created at Panama, a second wonder, more wonderful and more far-reaching. Just as we have linked together the oceans, let us link together the continents of the world. Let it be said in history that one and the same nation, which at Panama put asunder two continents that nature had joined together, still not content with one colossal task straightway at Behring Strait joined together two continents which nature had left asunder. The question whether it is possible for our engineers to construct such tunnels should be left for them to decide. When one contemplates the tunnel work of the Simplon, the work of constructing the tubes underlying Manhattan and the North and East Rivers, including the great bores of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the work does not seem either impossible or impractical from the standpoint of capital expense.

That the land is more important than the sea seems evident when we consider geographically the route by which our nation may invade the East, if ever it shall be necessary for the purposes of defense. The very possibility of war is a calamity, more grievous than mind can tell. Yet national policies should provide for all possibilities. If in an unfortunate tide of events we must carry the war into Asia, let us carry it by land and not by sea.

But, far more than this advantage in times of war, such a policy should be the guarantee of lasting peace. Through these tunnels,

great inter-continental railroads would thread their way. The building of the Alaskan Railway has already been provided for by the present Congress. By this railroad and possible future tunnels, five continents will be joined. For the traveler of the twentieth century, there will be "no more sea." Such continental railways will become the arteries of commerce. In times of peace, the railways will be trade routes of the world. In times of war, the railways will prove of value in ways which are apparent. By them, vast bodies of troops could be quickly assembled, their strength properly massed and the current of adequate supplies constantly maintained. Often as in the career of men, so in the lives of nations, crises are turned by wise policies which are adopted long before the real difficulties are reached.

What, then, should constitute a constructive peace policy for America? At this juncture, he who would think ahead, after contemplating the facts—geographical, racial, economic, sociological and national—irresistibly driven by the logic of the situation is forced to say: why not make for a long world peace by a new triple alliance, the United States, Russia and China—three great nations representing three civilizations, diverse races, yet common in three essentials: all are land powers; all meet at Behring Strait figuratively speaking; all are interested in internal development rather than in geographical expansion. Why not make treaties mutually defending the integrity of the domains of each? By such an alliance, war might be prevented for many years and the swift march of progress might carry our civilization many leagues onward in the great uplift which otherwise may be impeded, if not prevented, by those internecine combats which have drawn the life-blood from all the departed nations of the past, whether temporarily the victors or the vanquished, it mattered not. We may not estimate the value of a peace, guaranteed principal and interest, to China, to Russia and to the world. A wonderful development is in store for China. Russia has the great future filled with opportunity. The United States has a dream to work into a reality, a civilization which will stretch from Behring Strait to Panama. The Panama Canal was the inception. The Alaskan Railway and the Behring tunnels should be the greater conception and the new triple alliance should bring with it lasting peace.

Let us reason carefully without regard to precedent, and strictly in accord with the interest of the great future which holds in store

such splendid opportunities for intensive development by all nations and by all races. We occupy the heart of North America. We own Alaska, Panama and some of the islands of the sea. To the south, there lives an unhappy people, now greatly troubled by a distressing civil war. To the north, there is a kindred people. Their needs are our needs. War has come to the people of the South, because the government of the past thirty years failed to bring to the common people the great blessings of free public education, protection to life and property, local self-government and a system of small freehold properties in place of the great landed estates. A protectorate by the United States over Mexico and Central America conceived in the spirit of the higher patriotism with patient watchfulness for the purpose of insuring to each province the benefits of an equitable system of taxation, an honest administration, free elections, free public education and proper protection to life and property, would make for a lasting peace in North America. Without such a protectorate, every flighty despot wafted into Mexico City by some hot-headed impulse of an uneducated and distracted people becomes a ready tool for the political schemesters of foreign nations, to be manipulated for the purpose of securing concessions and colonies. In the past, we have written the Monroe Doctrine in figures of iron. If these principles which are fundamental to a constructive peace for North America cannot be seen clearly as yet by all nations, let us trace these principles in letters of fire: North America for North Americans and withal peace, order, education, protection to life and property, lasting prosperity.

Let us go further and help to establish the peace of the world, by means of a new triple alliance to include Russia, China and the United States, seven hundred millions of people, an alliance for the mutual defense of the integrity of the domains of each nation. Let us control the new tunnels under the auspices of the triple alliance. Let us say to all the world: We ask only peace and fair commerce. Our good will goes out to all. Our destiny is in North America and in the islands of the North American continent. There our rule shall be sufficient to insure security to all. We do not want the Philippines. They are too far removed from the land of our destiny. We await an honorable release. Shall we not give them over into their own hands, a republic under the protection of the triple alliance? Having established through such an alliance a lasting peace which

no nation would care to controvert, the severe economic pressure now felt by Japan could be relieved by a more intensive application of the recent advances in the arts, again through a reduction in the excessive appropriations for a navy and, finally, by emigration to friendly countries.

Let us open our doors to the immigration from all nations, restricted fundamentally in accordance with the statistical principles of the eugenic melting-pot, namely, that in any one year the number of immigrants shall not be greater than 2 per cent of our population and that the number from any nationality shall not be greater than that fraction of 2 per cent which the population of the given nationality now in our country bears to the entire population of the United States.

At home, let us look sharply to the objects for which go the enormous appropriations for the army and the navy. Let us hold that the sum we give for national defense is not too great, but rather that what we get in return is much too little. As we follow the careers of successive sessions of Congress, all bent upon vast appropriations and following constantly in the track of their predecessors, dimly at times there are those of us who have wondered whether tradition does not play too great a rôle at Washington. Let us interpret rightly the truth expressed in these words:

> Were half the power that fills the world with terror,
> Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts,
> Given to redeem the human mind from error,
> There were no need of arsenals or forts.

To obtain more utility from what we spend should be our purpose. We reform by substitution more easily than by prohibition. The following quotation clearly describes the wastes which have long been with us:

"Change the scene," said Charles Sumner one day at Harvard College, "and cast your eyes upon another object. There now swings idly at her moorings in this harbor a ship of the line, the *Ohio*, carrying ninety guns, finished as late as 1836 at an expense of $548,000, repaired only two years afterwards for $233,000, with an armament which has cost $54,000, making an aggregate of $835,000 as the actual outlay at this moment for that single ship, more than $100,000 beyond all the available wealth of the richest and most ancient seat of learning in the land."

How small these figures look in comparison with the figures of today. Today as then a battleship at $14,000,000 costs more than the foundation of Yale University. Possibly $15,000,000,000 has been expended upon the United States navy during the last twenty years. For the world, the costs of standing armies are no less astounding than depressing. In 1906 the amount expended by twenty nations reached $17,000,000,000. New inventions are making battleships obsolete for a continental power. An air-ship capable of dropping explosives can be built for $2,000. One battleship at $14,000,000 cost as much as seven thousand air-ships. What convoy of battleships threatening New York or San Francisco could withstand the hail of dynamite from these hostile hornets of the air, ten to twenty thousand in number, flying by day just above the clouds and by night just beneath the stars?

We should adopt a no-battleship program and appropriate ten millions, at least, annually for aero-nautical defense. One-half of this should be used as subsidy to increase the number of the owners of hydroplanes along our seacoast, to be classed as the aero-nautical reserve.

Finally, let us link up our army expenditures with education and vocational training. The army reserve should consist of two million men. Such a number we should build up in twenty years by establishing the standing army at four hundred thousand, consisting of young men who may wish to attend high schools giving vocational training, universities, scientific schools or industrial colleges. At least two self-sustaining trades should be taught each man in addition to his regular training. The man should have the privilege of choosing his trades from a broad list. The arts of war, rifle practice, marching and drilling, can readily be taught to small companies of selected boys who are living for the first two years at their own homes, assuming the term of enlistment to be four years. Cross country work can be accomplished in vacations. The expenditures for the army by this plan become simultaneously a subsidy to education. Exceptional boys in all the schools of the country, above fifteen years in age, would then have adequate opportunity of securing a vocational or higher education under a fair system of civil service examinations, and the country would have an army reserve of one million men at the end of ten years, two million at the end of twenty years, every man of them with two self-sustaining trades.

In summary, then, a rough outline of a constructive peace policy for America has been sketched, involving several radical departures. Among these, the plan of the peace enthusiasts for an Anglo-American alliance is not essential. The requirements of this analysis, outlining the essentials of a constructive peace policy for America are, first, a new triple alliance to include Russia, China and the United States; second, the construction of the Behring tunnels and the completion of our part of the inter-continental railway in Alaska, already commenced; third, a no-battleship program and a curtailment in naval expenditures; fourth, development of aero-nautical defense and the organization of an aero-nautical reserve; fifth, the development of the army reserve through the use of the army funds as a means of educating young men, especially in vocational training and in the arts of war; sixth, establishing once for all a statistical maximum limit for the annual immigration into the United States.

In this way, we shall perhaps most economically achieve the goal of a lasting peace, develop commerce, increase the opportunity of our people, mutually benefit with other nations and firmly construct the bulwarks of that impregnable security which is necessary to insure the intensive development of that magnificent area of the earth's surface which stretches from Behring Strait to the canal at Panama.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES[1]

By T. P. Gore,

United States Senator from Oklahoma.

I know of no subject more fitting for discussion than that of "A Constructive American Foreign Policy," no forum more fitting than the city of Philadelphia; for in this city the world witnessed the greatest exhibition of constructive statesmanship within the tides of time. In this city the dead past buried its dead; in this city a new age was brought forth from the womb of time; in this city a new republic was established and ripened, dedicated to human freedom and human equality. This republic has shown it is as equally adapted to the government of forty-eight sovereign states as it was to the government of thirteen feeble and infant commonwealths. Every exigency has been met by the constructive genius of our statesmen and of our people. Perhaps we have been at times too much absorbed in our domestic policies to devote as much time and attention to our foreign policies or to our foreign relations as their supreme importance would justify.

There are two schools of opinion touching the time as to when the United States really became a world power. One school of opinion believes that we entered the arena of world-wide politics when our fathers declared here in Philadelphia that all men were created equal and that all men were endowed with inalienable rights. Others believe that our birth occurred with the declaration of war against Spain. There are many of us who believe that the United States has been a world power since 1776, that its influence has been international, that its example has been a guide to the lovers of liberty in every clime in every succeeding time. There are those who believe that when the liberty bell rang out to the inhabitants of this land it meant liberty to all in every quarter of the globe. There are those of us who believe that our example since the declaration was promulgated within this city's walls has been the mightiest influence amongst the sons of man, fashioning the destinies of

[1] Remarks as presiding officer of the session of the Academy, Saturday evening, April 4, 1914.

nations. The influence of the United States, the service of the United States, have been of a double character. We have had a negative influence, if I may say so, and a positive influence. We had to assist in ridding the world of ancient Rome. We had to assist other nations in sweeping away the dead and wrinkled skin of antiquity. We had to assist in striking away the shackles from the nations as we assisted in striking away the shackles of the individual. Our example in those countries which are governed by despotism has been an inspiration to lovers of freedom—more than an inspiration—a substantial guide and a substantial leader. When the United States took its place in the sisterhood of nations, monopoly prevailed upon the seas. It was an age of prohibition, of restriction, of search and seizure, of indefeasible allegiance. We have helped to rid the world of those shackles. Search and seizure are now little more than a reminiscence. Indefeasible allegiance has passed with the other barbaric quackeries or is fast passing. The inherent right of expatriation is coming to be a universally acknowledged right amongst the children of men. We have established or helped to establish the principle of neutrality, which has done so much to civilize the methods of modern warfare.

It cannot be denied that with the declaration of war against Spain and with the conclusion of peace there came a train of new problems, a train of new and of strange duties, perchance, and undoubtedly a train of new responsibilities. There is no one who would undertake to crush the American eagle back into its shell, but for my own part I believe that we should neutralize the inheritances which we received in consequence of the war, and that the leading powers of the earth should guarantee their neutrality and their integrity and their independence. This would reassure us against the dangers of war in another hemisphere. I still believe in the far-sighted wisdom and provision of Washington when he declared that we should have no permanent alliances, but should rely on temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. If indeed there be a balance of power in Europe or a balance of power in Europe and Asia, we know that balance is in unstable equilibrium, and we can best serve ourselves and our destiny and our mission in a situation to cast the weight of our influence in whichever pan of the scale may promise most for the advancement of Christian civilization. I still believe that with a foresight almost superhuman Jefferson was right when

he pronounced our international policy to be that of peace, commerce, and friendship with all nations and entangling alliances with none. It cannot be doubted that with the spread of prosperity and the probability of peace we ought to encircle the world with our commerce. I am anxious, and I confess an ambition to see the United States the industrial, the commercial, and the financial leader of the world. I want to see the United States achieve that position by deserving that position. She must conquer commerce. She must conquer foreign commerce, not with the guns but with goods. Extended foreign markets give added stability to our industries, to our prosperity, to prices generally; and stability is one of the greatest desideratums in the industrial and financial worlds.

The observing of treaties is a virtue which the United States has inculcated among other nations, and this it has practiced with fidelity by its sacrificing observance of its treaty obligations. There may always be debate as to the wisdom of entering into a treaty. There can never be debate as to the virtue of observing any given treaty.

Good faith is to a nation what honor is to a man and what chastity is to a woman. It is that virtue without which all other virtues are vain. Fidelity—good faith—is essential to the success of a nation and of its rulers. It is essential to the success of a city boss, perhaps the worst of modern rulers, at least in the United States, and my words are to have no local application in this instance. The proverbial city boss may have every vice in the category of vices, he may want every virtue in the calendar of virtues, save only one. He must keep his word. And if you will make inquiries, as I have done, you will find the philosophy accounting for the success of the city boss in every city is this fact. His devout followers, and even those who follow him with an accusing conscience, offer this apology. He will do what he says he will do. And that virtue cannot be denied. It will cover a multitude of vices. I hope that the United States in the future as in the past will be a splendid example of a nation of the earth that adheres with scrupulous and unquestioning fidelity to its treaty obligations.

We have done the same in establishing the principle of neutrality, and in conducting international affairs according to the recognized and established rules of international law. We have taken the initiative in promoting the progress of arbitration. In order to

eliminate war we must eliminate the causes of war. We must minimize the differences between nations or municipalities for the pacific adjustment of these differences. Arbitration promises to compass the differences, to preserve peace, and to obviate war amongst the Christianized nations of the earth. We have been amongst the foremost in the establishment and in the practice of this principle, and I trust that we will persevere in the future in the promotion of the principle and the practice of arbitrating international disputes. This I say is the best means of obviating war, and I rejoice that the sentiment of modern civilization is growing constantly more steadfast in favor of peace and against war. It leads me to hope that the time will come when duelling between nations will be considered as odious and as harmful as duelling between individuals. I hope the time will come when it will be deemed to be no different for one hundred thousand men to murder one hundred thousand people than for one Cain to murder one Abel. The Christianized nations of the earth expend two billion dollars a year in preparation for war. Two billion dollars a year! The United States, champion of peace, expends four hundred and fifty million dollars a year on wars past, present, and to come. Enough to build four hundred and fifty thousand homes costing a thousand dollars apiece. Enough to build homes sufficient to house more than one-half of the population of this splendid metropolis. Four hundred and fifty millions a year on the bloody annals of war and only twenty-five millions a year on the arts of peace—on agriculture. Now I know and you know that the Golden Age has not come, perchance is not coming, when the dove of peace may plaint her notes in the throat of the cannon with unmolested and unthreatened security, and yet philanthropists may dream and poets may sing of the coming of the time when the plowshare will be dominant over the sword. I have a dream of my own, and I wish that each and every auditor here tonight might survive until the realization of my dream. I wish that the time might come when the Christianized nations of the earth would remit at least one billion dollars from their annual charges for war and for bloodshed—one billion dollars of burden from the bended backs of their citizens—and allow it to remain in the hands of those who earned that splendid, that colossal sum; when the civilized nations would limit their war expenditures to not more than five hundred million dollars a year and devote that for the time to the

maintenance of their present military establishments, and would levy about half a billion a year for an international peace guarantee fund and invest that half billion in the bonds of the different nations, at least one-half of it in the bonds of the different nations and the other half in the stocks and bonds of the leading industrial concerns of the various countries, and then create an international force for the adjudication of international quarrels, so that when a verdict is given in favor of an injured nation, indemnity would be paid like an international fine. How much of war would that abolish and how much of peace and its infinite blessings would it bring in its train. Now that is my dream. Not a practical proposition for the present time, but in the process of the suns a solution of that kind or of some other kind must be found to obviate war and the rumors of war and establish in its stead the universal blessing of peace.

One other point. Our foreign policy cannot be better, cannot be wiser than our foreign representatives, than our ambassadors, our ministers and our consuls, who are our national representatives in foreign lands. They ought to be men who can ably and adequately protect and promote the vast and varied interests of this splendid industrial and commercial republic. We ought to insist upon the very highest standard of fitness and of efficiency, for no matter how wise in theory our foreign policy may be, until the agents for its enforcement are raised to these standards our policy will still be subject to criticism. It will not be a success. It will be characterized by a greater or less degree of failure.

THE ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By W. Morgan Shuster,
Washington, D. C.

The subject of this discussion is one on which I have very definite convictions. It by no means raises an academic question. Our relations with the other nations of the world are of vital and material interest to every inhabitant of this country. We have sailed out of the comparatively calm seas of our foreign relations of twenty years ago. Serious problems confront us on many sides.

Since I feel earnestly upon this subject I shall speak earnestly, and if to anyone present I shall appear to touch upon matters of party politics, I crave their indulgence, because I do not intend to speak in a partisan spirit.

The foreign policy of a nation having a representative form of government should be the accurate expression of the collective conscience of the people. Autocratic governments are in a different situation.

In the United States the vast development of a free press, the large number of public-spirited societies, the system of open debate in Congress, all afford unusual opportunities to either the government official or the private citizen to gauge public sentiment on any important question. It is the privilege and the duty of every citizen to take part in the formation of a sound popular sentiment in any matter involving the honor, the prestige and the welfare of his country.

But there are some obstacles to the practical working out of this idea. Even with a representative government like ours it is impossible for the citizens at large to express in a formal manner their views and wishes concerning any emergency which may arise, however momentous. The polls cannot be invoked even in the gravest situation. Thus it may occur—and this is a serious defect in the actual practice of theoretically popular government—that a President or Congress, in entire good faith, may in a sudden international crisis pursue a course diametrically opposed to the conscience and judgment of a vast majority of the citizens. Fortunately such instances are not likely to occur.

But even if the citizens at large were able to vote on some specific policy in our dealings with another nation or nations, would they be able to do so, at short notice, with calmness, impartiality and knowledge of the real factors involved? I think not. The greatest drawback today to the attainment of civilization's principal goal, universal peace and justice, is the imperfect development of the individual conscience on broad international questions. As individuals we are still bitten by a hundred vanities which to us obscure the merits of any such question. Race-pride, aimless indulgence in patriotic fervor, the inherent lurking dislike for foreigners which has persisted to this day, the spirit which fans each member of a large mob to a fanatical state which, alone, no one of them could possibly attain, the belief that national conscience should not necessarily be as sensitive as individual conscience—something of all these things holds back each nation in the world in its natural *rapprochement* with the other.

It should, therefore, be the aim of statesmen to educate their countrymen along the broad lines of modern diplomacy. By modern diplomacy I mean the school which is slowly but surely displacing the adherents to the former system of deceit, subterfuge, evasion and trickery, which made the title "diplomat" a by-word with the masses.

In the United States the problem of creating and establishing a constructive foreign policy is especially difficult. Let us consider what elements such a policy should contain, and then discuss the possibility of attaining them. Some experience with the law has taught me to hesitate at framing definitions. But it seems clear to me that no foreign policy of ours, or of any other nation, could be termed "constructive" unless it should be based on certain obvious and fundamental principles.

A constructive foreign policy must have permanency and continuity. It must be a guide to our citizens in dealing with other nations, and to the other nations in their dealings with our government and our citizens. Therefore, in the United States, a foreign policy must be non-partisan; it must not be framed in a spirit of domestic politics, nor ever be made the instrument of party strategy. This is vital, since it is clear that, with the changes every four years in our executive branch, and the possibility of even more frequent changes in the legislative branch, there can be no continuity if our foreign relations are to be made the subject of party advantage.

To accomplish this result it is necessary that we should teach a

new definition of patriotism. The present conception of that word is too much bound up with the historical achievements of mere military success. Respect and encouragement should be given to love of country, but the wonderful emotional appeal which is made to the sense of nationality should be enlisted on the side of humanity and justice. Real patriotism demands that national honor shall be placed above national welfare.

If any conflict should arise between national duty and national welfare, we should first fulfill our obligations as a nation, and then adjust, as fairly as may be, our internal questions and the losses growing out of them. For example, I would rather see my government pay $100,000,000 a year subsidy to our coastwise trade than to be even suspected of violating or evading a treaty stipulation.

It must be remembered that a nation which lowers its prestige in the eyes of the world places a stain not only on each of its living citizens at the time the offense occurs, but also upon millions of unborn citizens whose future government will be dealt with in the light of past actions.

So far, I have mentioned elements of a purely general character which should help form a foreign policy for the United States, but there is a long list of specific points which cannot be safely ignored.

The foreign policy of the United States up to the present time, so far as there has been any at all, has consisted of sporadic asseverations of the Monroe Doctrine. Washington appealed to his countrymen to avoid entangling alliances. In so far as making treaties of offense or defense is concerned, that advice has been kept. But other circumstances may impose upon a nation risks and responsibilities quite as great as such documents of alliance.

We have entanglements in the Orient, in the Pacific, in the Caribbean, and, if we would be consistent, as far south as Cape Horn. We have somewhat lightly assumed a quasi-protectorate against the great military powers of the world in behalf of some twenty nominal republics, many of which are in reality monarchies or oligarchies with only the barest forms of democracy. It is useless to attempt to soften this fact. If the Monroe Doctrine means anything to the world today it means that the United States must, on proper demand, stand sponsor for the acts, debts or any other obligations incurred by any one of the present or future nominally sovereign governments in South and Central America. This is a thoroughly

entangling alliance, except that the other parties are in no way entangled by it. If any "subject" of the Monroe Doctrine acquiesces in the stand or action taken by the United States in its behalf, all is well and good; if it does not, it is in the same situation as if the doctrine did not exist and the United States sought to meddle in its affairs.

I believe that a constructive American foreign policy demands that we should deal with every sovereign nation in the world, large or small, on terms of absolute equality. The justice of a nation's claim to sovereignty should not be tested by the number of ships or men which it can muster, nor should our attitude, as one of the present-day world powers, be in the faintest degree altered by either the strength or the weakness of the nation with which we are dealing. Any taint of opportunism in our external relations could not fail to lower our prestige as a nation and diminish our power for good in the world's affairs.

We should regard it as a paramount national duty to observe strictly the spirit of all our treaty obligations, with large countries or with small. If a question arises as to the exact meaning of such an instrument, we should, if unable to adjust the question by diplomatic exchanges, agree to arbitrate the point and to abide loyally by the decision. We should exact similar treatment by other nations in their dealings with us. Some years ago we grossly violated a long-standing treaty with a friendly but minor Latin-American nation. We did so by force and fraud. We have been asked by that nation to make amends or, if their form cannot be agreed upon, to arbitrate the question. We have done neither thing so far, but there are certain negotiations in progress. No really constructive foreign policy can countenance the commission of an injury to the feelings or the welfare of a friendly nation without the fullest reparation being offered and made by the offending party. A nation which is not big enough to make amends for a wrong done to another nation is no more civilized than is the man who injures another by accident, but refuses to apologize.

We should continue to do everything possible to encourage the formation and employment of arbitral tribunals and procedure, not only by proposing or acceding to such a system in cases of questions involving ourselves, but by sending representatives to form a part of such tribunals whenever so requested.

In order that the national government of the United States may

act with proper authority in its dealings with other nations, there should be a constitutional amendment effecting the complete submergence of the theory of state's rights and sovereignty in so far as they might come into conflict with the treaty-making power of the federal government. Until this shall be done, we will continue to be in the ridiculous and anomalous position of having to explain to foreign nations that we cannot maintain our treaty obligations to them because of the action or attitude of some state government. The absurdity of this situation becomes more apparent when we reflect on the fact that if any state of the Union should be attacked by a foreign power, it would become the absolute duty of the national government to protect the state—in other words, an attack on any state would be an attack on the United States, but the international obligations assumed by the United States are not necessarily binding upon each state.

Last, but not least, it should be a vital part of our constructive foreign program to create and maintain a highly trained, non-political, non-partisan diplomatic and consular service. The arguments and the prejudice in certain quarters against this plan spring from a narrow ignorance which it is a disgrace to our national intelligence to allow to influence us. Today, more than ever, each nation, in its manifold and complicated relations with the others, springing from political, financial and commercial rivalries of constantly increasing importance, has need of highly competent representatives abroad, not only as channels of communication, but as advisers to the home government. No nation of the slightest importance in world affairs is as backward and as short-sighted as is the United States in this respect. We at times seem to be proud of our shortcomings in this matter. The American people need for their foreign representatives not only men of good manners, and of some knowledge of the world beyond that acquired in the pursuit of their local career, however brilliant, but men who have made a study of international law, of history, of the political alliances of the world, of the natural and inevitable tendencies and trends of the principal nations, and of the laws and customs governing international finance and trade. No man, be he inherently ever so shrewd, can, without this special training, have the poise and self-control necessary to acquit himself with credit when pitted against the trained minds of the statesmen who direct the foreign offices of the important nations of the world.

The consular service is not less important. Every commercial nation but the United States recognizes this fact. It would be passing strange if our commercial affairs were so different from those of any other country that we could afford to entrust them to inexperienced hands.

Our foreign policy should naturally take special heed of our peculiar position in the western hemisphere. We are dominant among the Latin-American nations purely because of our size, our wealth, and our armed forces. We are not dominant because we are regarded as particularly just or generous in our dealings with them; nor because of any similarity of fundamental social institutions. We are apt to think that the Latin Americans are more Americans, as we ourselves understand that term, than Latins. I believe that the contrary is the case. It is a mistake to suppose that because in the superficial forms of their governments many Latin-American countries are like the United States, their people are similar in their social, political, commercial or ethical viewpoints. The great majority of them have a distinctly Latin education; their mental process follows more closely that of Europe; they are by blood, tradition, financial relations, trade routes, and in some cases in actual distance, nearer to Europe than to us. Any sane American foreign policy should adjust itself to these facts, and not start out on a false hypothesis.

President Wilson, in a speech at Mobile on October 27, 1913, addressing the diplomatic representatives from Costa Rica, Bolivia, Panama, Peru, Brazil and Argentina, made a declaration which, for its boldness of expression and high statesmanship, deserves to become one of the axioms not only of American foreign policy, but of that of every truly civilized nation in the world.

He said: "I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will not again seek to secure one additional foot of territory by conquest."

The authority of a President to speak for, or bind, the American nation in such an affair may well be questioned, for Congress may declare a war of conquest at any time and direct the President to wage it, but his enunciation of this view as a principle of American statesmanship is beyond all cavil.

The history of our annexation of some of the territory now constituting the United States proper has been questioned in strict

ethics, but our actions were at least on a plane with the international standards of those times, in addition to the fact that the land was really needed for the proper development of the American nation. But commencing with the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and passing to the conquest of Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, and the forcible separation of the state of Panama from the friendly republic of Colombia, we find that our motives and standards, however unselfish and noble they may appear in our own eyes, are still subject to the gravest question in the minds of the peoples of the rest of the civilized world. Whether realizing it or not, we were giving to the world, and especially to Latin-American nations, a horrible example of that same "land-hunger" which we claim for over ninety years to have prevented Europe from gratifying at their expense.

President Wilson's words anent the securing of additional territory by conquest were, therefore, peculiarly timely and appropriate, and they should be proclaimed on every possible occasion and with all obtainable authority in our diplomatic exchanges with Latin-American countries.

The President, in this same speech, however, went further, and in so doing he gave a remarkable example of the state of "mental guardianship" which those who subscribe to the bundle of declarations now known as the Monroe Doctrine are apt to feel toward all other western nations.

He said: "States that are obliged to grant concessions are in the condition that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs. Such a condition of affairs is apt to become intolerable. *And it is emancipation from this inevitable subordination which we deem it our duty to assist in.*"

Now this is sheer idealism and dreaming. In enunciating a principle of this nature the President went beyond the confines of statecraft, and sailed away over the seas of fancy.

Under no previous construction of the Monroe Doctrine have we attempted to say what concessions should or should not be granted by any Latin-American nation. The Lodge resolution adopted by the United States Senate in the summer of 1912 as a result of the Magdalena Bay incident was aimed only at the acquisition of certain concessions by foreign governments. Nowhere, so far as I am aware, has there been any attempt by even the most ardent Monroe

doctrinaire to assert that the United States possesses the veto power over all concessions sought to be granted by nations in the western hemisphere. Furthermore, most of the nations of Latin America have always been, and are today, unable to obtain foreign capital except by means of concessions. They do not, as a rule, grant them by choice, but through necessity. To say to such nations that they should not grant concessions, but rather "invite investments" of foreign capital, is a mere question of language, and is analogous to telling a man who is starving to death that he should not pawn or sell his watch.

Lastly, even were it possible by mere persuasion to induce Latin-American nations to cease granting concessions to foreigners, the question arises: under any other system how would the necessary capital for their development be obtained? European bankers would probably refuse to furnish it without some adequate security, and practical experience has absolutely demonstrated that American capital will not go there even on the favorable terms which provoked this utterance by President Wilson.

I cite this case as a fair instance of what, in my opinion, a constructive American foreign policy ought to avoid. It is one of the many unauthorized attempts at political guardianship over smaller western nations which arouses against the American people a very keen resentment. We must be sure of our neighbor's willingness to have us meddle in his private affairs before we venture to do so, by word or deed, even though our intentions be of the best and most unselfish.

On the other hand, in this same address, the President used language which might well be placed at the top of the stationery of our state department: "It is a very perilous thing to determine a foreign policy in terms of material interests. It is, indeed, a degrading thing."

The United States may well follow that rule, and it may properly use such friendly influence as it can exercise to "see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national comity," but it should be remembered that the American people neither hold any divine commission to right the wrongs of the world, nor are they so free from doubt and danger in their own internal affairs as to be able, wisely, to devote their budding energies and resources to galloping up and down the world's highways with glistening buckler and gleaming sword.

Not as a specific foreign policy, but in the realm of international ideas to be given our moral support, we might well class the theory of a present-day "balance of territory," to be established throughout the inhabited world. We have seen much of the "balance of power" in Europe. It has always seemed to me a most unstable thing, but a balance of territory would be but a recognition by the family of nations that sovereignty in a people should no more depend upon the extent of their military and naval resources than does the right of an individual, in any civilized community, to liberty and the protection of the laws depend upon his physical strength.

The greatest obstacle to the fixture of sovereignty and territorial limits as they exist today is a fatuous tendency towards over-centralization of political control. Trade, finance, increasing population in the older countries, the principle of the "white man's burden," all seem to whisper it. Some nations pursue this policy for a "place in the sun;" others have stopped at no pretext and have shrunk from no crimes, however shocking, to fling further afield their flag and sovereignty. Yet, in any truly permanent arrangement of the world's political units, all government must take serious heed of, if not indeed actually pause at, certain racial, climatic and geographical lines of natural demarcation. No government can successfully withstand the test of time and changing social conditions unless there is at least a potential homogeneity among its people. The limitations on empire-building are distinct and inexorable. At these natural barriers must cease the existing trend of powerful nations towards concentrating under their political aegis all the weaker states and peoples which may come within their grasp, whether the relationship may take the forms of colonies, dominions, protectorates, suzerainties or spheres of influence. Failure to recognize this fact will only prolong the political unrest of the world and take heavier toll of humanity in general.

Many will say that this is idealism. It may be so. But if the American people, in their dealings with other nations and races, cannot rise to this plane, shall they not at least hold it up as a standard, as a serene guiding-star of policy in moments of storm and crisis when the public mind is inflamed by the heat of controversy or the fires of racial passion?

Three general reasons occur to me for which one nation may ordinarily intervene in the affairs of another: first, in the protection

of the intervening nation's citizens or their property, if either are jeopardized; second, to stop a wanton shedding of blood; third, on the broad grounds of altruism, sometimes called a "duty to civilization," and, in the Orient, "the white man's burden."

As to the reasonable and disinterested exercise of the first prerogative, there can be no just complaint. The direct collection of international debts by force in the last resort will continue to be necessary until some international bailiff shall be created for this purpose. Any other system would but invite fraud on the part of administrations temporarily in power in any debtor nation. By common acceptance it is the right of a nation to protect its nationals from violence or injustice. In connection with this a very delicate question arises. It is the right of individuals to trade in most foreign countries. It is also the admitted policy of most nations to foster their trade with other countries by all legitimate means. But what are legitimate means? Is, for instance, the exaction of any form of trade or tariff concessions by political pressure on another government a legitimate act? If not, how far may a friendly government go in the endeavor to promote its foreign commerce, and widen the field for its bankers, manufacturers, engineers and contractors? There is no standard at present in such cases, and the decision must be left to the foreign offices of the governments involved.

As for the second reason for intervening in another nation's affairs—to stop wanton bloodshed—it is a highly dangerous policy. Suffice it to say that it should be indulged in only as an exercise of what may be termed the international police power, and then only when the leading nations of the world are agreed that no other course remains open.

The third reason—altruism—is one which has recently been advanced by the United States not only as a justification for forcible intervention in the affairs of a theretofore friendly power, but for retaining indefinitely under the American flag territory obtained by armed conquest or ceded by a treaty of peace. At what profit or loss this task has been performed is a reasonable subject of inquiry.

A constructive foreign policy must take notice of the fact that international politics are intimately connected with international finance. Theoretically, perhaps, this should not be so, but the relationship is even closer than in the case of domestic politics and finance. It may be possible for the United States government to hold itself

clear of any influence in its foreign relations by financial problems, but no one nation, however powerful, can suddenly change the conduct of all other nations. The foreign policy of the United States in this respect is therefore compelled to choose between following more or less settled lines of action and standing strictly alone, at whatever cost to its bankers and commerce generally. The latter course would be difficult. The former course may not be idealistic, but the chasm between idealism and finance still exists. On finance must fall the opprobrium and criticism engendered by the intense struggle of nations and individuals to amass wealth. International policies should not be shaped to mercenary ends, but unless a government shall coöperate with its international bankers, its efficiency and influence will be greatly reduced. Other nations, which follow a more material course, will make loans on profitable terms, and the American investors in foreign securities (never numerous and always timid) will be content with domestic securities and enterprises. Since the United States still has need of all its surplus money, no immediate harm will result, but profitable foreign investment fields are not opened up in a day, and our present policy should consider the future. Furthermore, a certain proportion of foreign securities held in any country is a steadying factor in times of local money disturbances.

A constructive foreign policy must determine a line of conduct for our government in the matter of encouraging the investment of American capital in undeveloped foreign nations. For our government to do nothing would be, in practice, equivalent to putting a veto on all such investments, since capital will not go as private loans to foreign governments unless there is some promise or guarantee from its own government that good offices will be extended in the case of default of payment or breach of faith. To ask American investors to make loans to any governments smaller or less stable than the leading nations of Europe except upon some such assurance of official support at home would only encourage purely speculative financing, and place responsible bankers under a handicap which would inevitably drive them from any competitive field. Thus, if a group of American capitalists were bidding against a European group for a loan to be issued by a Latin-American nation, the fact that our government would not guarantee to extend its good offices in case of necessity, whereas the governments of Europe would do so, would

effectually bar American capital from the field, even though there were not other inherent handicaps which render real competition with the European money markets along these lines practically impossible.

In conclusion, I desire to advert to a very live issue on which our government seems to have no very clearly defined policy. I refer to the Mexican situation. Many plans have been suggested, but of late some prominence has been given to the idea of what may be termed a "Pan-American intervention." I believe that any attempt at joint intervention in Mexico by several South American nations, acting with this country, would result most unfortunately. The plan is impracticable, and if attempted, would result in endless complications in the future. The mere broaching of it through any official channels would be sure to arouse in Europe further resentment against the policy and attitude of the United States. The exclusion of the leading nations of Europe from the intervention would deprive the effort of exactly that crushing moral force which the united action of the leading powers of the world can always bring to bear. The Mexican dictators and people would still feel that they were fighting only the American nation, nominally assisted by some small South American powers, which in all matters would have to be completely dominated by the United States.

Argentina, Brazil and Chile have been mentioned as proper participants with the United States in bringing about public order and restoring normal government in Mexico. Each of those countries has its own peculiar and difficult problems to solve. No one of them has any substantial political, commercial or financial interests in Mexico. Their participation in armed intervention in the latter country would, therefore, mean to the European powers which are materially and vitally interested in Mexico but another test of how far the Monroe Doctrine is to be tolerated. It might well be that just some such instance as this would be selected by those powers as the starting point for a coalition in defiance of that doctrine. England, France, Germany and Spain would have a strong case upon which to rest their challenge of our exclusive policy. Every precedent of international law would be with them. The lives and property of their nationals have been destroyed and are still jeopardized in Mexico. The United States would by its action be admitting the necessity for outside aid in restoring peace and order in Mexico, yet it would be

undertaking that task in a manner calculated to emphasize its suspicions of the good faith of leading European nations and thus increase the resentment which in certain quarters is already felt there.

It is illusory for the American people to seek to isolate the western hemisphere from the rest of the world. The whole tendency of the day is a closer relationship between all nations, races and peoples. This is the inevitable result of modern civilization, progress, world commerce and science. Any attempt to retrograde, to mark off and reserve continents for the exclusive political domination and commercial monopolization of any one nation, however powerful, cannot fail to evoke in other nations a feeling of resentment which will increase in exact ratio as the policy of isolation succeeds. Common sense, fair play and prudence all urge upon the American people a closer and more harmonious understanding with the leading European nations in the solution of the Mexican situation, and any suggestion having a contrary tendency is harmful, and even dangerous.

A PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY

By Edward W. Townsend,

Member of Congress from New Jersey.

After the first performance of Sardou's political satire "Rabagas" at the Vaudeville theatre in Paris in 1872, President Thiers ordered the governor of Paris to forbid a second performance.

I wish that after the first performance of Sardou's romantic drama "Dora" at Wallack's theatre in New York in April, 1878, where it was given its American name of "Diplomacy," that the then mayor of New York had ordered its immediate suppression. I am soberly convinced that if the police powers of New York had been exercised for the immediate suppression of that play, it would be less difficult now to discover the elements of a constructive American foreign policy.

If some of you wonder what I have said has to do with the subject upon which I have been asked to address you, I hasten to explain: not many weeks ago an artist friend of mine in New York who had found profitable occupation in drawing caricature illustrations of the tango, drew the figure of a young woman so distorted, that it was a caricature of his own caricatures. Acting upon a happy inspiration, he gave the drawing the title of the "Debutante Slouch" and thus it was reproduced in a popular illustrated weekly. Today a million young American women are trying to copy that illustration in their own walk and carriage and those who have an unusually supple backbone, and are highly gifted with the power of imitation, are succeeding, to the delighted surprise of observers.

You see at once now the quarrel I have with Victorien Sardou's play "Diplomacy."

Jerome A. Hart, in one of his entertaining books, gives us a lively and comprehensive account of the plays of Sardou, and speaking of a woman character in the play, he says this of her: "This young lady is a unique and fascinating person, beautiful, elegant, seductive as a fairy princess."

Dora, you may recall, was unconsciously enlisted into the group of women who, Sardou would have us suppose, exist in all the large

European capitals, and act as secret agents for diplomats. Mr. Hart gives testimony to his belief that such groups actually exist, and are not the creation of M. Sardou's lively imagination, and says of them: "These ladies wear gorgeous gowns, and resemble Solomon's lilies in the other respect that they toil not; but they excel at writing letters, which letters pay the cost of their gorgeous gowns. Their perfumed correspondence is filled with gossip, political and other, and it amuses foreign statesmen even when it does not instruct them."

I shudder as I pause to ask if Mr. Hart unconsciously suggests here one of the reasons why only the very rich may play "Diplomacy" for us in foreign capitals? But that is somewhat aside from my main purpose in introducing M. Sardou into this very respectable company. Sardou is not the only offender, but he came conveniently into my mind as a type. Other romance writers have entranced their readers by drawing, if I may be permitted to phrase it in this way, the "Debutante Slouch." The creators of this burlesque diplomacy have been amazed, as my artist friend was at the result of his work, to find their fanciful creations laboriously copied; to find that nature, in fact, imitates art. Sardou and his fellow offenders have created a picture of diplomacy wherein we see lovely and mysterious women gorgeously gowned seducing from incautious diplomats, secrets for the information of other diplomats; a picture of subtle intrigue, of masterful intellect gaining advantage by processes allied to wizardry; of vast and complicated affairs determined at secret meetings, the result of which at times is announced by the sudden boom of artillery, the thundering charge of cavalry. This is the romance picture of diplomacy which excites the ambition of excellent heads of families to desert their homes and their comfortable clubs, and their golf links, to enter upon this delightful occupation, thinking to become "Baron Steins," to commune with bevies of "Doras," to control the destinies of nations, to impart to startled secretaries of state code messages carrying delightful information derived from scented correspondence. That is why M. Sardou's play and like output from other romance, lie under the disadvantage of my severe disapprobation.

To be sure there is a somewhat more real though scarcely more admirable attraction to the very wealthy in the prospect of representing our country in foreign courts. They will have there opportunity to dine with nobility, even at times with royalty, they will be seen

at the shooting boxes of dukes, at the race course with earls, at the clubs with baronets and on the streets with men of fashion.

In nothing which I have said do I intend to indicate disapproval of the custom practised by many administrations, of more than one political faith, of making appointments to the large places in the diplomatic service of rich men, because they are rich men. I am willing to admit that almost any rich man who made his own money, if he obey instruction such as I shall presently indicate, would be as capable as one less favored by fortune of carrying on, as a diplomat, the business of our foreign relations; but it distresses me greatly that this air of romance, of unreality, should have enveloped this very practical business.

There should be no illusion about it, and the incentive to engage in the business should be only a desire to do a public service in a very straightforward and simple manner. I do not mean that there are not certain qualifications for the office not usually possessed by men who have been industriously engaged accumulating a fortune, but I have a scheme to overcome the difficulty arising from that lack of special knowledge. There is, for instance, the great difficulty of knowing exactly how to address members of the diplomatic corps. In my own three years' experience on the foreign affairs committee of the House of Representatives, I have had the customary opportunities offered to the members of that committee, of meeting not infrequently, members of the diplomatic corps in Washington and the ladies of their households. I have found the men very human beings, interested deeply in trap shooting, golf, baseball, the price of beef and the difficulty of securing a lower berth. The ladies are all of them charming and affable. But I began to enjoy this highly enviable opportunity too late in life successfully to school myself in one of these special qualifications I have referred to; I do not know today, and sadly confess that I never expect to know, what rank in diplomacy entitles a man to be addressed as "Your Highness," and what rank as "Your Excellency." Unlimited study gives one a certain steadiness of voice in the matter of addressing by the more familiar titles, that is, those of nobility with which an early reading of Bulwer familiarizes one.

There is another difficulty of a more serious nature, concerning this special requirement that I have spoken of, one that somewhat handicaps our system of appointment as it is practised at present, but which

under my improvement will be also happily overcome. It is the matter of speechmaking by our diplomats. For this embarrassing problem I have a happy solution. When a representative in Congress finds in his morning's mail, 20 letters asking for precisely the same information, the congressman does not dictate 20 different forms of reply, but indicates a form already in use, or, if the matter is new, dictates a form to cover the whole 20 requests. This system could readily be applied in the matter of diplomatic speeches. One appointed to be ambassador to the Court of St. James, let us say, going to Washington to receive his instructions, could be supplied with a set of forms; form A to be used at the dedication of a new monument to Robert Burns; form B to be used if the admirers of Wordsworth are to unveil a bust of their favorite poet; form C the opening of a new Anglo-American Club in London. It is unnecessary further to unfold this scheme. It readily unfolds itself to any practical mind. To be sure the unexpected is always happening. But even in such an event I would have the situation handled with caution and according to instructions received by the diplomat. If, for instance, a society is placing a tablet in honor of George Bernard Shaw, and should invite our diplomat to submit a few remarks upon that interesting occasion, and his index failed to disclose an appointed form, the appropriation allowed him by my committee for incidental expenses would enable him to cable news of the exciting event to the secretary of state, and receive an approved speech by cable in ample time for its delivery.

To deviate a moment from the sober and orderly course of my remarks, what, I ask, could be more solemnly whimsical than an expression of the opinion of the present secretary of state, on the life and writings of George Bernard Shaw? Unless, indeed it might be a whimsically solemn review by Mr. Shaw of the diplomatic excellencies of the present secretary of state of the United States.

Now to my panacea: there are in the department of state in Washington, a score, probably many more than that number, of men who have received years of training there. They are linguists and highly skilled in the details, the precedents and the history of our foreign relations—the kind of men foreign nations appoint to diplomatic posts—but incapable of making large campaign contributions; these are without prospect of being sent by us to occupy diplomatic posts at important capitals. We should provide a new position in each American embassy; that of assistant ambassador, and to these places

should be appointed men such as I have described, and thus by the presence of such a man at each embassy, the ambassador will be given freedom solely to enjoy social delights, except upon such occasions when he might be required to deliver an address relating to form A, B or C, which form would be deftly selected for him and filled in where blank spaces as to the name and occupation of the person whose memory was to be celebrated, required. This assistant diplomat could perform the simple duties of the office, such as conveying to the government to which his chief was accredited the information his own government wished to be conveyed, and receive from that government the information it wished to convey to Washington, and diligently devote the rest of his time to discovering means of increasing our foreign commerce. Having been trained in his business, this assistant ambassador would know what he was in a foreign capital for, he would be under no illusions as to "Doras," he would know that there was no hocus-pocus, no sharp card tricks, no foolery whatever of any kind about this business of maintaining proper and profitable foreign relations between the countries whence he came, and to which his superior officer was accredited. He would know that M. Sardou was just as much a joker as is Mr. Ibsen, and that the play of "Diplomacy" is no more like the thing diplomacy than "A Doll's House" is like anything that really ever existed.

If these thoughtful remarks have not indicated to you precisely what in my opinion should constitute the elements of a constructive American foreign policy, they have been made in vain. From the time when, in March, 1776, the Continental Congress named Silas Deane as its diplomatic agent to France until this year of grace 1914, the end and aim of our foreign relations have been to extend our commerce. I do not say that this aim has been held true at all times, but I lay it down as a general proposition, that friendly relations being assumed, there is little else involved in foreign relations and certainly nothing else comparable in importance, to the business of extending the commerce of this country.

The importance of our commerce, in every consideration of our foreign policy, even in the earliest times when that policy was being developed, is suggested by Professor Moore, whose absence from the state department at this moment I deeply regret. In his *One Hundred Years of American Diplomacy*, he speaks of the 14 treaties entered into between the United States and the European nations early in our

national life, and refers to their wide range of subjects, among them commercial intercourse, and in one instance the agreement that "If difference should arise in consequence of our infraction of the treaties, no appeal shall be made to arms till a friendly arrangement shall have been proposed and rejected." Our author comments: "These clauses were far in advance of the international law of the time. They represent an aspiration; but, if intended as a prophecy, they yet remain for the most part unverified and unfulfilled, though they are by no means discredited."

I know that statistics make dull matter for an address, but I can not refrain from using a few figures to emphasize my contention that our foreign policy should be more largely directed to securing foreign commerce.

The total Latin-American foreign commerce for the year 1912 was twenty-eight hundred million dollars, of which our share was eight hundred millions, with a balance against us, however, of two hundred millions,—a fair percentage of commerce for us, although the balance against us remains a serious drain. The figures for the A B C group, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, are far from satisfactory, a fact due in part, certainly, to our lack of a constructive policy toward the A B C group, which, if adopted, would result in a much better trade showing. The total foreign commerce for Brazil, for 1912, was six hundred and seventy million dollars, of which our share was one hundred and ninety millions, with a balance against us of fifty-three millions. Great Britain had a balance in her favor of thirty-four millions in her share of Brazil's commerce for the same year. Only one more illustration by statistics: Chile's total commerce for 1912 was two hundred and sixty-one millions, of which our share was forty-one millions, with a balance against us of eight millions.

In those three great countries, of trade potentialities beyond computation, we have an embassy in Brazil only. There are bills pending to raise Argentina's legation to an embassy, but the administration has not yet made a recommendation that we should pay a similar deserved compliment to Chile, although peculiar reasons exist why Chile should be so complimented. It seems to me that our state department should adopt as a policy toward the A B C group an attitude of special cordiality, which should have as its most significant expression our friendly recognition of the great importance those powers have achieved in the family of nations; of our sincere pleasure in

their splendid civilization, their high advancement in art, letters and science. They should be made to know and feel that they are to share with us the responsibilities, the burdens and privileges of western hemisphere guardianship. Our exchange of commerce, of friendly intercourse through travel is startlingly short of what it should be; and for a remedy we must look to a foreign policy giving greater and well deserved recognition to those three great and splendid nations.

Commerce promotes peace as surely as peace promotes commerce. But what I shall say upon this subject now is upon the assumption that we shall remain at peace with the great nations of the earth, through the simple expedient of minding our own business and making the great part of that business the securing of foreign trade as a means of extending our domestic industries. Granting me that assumption, I now reveal what most profoundly lies in my mind on this subject. It seems to me that no student of our present economic and social conditions, even one giving but casual study to those subjects, can fail to see the vital necessity of providing more employment at more wages if we wish our country good health. There are symptoms plain to the senses, that a distemper threatens our social body. Some once looked about and denied that such symptoms were visible. Today only the fool will make such denial. More employment and better wages must be provided if we would have the threatening symptoms disappear—the fever subside. As an essential means for bringing about such subsidence there must come, as speedily as may be, a vast increase in our foreign commerce, a vast increaseof foreign consumption of our manufactures. The radicalism, so plainly discerned in groups of all the three parties contending for the political control of the government, is born of a perception of this need. It seems at times as if this radical energy was misdirected to attain the desired big end. We cannot, solely by legislation, increase employment, increase wages or decrease the hours of labor, yet this is being constantly attempted. Manufacturers will not produce more than they can profitably sell, they cannot give more than a certain share of their product in wages, or else they starve themselves. The radicals see the symptoms and, in part at least, attempt their cure. Under-employment and under-pay are not caused by the symptoms of idleness and unfair conditions of living. Yet we see the attempt persisted in to cure those things by legislation, which in no degree whatever can, nor does it even seek to increase the demand for labor-

ers and increase the share of the product which capital can give to labor. The remedy it seems clear to me is expansion of our foreign trade, a great increase of foreign use or consumption of our productions; and that I would have brought about largely by the work of our diplomats in carrying out our foreign policy.

Probably the men attracted from idle lives at home by the fascination of a Sardou picture of "Diplomacy," would be of but small aid in furthering a policy which seeks to better domestic conditions by increasing our foreign trade. If it has become a political necessity that such men should hold such offices, then the remedy I suggested, half in jest a moment ago, might be seriously considered. Let us, if it seems expedient that we should do so, treat the office of ambassador as purely ornamental, an offering to one whose gifts to party entitle him to a reward. But let us reform our embassies by placing in each of them a practical man, trained in intercourse with foreigners, trained to know which of our productions the country he is accredited to might use or consume, trained to know that diplomacy is not a romance but a business, and perhaps in that way we may supply at least the elements of a constructive American foreign policy.

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